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PREFACE.

THE Translator, having accomplished his very interesting, though laborious, task of rendering into
English the ma,nuscripts of General Ferrier, is anxious
to avail himself of this opportunity to congratulate that
officer on having added these instructive volumes
to the Eastern literature of this country. They can
be more thoroughly appreciated here than in France ;
and that they must prove of real value in England is
evident when we consider how great are the interests
involved in the development-commercial, social, and
religious-of
that vast continent which Providence
has permitted to fall under our rule.
As an old soldier also, the TranslatorAwishesto mark
his sense of the frank and generous manner in which
General Ferrier has spoken of the arduous services of
the Anglo-Tndian army in Afghanistan ; more especially
as at the period at which he gave expression to these
entente between his own nation
sentiments-1845-the
and England was by no means so cordial as happily
it is now. The Author's criticisms, when unfavonrable, are generally well-founded ; and though, no
doubt, inaccuracies are to be met with' in some portions of the ' History of the Afghans,' it is evident
that they proceed from defective information, and
not from any ignoble desire to write disparagingly
of the British Empire or our gallant soldiers. As
to his comments on the Indian policy of this country,
or the manner in which that policy has been carried
out, the Translator cannot, agreeing as he does with
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the greater number of them, feel a t all surprised
a t their severity; indeed, he considers that we ought
to accept these comments with gratitude, inasmuch
as they present to us a more unprejudiced viem of the
subject than me have yet seen.
A t a very early period French travellers greatly
distinguished themselves in the East, and the names of
Tavernier, Bernier, and Thevenot justify the assertion ;
but the travels of General Ferrier are even of a more
interesting character than those of these pioneers
in Asiatic adventure ; moreover, his sufferings were
great while wending his weary way over the deserts
of Central Asia, in some districts where European foot
had never before left its imprint on the burning sands.
The cruelty and hardships he then endured entitle him
to the commiseration of every feeling mind, and the
industry and perseverance that enabled him t o collect
and to preserve the materials for his History and
Travels, under circumstances so adverse, are worthy
of all admiration.
Important also are the opinions of one who is capable
of giving us much sound advice, and critically examining the conduct of Great Britain, in connection with
the countries which join her Indian frontiers on the
north and north-west. Our information regarding
these countries, their inhabitants, and their policy,
has hitherto come almost exclusively from officers or
civilians in the East India Company's service ; it is
profitable to see the same subjects treated by a
foreigner and from another point of view, for reasons
which must be apparent to many.
General Ferrier has pointed out, in his chapter on
the invasion of India, in ' Caravan Journeys,' the
probability of the Sepoys joining the Russian army,
and the princes and rajahs throwing off their alle-
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giance ; opinions which, no doubt, elicited expressions
of indignation from many of his readers, especially
those who were the servants of the East India Company-but
how fearfully has his estimate of native
fidelity been justified since the publication of that
volume !
The reader mill do well to consult the highly
interesting notes and appendices of Sir H. Rawlinson,
Sir John Login, and Ms. Danby Seymour, in ' Caravan
Journeys,' as they elucidate many points in the History
of the Afghans.
The style of the author is rather severe, and there
are several portions of the present work in which there
was an opening for much touching writing and for
appeals to the highest and best feelings of our nature ;
even a few words only here and there would have
considerably increased the interest of the subject, but
the translator did not consider himself at liberty to
do otherwise than adhere strictly to the text. When
there was a duplication of thought, or want of arrangement, he has endeavoured to remedy these defects;
but otherwise the reader is in possession of General
Ferrier's work in its integrity.
WILLIAMJESSE.
~ a i s & e t t e , Ingatestone, MmeA 27, 1858.
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THEorigin of the Afghans, which is involved in obscurity, has
given rise to a variety of opinions, and it is not easy to adopt
any one in particular. Some pretend that they are descended from
the soldiers of Alexander the Great, whom he left in these c o ~ t r i e s
after he had conquered them ; and from some Greek colonists who,
under the kings that succeeded that emperor, subsequently joined
these descendants of his victorious legions. Others affirm that the
Copts of Egypt, the Chaldaeans, and even the Armenians, were
their ancestors ; but the majority of Eastern writers consider them
to be the descendants of one of the ten tribes of Israel-and this
is the opinion of the Afghans themselves. ina ally, a few authors
assure us that this nation is not of Jewish origin, but that those
who introduced the Mahornetan religion amongst them were converted Jews.
. The following is taken from the work of that celebrated orientalist, M. Ruffin : " T h e Afghans," he says, "had their origin
from the Albanians of Asia, who, in consequence of their numerous
revolts, were transported from one extremity of Persia to the other,
and driven into Khorassan ; they were a very warlike peoplej
\
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kilown under the name of Aglhvan or Av9han, and made themselves famous in the history of Persia. Their Albanian origin is
evident by the name itself, for agran is the Greelr word HA'AB."
This opiuion, which has been contradicted by several authors,
merits nevertheless some attention, because it is in accordance with
the custom which tlie Persian monarchs are supposed to have followed, viz, that of removing from the shores of the Mediterranean
or the Black Sea any population that gave them the least uneasiness or apprehension ; also that of bestowing upon the Greeks, a
considerable number of whom were a t all times in the Persian
armies, a certain portion of territory, where they were allowed to
establish themselves, as a reward for their services. T h e historians
of Alexander have made us acquainted with one of these colonies,
anfl we learn from them that, when that monarch advanced into
Bactria in pursuit of Bessus, he destroyed the town of the Brances,
the inhabitants of which, descended from Milesim Greeks, he put
to death, as a punishment for a crime committed by their ancestors
-a most cruel and unjust act.
The opinion of M. Xuffin is in opposition to that of another
oriental scholar, M. Eugbne Bore', who, in his Letters on the East,
thus explains himself on the subject of these Albanians :L C The Aghovans," he remarks,
" were an ancient and distinct
people, first brought to our notice by Pompey a t the time of his
expedition into the Caucasus. The Greeks and Latins, by an inaccurate transcript,ion of their name, called them Albanians; they
inhabited the high mountains and the valleys bordering on the
Caspian Sea, which now form the provinces of Daghestan and
Shirvan. The Armenians were never able to subjugate this brave
people, who were governed by feudal laws similar to those which
existed in Europe during the middle ages.; they were Christians
before they adopted the faith of Mahornet, and it is known that
they preserved their liberty up to the period of the arrival of
Bouzan, general of the Sultan Seljoolride PllIalels Shah. The Iangoage of this nation differed entirely from that of the Armenians.
.
I n short, we may say that the people mentioned by the
Greelr authors under the denomination of Albanians cannot, on
account of their peculiar language, be considered as of Chaldzan
origin-an opinion which is in direct contradiction to that of their
historian, Moses Galganderasti, who lived about the ninth century
of the Christian .era, and who, with Moses of Chorenus, affirms -
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that they are descended f?om Sisag, of the ~ r m e i i a nrace. We'
hope to clear up this point after having collected from the mountainous district in which these pretended sons of the Aghovans
lived, the remains of the language they speak. I t 3s with less
reason still that some of the learned, led astray by a similarity of
words, have confounded the Aghovans with the Afghans, feudal
tribes dispersed over the south of Persia, and who, more than any
other, recall to our minds the ancient Parthians. T h e language .
of the Afghans is analogous to that of the primitive Persian, and,
in the opinion of Sir TVilliam Jones, they are neither of Jewish
nor Chaldaan extraction. The supposition that they were identified
with the Aghovaus, once formed, has led to the conclusion that
they were the descendants of Jews, because the province of I<ir, t o
which the Assyrians transported the captive tribes of Israel, appeared to commentators to be the country watered by the Kour,
the Cyrus of the Greeks."
Some persons have with reason affirmed that Tamerlane, exasperated a t the depredations committed by the people inhabiting
Mazanderan, south of the Caspian, transported the whole of them
into the mountains situated between India and Persia. But they
erred in supposing that. from this population are descended the
Afghans of our own day, for the posterity of the unfortunate people
who were removed to these mountains by the Tartar conqueror form
at the present time a small tribe of E'imaks, known under the appellation of Firooz Kohis, after the city of that name (situated about
siity-three miles from Teheran), ml!ere they were defeated and taken
captive by Tamerlane : this tribe now inhabit the country between
Herat and Meimana. Besides, the Tartar warrior and legislator
mentions the Afghans, in his Institutes, as a nation which had for
many years inhabited the Suleiman mountains, and was much
given to pillage.
The Afghan authors who admit the Jewish origin of their nation
thus account for the removal of their ancestors to Central Asia :
some declare that Afghans, who gave his name to the Afghans,
was lineally descended from Abraham and Hagar by Ishmael ;
ohers &rm that he was the grandson of Saul ; and dl think that
Bakht ul Nasser * must have sent some Jewish prisoners into the
mountains of Gour. These prisoners would soon have considerably
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increased ; and though far from their mother-country, without do~ibt
they would have preserved their faith, which was kept alive by
the periodical reception of letters from their countrymen who, more
fortunate than themselves, had returned to the Holy Land. Matters
remained in this state until Mahomet announced himself as the
messenger of God. A Jew, by name Khaled, whom he converted,
wrote at this time to his brethren in Gour to give notice of this
happy event, and induce them to embrace the new faith ; but they,
before adopting Islamism, sent several of their chiefs to the Prophet.
Amongst these was Keys, who pretended to be descended in a
direct line from Saul through forty-seven generations, and Abraham
through sixty-five. Mahomet loaded him and his companions with
favours, and gave him the title of Malelr* Abd-ul-reshid, a rank
to whicl~he was entitled as the descendant of the Jewish king.
These Afghan ambassadors, now Mussulmans, accompanied Mahornet in several of his wars, and distinguished themselves by many
remarkable deeds of vdour ; nevertheless, with the sanction of the
Prophet, and after having received his benediction, they returned
to their own homes, accompanied by a few Arabs, and with their
assistance succeeded, in the space of forty years, in completely converting their countrymen to Islan~ism.
Some authors affirm that Afghana was the son of Rhaled ; others
say he was contemporary with Solomon, and assert that he was one
of the principal officers of that monarch.
These different versions,, which do not rest upon any sufficient
proof, are very difficult to admit ; the Afghans, however, thinlc
that they have evidence of their Jewish origin in the following tradition. When Nadir Shah, marching to the conquest of India,
arrived at Peshawur, the chiefs of the tribe of the Yoosoofzyes presented him with a Bible mitten in Hebrew, and several articles
that had been used in their ancient worship which they had preserved; these articles were a t once recognised by the Jews who
followed the camp. This fact, supposing it to be one, if affording
evidence sufficiently convincing to some persons, can only be considered as authority with respect to the Yoosoofzyes; but it does
not follow, therefore, that other Afghan tribes are branches from
the same stem ; on the contrary, everything leads to the conclusion
that, although they all speak a common language, the Pushtoo,.
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the tribes are not all of the same origin,--they are distinguished by
marked characteristics, moral as well as physical. The Afghans
of Kabul consider themselves as Indian Afghans, whereas those
of Herat say they are Khorassani Afghans ; one tribe repudiates
another, and denies its Afghan origin, and there is not the least
sympathy betwcen them. W e may believe that, being enemies
in bygone ages, their union, such a s it was, progressed only by
degrees, with a view of delivering themselves from slavery, and
repulsing the common enemy. The names of Patan, Rohilla,
Afghan, which serve at the present time to designate the Afghan
nation, are really those of so many distinct races now confbunded
in one. If we could admit, as they do, their Jewish origin, we
must also suppose that they would, on the spot to which they were
transferred, have developed all the characteristics of an enslaved
people, humble and degenerate ; but such is not the case, for we
find the Afghans from the very &st, that is to say from the reign
of Sebek-Taghee, courageous, and animated by a love of independence-always warlike and energetic, retiring to their mountain fastnesses to escape from tyranny, and leaving them whenever
the smallest hope presented itself of seizing lands which they considered they had any right to-it is only a primitive race who
could have remained so strongly attached to the soil.
No one has thought of the aboriginal people, nevertheless they
must not be lost sight of, for, according to Quintus Curtius and
Arrian, the Arians, Arrachosians, and others, were both numerous
and brave. The conquests of Alexander did not lead to their extermination ; and it is very natural to suppose that their race has
descended to the present day through intermarriages, though in small
proportions, with the Greeks who remained amongst them, and afterwards with the Tartar and Persian conquerors who invaded them.
Uowever, under all circumstances, there is little affinity between
them and these two nations ; it is not thus with the Beioochees, with
whom they have many points of resemblance, moral as well as
physical. I n spite of the foreign domination which has weighed
upon the Afghans for so many generations, we ought to believe
them when they state that their race has never mixed with any
other, for in our day they make no alliances except amon,@
themselves ; and the Afghan who should give his daughter in marriage to a stranger would clishonour himself; this, however, is rt
remark which in a strict sense applies only to those tribes that

'
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inhabit Afghanistan properly so called, for those disseminated
through India connect themselves ~ i t h o u tdistinction with all
B'ahomedan nations.
The natives of India have known t,he Afghans for centuries under
the name of Pataus and Rohillas," a designation which they now
apply to them ; they also call them Pushtoonees, from the language
they still speak; and it is not till the reign of the Sultan Abouseid, of the race of Ghengis Khan, that certain Eastern writers
speak of them under the name of Afghan, which is only the plural
of the Arab mord fe&m t This was applied to them because
they were almys in a disunited state amongst themselves, and
continually addressing their complaints to the sovereigns on whom
they were dependent ; nevertheless the name was but little used
till the reign of Shah Abbas the Great, who, tired with their incessant lamentations, ordered them henceforward to be called by
that designation only.
There are almost as many classifications of the Afghan tribes
as there are Eastern a~~thors
who have written on the subject ; not
only are they not agreed, but they have called each other very hard
names to prove their accuracy. Being incompetent to decide
which is right, we shall adopt the opinion of Abdullah Khan of
Herat as the one most deserving of credit, and we will precede it
by giving his view of the manner in which the Afghans were
brought to Afghanistan. The following is a translation of his
manuscript :" T h e word Afyhan is derived from the Arab, that of aoughan
from the Persian, and both one and the other are used in Hebrew.
" Malek Thalut (Saul) king of the Jews had two sons, Afghan
and Djalut-the first was the father of the Afghan nation and gave
his name to it. After the reigns of David and Solomon, who succeeded Saul, anarchy divided the Jewish tribes, and this continued
to the period at which Bouktun Nasr $ took Jerusalem, massacred
70,000 Jews, and after destroying that city led the surviving
inhabitants captives to Babylon. Subsequently to this disaster the Afghan tribe, struck with terror, fled from Judea and settled in
Arabia : here they remained some considerable time, but as pasturage and water were scarce, and both man and beast suffered
extreme privation, some of the tribe determined to emigrate to

* Boh in Pnshtoo signifies mountain,
and Bohilh au i u h a b h n t of rnountaillx.
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I-Iindostan. The branch of the Abdalees continued to reside in
Arabia, and during the caliphat of Aboo Bekr their chiefs allied
themselves to a powerful sheikh, by name Khalecl ibn Velid, of the
tribe of Korech. The position and condition of the Abdalees was
sensibly ameliorated in consequence of the assistance which they
obtained from Khaled, but a t the period when the Arabs subjugated Fersia the Abdalees left Arabia and settled in this new conquest, establishing themselves in the provinces of Fars and Kerman,
and here they remained until Ghengis Khan invaded those districts.
The tyrannical proceedings of this conqueror weighed with such
terrible effect on the population, that the Abdalees q~cttedPersia
and, passing by the Melrrane, Scinde, and Mooltan, arrived in
India; but the results of this new migration were not more fortunate, for they were scarcely settled here when their neighbours
made war upon, and forced them to leave the n la ins and inhabit
the rugged mountains of Suleirnan, considered as the cradle of
the tribe, and called by them Kooh-I<hasseh.* The whole Afghan
nation was brought together by the arrival of the Abdalees in
the Suleiman mountains, and then consisted of twenty-four tribes,
of which, as it has been already observed, Afghan, the son of
Saul, was the father : this prince had three sons, named TseraBend, Argoutch, and Rerlen, and each of them was the father of
eight sons, who gave their names to the twenty-four tribes.
" The following is the manner in which they are classed :"Sons of Tsera-Bend.
Abdal
Yoosoof
Baboor
Wedr
Lohooan .. :.
Beritch
Rhoognian
Chiran

Names of tlie Tribes.

. . . . . . .. Abdalees.
.... .. Yoosoofzyes.

. . . . . . . . Baboorees.
. . . . . . .. Wezireea.
.. Lohooanees.
. . . . . . Beritchee~.
.. .. IChooguianees.
...... .. Chiiaueea.

"Sona of Kerlen.
Khattak
Soor
Afreed
Toor

Names of the Tribes.

. . . . .. Khattakees.
. . . . . . .. Soorees.
. . . . . . .. Afreedees.
...... .. Toorees.

* Aden and the surrounding country
is .at the present time inhabited by an
Arab tribe, which, as well as the principal Afghan tribe, is known by the
name of Abdalee. Are we to conclude
that t,hey have one and the same origin,

Sons of Argoutch.

Nnmea of the Tribes.

.... .. Ghildjzyes.

Ghildj
Kauker . , ,
Djumourian ..
Storian
Pen . . . . . .
Knss
Takm
Naasar

. .. Eaukerees.
.. Djumourianees.
.... .. Storianees.
.. Penees.
. . . . . . .. Kaasees.
.... ...Takanees.
. . . . .. Nassarees.

Sons of Kerlen.

Nnmes of the Tribes.

. . . . . . .. Zazees.
. . . . . . .. Babees.

Zaz
Bab
Benguech . . . .
Lendeh-poor ..

.. Benguechees.
.. Lendeh-poorees.

as an Afghan author hns stated ? I do
not think we should: a similarity of
name and the alliance of the Afghan
Abdalees with the Arab tribe of Korech
are not fiufficientproofs in the affirmutive.-Ferrier.
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" The greater number of these tribes were scattered over India; but
there, instead of increasing, they so diminished that scarcely a trace
of any of them is to be found in.tllese days. The only exception
to this remrtrk is the tribe of Yoosoofzyes settled in Cashmeer.
Naclir Shah, desirous of ascertaining- their numbers, issued a decree that each family should bring a spear to his camp, and when
these were counted they were found to amount to 600,000: at
the present time there would not be half that number. This tribe
has for more than thirty years been under the dominion of the
Sikhs. Afghanistan, properly so called, is inhabited almost exclusively by Abdalees and Ghildjz~es,and of these we shall speak
more especially. The first, although inhabiting every part of
Afghanistan, are principally resident in Herat and Kandahar;
the Ghildjzyes are established in t-he last-mentioned principality
and Kabul ; the I<aulterees near the Bolan Pass ; the Baboorees,
Nassarees, Lohooanees, and Babees, in Kanclahar and Scinde, where
they are profitably occupied in conimerc.ia1pursuits ; the Beritchees
are in the neighbourhood of Pisheen ; the Chiranees and the Mohmuncls to the north-east of Kabul ;the Benguechees (Shiahs) between
the last-mentioned town and the country of the Hazarahs,-these
are divided into four branches, viz. the Bede-ltheelee, Chaloozanee,
Djajee, and Bertedjee ; finally, the Chiranees are to be found everywhere, though in small numbers : the remaining tribes are in India,
or have become extinct.
" Having only to consider Afghanistan Proper, I will now give
more detailed information respecting the Abdalees and the
Ghildjzyes, which form the bulk of the population of this country ;
and as the offshoots in which they are subdivided are tolerably
numerous, it will be useful to give here a tabular statement, which
I have endeavoured to render as accurate as possible.
"The powerful tribe of the Abdalees is known at the present
time under the name of Dooranee, which was given to them by
Ahmed Shah Suddozye on the occasion of his ascending the throne
in 1747. When Nadir Shah ordered a census to be made of the
Abdalee tribe, there were 195,000 families, and from these he
raised 12,000 excellent cavalry ; but the Abdalees have decreased
in number since Nadir's time.
" Abdal, the son of Tsera-Bend, the founder of this tribe, had only
one son, named Teryn, who had two sons, Zirek and Pindjpa :
from the first originated three tribes, slid from the second five.
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The tribes that descended from Zirek are,more generally known under the name of
Popolzye, divided into five branches, namely,-lst, the Hussenzalee ;
2nd, Badoozye ; 3rd, Kalenderzye ; 4th, Ayoobzye ; 5th, Suddozye.
The legitimate sovereigns who have reigned over the Afghans
during the 17th and 18th centuries were of the branch of the
Suddozyes. The tribe of the Koofelzyes numbered 20,000
families.
'&2nd.Barulcyze. This was in very ancient times one of the
most distinguished offshoots of the Abdalees; i t is divided into six
branches-lst, the Mohamedzye ; 2nd, Kharzye ; 3rd, Sefretzye ;
4th, Inguizye ; 5th, Gurjizye ; Gth, Etchelaye. The actual
sovereigns of Kandahar and Kabul are of the branch of Mohamedzye. The Bamkzyes numbered 40,000 families.
" 3rd. Alikiouzye, which is divided into three branches-lst, the
Djaloozye, to which belonged the chiefs of the Alikiouzye tribe ;
21-14 Melazye ; 3rd, Serlcanee. Yar Mohamed Khan, of Herat, is
of this tribe and the Djaloozye branch. The Alikiouzyes number
20,000 families.
" The tribes descended from Pindjpa are" 1st. Isalrzye, numbering 10,000 families and divided into four
branches, viz., lst, Ahmedzye ; 211d, Avazye ; 3rd, RI erdinzye ;
4th, Biroozye.
" 2nd. Alizye, numbering 10,000 families and divided into three
branches-lst, Hassanzalec, to which the chiefs of the Alizye tribe
belong ; 2nd, Alelczye ; 3rd, Guerazye.
" 3rd. Noorzye, numbering 30,000 families and divided into three
branches-lst, Tchalalczye ; 21-14 Bahaderzye ; 3rd, Derzakee.
" 4th. Khaouganee, numbering 6000 families and divided into
two branches-lst, Khaouganee Kelan ; 2nd, Khaouganee I<itchik.
" 5th. Makoohee, numbering 10,000 families and divided into
three branches-lst, Bedelzye ; 2nd, Firoozye ; 3rd, Sebzalee.
"The tribe of the Ghildjzyes, from which sprung Mir Weis, Mir
Mahmood his son, and Mir Echreff his nephew, had-Ghildj, the
son of Argoutch, for its founder. Ghildj had two sons, Ibrahim
and Thooran, from whom sprung the six tribes that follow, viz.,
lst, Suleiman-Kheilee ; 2nd, Outekee ; 3rd, Tookhee-from this
came the branch of the Loods, which gave India its sovereigns;
4th, Rhaleelee; 5th, Toorkee ; 6th, Euderee. The three first
descended from Ibrahim, and the three last from Thooran.
"
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A TABLE
of the TRIBEof the ABD~LEES.

---

Zirek

Pnpolzye

..

Barultzye

..

Alikiouzye

..

..

Abdnl and
his son Teryn
founders of
the Tribe.

Pindjpa

Branches.

Tribes.
--

Stock.
---

Founders.

..

Iaakzye

.. ..

Alizye

.. .,

Noorzye

.

Khao nganee
Makoohee

.

3ucldozye.
Bussenxalee.
Badoozye.
Kalenderzye.
kyoobzye.
hlohamedzye.
Kharzye.
Sefretzye.
Inguizye.
Gurjizye.
Etchekzye.
Djaloozye.
Melazgn.
Serkanee.
Ahmedzye.
Avszge.
Merdinzye.
Biroozye.
Hassanzalee.
Alekzye.
Cuerazye.
Tchalakzye.
Bahaderzye.
Derzakee.
Khaouganee Xelan.
Khaouganee ICitchik.
Bedelzye.
Firoosye.
Sebzalee.

TRIBEof the GHILDJZYB.

-

I

Ibrahim..

..

Thoorsn

..

I

Suleiman-Kheilee,
Outekee.
Tookhee.
Khaleelee.
Toorkee.
Enderee."

The primitive tribe of the Afghans was called taijeh, a word
which corresponds with that of nation : the first divisions of this
primitive tribe are called ferguefi, tribe ; the subdivisions of this,
tirehs or branches. Thus the families which are descended from
the first generation-Tsera-Bend, Argoutch, and Kerlen-as the
Abdalees, the Ghilcljzyes, the Kaukerees, form the Taw,nation ;
those which descend from these last, such as. the Popolzyes, Barulrzyes, Ibrahim, Thooran, &c., are called Fergueh, tribes; and the subdivisions of these (see the above tablej are called the Tireh, branches.
The Abdalees and Ghildjzyes, by reason of their numerical
superiority over the others, and also from the power they have
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exercised, and continue to exercise, in Afghanistan a t the present
day, have arrogated to themselves a certain kind of supremacy
over the other tribes, and consider themselves of an origin more
noble than theirs : they even refuse to acknowledge their right to
the title of Afghan. I t is more especially the Abdalee tribe that
has put forth, and in the most positive manner, this pretension.
Not only do they refuse the title of Afghans-and this even to the
Ghildjzyes-but
also there is a schism on the subject amongst
themselves, and the Zireks affirm that they are of a more noble
extraction than the Pindjpas. This scornful assumption has often
given rise to sanguinary couflicts between them, and is based upon
the fact that the mother of Abdal was a legitimate wife, whereas
the mother of Ghildj was a concubine, which is, they say, proved by
the name which was given him, for Ghildj in Pushtoo signifies
bastard.
On the other hand, the tribes of nTakoohee and Rhaouganee,
though of Afghan origin, were not a t the outset of the Abdalee
tribe, but, by reason of the perfect friendship which always existed
'between them, the ,Abdalees adopted them and classed them
amongst the Pindjpas, and they have ever since been considered
as belonging to that family. After the death of Nadir Shah an
occurrence took place which will give some idea of the importance
the Afghans attach to their belonging to the most noble tribe.
Ahmed Shah had scarcely founded the dynasty of the Suddozyes
when it was nearly overthrown by an intrigue fomented against
him by the Serdar Noor Dlohamed Khan. Obliged to employ
severe measures to repress the evil-disposed, he ordered that ten
persons of each tribe taken from amongst the most guilty should b e
put to death. It w a the first time he had shed the 'tiIood .of his
subjects, and the experiment was not ~ i t h o u tdanger, for the
Afghans talked of avenging themselves and retaliating upon the
Shah and his family ; but the sovereign authority triumphed, and
from that moment it was admitted by the tribes that the king had
the right of shedding blood without any one having the power to
question it. The &Ialzoohees and Khaouganees had not been
included in these acts of severity, 011 the ground that, not being
Abdalees by descent, their fault was of less magnitude, and therefore
it was possible to pardon them; but these tribes, affronted at the
exception, withdrew from the Shah's camp. An explanation
naturally followed, and Ahmed Shah, to satisfy them, ordered ten
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Makoohees and ten Khaouganees to he put to death, upon which
they immediately returned to their duty, for they considered themselves vilified by the esception that had been made in their favour.
Independently of the tribes and branches that we have classified,
those of the Abdalees and the Ghildjzyes are again subdivided into
so great a number of tireh, or families, and there is so much confusion in these subdivisions, that it would be impossible for an
Afghan, even the best informed upon the subject, to give a perfect
list of them. There would be no exaggeration in stating their
numbers at more than three hundred. These have been formed
from time to time when the surplus population of a tribe has been
obliged to separate from it and seek a fresh district, or when an
influential relative of the chief had some misunderstanding with
him and withdrew from his authority, with those who were attached
to his own person. At other times some successful conqueror broke
up a tribe, to render it less powerful ; each subdivision then took the
name of the new chief whose fortunes it followed, but they always
looked upon themselves as members of the original tribe, though
often separated by considerable distances from each other. These
separations are also to be attributed to the fear entertained by the
sovereigns of the numerical force of some of the tribes. Shah
Abbas the Great was the last who adopted this measure on a large
scale ; and to secure the permanent tranquillity and stability of the
populations to which he had assigned a new territory, he carried a
number of hostages with him to Ispahan.
T h e Abdalees, besides having the name of Dobranees, which
they received from Ahmed Shah, are still called Suleimanees, from
the mountains whence they came ; the district they then inhabited
bears the appellation of Tobeh-filahuroof.
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Afghanistan conquered by Alexander -Reconquered, by the aboriginal inhabitants
-Taken
by the Tartars -Death of Mansoor - Success of Sebek-Taghee Character of the Afghans at this period-Concession
of territory t o the
Abdalee tribe- Ghildjzyes opposed to the Tartar dominion-The Brst sovereign of Afghanistan- His son Mahmood- Cruelty of t h e Tartar princes Expulsion of Beiram - Khosroo Malek the laat of the Ghaznevide dynasty -List
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Mahmood 111.-Ibrahim Khan defeats Bellal
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AMONGST
the conquests of Alexander the Great was that of Af-

I

ghanistan, and at the death of this invader his lieutenant, Seleucus,
succeeded to the sovereignty of the greater portion of his dominions
in Asia. It is presumed that his son and grandson followed him ;
but history does not inform us how or why, under the reign of the
last-mentioned monarch, Afghanistan was taken from the Seleukides
by the aboriginal chiefs, and soon formed, with Bactria, an independent state, which existed with some degree of splendour during
one hundred and fifty years. After the lapse of that period the
Tartars made tlxmaelves masters of the country, and appear to
have held possession of it up to the tenth century. This blank
remains in profound obscurity, and it is only from about the year
A.D. 997 that we have any information which can elucidate the
history of the Afghans.
A t that time Mansoor reigned in Tartary, and when h e died
an officer of rank, named Sebek-Taghee, threw off the allegiance

h e owed to his successor, established his dominion over all the
southern part of Afghanistan, and made Gliuznee his capital.
T h e Afghan tribes at this period were for the most part a nomade
and barbarous people, living by plunder and rapine, and under
a host of chiefs very careful of their independence, who were
almost always at enmity with each other, and ready to sell their
services to the highest bidder. Thence it often happened that a
part of the nation was to be found in one camp, while another was
opposed to it in-that of the enemies, and, like true Condottieri, they
fought against one another without the least scruple. The disunion
existing amongst the Afghan tribes in the present day may be
traced back to the most remote times, and it is not surprising that
with this sentiment they have so long delayed to organize themselves as a nation. Their migratory habits also contributed to
this result, and they mere for a long time a wild race dispersed
over Persia, India, and the mountains of Afghanistan, but everywhere and a t all periods turbulent and dificult to govern, adapting
themselves very little to the habits of those of a different origin
within whose territory they established themselves. The consequence
was, that on very many occasions quarrels arose in which many of
the tribes were decimat.ed without pity, while the remainder were
obliged to seek refuge in the mountains where they are to be met
with in the prescnt day. The tribe of the Abdalees, the most
powerful now existing, did not fix itself in the Suleiman range
till i t had received authority to do SO from Sebek-Taghee, who was
desirous of reconlpensing them by this concession of territory
for the support they had afforded him in his Indian campaigns.
The Ghildjzyes, on the contrary, were always strongly opposed to
the Tartar dominion over their country, which was so much the
more dangerous for them, because their tribe was at that time
exceedingly numerous. They carried their malpractices to such
an extent, that Mahmood, son of Sebeli-Taghee, who succeeded
him on the .throne of Ghuznee, was obliged almost entirely to
exterminate them. But succeeding centuries have enabled the
Ghildjzyes to recover from this disaster, and the tribe is now,
next to that of the Abdalees, the most numerous and the lnost
powerful in Afghanistan.
Sebek-Taghee may be considered as the first sovereign who ruled
over Afghanistan properly so called ; but the Afghans, in consequence of his Tartar origin, looked upon him and his descenclants
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as tyrants and usurpers, and thought little of his good deeds
and the benefits he conferred upon them. Mahmood, after the
death of his father, carried his arms into Persia aud India, and
with the spoils of war obtained in these countries enriched
Afghanistan, and made Ghuznee, his capital, one of the most
beautiful cities in Asia. His death took .place in 1028. His descendants, little worthy of succeeding him, soon lost the territory
which he had added to the kingdom founded by Sebek-Taghee ;
their dominion was soon reduced to the Afghan provinces, in which
their authority was not always respected; and if they preserved
these during two centuries, they owed this circumstance much more
to the difficulties in which their neighbours .were involved than to
any fear they entertained of the Tartar dynasty.
Beiram, one of these princes, seized upon an -Afghan chief, of
the name of Sooree, who about, the year 1151 commanded in the
province of Gour, and put him to a cruel death to punish him for
the resolution with which he had opposed him. T h e barbarity
of the Tartar prince on this occasion exceeded anything that can
be imagined ; he made him suffer a thousand tortures, and insulted
him by every species of outrage.
Allah-Eddin, brother of this unfortunate Afghan an4 his successor
in the sovereignty of Gour, determined to revenge himself by force
of arms, and completely succeeded. H e seized the town of Ghuznee,
abandoned it during seven days to the fury and excesses of a n
army burning with vengeance and possessed with an inherent passion for plunder, and who carried the spirit of a savage temperament
so far as to mix the blood of the vanquished with the mortar destined to repair the walls of the city.
Beiram, thus vanquislled, retired beyond the Indus, and continued to reign in the Punjab, abandoning the western provinces of:
his kingdom to his victorious adversary.
War was declared on several other occasions. between these two
princes, when Beiram was less unfortunate, and his son Xhosroo Shah
inherited the reduced territory he had preserved ; but the dynasty
of the Ghaznevides was brought to a close during the lifetime of
his grandson Khosroo Nalek. Attacked in 1160 by Mahmood
Gouree, cousin and successor of Allah Eddin, Khosroo Malelr
was overtbrown, and his kingdom annexdd' to that of Afghanistan.
The following is a list of the Ghaznevide princes who reigned over
the last-mentioned country :-
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..

Sebek-Taghee
Isma61 . . . . . .
Muhmood
....
Mohamed
....
Massood . . . . . .
Madood
&l&sood . . . . . .

......

A.D.

976
997
997
1030
1031
1041
1049

Hejirr

.... 365
.... 387
.... 387
.... 431
.... 422
.... 433
.... 441

OF GOUR.

CHAF.IT.
A.D.

Ali . . . . . . . . . . 1049

Abd-ul-Reschid .. 1052
Ferakh-zad . . . . 1053
Ibrahim
1059
Massood . . . . . . 1098
Arselane Shah .. 1104
1108
Beiram Shah

......

....

Kejirn.

.... 441

.... 443
.... 444
....

456

.... 492
.... 508
.... 512

The Afghan princes of Gour, from being simple chiefs of a smdl
principality, were thus raised to the sovereign power in Afghanistan,
to which they soon added divers principalities of India. Gour is a
little province, well situated for defence, and in the heart of the
most rugged mountains of the Paropamisus, but possessing none
of those means of aggression which could enable the Afghans to
hope for victory against one so powerful as that of Ghuznee. I t
may be supposed' that Allah Eddin found a ready support in the
other tribes of his nation, who submitted with r e g e t to the dominion
of the Tartars. The humiliation which the Afghans experienced in
being treated as a conquered people, added to their feelings of
nationality, must have excited heroic sentiments in their breasts, and
made them triumph over the foreign race that oppressed them.
B1ahmood Gouree carried his arms into the interior of India
and seized Benares, in which city he committed a thousand
atrocities. This prince left no heirs, and died in 1205. His
empire, in accordance with his desire, was divided between
his favourites and hjs freedmen. Afghanistan proper fell to
Eldooz, but he was soon despoiled of it by a prince of Kharism,
whose successor, Djelld Eddin, was in like manner obliged to
retire before the victorious armies of Ghengis Khan. Ferishteh
informs us that the descendants of this conqueror were in possession
of Afghanistan up to the year 1251-the
period at which an
Afghan or Patan King, which is synonymous, seized upon Ghuznee
a n d Kabul, and annexed them to the lndian empire.
Less than a century later a new dynasty, which western authors
mention under the name of Mdek Kurt," established itself in the
province of Gour and extended its dominion over Kandahar and
Herat from A.D. 1336 (Hejira 736) to A.n. 1383 (Hejira 785).
T h e first sovereign of this dynasty, Chems-Eddin Gouree,

* The word Eurt is a corruption of
t h e word Gmr, which, united ~ 5 t that
h
of Malek, signifies Prince of Cour. This

dynasty urns of t h e Afghan race.Ferrier.
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nevertheless, aclmowledged the suzerainty of the Tartar monarchs ;
this was the case also with his sons and successors, Rookn-Eddin
and Fakhr-Eddin, but the third, Ghyaz-Eddin, threw off the vassalage which had been laid upon him by the descendants of Ghengis
K h m . Chems-Eddin, Nalelr; Hafez, Moez Eddin IIoosein, a d
Malelc Bagher, who succeeded him, preserved their independence ;
nevertheless the latter claimed the support of the Tartars to maintain him in the position he had usurped; but his reign was of
brief duration, for his brother Noez-Eddin overthrew him, and left
the reins of power to his son Ghyaz-Eddin, the ninth and last sovereign of this dynasty. This prince was made prisoner by the
Emir Tamerlane, who seized his territory as well as that of Ghuznee
and Kabul.
Tamerlane speaks of the Afghans in his Institutes as a barbarous
people, devoted to pillage, and by no means so far advanced in
civilization as the Tartars; but he limits the counhy they then
occupied to the Suleiman mountains, from which me are left to
conclude that he understood by the name Afghan or Aoughan
only the tribe of the Abddees, who, since the days of Sebelc-Taghee,
were in possession of the country mentioned in the Institutes. This
circumstance is therefore confirmatory of the opinion we have
already set forth on the uncertainty of the origin of the Afghans.
From the conquest of Afghanistan by Tamerlane up to the commencement of the sixteenth century the information respecting them
is exceedingly vague, and yet this epoch ought to have been one of
the most honourable in the annals of Afghan history ;but a portion
of the facts which relate to it occurred in India, and beyond the territory the history of which we are ende$vouring to sketch : we shall
therefore pass on very rapidly, and only have recourse to the manuscript from which we have already given some passages.
The Afghan rule in India commenced at the death of Mahmood
Gouree, which took place in 1205; thus, as we have already
stated above, the dominions of this Mahmood were, for want
of a direct heir, divided between his favourites and freedmen.
T h e Indian provinces fell to Routoob, one of his generals of the
Afghan tribe of Lood. This tribe, seeing its chief the sovereign
of a vast empire, with Delhi for its capital, left Afghanistan
and settled themselves in India, where, protected and favoured
by the monarch, they increased rapidly. Accustomed from their
infancy to a life spent in camps, and of rude and simple hitbits,
C
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they with little difficulty obtained an ascendancy over the natiircs
of India, and the fear with which t.hey inspired them resulted in
their accepting with resignation the yoke of the Afghan dynasty.
This d p a s t y still held possession of that country in 1398, when
Tamerlane conquered it. Nahmood 111. was then on the throne,
and the invader allowed him to retain the supreme power as a
recompense for the assistance which he gave him during those
bloody massacres that obtained for him the title of the destroyer
of humanity.
Mahmood 111.died in 1450, a period a t which an Afghan lord,
also of the tribe of Lood, named Bellal, overthrew the reigning
family. This new sovereign made B p s his capital. During his
reign the empire was a prey to c,ontinual agitation; the revolts
amongst the Loods were incessant, and Bellal vas at length driven
out and succeeded by Ibrahim Khan, another Afghan chief of the
same tribe, who subdued each of his competitors in turn; he invaded successively Icandahar and Kabul, meeting with scarcely
any resistance, favoured as he was by the Afghan tribes. Successes so easily obtained increased his ambition, and he resolved to
march upon the Tartar kingdom of Ferghana, already attacked in
the rear by Chahee Beg, king of Bolchara, with whom he concluded
a treaty offensive and defensive, stipulating that the conquered
countries should be divided between them. Nirza Baboor, of the
tribe of Gurlrani, and fifth in descent from Tamerlane,* was a t
this time sovereign of Ferghana, who, dready despoiled of some
of the best parts of his territory by Chahee Beg, and menaced on
the south by Ibrahim Khan, despaired of being able to resist this
combination of his enemies, fled from his kingdom, and placed
himself under the protecticn of the King of Persia. This took
place in the year 1498 (Hejira 904). Shah Ismael Seffavye received him in the most gracious manner, and soon afler gave him
a force of 20,000 horsemen, commanded by Mir Nadjm, with
which to recover his kingdom. 'Rlirza Baboor also took' the field,
and commenced operations against the Uzbeks ; but he had
scarcely laid siege to Bolrhara nhen the inhabitants, reinforced by
the troops which Ibrahim Khan had sent to his support, attaclced
the Persians during the night, routed them, and killed their leader,
Mir Nadjm. This occurred in 1505 (Hejira 911).

* He was t h e son of Omnr Sheikh,
who was t h e son of Aboo Seid, who

was the son of Miranshfih, who lvas
t h e son of Tamerlane.-firricr.
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After this disaster Mirza Baboor retreated by the way of Balkh,
the road t.o which city remained open : he was fortunate enough
to be able to take Kabul, and within a brief space he had
made numerous partisans in that country, which he entirely subdued. I n 1505 (Hejira 913) he seized upon Kandahar, and
not long after the Punjab. The natives of India, seeing his success, wrote to him in 1511 (Hejira 916), and besought his assistance
in throwing off the tyranny of Ibrahim Khan, promising to act
with vigour the moment he should appear a t the head of his
army. This request consorted with the projects of vengeance that
Mirza Raboor cherished against Ibrahim Khan, and he accepted
it with readiness. He marched, therefore, against that monarch
in 1525, defeated him, and took possession of the whole of the
Indian territories of which Ibrahim had usurped the sovereignty.
After this brief description of the transient power which the
Afghans possessed in this part of India, the manuscript of Abdullah Khan of Herat proceeds thus. The natives of India had
little reason to congratulate themselves in having requested another
monarch to come and govern them, for Mirza Baboor oppressed
and plundered, and made them almost regret Ibrahim Khan the
Lood.
A t the death of Mirza Baboor, sovereign of India and Afghanistan, which took place in 1530 (Hejira 937), his eldest son succeeded to all his dominions, but his brother Kamran, and his
vizier Shere Khan, an Afghan of the tribe of Lood, revolted
against him, and, assisted by those devoted to their interests,
obliged him to fly; the Persians, on the other hand, had some
time before attacked Kandahar and taken it from the Moguls.
Notwithstanding this act of hostilit,y, Humayoon did as his father
had done-he retired to the court of Persia and sought the protection of the Shah Thamasp. This monarch, having been informed that the fugitive prince was approaching his territory, sent
an order to the governor of Herat to receive him with every mark
of respect, and to escort him to Kasbeen, the capital, in a manner
worthy of his rank and with a splendour truly regal. After their
meeting the two monarchs felt a lively interest in each other. T h e
Shah Thamasp not only acceded to the wishes of his royal guest,
but did everything in his power to anticipate them, as the following anecdote will show :.Humayoon, walking one day in the streets of Kasbeen, came to a,
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canal, the clear and limpid waters of which ran with a rapid course
between banks covered with flowers and verdure ; the spot pleased
him greatly, and turning to one of his officers he said, " If I had
the means of doing so, I would here build a magmilicent mosque."
A Persian nobleman who heard these words repeated them to the
Shah Thamasp, who swore that the wish of H~lmayoonshould not
remain ungratified, and his architect, having been called into his
presence, was ordered to construct a mquficent mosque, and
within the space of six months, upon the site indicated by the
exiled prince. H e also forbade any of his servants from mentioning the circumstance, and gave strict injunctions that I-I~tmayoon
should never be permitted to walk near the spot until the edifice
was completed. I n six months the beautiful mosque was finished,
and the name of the Shah's guest inscribed over the portal in the
f a p d e as having been the founder. EIumayoon, to whom no
intimation on the subject had been given, was conducted to it.
H i s astonishment on seeing it was great indeed, and his gratitude
to the Shah Thamasp for this delicate mark of his friendship not
less. Subsequently the Shah gave him further proofs of his attachment; indeed he was prodigal of them.
Humayoon, nevertheless, became at length sensible that the state
of his aflairs in India would never improve if he continued to pass
his time amidst the festivities of the co~wtat Kasbeen ; he therefore
begged the Shah to give him some troops with which he might
hope to regain his crown and punish the usurpers of his throne.
T h e King of Persia received this new request as he had done every
other, and placed 12,000 cavalry, commanded by Beyram Khan,
a t his disposal. This officer had resided many years in India, was
well acquainted with the habits and feelings of the people of that
country, and the Shah charged him to re-establish Humayoon in
all his rights. The march 'of this army upon Delhi was soon
known, and the Loods a t once made every preparation for defence,
but in vain. I-Iumayoon had scarcely arrived at Kabul when his
Indian subjects revolted against Shere Ehan, and after having
killed a large proportion of his Afghans obliged him to fly from the
country. On hearing this Humayoon travelled night and day to
reach his dominions, leaving Beyram Khan and his Persians, with
a crowd of Tartars and Parsivans that soon joined him, to follow.
This numerous and well-trained army was broken into divisions on
its arrival in India, and Humayoon sent them in various directions

,
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with orders to massacre the Afghan Loods wherever they were
met with and not leave one alive. These instructions were
rigorously executed, and those who were fortunate enough to escape
were reduced to a pitiable condition; but when they recovered
from the terror into which they had been thrown, they showed
themselves in arms at various points and again threatened the
Emperor of the Moguls. Nevertheless they did not attempt anything in the lifetime of I-I~unayoon, but after his death, which
took place in 1555, and in the reign of his son Mohamed
Alrim Mirza, surnamed Djellal Eddin Akbar, Roouchen Bayazid,
one of the chiefs of the Loods, who passed amongst them as
inspired, in short almost a prophet, united the scattered warriors of
the tribe, placed himself at their head, and declared his pretensions to the throne of Delhi. For several yeass he kept up a
desultory warfare against the 171oguls, but without obtaining any
positive result, for death surprised him in the midst of it. His son,
Omar Sheikh Riemd Eddin, continued the strife, and owed the
success which he obtained, as his father had done, to the co-operation
of the Prince Noor EddinJehanghir, second son of FIurnayoon, who
had also raised the standard of revolt against Akbar. The Loods
continued to carry on this party warfare for a considerable time, but
without being able to grasp a second time the Indian sceptre, for the
Moguls were too powerful. ARer the death of Omar Sheikh Kiemal Eddii, a young maiden
of the tribe of Lood, named Kiemal Khatoon, endeavoured to create
a schism in the n4ahomedan religion as professed by the Afghans,
the Moguls, and a few Indian tribes ; her preaching and that of
her disciples was the cause of great commotions in the empire : the
Loods, who were always at the head of every disturbance, suffered
new misfortunes, and fresh massacres considerably reduced their
n~unbers. These troubles were rife up to the commencement of the
reign of Shah Abedin Mohamed Shah, surnamed Shah Jehan, who
again persecuted the Afghan Loods, and in 1632 (Hejira 1042)
drove them out of India, but the revolts, which had been excited by
this religious schism, were not thoroughly put down until the close
of the reign of Aurungzebe, who succeeded him. From this period
the Lood tribe ceased to have any influence in India ; they made
no further attempts to obtain power ; and we shall in future become
further acquainted with their history in that of Afghanistan Proper.
Mirza Baboor, the founder of the dynasty of the Mogds,' was

enabled to hold possession of Eabul, which he left to his successors ;
but he lost Eandahar, and this as well as the piincipalities of Herat
and Gom fell into the hands of the Persians. Subsequently, however, he retook Kandahar, against which he sent his son IKamran
Dlirza, but soon after it was again in the powcr of the Shah Thamasp.
Seffavye Humayoon, the succcssor to Bnboor, seized upon it once
more, but, to mark his gratitude for the services which he had
received from the Shah of Persia, he ceded it to him by treaty in
1545 ; it contini~eciin the possession of Persia during the lifetime
of Hunayoon, after which his son dkbar retook it. It fell, however, in 1609 (Hejira 1018), into the hands of the great Shah Ahbas
S e f f a ~ ~but
e , only to revert to the Emperor Jehangir, who carricd
Iiandahar by aseaul t. This was the last time but one that the Noguls
were enabled to take this fortress, the advantageous position of which
on the frontiers of the tn-o states made them dispute its possession
with so much tenacity against the Persians. The contest for it was
again renewed in 1620 by Shah Abbas, and the efforts which
Aurungzebe made to retake it at n later period completely failed.
The officers appointed by .the Persian monarch to govern Kandahar
so oppressed the Afghans that they sent two of their principd
Serdars to the Shah to obtain a relaxation of the rigorous measures
to which they were subjected, and requested that the governor
might henceforth be chosen from the chiefs of the Afghan tribes,
promising that their fidelity should be proof against every temptation. The following are the terms in which Sir John Malcolm,
in his excellent worlr on Persia, speaks of this embassy ; the information is taken from the Persian manuscript of 31irza Syud Mohamed
of Ispahan :'' I n the time uf the Saffavean kings of Persia the Affghans were
often oppressed ; and on one occasion they were so discontented with
their Persian governor, that they sent a secret deputation to
Ispahan to solicit his removal and the appointment of one of their
own tribe. Their request was granted; and two of the tribe of
Abddlee were raised to the office of Reish Saffeed, or Kutlrhodah of
the tribes, and their authority was confirmed by a royal patent.
The name of one of these two persons was Seedoo, of the famly of
Bameeyehi, from whom Ahmed Shah, the founder of the present
royal family of Cabd, is lineally descended. The name of the
other was Ahmed, of the family of Bareclrzehi, from whom the
present Affghan chiefs, Serafray Khan and Futteh Khan, are
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descended. The A5shans were delighted with this arrangement,
and granted their entire and respectful obedience to the chief
appointed by the Persian Government, Time has confirmed this
respect; and the superiority of the chiefs so selected has become an
inheritance to their family. The race of Seedoo obtained sovereignty,
while that of Ahmed has only gained high station and command.
The Seedoozehis (or descendants of Seedoo) are held in such veneration, that, if one of them was to attempt the murder of an ameer, or
lord of another tribe, it would be considered wrong to obtain
safety by assaulting the Seedoozehis. If an Affghan acted otherwise he would be deemed an outcast in his own class or tribe.
There is, however, an exception to this rule in favour of the
descendants of Ahmed, and the Ahmedzehis may without sacrilege
slay a Seedoozehi ; but a great number of the Affghans deny this
privilege, even to the Ahmedzehis. Seedoo and Ahmed (this
author adds) were raised to rank by Shah Abbas the Great, and
derived their fortunes from that fountain of dignity and splendour."
This respect for the Suddozyes amongst the Afghans has disappeared in our days ; and since they have been dispossessed of
the throne, not only those who belonged to this branch, but also
all the members of the tribe of Popolzye, from which it was
derived, are persecuted and often plundered by the Mohamedzyes
actually in power.
So long as Shah Abbas lived the Afghans settled in Herat and
Randahar remained perfectly tranquil under his dominion ; but a
Persian governor, appointed by his grandson and successor Shah
Seffee, having maltreated them, they revolted. This sovereign
managed to keep the Heratees in check, but his governor in Kandahar, a traitor to his duty, passed qver to the camp of the Mogul
Emperor with the Persian troops under his orders, and gave up
the fortress to the Shah in 1634.
Kandahar was taken from the Moguls by the Persians in 1642,
during the reign of Shah Abbas the Second. The conquerors of
Dew1 subsequently made every effort, but in vain, to recapture
the city, and were obliged tc remain satisfied with the possession
of Kabul, which had belonged to them from the time of Baber.
The Persians retained Herat and Kandahar in spite of the adverse
feeling of the Afghans, who were always more anxious to be under
the dominion of the Great Mogul, which they considered less burdensome than that of the Persians.

The Afghans of the tribe of Ghildjzyes, dispersed over the province of Iiandahar, were, however, the most restless and the most
constant enemies of Persia, so that, towards the close of the seventeenth century, they had pretty ncarly rendered themselves masters
of the principality.
In 1693, a little before his accessiou to tlie throne, the Shah,
Sultan Hoosein, felt that it was absolutely necessary that they
s h o ~ ~ be
l d put down, and with a vieu to effect this object he selected
as their governor the MTalee of Georgia, Gourguin Khan, surnamed Shah Nawaz Khan, a clever and energetic man, and sent
with him a well-appointed and nurncrous army, and instructions to
take severe measures with the Afghans.
Shah Nawaz Khan arrived a t Kandahar in 1702, and treated
but rebellious people;
the Afghans without pity, as a conq~~ercd
nothing could escape his inflexible and harsh proceedings-neither
rank, age, nor sex was any protection ; his troops, surfeited with
murders and pillage, reduced the women and girls to a state of
slavery, and made them the unhappy victims of their base violence.
T h e Afghans, bewildered and alarmed a t this sbte of things, sent
a deputation to Ispahan, in 1706, to entreat the King to put a
stop to the calamities which weighed upon them; but this embassy
did not succeed as a similar one had done in the reign of Shah
Abbas, for their delegates were received with haughty and h a ~ h
indifference ; and the inclividuals who composed the deputation returned to their countrymen to share with them the despair they
also fel .
Disappointed in their hopes, the Afghans could not dream of
emancipating themselves by force of arms fi-om the heavy yoke
of Gourguin Khan, for his vigilance was equal to his severity ;
flight being impossible and complaint useless, and seeing no other
mode by which they could put a stop to the cruelties that were
practised upon them, they awaited in silence, and bowed down with
grief, the moment when they should be able to take vengeance
upon their oppressors for so many outrages ; and this was not far
distant, for an act on the part of Gourguin Khan soon presented
them with an opportunity.

CHAPTER 111.
The Kelauter of Kandahar is sent prisoner to Ispahan -His intrigues against
Gourguin D a n -He makes a pilgrimage t o Mecca - Obtains a fetuo from t h e
chief mollah of Islain -Returns to Ispahan, and finally to Kandahar -Indignation of Gourguin Khan-Events consequent upon this -Opinion of Abdullah
Khan upon them-Death
of Gour,pin Khan-Mk Weis enters KandaharStatement of Mirza Nehdee - The Ghildjzyes declare their independence, a n d
exterminate the Persian troops-The tribe of the Abddees establish themselves in Herat-The Persian generals attack the Kelauter and we beatenKaee Xhosroo Khan besiege3 Iiandahar-He is defeated and killed with 30,000
of his troops -Mohamed Roo,qtem aucceeds him, but is also beaten -The
Afghans acknowledge Mir Weis as their sovereign chief -- Death of t h e Mir i n
17'15 -His brother Mir Abdullah succeeds him - His negotiations with Persia
-Is put to death by the eldest son of Mir Weis, who succeeds him-Alayor
Khan, Governor of Herat - Zeman Khan appointed by the Persian monarch t o
succeed him Heyat Sultan - He marches against Randahar -Attacked by
Assad Ullah and defeated-Ente~s Eerat-Persian
campaign against t h e
Uzbeks -Sefi Kooli Khan -1s defeated by the Afghans Independence of the
Afghans established -Assad Ullah lays siege to Furrah -Is attacked by Mir
Mahmood of Rnndahar A Belooch chief, Mir Mohamed, seizes Herat.
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AMONGSTthe Afghan nobles who had signed the petition to the
Shah against Nawaz Khan was Mir Weis, the lielauter" of Kandshar, and chief of a branch of the tribe of Ghildjzyes. This
Serdar had, by his amiable manners, liberality, persuasive powers,,
and great intelligence, made himself much beloved by his countrymen.
Gourguin Khan feared him, and knew that he was the principal
instigator of the hatred mhich the Afghans bore him ; he therefore
ordered the Kelauter to be arrested, under the pretext that he was
conspiring against the government, and sent- him, with several
other rich S+d t Afghans, to Ispahan, there to explain his conduct
to the Shah.
Mir Weis did not on this occasion belie his reputation for ability.
On his arrival a t the court of the Seffavyes, he a t once perceived the
corruption which reigned on all sides and scattering a little gold
about him, he endeavoured to turn his captivity to account. I n a

;

* The dutiea of kelautw in Peivia are
not exactly defined. I n different towm
they are more or less important: but
in the case of Mir Weis, at Kandahar,
t h e office must have been Governor in
chief. And he had probably amongst

his other functions to superintend t h e
administration of the police, b u t with
very extensivs powers.-Fariw.
t Literally white beard, but in this
instance eminent.-Tewio.
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solemn audience granted him by the IGng he succeeded in obtaining from the sovereign an acknowledgment that he was innocent
of the accusations which had been brought against him ; and suc11,
w s his tact, and the ductile character of his mind, that in the
course of a few days he became one of the priricipnl favourites of
Shah Sultan Hoosein, and the friend of all the great nobles of his
court.
Assured of having for the future an influence over the degraded
courtiers of the Persian King, the views of Mir TVeis took a wider
range than they had hitherto done, for he concluded that a country
thus delivered up to men so worthless and corrupt might become
a n easy conquest if attacked by some brave men well led. Strong
in the power of his own genius, he deeply reflected upon the mode
in which he might carry out so gigantic an enterprise as a n inva-'
sion of Persia ; and, to give himself the best chance of success, he
determined to work upon his countrymen by that most powerful of
agents, fanaticism. Instead of evincing a desire to return to his
country, he solicited and obtained the Shah's pern~issionto undertake a pilgrimage to Mecca, and also his consent that the rich sejds
who had accompanied him should return to Kandahar ; but before
they left Ispahan he instructed them secretly to prepare the Afghans
for revolt. A few days after their departure Mir Weis was on his
way to the Holy City, where, having enlisted the sympathies of
the chief mollahs of Islam, who, like the Afghans, were Soonees,
h e found no difficulty in obtaining from them a fetzlo, in which
they declared that his countrymen were bound by every means in
their power to throw off the thraldom of the Shiah heretics.
Mir Weis returned to Ispahan as soon as he had performed his
pilgrimage, and occupied himself in carrying out the intrigue
which, with no little ingenuity, he had set on foot before his departure.
Like all Persian nobles in high situations, Gourguin Khan had
enemies a t court anxious for his downfall, as much from jealousy
as in the hope of succeeding to the government of Kandahar, or
replacing him by one of their own creatures. Amongst these
enemies was the vizier of Shah Sultan Hoosein, who could not
forgive Gourguin Khan and his nephew, the Sipahee Salar Kaee
Kllosroo Khan, the estimation in which they were held by the
Shah, and the influence which they had almays employed against'
him. Mir Weis, .with considerable penetration, saw that this.
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personage intended to compass the ruin of both uncle and nephew
by prejudicing the mind of the Shah against them whenever an
occasion should present itself; he made, therefore, secret advances
to the Vizier rith the hope of inducing him to associate himself in
h k design. The Vizier, well convinced of the bad feeling which
the Afghan chief entertained against Shah Nawaz Khan, and
believing him to be entirely devoted to the interests of the S'nah,
entered into his views, and became one of Mir Weis's warmest
protectors. I n order the more rapidly to bring about the fall
of Gourguin, the Vizier made every effort to support the Mghan chief against him, and solicited the Shah's permission for
Mir Weis to return to Kandahar. This feeble prince had been
persuaded that Gourguin Khan and l i s nephew, secretly supported by the Tzar of Russia, wished to raise the standard of
revolt in Georgia, a n j declare themselves independent. This
was sufficient to induce the Shah to give Mir,Weis permission to
return to his native city, with orders to resume the important functions of Kelauter, satisfied that his fidelity and vigilance would
enable him to penetrate the real sentiments of Gourguin, and a t
the same t h e serve as a counterpoise to his power, which had considerably increased, and given rise to some apprehensions. Mir
Weis, well assured that every one would be in 'his favour, returned
to I<andahar by Kerman and the Seistan, observing attentively on
his journey the state of things in each locality. On his arrival he
saw that the power and tyranny of Gourguin Khan had attained
their utmost limits, and thought that his adversary might rehse to
recognise the firman which conferred on him the functions of Kelauter. But the Governor, though indignant at his return, conformed to the orders of his sovereign, and reinstated the Mir in his
post. Nevertheless, to humiliate him in the eyes of the people,
and to prove that he himself was absolute in his own government, he ordered him to send one of his daughters, a girl of great
personal beauty, to his harem without delay-his intention being
not to make her his wife, but his concubiie.' The Afghans, informed of the affront which had been put upon their chief, and eager

* The manuscript of Abdullah Khan
is here atvariance with that of Mirw
Ali Mohamed, whose account of the
transaction I have followed. Abdullah
Khan states that Gourguin Khan was
really desirons of an alliance with the

Mii, with whose talenta and influence
he was well acquainted, and that he
wished by means of this marriage to
put an end to the differences that
existed between himself and that chief.
-F~wicr.
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to avenge it, rushed immediately to arms ; but &IirWeis, secretly
assembling the principal chiefs, arrested their ardour, and they
decided upon temporising in order that they might take measures
The time
which should better ensure the success of their plans. '<
which must prove our courage," said he to them, " is arrived, b ~ t
the prudence of the serpent that watches overcomes the strength of
the lion who permits himself to slumber ; we must conceal our
swords in a bed of roses, and those who have sufficient faith in me
to place their destiny in my hands may be convinced that the most
profound secresy is the first condition of success."
After this conference N i r \TTeis affected to submit to the governor's wishes ; but instead of sending him his o m daughter, he
substituted one 'of his slaves, also a very beautiful girl, who, dressed
in the richest attire, was conducted in great state to the harem of
the Shah Nawaz Khan. Not less animated than X r Weis against
the oppressors of her country, his slave accepted, and with delight,
the part she was called upon to perform. Gourguin Khan, not in
the least suspecting the plot, believed the Afghan was really desirous of forgetting the past and being on friendly terms with him
for the future ; he therefore trusted him implicitly.
Mir Weis.profited by the favour which he now enjoyed with the
governor to bring about his fall with greater certainty ; at the same
time he secured the co-operation of the officers of the palace, and
excited the turbulent Abclalee and Kaulteree tribes to commence a
revolt, which soon spread its ramifications over all the southern part
of the province of Kandahar. This rising occasioned Gourguin so
much anxiety, that he decided on sending his best Georgian 'troop
to put it down, and retained only twelve or fifteen hundred men near
him to defend the citadel.
Mir Weis took advantage of the absence of these troops to put
the projects he had so long meditated into execution, and sent
- Shah Nawaz an invitation to a feast which he had prepared at one
of his country houses, situated about half an hour's ride from the
city. This he accepted, and wit.hout suspicion, and such was the
security felt by Gourguin after he had arrived there, that he quaffed
immoderate quantities of wine during the repast, and with his
suite, who had indulged to an equal extent in their l'ibations, even.
tually fell asleep. Everything, in short, worked well for Mir
lTTeis;the conspirators slaughtered all the inebriated sleepers, after
which the Kelauter dressed himself in the robes of Gourguin,

and ordered the Afghans' in his own service to put on those of
the Georgians who had accompanied their Walee. Thus disguised, they returned to Kandahar in the middle of the night, put
to death the Persian troops on guard at the gate, and entered the
city without being recognised. The insurgents, a t first but few in
number, were soon reinforced by the Afghans from the environs,
who had previously been prepared for the movement, and the Persian garrison was SO coiupletely exterminated, that not one soldier
was left alive. Mirza Mehdee, a Persian, and a ~ ~ t h oofr the ' Life
of Nadir Shah,' gives a different account of the death of Nawaz
Khan. H e states that the governor had quitted Kandahar to
chastise some rebels of the Kadreree tribe, when Mir Weis arrived,
who fell upon the Georgian W a k e at Dehchir, defeated and took
him prisoner, and subsequently put him to death by the hands of
Murad Khan, a low Afghan. This statement seems, however, to
be inaccurate.
The natives of different countries residing a t Kandahar were
at that time at variance with each other, and, after this tragedy was
over, Mir Weis assembled them together with a view to their reconciliation. I n his usual persuasive style of eloquence he showed
them the advantages they might obtain from the liberty which had
thus been given them, and invited them to form that bond of union
which alone could emancipate them, and for ever, from the Persian
yoke. H e then drew forth the fitvo he had obtained from the chief
mollahs at Mecca, which had an irresistible effect upon the feelings
of this fanatical people, whose warlike instincts, having been powerfully excited, required only to be cleverly directed. They were
not long in deciding what course to take, and swore that they would
obey the Mir, inviolably attach themselves to his fortunes, and
respect his person.
Three days after this unlobked-for event, the Georgians who had
been despatched against the rebels in the south, and succeeded in
their mission, arrived under the walls of Kandahar. Here they
were suddenly attaclred by five thousand Afghan horse, cornmanded by Mir TiVeis ; and though they fought with a heroism
worthy of a better cause, they were unable to stand the unexpected
shock or malcgpod their retreat: only eighteen escaped and returned with the disastrous intelligence t,o Persia Such is the
account given by Mirza Ali Wohamed, from whom Abdullah Khan
again differs. T h e latter states "that Gourguin Khan himself.
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marched at the head of his troops against the Abdalees and IcauIrerees, who had taken up a position about twenty leagues from
Kandahar, and, refusing to pay the taxes, masw.cred without pity
every Persian they came in contact with. Gourguin Khan was
scarcely ten miles from the city, when Mir Weis, having quickly
assembled the principal chiefs and all the fighting men of the Abdalee, G.hildjzye, and Kaukeree tribes then in Kandahar, followed
rapidly in the rear of Gourguin Khan. I t was the habit of the
governor and his Georgians to get drunlc regularly every day after
sunset, and no precautions mere ever taken to guard a camp in
which every one was plunged in debauch. Blir \$reis knew this,
and fell upon them during the night : it was a massacre rather than
a combat, for t.he Shah Nawaz and his troops were put to death
almost without resistance, After this coup-de-main Mir Weis returned immediately with his men to Icandahar, to which he Iaid
siege, and after a few days obtained an easy victory over the
remaining half-starved Persians that defended the place. These
he put to death, as well as those individuals who were not of Afghan
origin, or who held an appointment under the late governor. Discord ensued when the plunder was to be divided, and smords were
drawn; but the Abdalees and Kankerees were beaten by the
Ghildjzyes, and finally obliged to submit, nor could they have
remained in Icandahar without their permission. The Abdalees up
to this time had always inhabited the country to the south of the
Urghendab and the I-Ielmund without -having ever obtained the
consent of the Mogul or Persian kings to pass those rivers ; but
now, by virtue of a fresh agreement with the Ghildjzyes, they were
enabled to do so, and many of them settled amongst the mountains
of the Siah-bend, situated between Kandahar and the principality of
Gour. The emigration of the Abdalees into the principality of
Herat dates from this period, and there in the course of a very few
years they greatly increased in numbers and became very rich.
Nevertheless the Afghans agree in stating that a branch of the
Noorzyes had been established in the plains of Obeh and Chehrak
for more than one hundred years before the bulk of that tribe came
to reside in the principzlity."
Mir Weis, having driven out the oppresors of his country, turned
his attention to the manner in which he might best consolidate his
work : he restored union between the different tribes, established a
kind of discipline amongst them, and released them from the heavy
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imposts which had till then weighed heavily upon their exertions.
Finally, in 1713, the principal families acknowledged him as the
Sovereign Frince of Iiandahar.
The Court of 'Persia, instead of putting down this rebellion
with vigour, adopted a system which exposed all its weakness. I t
commenced by negotiating ; but Mir NTeis, having detained the
ambassadors who were sent to advise him to return to his duty, the
Shah a t length determined to march an army upon Kandahar.
With this view the chiefs who commanded in I<horasan were ordered
to unite their forces and attack the rebels. This they did, and,
though outnumbering the Afghan troops in the proportion of
eight to one, they were, in consequence of the want of co-operation
between the Persian chiefs, completely beaten by Mir Weis in three
successive battles. These events took place in 1713.
The Shah, on receiving information of this catastrophe, saw
a t once the imminence of t h danger. The revolt might gain
ground in other provinces of his empire, in which alarming indications
had manifested themselves; however, two years elapsed before he
ordered his army of 30,000 men to take the field. I t was composed of Persians, Arabs, and Abdalee Afghans, at enmity with the
Ghildjzyes, and commanded by Sipahee Salar Kaee Khosroo Khan,
Walee of Georgia, and nephew of the unfortunate Gourguin Khan.
I n this campaign Mir Weis was not successful. H e lost all the
territory he had &ken from the chiefs of Khorassan, was completely
defeated by Kaee Khosroo between the Helmund and the Urghendab,
and, retiring from thence, was obliged to seek refuge within the walls
of Iiandahar, to which city his adversary soon laid siege. This the
Sipahee Salar pushed forwrd with great activity and perseverance,
and ravaged all the environs of the city, which, ere many days had
passed, became a complete desert. As a reprisal for the acts which
the Abdalees and Raukerees had committed, he put to death all
the Afghans who fell into his power, and did not even spare the
women and children.
The besieged were soon reduced to the greatest extremity, and,
alarmed at the terrible consequences that might befall them if the
city was taken by assault, they insisted -that Mir TVeis should offer
terms of accommodation to the Persian general. But Raee Khosroo
Khan, thinking himself sure of success, and eager to avenge the
death of his uncle by that of his murderers, demanded the unconditional surrender of the place. The garrison saw by this reply that
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they had nothing to hope for, and, gaining courage from despair,
continued the defence with renewed energy, the abilities of their
chief rising with the difficulties which he had to contend with.
Mir Weis, having succeeded ill baffling the vigilance of the besiegers and escaped from Randahar, assembled several tho~~sand
Afghan cavalry, ravaged the localities IChosroo had spared for the
purpose of supplying his own camp, and harassed the Persians day
and night. T h e result was obvious. The Sipahee Salar was obliged
to raise the siege to obtain provisions, of which he stood greatly in
need ; but constantly molested on his march, he found it impossible
to secure a moment's repose for his troops, who, decimated and
discouraged, began to disband. This new danger induced him to
offer battle to the Afghans, who accepted it on the 26th of Ramazan
1714 (Hejira 1126), and they so completely annihihted the Persian
army, that only one hundred out of thirt.y thousand men escaped
with their lives. Khosroo Khan, borne down with despair, threw
himself at the head of a few brave companions into the thickest of
the fight, and there sought an honourable death, which defeat had
made more welcome to him than life. This narrative is also from
the text of Mirza Ali Mohamed; Abdullah Khan assures us that
IChosroo did not attack the Afghans, but that, they surprised and
defeated him in a night attack.
Mohamed Roost.em, another Persian general of some repute,
was subsequently sent with a third army to subdue Mi Weia,
but he was not more fortunate than his predecessor. Defeated
by the Afghans in several encounters, he owed his own safety
only to a rapid retreat, which left the Mir absolute master of the
whole province of Kandahar. After this fresh success all the
Afghan tribes gave in their adhesion to him, and acknowledged Mir
Weis for their sovereiga chief, as the inhabitants of the capital had
done after the death of Gourguin Khan. Unfortunately, however, this adroit and courageous man could not continue the great
work which he had up to this time so cleverly conducted, for he
died towards the close of 1715, in the eighth year of his rule over
the Afghans, and in the succeeding one to that in which he obtained
his last victory over the Persians. I t was also the very moment
a t which the measures he had taken with a view of insuring the
independence of his country and ameliorating the condition of the
people afforded every hope that they would be realised; but,
though checked for a time, these hopes were not extinguished, for
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those measures received a fresh impulse under the g o ~ e ~ x m e noft
his son Mahmood.
Mir lT7eis left two sons, Mir Mahmood and Nir Hoosein. The
former, who was the elder, had scarcely attzzined his eighteenth year
a t the time of his father's death, and in consequence of this the
Afghan chiefs declared that he was not competent to succeed him.
Their uncle, Mir Abdullah, was therefore placed at the head of
affairs, but the expectations which had been raised by the bpld and
characteristic conduct of his brother were not realised by him :
his first act was to open a conference with the Persian government, whose suzerainty he agreed to admit, and also to pay a
tribute, if the Shah would give him the government of Kandahar, make it hereditary in his family,' and withdraw the Persian
garrisons from the principality.
Two years were consumed in these disgraceful negotiations,
and, though the projects of Mir Abdullah were b ~ imperfectly
~ t
known to the Afghans, they were mistrustful of his intentions, and
opposed him as best they could ; but when these projects came to
be revealed to them by the Persians, who in so doing hoped to sow
the seeds of dissension amongst them, they were in the highest
degree indignant.
The eldest son of Nir Weis, who was already distinguished by
many of the qualities the Afghans had admired in his father, and
who, though so young, had displayed daring acts of courage bordering on rashness when engaged with the Persians, took advantage of the discontent which the interested conduct of his uncle
had given rise to in the minds of his countrymen, and seized the
sovereign power of which he thought he had been unjustly deprived.
The unpopularity of Mir Abdullah made his success easy ; he
attacked his house with only fifty men, killed him with his own
hand, and made the Afghan chiefs then a t Kandahar elect him
governor in the room of his murdered relative. The people thernselves demanded his election, which, however, was not agreeable to
a few ambitious Serdars ; but when they saw the young chief had
obtained the general support of the nation, they adhered to the new
order of things.
Abdullah Khan, the I-Ieratee, gives a different account of the
motives which led to this murder of the Mir. Abdullah, observes
that historian, was less active, less impetuous, but not less intelli-.
gent and prudent than his brother Mir Weis. After the death of

the latter several Ghildjzye chiefs talked openly of their intention
to dictate to those in power ; the seeds of much discord had also been
sown amongst the tribes, and Mir Abdullah was perfectly aware that
he could not expect to retain the sovereign authority in any degree
of tranquillity unless he could prevent new hoslilities on the part
of Persia. T h e negotiations therefore which he had entered into
with the Shah had only that object in view, and there is no doubt that
whenever he had found himself able to do so he would have thrown
off a vassalage the light fetters of' which he now consented to wear.
T h e fiery Afghans could not understand the wisdom of this system,
and the constant oppusition of his nephew Mahmood finished by
lowering his influence with the Serdars, several of whom hoped
and were desirous of occupying his position themselves. T h e
Mir's death was as unjust as it was to be regretted, and the more
to b e deplored, as his successor displayed warlike qualities only,
which led to the decimation of the tribes, and weakened them to
such a degree that, under the reign of Nadir Shah, they again fell
under the Persian yoke. The power also after Mahmood's time
passed into the hands of the Abdalee tribe-to the injury of the
Ghildjzyes, who had been the first to proclaim and establish the
independence of the Afghan nation.
A t about the period when Mir Weis died, the population of
Herat tried also to withdraw from their allegiance to the Seffaveans. T h e Khorassians, of whom it was for the most part
composed, had obtained from Nadir Shah the privilege of being
governed by their own chiefs. Alayar I<han, who was governor
of the province a t the time of Roostem Khan's defeat, though not
declaring himself independent as Mir Weis had done, acknowledged only from that time a nominal submission to the Persian
court; but whether the Persian garrison of Herat, though very
small, still inspired him with awe, or whether he hoped by cunning
and temporising finally to become completely independent, he
continued to keep up appearances, and observe a respectful bearing towards the Shah Hoosein ; and as anarchy reigned in several
Persian provinces, he thought the monarch might possibly look
upon these faint proofs of his obedience as submission.
Alayar Khan, as well as Mir Weis, with whom he had secretly
allied himself in a common determination to resist the Shah, died
before he could put into execution the plans which he had conceived. T h e court of Persia appointed Zeman Khan, Koortchee

.
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Bashee, his successor. This officer, who commanded the troops
quartered in the province of EIernt, was instructed to reinforce his
division by enlisting all the volunteers in the locality and march
against Mir Abdullali. If this chief had been as prudent as his
predecessor, he might have hoped, if not to obtain a positive and
complete success against the rebels in the south, at least some
advantages which would, without doubt, have prevented Mir Mahmood from undertaking the expedition which he made some time
after in Persia ; but Zeman was a dull and dissipated man, and
had not the tact to foment the elements of discord which existed
amongst the Afghans. The Abdalee tribe, almost the whole of
which was settled in his government, were the hereditary enemies
of the Ghildjzyes, and might have been led against them with
success ; but he had affronted thcm, and was obliged to take the
field with a weak corps-d'arme'e composed almost entirely of Persians. Neither the importance of the undertaking he had to carry
out, nor the burden of the responsibility which rested upon him,
operated as any restraint upon his conduct, and his excesses were
such that they effected his ruin even before he was in presence of
the enemy.
A short time before this a branch of the Suddozye tribe had
established itself in the neighbourhood of Suklrur, and their chief,
Heyat Sultan, anxious to obtain certain favours from Zeman
Khan, committed a most fearful outrage against his own son. Incredible as it may appear, he sent Assad Ullah, a young and beautiful lad, to this wretch in human shape for an infamous purpose.
The crime accomplished, the unfortunate youth took the first
opportunity of making his escape from the Persian camp, and, returning to his tribe, which shared with him the feelings of fby that
animated their young chief, they determined upon taking a d'eep
revenge. Assad's first step was to seize his vile and unnatural
parent and imprison him in a fortress, after which, accompanied
by a few thousand horsemen, he skltrted in pursuit of Zeman Khan,
and such was the rapidity of his movements, that he surprised the
Persian commander at midnight in the district of Zemindavar,
before he had received the slightest intimation of his being in
arms, attacked with great bravery and impetuossty the weary and
sleeping troops, and put them nearly all to the sword. T h e villain
who had so deeply injured him was the first that fell, and by the hand
of Assad ; after which the victorious youth marched on Herat,
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and, having obtained an entrance to the city, exterminated the few
Persians he found there. After this he again took the field, and
made himself, dmost without opposition, master of the whole province, which, on the 26th of Ramazan, 1716, he constituted an independent principality.
A s to the Persian troops which had succeeded in effecting their
escape from the massacre at Zemindavar, finding themselves without a commander, they disbanded, and returned to Ispahan. All
that the government could do to induce them to return to Afghanistan under a new general was ineffectual ; they rcfused to march ;
and the Shah Sultan Hoosein was under the necessity of relinquishing his project for bringing that country again under his
dominion. Assad Ullah Khan raised himself to power about a
year before the period at which Mir Mahmood became by the:
murder of his uncle Prince of Kandahar.
Persia, already so much weakened by the loss of two of her
finest provinces and three armies, ravaged by the Uzbeks, menaced
by Turkey and Russia, and governed by a degraded and superstitious court who ruled the feeble Sultan EIoosein, had no little
difficulty in making a stand against so many disasters. Nevertheless, the Persian monarch made a last effort, and in 1719 raised
an army of 35,000 men, well provided with artillery, which he
placed under the orders of Sefi Kooli Khan, a general of reputed talent, to whom he allotted the task of driving back in
the first instance the Uzbeks, and then of reducing Herat and
Kandahar.
T h e Khan obtained an easy victory over the undisciplined
hordes of Uzbeks, who, badly armed and badly led, having pillage
only in prospect, and not the permanent occupation of Khorassan,
took to flight a t the first shock of the Persian army. Puffed up
with pride a t a success thus easily obtained, Sefi Rooli Khan
pompously announced his intention to exterminate the rebel Afghans, to whom he sent an imperious order to come to his camp and
implore his mercy. On the receipt of this message, Assad Ullah
Khan moved forward to meet him at the head of 12,000 Afghans
and Hazarahs, and, in spite of the disproportion of the two armies,
attacked him directly. The Afghans were armed only with bad
swords and worse matchloclrs, but they did not hesitate to face the
fire of the formidable Persian artillery, and maintained during a
whole day a most obstinate combat, in which 3000 of their best
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troops lost their lives. The victory was still undecided at sunset,
when by some accident never accounted for a dreadful explosion
took place amongst the Persian artillery. This caused an instantaneous panic in their army, and they took to flight, leaving on the
field of battle a11 their baggage and the greater part of their guns.
Sefi Kooli Khan and several members of his family, together
with a large number of chiefs as well as 20,000 Persian soldiers,
were slain in this battle fought near the village of Kariz.
This victory decided the fortunes of the Afghans. Independence
was henceforward theirs, and the power, but half-established,
of Assad Ullah Khan was consolidated, not only in Uerat, but
also through the greatest part of Khorassan, of which he took
possession, with the exception of Meshed, its capital, and that resisted all his attacks. Seeing,that his efforts to reduce it were
ineffectual, he was satisfied with keeping a watch upon it, and
marched to the south of his territories, in order to extend them in
that direction. H e seized, in the first instance, upon Subzawar,
and afterwards moved on Furah, to which place he laid siege,
when he was attacked by Mir Mahmood of Kandahar, who thought
these proceedings might be detrimental to his own interest, more
particularly as Assad Ullah exhibited the courage and capacity of
a good general, and belonged to the tribe of the Abdalees, the
rival of his own. But Assad Ullah Khan was unfortunately killed
at the commencement of the battle, a ball having struck him in
the middle of the forehead ; his troops, discouraged, retired to
Herat, where anarchy reigned during several months, until a
Belooch chief of the Seistan, one Mir Xohamed, seized the power
and established order in the city.
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T l i Persian
~
Governnlent, while sending armies to subdue Kandahar,
also employed the arts of negotiation, and tried to deceive successively Mir \TTeis, his brother, and his son, ~ i t hintrigues and
proinises of which Eastern nations are so prodigal. Rut these
chiefs did not fall into the snare prepared for them: nevertheless
Mir Mahmood, w11o put his uncle to death because he had received
certain propositions from the Shah, found somewhat later that this
plan was a good one, and adopted it himself; less, however,
because he was afi-aid of the Shah of Persia, than because he required a fern years of repose to prepare hmself for the invasion
which he had projected against that kingdom. As the victory over
Assad Ullah Khan might awaken the fears of the Persians, and
induce them to march one of their everlasting armies upon him, he
hastened, immediately he had relieved Furrah, to inform Shah
Hooaein that he had attacked the Abdalees only to prevent them
from taldng the town from him, and that it was now entirely at the
disposition of the Shah. The letter which Mir Mahmood sent to
the Sha.h was placed in his hands by the same minister who had
been the accomplice of Mir Weis, and on. t h s occasion he did not
give the lie to h s own bme antecedents. Instead of enlightening
his master on the manifest ambition of the Afghan prince, he did
all that lay in his power to convince him that the ~hildjzyeswere
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excellent vassals, who had rendered him a very great service, and
furthermore that they had only exterminated Gourghin Khan, his
nephew, and the Georgians, on account of the excesses they had
committed, and to deliver themselves from a most odious tyranny.
By such representations he sought not only to revenge himself on
the Georgians, whose chiefs were his most dangerous antagonists,
but also to endeavour to calm the resentment the Shah had always
felt against him, in consequence of the efforts he had made to induce him to give Mir Weis permission to return to Icandahar.
The yoor feeble-minded sovereign, deceived once more, bestowed
upon Mir Mahmood the surname of Hoosein Rooli Rhan (the slave
of Hoosein), and sent him a firman appointir~ghim GovernorGeneral of Kandahar, and making that high office hereditary in his
family. Mir Mahmood accepted these honours with apparent
gratitude and respect, and this good understanding between the
Mir and the Court of Ispahan enabled him to augment in all
. security the force which he intended to employ in carrying out his
ambitious projects. T o clear away, however, all difficulties, he alsu
wrote to the Shah and represented that the Abdalees recently
established in Herat had been in revolt for the last two years
and paid no taxes, and he solicited the Shah's permission to
subdue them. Sultan Hoosein was foolish enough to consent to
this expedition, which Mir Mahmood at once undertook, but, instead of directing his steps to the north, he sent there a small
flying detachment, while he himself marched with the mass of his
army along the banks of the Helmund and seized all the fortresses
on that river, for they commanded the principal roads of the Seistan
leading into Persia. I t is true he took possession in the name of
the Shah, but his secret purpose was tu fortify himself, and to
collect provisions, in order that he might command an easy passage
to the southern provinces, and at a future time with little difficulty
invade the Persian territory. It will be remembered that his father
had travelled through them on his return from Iiandahar, and
the invaluable information which he then collected was now to be
ntilized by his son, whose preparations for this invasion were prolonged up to 1720. But even then his army numbered only
12,000 men ; however, they were all piclced men, inured to war and
hardships of every k i d , and prepared for any eventuality that might
arise. Persia, on the contrary, was a t this time in a most deplorable condition ; everything was in disorder ; and the only emula-,
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tion that could be said to exist at that court was who should exhibit the greatest weakness and degradation. The right of holding
the appointments of the public service, instead of being a privilege
belonging to high birth or a recompense for meritorious services,
was sold to the highest bidder ; the troops, without discipline, received neither instruction nor pay, and, frequently disbanding themselves, pillaged the villages and the caravans. The towns were
infested with thieves, who o~enlyfollowed their villanous profession
with the utmost assurance, knowing they could do so with impunity.
I n short, everything announced the complete decadence of this great
monarchy, which, attacked on all its frontiers, by the Afghans, the
Tartars, the Russians, and the Arabs, seemed likely to become an
easy conquest to the first who should attempt to invade it.
I t was the young Mahmood, breathing vengeance for the miseries
which his country had suffered under the Persian rule, who was the
first that engaged in this difficult enterprise. I n 1720, under the
pretest of attacking Cliedad Khan, a Belooch chief, who with his
nomades was ravaging the province of Kerman, Mahmood placed
himself at the head of his small army, and traversed amidst unheard
of difficulties the arid and desert countries of the south of Persia. On
this march his soldiers were soon decimated by privations and fatigue,
and of the 12,000 men who set out with him only 7000 arrived
under the walls of Kerman, to which he laid siege with a courage
and determination utterly disproportioned to the means of aggression
a t his command. Simultaneously with these operations he again
endeavoured to put the Shah Hoosein on the wrong scent and lull
the vigilance of his government, to which he wrote stating that he
had besieged Kerman merely to force the Governor to furnish his
troops with provisions, and thus repay him the expense of moving
his army in the interest and for the benefit of the Shah of Persia.
Mahmood was joined by a great number of Persian malcontents, who soon filled up the casualties in his army. The town,
hard pressed, held out only for a few days, and then surrendered at
discretion ; nevertheless the victor thought it necessary to punish
the inhabitants for the feeble resistance they had offered, and not
only them but those of the whole district. During four months his
soldiers, gorged with plunder, committed every imaginable excess,
a t the expiration of which time they were attacked and put to
flight by the Persian General Leuft Ali Khan, who marched to the
assistance of the invaded province with a very superior force. The.
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defeat of Mir Mahmood was so complete that he was obliged
to make a rapid retreat to Kandahar, taking with him only a
miserable remnant of that army which had followed him with so
much enthusiasm to the conquest of Persia! Not one man would
perhaps have survived if the evil genius which presided over the
destinies of that empire had not arrested the progress of her victorious commander. Leuft Ali Khan, the only good general the Shah
then had, was, by way of recompense for the brilliant success which
he had just obtained, deprived of his command a d t h r c m into
prison. A court intrigue, originating in the Vizier, brought about
this unjustifiable result, for the letter of Mir Mahmood had been perfidiously misinterpreted by him to the Shah Sultan Hoosein. But if
Mir Mahmood had not been defeated, more important interests would
have obliged him to abandon the province he had just conquered.,
for he received intelligence that his rear was seriously menaced.
Beiram Sultan Lakzee, governor of Funah, and Malek Djaffer
Khan Sistanee, having formed an alliance, succeeded in cxciting a
portion of the province of Kandahar to revolt against his authority.
Supported by a few thousand men, they had even seized upon the
city in the name of Shah Hoosein, but were driven from it by Mir
Roosein, brother of Mir Mahmood. T h e latter therefore hastened
his return, and his presence soon restored order. His reaolution had not been shaken for one instant, for he had reflected, and
wisely,, on all that had passed, and had seen his own faults.
These had arisen rather from ignorance than want of couragethey appeared to him therefore easy of correction : and the bravery
and intelligence which he had shown in his fatal expediti& of 1720
secured for him the obedience and admiration of his soldiers, which
enabled him with little trouble to raise another and a larger army,
one not less enthusiastic than the first. The Afghans of every
tribe, even those living m the provinces of Herat and Kabul as well
as the EIazarahs, hastened with alacrity to the standard of a chief
who promised to enrich them with the spoils of their ancient oppressors. The Belooches settled to the south of the I-Ielmund also
furnished him with a contingent of several thousand men, and he
determined to take an ample revenge for the disasters inflicted
upon him by Leuft .Mi Khan.
After having installed his brother Mir Hoosein as Regent of
Kandahar during his absence, he again entered Persia, in January,
1722, a t the head of an m y of 28,000 men, carrying with him

immense stores of provisions in order to guard against the privations his troops had suffered on his first expedition from the
scarcity of food and forage.
Mir Mahmood opened this campaign by rapidly crossing the
Seistan, and without encountering any obstacle he reached the
fortress of Barn, where he remained for a few days. This fortress he repaired and strcngthened with weat care, and made it
P.
a n immense dep6t of provisions and munit~onsof war. The gasrison Tvas ordered to collect wiclzin its walls all the corn which
the inhabitants of the surrounding country could supply above what
they required for their own use, and also to keep numerous beasts
of burden ready to take the road whenever instructions were given
to that effect. T h e command of this important place was confided
by Mir Mahmood to his relative Noor Ullah Khan, a brave and
energetic man, on whose fidelity he could rely ; and having thus
completed his preparations, he again advanced and arrived before
Iierman, intending to besiege it once more, but the inhabitants
opened the gates almost without offering any resistance : the garrison,
however, in the citadel, composed of picked men, refused to surrender. The commander wrote to the Afghan chief that, if his
object was to. amass great riches and become Shah of Persia, he
would lose his time and ~ ~ e l e s s exhaust
ly
his resources in undertaking the siege of a place that was provisioned for ten years, and
the defenders of which were determined to bury themselves beneath
its ashes rather than capitulate ; but he added that if the Mir chose
to march 'on Ispahan he might accomplish his purpose, and he
offered to give him 18,000 tomauns towards t.he expenses of the
campaign, if he would raise the siege. Mahmood accepted these
conditions, far less because, according to the custom of his country,
i t .saved the honour of his arms, than because he had no heavy
artillery to batter the place-the only guns at his disposal, those
called in Persia zimboorek, being wholly inefficient for this purpose.
Of these he had an hundred carrying a ball of from one to two
pounds, each zimboorek being carried by a camel with the artillelyman who served it.
Directly Mahmood had received the sum agreed upon he moved
upon Ispahan by Yezd, the direct road, and made an attempt to
take the latter town by assault as he passed ; but several attacks having, in spite of the brilliant courage of his soldiers, been vigorously
repulsed, he abandoned this siege also. It was likely to provo
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a lingering affair and occasion him the loss of much precious time,
so he continued his march upon Ispahan without troubling himself
about his rear, for the country was too denuded of the enemy's
troops to give him any anxiety on that subject. As to his line of
operations, that lay wherever provisions could be obtamed, and he
4.
carried with him a pretty large supply, which was renewed from
time to time in the villages on his road. In this manner he arrived
at Guluabad, a village situated ten miles from Ispahan, without
having met one Persian vho attempted to oppose his passage.
I-lere he entrenched his army, which had been somewhat reduced
since its departure from Kandahar by privation and fatigue, as
well as in the combats before Iceman and Yezd ; but these losses
he had repaired by a few thousand Gheber recruits, who were not
less desirous than the Afghans to revenge themselves on their
common oppressors the Persians. Mahmood had still 23,000 combatants under his command when he arrived at Guluabad, but, in
spite of their courage and the advantage they derived from the reputation of their arms, they could have been easily exterminated
if the Persians had possessed the least sentiment of national
feehg, and been animated by the remembrance of the ancient
grandeur of their country; but this debased people learnt from
their weak monarch only how to lament their misfortunes, instead
of warding them off by fighting manfully to prevent them, and it
was not till the last moment, when money and arms were distribnted amongst them, that they decided npon defending the capital
of the empire.
Mir Mahmood's troops arrived at Guluabad in wretched condition : the rags they wore scarcely covered them ; they were destitute
of warlike stores ; mith rare exception, their sabres were the only
arm of which they could make any use, and their light artillery
was unfit for siege purposes. Ispahan, on the contrary, besides its
population, which was at this time estimated at more than 600,000
souls, had a garrison of 60,000 soldiers; the city walls were
strong, and the besieged in possession of a formidable artillery.
Unfortunately, however, the spirit of the army was cowardly and
superstitious, and it was in those days more advantageous for a
minister to deceive and betray the monarch, or flatter his predilection for theological discussions, than to do his duty. One
of his favourite generals, Fath Ali Khan Kadjar, assured Shah
I.Ioosein he had heard from an old woman of Asterabad, who
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was said to be inspired, that two l e e of a he goat, boiled-with
325 peapods in water over which a young virgin had repeated
1200 times " L a illah, illah l'a,"" made a broth which mould render
invisible the men who drank it : the superstitjous monarch therefore
ordered that his troops should be daily supplied with goat-soup
thus prepared. A thousand absurdities equally efficacious were
decreed for a like purpose ; and there were only one or two highminded men who, stimulated by the calamitous state of affairs,
endeavoured to raise the drooping spirits of the garrison ; but owing
to the weakness of the monarch, they and the few followers
who adhered to them soon fell victim to his imbecile conduct.
Traitors alone were listened to and intrusted with the command of
the troops ; there was no mutual understanding between them, and
they daily accumulated acts of cowardice, treason, and folly, one
upon the other.
The Ethemail.:Dooulet, first minister of the Shah, and the Walee
of Arabia, who was General in Chief, were always of opposite
opinions. T h e first asserted that, as they had hitherto done nothing,
but had allowed the Afghans to arrive under the walls of Ispahan,
it would be better to remain on the defensive, and let them wear
themselves out in useless efforts ; but the TValee made light of
the opinion of that eminent personage, and went out nearly every
day skirmishing round the enemy's camp, in a manner, moreover,
that appeared to be much more in the interests of Mir Mahmood
than in those of his sovereign. His subordinate officers committed
similar faults ; sorties were made without judgment or discipline,
and the Persian troops gave ground a t the first onset, while the
rivalry existing amongst the comanders produced d d y collisions
in their army, that frequently ended in bloodshed.
A council of war having been summoned by the King, who
presided in person, it was at length decided that a general attack
should be made upon the Afghans. Mahmood had only twenty
thousand fighting men to withstand the Persians, but, accustomed
to conquer, the power of this force was increased three-fold by
their own courage : they heeded not the numbers of the enemy, and
b h d l y obeyed a prince who possessed all their sympathies, and
who had the command entirely in his own hands; while the
Persians, being formed into several divisions, all independent one of
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the other, and receiving different orders, were essentially deficient
in combination and resolution, the chief elements of military success.
~t daybreak on the 8th of April, 1721, the Persians left the city
in great confusion to attack the Afghan camp. The Ethemad
Dooulet and the Walee of Arabia had not been able to come to an
understanding as to the order of battle, and were no better weed
in opinion as to the attack ; thus each of them commenced with the
corps-d'arme'e under his command, and in accordance with his own
individual ideas, without dreaming of the mutual support they
ought to afford to each other when required.
A t first the Ethemad Dooulct remained inactive, and, advantageously posted on the defensive, waited for the Afshans to advance, and
this plan was approved by the majority of the other generals. But the
Walee, s man of little reflection and of an ardent temper, looked upon
this inaction as disgraceful, and, without listening to the advice of his
colleagues, exclaimed, " W e are not here to deliberate, but to fight.''
With these words he galloped forward to his men, who poured
down upon the left flank, which gave way at the first onset. I t now
required a slight effort only to turn the Afghans and put them to a
complete rout ; but the Arabs, far more anxiuus for plunder than for
glory, rushed into the camp of Mir Mahmood and began the work of
pillage. The Ethemad Dooulet, observing the W d e e thus engaged,
fell upon the Afghan right, which was moving up to attack the Arabs ;
but Aman Ullah Khan, the most talented of Rilir Mahmood's lieutenants, who commanded this ving, perceiving his intention, faced
about, and for some time retired before the Persians ; then suddenly
h+ing, he opened his squadrons and unmasked his one hundred
zimbooreks, which instantly sent forth a hail of balls into their ranks.
The enemy, instead of rushing at once upon the guns, which could
not have been reloaded in time for another discharge, suddenly
halted, and finally decamped. Aman Ullah, seizing the propitious
moment without hesitation, fell upon the fugitives with his cavalry,
and made a terrific carnage ; their artillery, consisting of twentyfour pieces of large calibre, which they had placed in their rear,
were also captured, and turned against the royal army. From
that moment the rout of the Persians was complete, and the soldiers,
instead of entering Ispahan, regained each his own province, and
there waited the issue of events. T h e Afghans obtained an immense booty in this battle, in which 25,000 Persians remained upon
the field: amongst them was Roostem Khan Gooulaye Agassee,
I
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chief of the slaves, and Ahmed Khan, General in Chief of the
Artillery, two of the most important officers in the army.
This event spread the greatest consternation in lspahan, and the
Shah held another council of war, at which the Ethemad Doo~det
proposed that the Icing should leave the capital without delay, and
retire to Karsbeen, from whence he could make an appeal to his
faithful subjects, raise a powerful army, and, returning, rescue
Ispahan from the Afghan invaders. The Walee of Arabia, whose
troops had bchaved so ill in the last battle, and had been the
cause of the defeat, again held a different opinion, which obtained
with the feeble monarch, who, influenced by traitors and cowards,
blindly consented to his own ruin. H e gave the JqTalee the supreme
command of his army ;but in thus concentrating the power into one
hand he did not succeed in imparting greater unity to the subsequent operations. The successive reverses which overwhelmed
the Persians, instead of opening the eyes of the Shah to the incapacity of his general, served only to increase his absurd caprices,
which always ended in partial defeats, and eventually so decimated
and discouraged his army, that the troops were afraid to expose
themselves bcyond the walls of the city.
While the Shah Hooscin confided the destinies of. lns empire to
a man so little worthy of this trust, &Iir Mahmood, though a aonqueror, was a prey to the most cruel anxiety, for the number of
his troops diminished without his having the power to recruit
them ; a turn of fortune in favour of the Persians might place
him in a most criticd position ; and a t one moment such was
his indecision that he ceased to give any orders to his gcnerals. Finding that Ispahan did not surrender after the victory
he had gained, he was on the point of retiring to Kerman to
reorganize his army ; but having been informed of the alarm
which reigned in the city, and that provisions were running
short, his hopes again revived, and another motive arose to dissuade him from fulfilling his intention of retreating. Instead of
preserving that firmness of demeanour, which will frequently sustain a drooping cause, instead of energetically battling with his
enemy, the Shah Sultan Hoosein was seen to drag the imperial
purple through the mire, and, following the example of his governor of Rerman, beseech his enemy to accept immense sums
of money to evacuate the Persian territory. I t was evident that
his proposition originated in fear and discouragement ; and
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Mir &Iahmood was convinced that he should soon be master of
the city if he persevered in the investment of the place. He
hourly saw the Persian generals committing the grossest faults,
and neglecting to take the most simple measures for their preservation. I-Ie knew that imprudent and ignorant counsellors gave
the Shah advice which must infallibly lead to his destruction ; and
these circumstances determined him to a h n d o n his project of
retreat and press the Persians with additional vigour.
The errors, or rather the treachery, of the Persian nobles,
enabled Mahmood to surround the city by a line of circumvallation,
which it would have been impossible to defend with his small army
if the \JTalee had made the least effort to dislodge him ; but he sent
a succession of feeble detachments against the Afghans, which,
badly directed, failed in every attack. Ferahabad and Djulfa,
abandoned by the TTTalee, were now taken by assault, and, regardless of the heroic resistance of their inhabitants, the general in
chief made not the least demonstration in their favour ; it was
supposed that the fanaticism of this barbarian was gratified by the
ruin of Djulfa, for it was inhabited by Armenian Christians. I n
short, the Walee and his troops always moved in the direction
where the enemy was not ; and if .he did meet the Afghans, he was
sure to retreat under some frivolous pretext or other ; he boasted
in loud terms, when in presence of the Shah, but always remained
in a state of inaction when he ought to have shown energy and
determination.
Feeling that he was victorious on all points, Mahmood drew
closer the line of circumvallation in which he held the Persians,
who made not the least attempt to check his operations : debased
by the tyranny and superstitious bigotry of the court, they became
utterly helpless ; while the Afghans, elated by their success, and
possessing all the elan of a people who had recovered their liberty,
fought with the greatest enthusiasm. They carefully guarded the
roads, intercepted the convoys of provisions that endeavoured to
enter the capital, and laid waste the environs with fire and sword,
preserving only what was necessary for themselves; until this
country, hitherto so fertile, became an arid desert on which nothing
could be seen but the bleached skeletons of men and horses, and
the charred ruins of forsaken villages.
At the commencement of the war the rural population, harassed
and plundered, flocked to the capital, where they were of no use in
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the defence, and their presence only increased the scarcity, which
soon became extreme, and many thousands of the famished citizens
of Ispahan let themselves down from the ramparts and fled from
the city, hoping to reach some other province where food was in
abundance, But the Afghans, who closely watched their movements, slaughtered them without remorse, and but a veiy few
succeeded in effecting their escape ; nevertheless the bare possibility of doing so induced crowds of them daily to make the
hazardous attempt. Heaps of human bodies were seen here and
there wanting the common rights of sepultwe, while maziy more
floated on the surface of the Zendehrood, the tainted waters of
which were no longer fit for the ordinary purposes of life ; and at
length even these did not reach the capital, for the Afghans cut off
the canals which supplied the city; the tanks were insufficient to
meet the general consumption, and thirst was superadded to the
pangs of hunger. Provisions of all kinds were soon exhausted ; the
few camels and other b e s t s of burden which remained were sold
at so high a price that the great men about t,he court could alone
purchase any animal food; and the people were reduced to such
extremities that they were compelled to give chase to the most
unclean animals, which by their religion they were forbidden not
only to eat, but even to touch. A t night the inhabitants of one
quarter made incursions into other parts of the city to search for
provisions supposed to be concealed, and frequent scenes of'violence and bloodshed were the result ; for here the father was often
found armed against his son, and brother against brother; all
affection was banished amongst the members of the same family ;
they looked upon each other as deadly enemies, and fought
for the wretched scraps of food they had perchance procured.
At length meat of every kind disappeared, and the trees were
stripped of their leaves and bark to satisfy the cravings of these
miserable beings, who, searching the very dunghills and common sewers, lived upon any soft substance, whatever it might
happen to be, which they found there. Old pieces of leather
were soaked, boiled, and eaten with avidity ; the plaster from
the walls, mixed with sawdust, also offered them another species of food which was sometimes the object of angry dispute
even to the d.eath. The population of Ispahan, so 'healthy, lighthearted, and rich a few months before, now presented the spectacle
of a mob of attenuated creatures, wan and of a sinister aspect,
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scarcely able to drag themselves along the streets and public
places, that were covered with the corpses 'of their countrymen,
and. which, horrible to relate, were sometimes eaten to alleviate
the terrible pangs of hunger. Many put an end to their own
existence to avoid these sufferings. Amidst. all this appalling
misery the people evinced to the last their devotion to their King,
who assured them of the speedy arrival of his son Thamasp. This
prince had succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the Afghans,
and gone to the north of the empire, where he expected to raise
an army and march to the relief of Ispahan ; but five montlis
having elapsed without any tidings of him reaching the capital, its
inhabitants despaired of his return, and besought the Shah to bring
their calapities to a close. This prince, more weak'than ill-intentioned, afflicted with the fearful condition of his subjects, determined
to put an end to it ; besides, it was utterly impossible that he could
prolong the defence. All his armies had been destroyed, the
few soldiers that remained in Persia were in distant provinces, and
many of them in the interest of ambitious chiefs, who, profiting
by the miserable state of their country, united with each other to
create an independent power.
Eight months had elapsed from the commencement of the siege,
when, on the 14th of Sefer, 1135 of the Hejira, and 23rd October,
1722, the Shah Sultan Hoosein left the city, escorted by the great
officers of his court, and arrived at the camp of Mir Mahmood,
in whose favour he publicly abdicated the throne, and with all
solemnity delivered to him the sword and crown of the Seffaveans, the attributes of lus power as monarch of the Persian
empire. T h e same day the invader took military possession of the
arsenals and other public establishments, but it was not till five
days after that he made his triumphant entry into Ispahan. Hi
first act was to assign a place of residence to the fallen Shah, and
; his second, to order
a sufficient pension to meet his req~~irements
a general massacre of the troops remaining within the city, not so
much with a view of taking revenge upon them for the resistance
they had made, as to strike terror into those who, under the command
of the Prince Thamasp, might be tempted to renew the contest.
This massacre continued during three days, after which Mir Mahmood ordered it should cease, and occupied himself in restoring
tranquillity and security in the capital. Having very little confidence in the administrative powers of the Afghans, who, up to this
E
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period, haci never taken part in public affairs, and not daring to
,.
place any faith in the Persians so recently subjected to his rule, the
N i r appointed two officers at the head of each department of the
administration-an Afghan and a Fersian ; the former to watch
the latter, alld a t the same time acquire from him a11 that it was
useful for him to know.
T h e measures taken by 31ir Mahmood to protect the vanquished
from insult, the severe discipline he observed in his army, and the
even-handed justice he dealt out to every one, soon acquired for
him the esteem of the Persians. The Persian chiefs, who, traitors
to their king, had furnished him with information during the siege,
he treated with the greatest severity ; he, nevertheless, made an ,
exception in fayour of the Walee of Arabia, whose life he spared
in conformity with a vow that he had made so to do if he should
.
come victorious out of the contest ; and in order not to give any
opportunity for a false interpretation to the motives mhich dictated
this, he loaded with favours those who had remained faithful to the
,
,:
fortunes of the Shah I-Ioosein.
U p to the day on which Mir Mahmood attained a position so
elevated, his conduct was that of a man animated by magnanimous
sentiments ; but, from the time he felt securely seated on the
a throne of the Sefkveans, he adopted a line of conduct which tar<
" nished the glory of his previous career; the innate ferocity of the
.L
Afghan, suppressed for a time, soon reassumed its empire over his
mind; he became suspicious and even cruel towards those who had
'i
served him with the greatest fidelity. But, in spite of his tyranny,
he endeavoured to tranquillise Persia by his judicious administra.i
tion, and to extend his doininion over those provinces which had
*'
not recognised his a~~thority.H e wo~dd,perhaps, have succeeded,
?
but for the change which had taken place in his character, and
which became every day more and more cruel.
-*
*.
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AFTERthe abdication of his father in 1722, the Prince Thamasp
Mirza assumed the title of Shah at Ihsbeen ; but when Mir Mahmood despatched an army against him, the prince fled at its
approach, and retired into the Azerbaidjan. The inhabitants of
Rasbeen, seeing themselves thus abandoned, immediately made
their submission to the Afghans, to whom they gave a most
fiendly reception. T h e invaders reciprocated this feeling, and
appeared desirous of being on the best terms with them ; but, after
they had been some time in the town, renewed the scenes of carnage which took place at Ispahan, and during three days gave the
reins to their .passion for murder and pillage. The Kasbeenians,
finding that submission had not disarmed the vengeance of their
conquerors, assembled in arms after the first moment of surprise, massacred-in their turn nearly half the Afghans, and drove
the remainder from the city. The survivors at once dispersed ;
some of them regaining Ispahan, .while others followed the Serdar
Aman Ullah Khan, and Wi EchreE, the cousin of Mahmood.
These.two Afghan chiefs h-ad, more than any others, contributed t a
E 2
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the victories and elevation of the .son of Mir Weis ; but Mahmood,
jealous of' their popularity, instead of recompensing them for their
services, basely accused them of treachery ancl threatened tliem
with death, fi-om wh'ich they escaped to Icandahar.
Mir 31ahmood Fas highly incensed a t the defeat his troops sustained at Icasbeen, and not less so at the defection of the two
serdars; he mas also apprehensive that the Persian nobles whom
he had retained at his court might attempt to overthrow him 01:
take his life, and thought, therefore, that, having merely a small
body of troops to make a stand against a general revolt, terror
alone could retain the Persians in obedience. Well convinced of
this, he determined upon adopting the most barbarous measures, and,
having succeeded in reconciling himself with Aman U1la.h Khan,
turned that circumstance to account by making it the opportunity for holding a great festival. T o this he invited all the Persian
dignitaries of rank and other persons of note in Ispahan, who,
anxious t o please their new sovereign, and entertaining no suspicion
of his villanow design, accepted his invitation, and arrived at the
palace to the number of one hundred and fourteen, but, instead of
the banquet which they had expected, they found Afghan troops
posted in the royal gardens, who, in conformity with the orders they
had received, put them all to death. This horrible butchery accomplished, the soldiers spread themselves over the city, and slaughtered,
to the number of several thousands, the near relatives of the victims,
as well as a great number of syuds ancl ulemas of the capital. I t
was only when this bloody tragedy had been played out that
Mahmood's fury was temporarily appeased. Two days after, five
hundred youths, of the first families in the Icingdom, and who
within the walls of thcir colleges had escaped this massacre, were
taken from thence into the country, and hunted down like deer, the
Afghans piercing them through with their jkreeds as t.hey fled
terror-stricken across the plain. Not long after, three thousand
Persians, who had taken service in the tyrant's army, experienced
a similar fate; they were suddenly attacked a t a banquet whic.h
he gave them, and, being unarmed, were extermii~ated to a man.
Finally, he put to death every Persian who had held any employment or received any favours from the Shah's government.
These horrible proceeclings, which lasted 'during a month, plunged
all the first families of the country into -the depths of despair, and
denuded Ispahan of half its population ; the carnage subsequently
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extended itself to the provinces, and murder, pillage, and clesolation reigned on all sides.
At length the cruelties of Nir Nahmood became a species of
madness, but the ~ e r s i a n iuttedy debased, did not attempt to
deliver themselves from his frightful tyranny. I n the midst of
these sanguinary scenes they lay prostrate a t . the feet of him who
had but yesterday deprived them of a father, a brother, a son, or a
friend, and, while waiting till they received the same fate at his
hands, were vile and degraded enough to submit to be used as the
instruments of his ferocious n a t ~ ~ r e .But the torrents of blood thus
shed brought no sense of security to Mir Nahmood, and his position was certainly'well calculated to inspire him with uneasiness.
Thamasp Mirza had recently been acknowledged Shah by the
of Azerbaidjan, and a party which began to be powerful
in that province had pronounced in his favour, and threatened to
march, at no distant date, upon Ispahan. On the other hand, the
Turks and the Russians, talring advantage of the distracted state
of Pe~.sia,had seized upon Armenia, Georgia, Guilan, Ihrclistan,
and a part of Iralr, ancl made further di~positionsfor advancing
towards the south. The army of Mahmood numbercd only at this
time a few thousand Afghans ; it is true, their name alone was in
itself sufficient to make the ~~onquered
tremble ; but the ranks
of these. hardy and ferocious soldiers were daily thinned, and everything indicated that they would not be able to rcsist the storm
*
which was gathering against them in the north.
All these considerations, and the retirement uf ~ i Echreff,
r
a
chief beloved by the troops, led to ,much desertion amongst the
Afghans ; the most devoted servants and the nearest relatives of Jlir
Mahmood fled from the effects of his tyranny, and he soon found
himself isolated in the midst of his court. I n this extremity he
recruited his army with Kurds, who, as well as the Afghans, were
Soonees, thinking that he could rely more upon them than upon
the. Persians, who were of the hostile sect of Shiahs. H e thus raised
a new army, with which, in 1724, he took possession of several
districts in Irak and Fars, though Shiraz, the capital of the latter
province, did not surrender until it had stood a siege of eight
months ancl suffered all the horro~sof famine.
But the Afghan nation were not dazzled by these successes. .
Mahmood never regained their confidence, and such was the impression his actions had produced that the reinforcements he had
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haughtily demanded from Kandtthar arrived but tardily, and
amounted only to the tenth part of what he anticipated, for no one
would serve a prince who hdd clelivered then1 from the Persian yoke
only to impose a more cruel and despotic tyranny of his own. The
Serdar Jfir Echreff was at the head of these troops, and they
insisted that 11e should be confirmed in his command as the absolute condition of their services. Mir Xahmoorl the more readily
complied with this request, because, having been abandoned by
his principal officers, the co-operation of his cousin had become a n
absolute necessity for him, not only to direct the military operations, which, by reason of his bad state of health, he was unable to
conduct, but also to retain in Persia, through his influence, many
Afghans who would otherwise have left the country. O n the
arrival of this reinforcement Mir Mahmood marched upon Yezd,
which he attempted to seize, but he was not fortunate in this
enterprise. H e issued orders to his troops which it was impossible to execute, and derangement of his intellectual faculties
was clearly manifested upon this occasion; his eccentricities were
very nearly causing a revolt in his army, which, indignant a t
the losses it had sustained without obtaining any corresponding
success, obliged him to raise the siege and return to Ispahan.
This check soured and excited him, and his irascible nature
was still more aggravated by the unreasonable demands of his
officers, who were supported by the troops. Alarmed also a t the
progress of Thamasp Xirza, the Russians, and the Turks, and a
prey to remorse, his mind was filled with visions of his victims
ready to torment him, so that he abandoned himself to superstitious devotion in the most exaggerated form; he shut himself up in a subterraneous cell, observing the strictest fast, and
when, at the end of two months, he left this retreat, he was in such
a state that h e could scarcely be recognised. Livid, emaciated,
and his features contracted, he seemed to dread the light of day,
and reappeared more fearful and more cruel than ever ; haunted by
the darkest suspicions, gloomy and taciturn, he shuddered a t the approach of his best friends, dreading to find in every one an assassin.
During one of the paroxysms of his disease he was informed
that the sons of the Shah Sultan Hoosein had made an attempt to
escape, when, trembling with rage at this intelligence, he ordered
them all to be brought into his presence, and, drawing his poignard,
put thirty-one of them to death with his own hand. Their unfor-
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tunate father, hearing their cries, broke through the guards, and,
to the scene of carnage, endeavowed to protect them at
the risk of his own life ; a blow from Mahmood's dagger wounded
him in the arm, and the sight of his blood alone recalled the Mir
to himself, and induced him to spare two of the princes, still very
young, the only ones that escaped from this fearful massacre. His
insania was at length complete: to this were added an att,ack of
paralysis, a painful disease of the intestines, and want of sleep, and
in this condition he sometimes tore pieces of flesh from his body,
and devoured them. His mother, as some say, in despair a t his
sufferings-or Mir Echreff, as others affirm, to obtain the power to
which he was called by the general wish of the Afghans-ordered
him to be smothered under the cushions of his own divan ; his remains were thrown to the jaclrals. But whoever gave the order for
the death of i\Iahmood, it is certain that this prince was still alive
when the Afghans acknowledged Mir Echreff as their sovereign.
The antecedents of this young soldier and his brilliant qualities,
in no way inferior to those of his predecessor during the first years
of his reign, raised great hopes of him in the minds of his subjects.
Accordingly, he applied himself earnestly to the task of mitigating
the misery inflicted by his relative, and expressed publicly the
horror he felt at the merciless deeds which had rendered the very
name of Afghan odious ; he paid the greatest honours to the remains of the sons of the Shah S a t a n Hoosein by magnificent
funeral rites, at the close of which he declared to the assembled
Afghan and Persian nobles that he devoted the memory of Mahmood to the execration of future ages. I n short, he did everything
in his power to attach the Persians to his interests, and bestowed
favours upon them, even to the detriment of the Afghans. T h e
latter were not long in perceiving that they had chosen a master
who was quite determined to take every advantage of the power
they had just placed in his hands, for his first act was to. put the
Serdar Aman Ullah Khan to death. This brave but ambitious
general of Mir hahmood, as well as several other chiefs, had done
everything to prevent his election, and he was also suspected of
holding a secret correspondence with Shah Thamasp. No real
crime could be imputed to them, but Mir Echreff'thougbt their deaths
necessary to his security. H e confiucated to his own profit the
wealth which they had accnmulated during the conquest of Persia,
and this enabled him to meet the immediate necessities consequent

,

56

THE R U S S I ~ SAND TURKS.

CHAP.

V.

upon his succession and the embarrassments that met him on all
sides.
Echreff entertained no clelusions on the difficulty of his position.
It was evident that he must put an end to the divisions amongst his
own people, and obtain the confidence of the Persians ; he had also
to repel the invasion of the Russians,- who had seized upon the
Guilan ; that of the Turks, already masters of Georgia, the Azerbaidjan, Kurdistan, and part of Iralc ; and finally bo subdue the
party of Thamasp Mirza, which had been organised in the south of
the Azerbaidjnn and the Mazanderan. This prince was the only
one of the t h e e surviving sons of the Shah I-Ioosein, who was then
in possession of his liberty : by the abdication of his father he considered himself King of Persia, and had, as Shah, treated with the
Russian and Turkish governments. T o the first he had pro~nisecl
the cession of the provinces borclering on the Caspian ; and to the
second, the countries they h d already seized, on condition that they
assisted him in regaining the throne of his fathers. Agreeably to
the terms of this treaty, which accorded so well with the views of
territorial aggrandizement projected by the remarkable sovereign
who then reigned in Russia, the army of Peter the Great disembarked in the Guilan, and there established itself; and as everything denoted that the Russian generals did not intend to leave the
positions they had taken up, Echreff turned his first efforts against
the Turks. I n his entleavours to establish peace he a t first tried
what he could effect by negotiation, offering to make great sacrifices
to obtain that result. But the Sultan, Ahmed Khan, seeing the
state of anarchy that reigned in Persia, determined to retain the
provinces already mentioned; the negotiations, therefore, were
broken off, and h e ordered,Ahmed Pasha, the Walee of Bagdad,
and Hoosein Pasha, the Walee of Mosul, with the troops nnder their
command, to' converge fiwt oil Kernlanshah, and afterwards to
concentrate them on Hamadan. These two towns were already
occupied by detachments of the Turkish army under the orders of
S b d u l Rahman Pasha. The Walee of Bagdad, who had the command in chief, was instructed to send a flag of truce to Mir
Echreff directly his army had assembled at EIamaclan, and imperatively demand that the Shah Hoosein and his sons, at this time
imprisoned in the fort of Teberruk, a t Ispahan, should be set a t
liberty. I-le mas also to insist upon the immediate evacuation of
the Persian territory by the Afghans, as well as the restitution of

.

~1 the treasure they had laid their hands on during their occupation.
The rejection of any one of these conditions was to be followed by
a declaration of war.* And in this manner the matter terminated,
for the Turkish envoy was unable to come to any understanding
Mir Echreff. Ahmed Pasha took the field with an army of
60,000 men and 70 pieces of artillery, and marched direct u-pon
Ispahan. Echreff met him about four days' march from the capital,
his army not being half as numerous as that of the Turks, and very
ill provided with artillery. A battle was fought a t Kiemereh, a
town situated behreen Ispahan and Boroodjird, and the victory was
for a long time undecided, but at length the Turks were routed,
leaving 12,000 men upon the field, and 50 pieces of cannon ; the
baggage also fell into the hands of the Afghans. Echreff showed
himself as great after the victory as he had been reasonable and
moderate during the negotiations, and, retaining only the arms,
returned all the booty his soldiers had made to the Turks. T o
Alimed Pasha he wrote that he could not consider as legitimate
spoils of war the plunder he had taken from misguided Mussulrnans ;
,that his greatest desire was to live in peace with his brethren; that
he trusted the Scltan would not again disturb him in the possession
of a throne which he had taken from heretics, and to which he had an
incontestable right by every law, human and divine. This .generous
conduct, and the cession -to the Turks of the districts or Tauris,
Zinguian, Sultanieh, Tefrich, Ferahane, Kezaz, Ihrdistan, Looristan, and Koozistan, as well as admitting the religious supremacy
of the Sultan, which Mir Echreff engaged to aclrnowledge in future,
induced the Turks to make peace. This he ardently desired, for he had
to contend with immeasurable difficulties ; and in these negotiations
with the Turks, as well as his conduct in the field, Echreff displayed
the talents of a consummate diplomatist and a first-rate &neia3.
H e obtained from Turkey the formal recognition of his right to the
throne of Persia : and the year following, the Sultan ~ h k e dKhan
sent Reshid Pasha to congratulate the Afghan chief on his accession to the throne. Echreff afterwards sent Mohamed Khan, a

* Abdullah Khan, the historian of
Herat, remarks in his manuscript, that
Echreff was so thoroughly indignant a t
the insolence of this message, that immediately after the receipt of it he
ordered the Shah Hoosein and his sons
to be beheaded in the presence of the
Turkish envoy; but as Abdnllnh Khan

is the only eastern authority which
records the death of the Shah Sultan
Hoosein as having taken place at this
epoch, I thought it right to mention
the circumstance in a note, adopting
myself t.he opinion more generally accredited.-Femw.
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Beloochee, to acknowledge the compliment, and he was received at
Constantinople with great honours.
I n consequence of the treaty thus concluded between Echreff and
the Sultan, the Prince Thamasp was left to his own resources ; and
mhen the Turks entered the Azerbaidjan he evacuated that province, followed by a few devoted adherents. Subseqnently to this
he again took possession of Kasbeen and Teheran, and in these
cities he resided alternately ; but no sooner had Echreff got rid of
the Turks than he marched against and completely defeated the
Prince, forcing him to retire into the Mazanderan. Nevertheless
the troops of Thamasp refused to surrender Kasbeen and Teheran
to the victor, who, called to Ispahan by the urgency of his a.ffairs,
left an army to prosecute the sieges under the command of the
Serdar Seidel Khan Nassaree, who soon reduced these cities.
While Echreff was courageously fighting in Persia to establish
his power, he lost his hold upon Kandahar, q-hich remained definitively in the hands of Mir Hoosein, a brother of Mir Mahmood,
whom he had endeavoured to overthrow by an intrigue. I n the
Seistan, the governor Malelc Mahmood, a descendant of the ancient
Persian sovereigns, had taken the title of king, and subsequently
seized upon the greater part of Khora.ssan. Herat had aclrnowleclged his authority for many years past, so that the Afghans were.
driven out in this direction. These changes were the cause of
further complications amongst the chiefs, between whom,there was
already anything but a good underatauding.
It was, therefore, evident to Echreff that there was no hope of
his being assisted by his own nation, and that for the future he
could reckon only upon those who had, up to this time, followed
his fortunes. H e nom saw, without much regret, the R.ussians
masters of the Guilan ; and when he was convinced that the possession of that province would satisfy their ambition, and that they had
110 intention of disturbing him in Irak, he determined to act with
the utmost energy in the East, where his affairs were much embarrassed ; but before leaving Ispahan he ordered t.he quarter in
which the Afghans resided to be enclosed with high and thick walls,
within which they would be secure against all the vicissitudes of
war. Shah Thamasp, on the other hand, made every effort to
recover the throne of the Seffavyes, and had the good fortune to
secure the services of one of those extraordinary men that Nature
produces only at long intervals. Nadir, subsequently Nadir Shah,
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a powerfill robber-chieftain, offered his services to the son of the
Shah Sultan Hoosein, who accepted them with eagerness. T h e
military reputation of Nadir, to which was now added the authority derived from his position as commander-in-chief of the troops
of the legitimate king, attracted numerous partisans to his camp,
and he soon saw himself at the head of a large and well-disciplined
army inspired by his own peculiar and energetic impulses.
During the years 1726 and 1727 Nadir employed himself in
reconquering that part of Khorassan which Malek Mahmood, the
Prince of Seistan, had seized, and also in taking Herat ; after which
he marched towards Mazanderan, that he might, in concert with
his sovereign, adopt some plan for driving the Afghans from t,he
lmgdom. The capture of the city of Nishapoor, and the slaughter
of 3000 Afghans, was the prelude to this enterprise. After this
he dislodged successively all the Afghan garrisons in Khorassan,
and drove them from post to post, until they had entirely evacuated
this province, which soon acknowledged, and to the fullest extent,
the authority of the Shah Thamasp.
While Nadir was thus occupied, Mir Echreff seized upon Yezd,
which had resisted the arms of Mir Mahnlood : but the conquest
was dearly bought, for he there lost his tried and veteran soldiers, the
e'lite of his army. This was indeed a great misfortune, and,
aggravated by the fact that, Mir Hoosein having declared himself
independent in Kanclahar, he was unable to fill up the casualties
in his army with Afghans, who were no longer anxious to take
service under him. Mir Echreff was, therefore, constrained to
recruit his army with Persians, ancl march without further delay
against Nadir, whose victorious battalions were daily augmented
by men eager to deliver their country, and take a deep revenge for
the odious tyranny under which they had groaned for six years.
Rlir Echreff had never been in such a critical position, and the
measures of precaution which he toolr to protect his rear plainly
showed the disquietude he felt; his soldiers participated in this
feeling, they hsd lost all confidence in themselves, and it was under
such apprehensioris that they moved forward to meet the enemy.
Shah Thamasp, i~npatientto recover his capital, was desirous that
Nadir should march in all haste on Ispahan; but the prudent
general respectfully but firmly declined to comply with his wishes,
convinced that such a movement would be inopportune. Nadii felt
confident that, if he kept his troops fresh, it would be easy for him
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to beat the Afghans, if they attacked him after a long forced march,
exhausted by privations and fatigue. I n acting thus he also had
the advantage of choosing the ground on which he intended t,o give
battle without removing from DIazanderan. The population of this
province was entirely dcvoted to Shah Thamasp, and he could therefore, in case of a reverse, effect his retreat in all security across the
mountains, which offered at every step admirable positions for
defence.
The army of Echreff numbered 30,000 men, scarcely the half of
which, a t the utmost, were Afghans, and on coming np with the forces
of the enemy he found them entrenched in a well-chosen position on
some small hills selected by Nadir. The Afghans, never having
seen the Persians hold their ground, were anxious to attack at once ;
but Echreff, who had a higher opinion of his adversaries, repressed,
perhaps inopportunely, this impulse, which might have given him
the victory, and remained several days in a state of inaction. I t
was only when it became impossible for him to obtain supplies that
he decided upon giving his adversary battle, and on the 23rd of
Rebji-i-ul akher, 6 th of November, 1728, he took up a position in
front of his army 6chelloned from Moomineitbad to Boordj-meyoos,
or Meimandoos. The latter place is situated about seven miles east
of the town of Darnghan, having the village of Naimabad on thc
west, and at the same distance from the village of Dell Hollah. The
attack commenced along the whole line ; but the Persians received
it with great steadiness, and, perfectly cool, waited till the enemy
had advanced within half musket-shot before they poured in their
fire. The Afghans fought with the courage and sav'qe energy that
mas natural to them and the confidence of men accustomed to
conquer ; hut they were unable to malie any impresion upon their
adversaries. Echreff, surprised at a resistance to which his troops
were not accuston~ed,attempted to clestroy Nadir's order of battle
by turning his left flank ; but the Persian commander, perceiving
his intention, formed his infantry into squares, and routed in detail
with his cavalry Echreff's detachments, after which, leading the
mass of h i forces against the Afghan reserves, he pui them to flight."

* Abdullah Khan states there were
ten French officers, for t h e most part
belonging t o the artillery, serving in
the Persian atmy, and t h a t his father,
who was placed by Nadir under their
special ordeiu, had frequently told him

that this sovereign held them in great
considerrtion, gave them the absolnte
authority over his troops, and that ha
owed the greater portion of hia success
to the f ~ i t h f u support
l
which they gitve
him,-Tewisr.
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The $Iir's troops performed, indeed, prodivies of valour ; but they
9
were unable to rally, and left 12,000 of their comrades on the field
,f battle.
The Persians, who lost only 3000 men, followed the
retreating enemy and came up with them a t the defile of Khar,
called also by the Persians Tingui-serdaree." Here the Afghaus
rallied and renewed the fight; but they mere again defeated, and
abandoned all their baggage to the victors-Nadir himself was
wounded in this second engagement. T h e distance from the
defile of Khar to Teheran is forty-five miles, and the remnants
of the Afghan army reached that city in one day ; they subsequently pressed on to Ipsahi~nwith all speed, spreading alarm,
desolation, and death on their route. On their arrival there they
hastened, with their families and their treasure, into the fortress
which Echreff had constructed in the centre of the city ; but after
having confided its defence to a garrison of picked men, the Afghan
commander again took the field with his remaming troops, consisting of Afghans, Tartan, Kurds, and Ghebers, in all 20,000
men, marched to the north of Ispahan, and at a spot twenty-four
miles from thence took up a position on a table-land in advance,
and to the north-ebt of the village of ~Ioortchekhor. There he
waited for the Persians, ovcr whom he still hoped to prove his
superiority in arms. The Afghans were posted between the village
and a trench which they had thrown up in front of their camp in
the form of a derni-lune, their right resting on a watercourse and
their left on a caravanserai difficult to take. Seeing them in so
good a position, Nadir did not think it adyisable to attack immediately : he wished to refresh his troops, and for this purpose pitched
his camp about two miles west of the high road and round the
village of Bagh-mirane. The reconnaissances which he ordered to
be made on the Afghan camp having satisfied him that it could not
be carried in front, he determined to turn the position, and taking
advantage of a aarlr night, which occurred three days after his
arrival, he found himselfat the near approach of day in the rear of
the Afghans, separated from them only by the village. Fortune,
which favoured him at all points, again declared for him, for
a violent wind arose and drove clouds of dust in the faces of

* This spot is cited by several
Py1es.-Ten-ier.

travellers, and with

reason, a s being the Caspian
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the Afghans, and, favoured by this circumstance, Nadir fell upon
them with the same intrepidity and vigour which he had already
displayed. T h e enemy, in despair, maintained an obstinate resistance ; but they had to do with men flushed with recent victories,
which gave them the solidity of old soldiers. If the Afghans fought
to preserve their conquest and their lives, the Persians were animated by the remembrance of the irijuries they had suffered, and
were burning to avenge. The village was a t length carried, and
afterwards the entrenchments, in defending which 4000 Afghans
found a soldier's death. The survivors retreated in disorder to
Ispahan, where each of them collected in the course of the night
his most valuable effects, and at daybreak, accompanied by their
wives and children, mounted on mules and camels, fled southward.
Mir Echreff, furious at his reverses, put the Shah Sultan Hoosein
and his two sons to death, and in a gloomy and savage mood was
the last Afghan that left the walls of Ispahan. H e carried with
him all his treasures and jewels, and, with 12,000 horsemen still
under his command, directed his course on Shiraz, from which city
he hoped again to reassume the offensive against the Persians; but
Nadir did not allow Echreff time to reorganise his army, and after
a few days' repose he was once more on foot, intending, if possible,
to force him to evacuate the province of Fars. T h e Afghans advanced to meet the enemy as far as Peulee Khan, a bridge over the
Bendemir, ten miles south of Persepolis, and disputed with tenacity
and fury the'passage of that river; but they were again defeated
and retired to Shiraz in the greatest confusion. Nadir doggedly
pursued them step by step, invested the city, and informed the
beleaguered host that, if Echreff was not delivered up to him
within forty-eight hours, he would put every soldier to death,
and with torture. The Afghans agreed to his conditions, on ascertaining which the M i r prepared for flight, and, accompanied by two
hundred brave men who remainedfaithful to his fallen fortunes, cut
his way sword. in hand through the investing army, talting in hot
haste the road to Afghanistan-a portion of his army fell under the
swords of the Persians, who gave their adversaries no quarter, and
the remainder dispersed. As to Echreff, he was so rapidly pursued
that he was obliged to abandon his baggage and treasure to avoid
being made prisoner : his followers, seeing that they could no longer
be of the least service, left him. When he reached the Seistan,
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he had only two servants with him, and they, as well as the Mir,
fell by the hand of Abdullah Khan, a Belooch chief, who sent his
head and two large brilliants which were found on him to the
Shah Thamasp."
~ h u terminated
s
the dominion of the Afghans in Persia. If any
individual was capable of maintaining it for a longer period, it was
Nir Echreff, who to extraordinary courage united great
talents of every kind ; but the elements on which his power rested
were too unstable for it to be possible that he could eventually
come forth victorious from the conflict which arose between himself
and the robber chieftain. This extraordinary invasion of Persia
ended in the extermination of dl those who had taken part in ita just retribution for the crimes and atrocities with which they had
sullied their cause. During the seven years that the Afghans held
Persia, that empire lost more than a third of its population ; the
soil remained without cuitivation, the canals and watercourses for
irrigation were dried up, and the greater portion of the public
buildings complctely destroyed. The invaders had to contend
against a people enervated, effeminate, and devoid of every sentiment of honour and national feelmg; they triumphed, therefore, by an obstinate determination to succeed, and, in spite of their
inferiority in numbers, they did so. Such examples are, it is true,
rare in history ;but the Afghans were better qualified to fight than to
govern. T o appropriate, wherever they went, and without any reason
or pretext whatsoever, money or money's worth, was their practice ;
revolts and disturbances naturally ensued, and necessitated the
employment of a large army. They were in the end weakened by twenty combata, and found it impossible to recruit in
Afghanistan, except in the small and scarcely organised state of Kandahar, which ceased to provide them with further reinforcements;
they, were, therefore, obliged to admit foreign soldiers within their
ranks, whose fidelity was at least doubtful, and who rarely acted
with vigour ; but they maintained themselves seven years in Persia,
much more by the terror which their first victories and their cruelty
. inspired, than by the material means at their disposal. If Echreff
vanquished the Turks, it was because he had the support of the

* Several E a t e r n authors contradict this account, and assert that' Echreff
died of dieease.-Atrier,
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Persians, who detested them much more than they did the Afghans,
and served voluntarily against them; but directly Nadir appeared,
this unreal and unstable dominion was dissolved and overthrown in
four successive battles. Shunned and dreaded everywhere for their
turbulence and barbarity, they were repulsed on all sides, and found,
with great difficulty, an asylum or even a shelter in those desert
wastes ; the greater number of them mere tracked like wild beasts,
and killed like them, or perished from misery and hunger, and it
is doubtful whether more than a few huudred Afghans ever returned
to their own country.
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IT not having been our intention to write a history of Persia, we
shall not follow Nadir Shah in his wars with the Turks and other
nationalities under the Persian rule, but proceed at once to speak
of his campaigns in Afghanistan.
After the victory at Shiraz Nadir reconquered in succession all
the Persian provinces which had become detached from the empire.
In the year 1730 he seized upon Herat, that city having revolted
from his authority ; he also took Furrah, a strong and very important fortress, situated about one hundred and forty miles south
of the first-mentioned place ; but he did not extend his conquests on
that side, and. it was only after having obtained several fresh victories over the Turks, and imprisoned Thamasp, that he placed the
crown of the Seffavyes on his brow. In 1737 he marched on Kandahar at the head of 100,000 men without meeting any resistance on
his road, for the inhabitants submitted to his authority or fled at
his approach. Nevertheless the population of the city, which had
been considerably augmented by the influx of persons whom his
victorious march had driven into it, prepared to resist the Persian
invader.
Mir Hoosein Khan, who was still in command there, reminded
the Ghildjzyrs of the struggle they had made for their independence, their victories over the Persians, and their conquest of that

country ; and, being eloqucnt as well as brave, he easily succeeded
in exciting them to make a spirited defence. The position of Kandahar was at this time very strong, the city being situated at the
foot of a rocky mountain which flanked it on the north and east:
innumerable stone towers, connected by curtains, surrounded it, and
followed the sinuosities of the mountain, the summit of which was
occupied by a fort, believed to be impregnable, and commanding
the citadel, placed half way between it and the city. Nadir Shah,
against whom n o resistance had as yet been offered, was obliged to
halt before these obstacles, to which art had also added all that
could render the defence effectual. Despairing of being able to
take the city by assault, he established a strict blockade, hoping to
reduce the garrison by famine ; but it was in vain that he enclosed
Iiandahar within a double wall, between which his soldiers were
sheltered from attacks both from within and without; a year and
a half elapsed without his having obtained the least advantage
against the city-however,
he was more successful towards the
country, for his detachments brought the whole of the environs
under submission. When, therefore, he was master of the province,
he resolved to carry the place, and ordered a general assault. The
preparations for this had been most formidable, the bravery and devotion of the troops admirable, but, after a furious and desperate
conflict of two clays' duration, Ibndahar was not only not taken,
but not one of the advanced works was carried, though several
attacks against them had been made. A fceling of discouragement began to pervadc the Persian army, when a newly-raised corps,
of the tribe of the Bakhtyarees, which had already distinguished
itself on several occasions by its firm aud courageous bearing, obtained an advantage which raised the hopes of the rest of the troops,
ancl induced them to redouble their efforts. Though received with
a storm of bullets, this gallant band had succeeded, by climbing the
almost perpeniiicular rocks and clinging to their projections, in
reaching a little plateau, from whence they were enabled to carry
several towers on the north side of the mountain. Into these they
managed, simply with ropes and their own strong arms, to raise
some pieces of artillery, which opening their fire upon all the
other towers, a breach was made, and in six hours the Bakhtyarees were in possession of them; the town and citadel were
therefore obliged to surrender at discretion. Mir Hoosein Khan
retreated into the fort on the s m i t of the mountain, where
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he successfully resisted every attack, and might still have made a
ptxacted defence had it not been for the generosity of Nadir, who
to spare his life, aud give him high rank in his own army.
This noble offer led to a capitulation, and &fir Hoosein afterwards
became sincerely attached to the Persian invader, and one of his
favourite generals.
Once master of Kandahar, the Persian monarch took measures
to consolidate his power, and, with a view of preventing the inhabitants from again offering a similar resistance, which their
bravery, their means of defence, and the strength of the place
might tempt them to do, he dismantled the fortifications, and transferred the population to a new town which he built during the
blockade at about a gunshot from the old city. But the new one
was scarcely inhabited fifteer, years, for immediately Ahmed Shah
Suddozye came to the throne he built a third city, atout one mile
and a half further east, when the city of Nadir was deserted.
T o the conqnests of Herat and Kandahar Nadir was not long
in joining that of Kabul, and thus becamc master of the whole of
Afghanistan. By great political ability, and more especially by
the generous manner in which he treated the people and their
chiefs, he completely secured their good will, and raised a contingent of 16,000 horse in that country. They were recruited
amongst those who could claim descent from the Abdalees and
the Ghildjzyes, twelve thousand being taken from the former
tribe, and four from the latter : the chiefs of these tribes, to the
number of ten, namely, eight Abdalees and two Ghildjzyes, had
the cainmand of these troops, the command in chief being given
to Boor lMohamed Khan Alizye, one of them. This body of men
accompanied Nadir Shah in all his expeditions, and participated
powerfully in the successes and glory of that conqueror. They
rendered him more especially a signal service, and certainly saved
his army from complete destruction, when, on his return from India,
he was engaged with the enemy iu the mountains beyond Peshawur,
and harassed on all sides by the Khyberrees. The Persian conqueror was in a most critical position on thai occasion, and extricated himself only by paying a large sum of money by way of toll
to the mountaineers who closed the defiles against him. In short,
this contingent of the Abdalees and Ghildjzyes showed so much
devotion to Nadir, and rendered him such important services, that
he at length preferred them to his o m troops, which led to great
F ;!

88

ISSURRECTIOS OF THE AFGHAXS.

Ca.4~.VI.

jealousies oil the part of the Persians ; a i d when Nadir was assassinated in 1747, they gave vent to their resentment, and attach$
this ftl~ouredcorps with fury. Being vwy inferior in numbers,
the Afghans vere obliged to consult their own safety by a prompt
retreat, and returned to their country under their own commander .
Noor Nohamed Khan, but they immediately took measures to deliver themselves from the Persiau yoke, by no lnrans 3. clifficult task,
for, after Sadir's death, anarchy reigned in every part of the empire.
The serclars who had se~vedin the Persian army were, as we
have already remarked, ten in number. Ahmed Khan Suddozye,
descended in a direct line from Sucloo, who had been ambassador
to Shah Abbas the Great, nas the most noble amongst them ;
and Hadji Djemal Khan Mohameclzye, lineally descended from
Mohamed, a companion of Sudoo in that embassy, was the most
influential. Experience had clearly demonstrated to all thcse
chiefs that the clivisions amongst themselves, much m6re than the
power of their .enemies, had, up to that period, broight them under ,
the subjection of the various invaders of their country ; and they
swore therefore to remain strictly united, and adjourned for one
mont,h the completion of the code of l a m which they had cletermined to give to thek nation.
After the return of the Afghjn contingent to Randahar, they
remained some days in the enjoyment of tlibse social and family ties
to which they had been for so long a time strangers, and their tur- .
bnlent spirits took soine repose; but whether from a discontented
feeling towards their chief, or intrigues which led them to rebel
against him, they withclrew the chief command from Noor Mohamed
Khan, giving its a reason that his origin was not sufficiently noble.
After the fall of this personagethe principal serdars of the Abdalee
m d Gkilcljzye tribes assembled in the tomb of Sheik ~ ~ u r l c ,
situated in the village of Naclir-abad, now IGchk-noolthood, thirtyfive miles fi-om liandahar, to decide upon the best method of
organising a regular government in Afghanistan. A t this meeting it was agreed ihat a fusion of their nation with the Persians
was henceforward impossible-that they ought to elect a chief
taken from amongst t.hemselves, who should be obeyed in all things,
and assisted in giving that unity of purpose to all military operations, and the civil administration, without which there was no
chance for them to preserve their independence. This proposition
was not agreed to without delay, and more especially without great

,
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difficulty; each tribe was anxious to advance the claims of its own
for the throne, and the good understanding between the
&iefswho represented the tlibes was far from being impressecl with
of a conciliatory or unselfish character. Ahmed Khan
Suddozye, whose family lived at Herat, where he enjoyed great
was present at eight of these tumnltuous assemblies,
and had listened attentively to all that had been said without offering one word on the important questions which had been discussed.
The dervish who had the care of the tomb of Sheik Seurk, and
whose opinion was always reccived with respect, had rcmarked the
reserved manner of Ahmed Khan, and the holy man, wearied with
the interminable discussions and repetitions which had tdwn place
during several days at these meetings, advised their breaking up
the conference at once. ('Why all this verbose t a k ? " said he to
the serdars ; " God has created Bhmed Khan a much greater man
than any of you ; he is of the most noble of all the Afghan families.
Maintain, therefore, God's work, for his wrath will weigh heavily
upon you if you destroy it." After having pronounced these words
in a most energetic manner, he took a handful of barley from an
adjoining field, and, having formed it into a wreath, placed it on
the head of Ahined Khan, adding, " and may this serve as your
diadem." Hadji Djernal Khan, the most powerful of the serdars
present at this meeting, and who appeared to have the greatest
number of votes, immediately withdrew his pretensions in favour of
Ahmed Khan, and supported his election with all the weight of
his persuasive eloquence-conduct that obtained for him the general
respect of the Afghans. The serdars, seeing that he who mould
certainly have been chosen their sovereign was so disinterested,
followed the example thus given them ; but they separated well
convinced that Ahnle,d Khan, who had been the most silent of them
all, had also been the most clever in not allowing his claim to be
advanced till the last moment, when the diversity of opinions had
wearied the meeting, and, above all, in having these qualifications
brought forward by a third person, which made him appear modest
and disinterested, when they well lrnew he was neither the one nor
the other.
Ahmed I<han, who took the title of Shah, was crowned in the
mosque a t Kandilhar towards the close of the year 1747, when
there were great rejoicings, which were prolonged during several
weclrs. The ceremony of his coronation was of the most simple
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kind : the Mollah of the highest rank poured a measure of wheat
on the head of the new monarch, announcing to the assembled
Afghans that he was the chosen of God and the nation. This
emblematical investiture of the regal power is followed a t the
present day amongst the Afghan tribes each time that they elect a
chief; the signification which is attached to this ceremonial is,
that abundance and prosperity will result from the acts of him
whom they make thc depository of power.
T h e Afghans were still in the midst of their coronation festivals
when there arrived a t Kandalitlr Eaghee Khan Chirazee, chief of
the customs to Xadir Shah in Sciide and the Punjab, having in
his custocly two kooroom, 1,360,0001., in money, diamonds, and
shawls. This Ahrned Shah seized and immediately distributed
amongst the officers and men of his army and the employes of the
government ; and this great liberality on his part did more for his
future career than all his private virtues and his uoble origin.
Several tribes who had not as yet positively recognised his election,
but the chiefs of which were on this occasion the recipients of his
generosity, now attached theruselves to his person, and he profited
by this feeling of unanimity to consolidate his power, and during
the first years of his reign to raise a large army, with which he
s~~bsequently
marched on Kabul with a view to its capture. This
was not so easy as an oflensive operation, for Naclir Shah had
settled twelve thousand Persian families in the Eala Hissar, the
citadel of that capital ;but Ahmed Shah having, through his partizans, entered into a secret un-~derstandingwith them, they made
common cause with the Afghans on their arrival, under a promise
that their chiefs should participate in the official appointments and
advantages in the gift of the sovereign, and be treated in all things
on a footing of equality.*
I n spite of this defection, Nasser Khan, the governor of I<ahul,
obstinately refused to recognise the authority of Ahmed Shah, and
did everything in his power to recruit the garrison amongst the

* The Persians inhabiting Kabul are
known by t h e name of ICuzzilbnshes,
because they form part of one or more
of the seven Turkish tribes that embraced t h e party of the Shah Ismail,
the founder of the tribe of the Seffavyes. This sovereiy, to distinguish

them from the others, gave shem a
kind of red cap; hence their name of
" Red head,"
Kezeel bash. These
seven tribes were Oustadjsloo, Chamloo,
Nikaloo, Bnhmloo, Zoolkadder, Kadjar,
and &char. lzcm'er.
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Hazarahs and Usbeks, but all in vain ; and despairing at length of
being able to make head against the Afghans, he fled, after a fecblc
conflict, to Peshawur. Ahmed Shah then took possession of Kabul
~ h o u meeting
t
with the slightest opposition ; appointed as governor
of the province a clever man devoted to his person and interests ;
and left the city in pursuit of Nasser Khan, who, abandoned by the
greater part of his followers and seeing clearly that a longer
resistance could only end fatally for himself, surrendered Peshawur
to the Afghans and submitted to their king.
Ahmed Shah was aware that war was a necessity to the people
over whom he reigned ; their turbulent nature, and the rivalry which
existed between the various tribes, would certainly have led to grave
disorders against the prosperity of the state and been dangerous to
his rising power, if they had remained inactive. Besides, the lringdom of the Afghans was to be constituted, the limits and boundary
of which had not up to this time been defined by any one. Ahmed
Shah resolved to extend these limits wherever an Afghan tribe was
to be found, and, in order to carry his views into effect, he remained
no longer a t Peshawur than was necessary to subdue and organize
thc tribes which inhabitcd the mountainous districts of that province ;
and when he was convinced that there was nothing more to apprchend from their opposition, he crossed the Tndus and marched
against Lahore.
Hayat Ullsh Khan, son of Zelteria Khan, honoured by Nadir
Shah with the surname of Shah Nawaz Khan, who had succeeded
his father in the government of this city, hearing the intentions of
Ahmed Shah, assembled an army and took up a. posittion at a little
distance north of Lahore. H e also wrote a letter to the Great
Mogul at Delhi, Ahmed Shah Gourlranee," informing him of the
advance of Ahmed Shah Suddozye ; the capture he had recently
made of Kabul and Peshawur ; of his projects on Lahore, and those
which he presumed he might have on India ; and for these reasons
claimed his assistance. The Mogul Emperor conceded all that he
desired, and placed himself at the head of the troops destined to
co-operate with LIayat Ullah. Immediately the Lahore chieftain felt
certain of this he did not wait for their arrival, for, thinking that
Ahmed Shah Suddozye, when he saw him so well supported, would

* Qourkanee is the name of the tribe t o which Tamerlane belougcd, also
Mima Baboor and his descend,mts.-Terrier.

not da1-e to tempt fortune against him, he made a bold demonstration in the hope of arresting his march, and moved his camp to the
left banlr of the Tchenab. The Afghans, however, neither halted
nor clelayed their onward movement as he had expected, and soon
arrived in his front; but as the river mas considerably swollen,
the two armies were obliged to wait till it had fallen before they
could attack. The impatience of the Afghan monarch in articular
was great, for he was anxious to engage his adversary before the
Moguls, of whose expected arrival he was aware, had joined, but
the want of pontoons obliged him to remain passive during severd
clays. Directly his cavalry could attempt the passage of the river
vith any security he put the whole of that arm in motion at midnight and in profound silence, and crossed at a spot a few parasangs
above the enemy's encampment. Ahmcd Shalt had conccived the
idea of marching straight to Lahore, carrying the place by a coupde-main, and balRing the vigilance of his opponent by leaving his.
infantry behind him on the right bank and in sight of the enemy.
Iris anticipations mere well founded, for the army of Shah Nawaz
Khan, thinlting they had still before them the whole of the Afghan
forces, slept in fancied security. On the following day, however, the
Govwnor of the runjab learnt that Ahmed Shah was marching on
the capital with his cavalry. Leaving therefore his infantry face to
h c e with that of his opponent, he hastened in pursuit of their horse
with his own, and came up with them on the following day half-way
between the Tchenab and the city ; but having reconnoitred and
found the enemy much superior in numbers, he did not dare to
attack, and filed along his flank, protectcd by a chain of hills, south
of which he expected to fall in with Gourlcanee, who was marching
to his assistance.
T h e Afghan King saw clearly the movement of his adversxy
and divined his object, and, a fresh project having suddenly suggested itself to his mind, he perrnittcd Shah Nawaz to make this retrograde movement \nthout offering ally opposition to it ; but when he
supposed him to be a t a good distance Ahmed returned by the road
by which he had advanced, and fell upon the Sikh infantry on the
left of the Tchenab, routed them completely, captured their artillery
and a considerable booty. H e then passed his own infantry over
t o the right banlr of the river, and moved rapidly on Lahore, which
be seized without difficulty.
Shah Nawaz Khan, ashamed of a flight which must bc explained
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by some reason or anot,her, attempted to justify it by
to his
exalting to the highest degree the numbers, courage, and cleverness of the Afghans ; this imprudent speech brought. discouragement
into the Mogul ranks, and their inclinations, which up to that period
had been unanimous in favour of fighting, were transformed into an
ardent desire for peace.
After having fortified Lahore and confided it to the care of a
.picked garrison, Ahmed Shah Suddozye marched to meet Ahmed
Shah Gourkanee, but he had scarcely traversed half the distance
which separated him from the Mogul Emperor, when he was met
by his envoy, who was the bearer of pacific proposals from his
master. After long hesitation Ahmed Shah Suddozye decided for
peace, for the chances of the war in which he was engaged were
oreat.; his power was as yet in the bud ; he was also not without
b
uneasiness as to his rear, and even regarding the state of his own
country; he. thought therefore that it would be imprudent on his
part to risk his fortune on the ilncertilin issues of a battle, and
therefore agreed that all the provinces in the Punjab which had
been under the rule of Nadir Shah should remain in the hands
of the Afghans, and should form the dower of a Mogul princess, who was some little time afterwards married to the prince
Timoor Mirza II., son of Ahmed Shah Suddozye. All the
countries situated beyond the Sutlej on the left bank of the
Inclus remained in the hands of the Moguls, and the rivers
before mentioned were to form the line of demarcation between
the two empires. A treaty based upon this convention was
signed by the two parties in 1750 ; and the Suddozye prince,
afker having nominated governors in his new conquests, returned
to ICandahar, where several Afghan serdars, jealous of the power
of their sovereign and of the glory which he had recently acquired,
secretly endeavoured to excite the masses against him. No sooner,
therefore, had he arrived in his capital than they resolved to
assassinate him, but the king, informed of this conspiracy a few
moments only before the time at which they had fixed to carry it out,
frustrated it en tirely by his firmness and presence of mind. The leader
in this plot was the same Noor Mohnmed Khan, Alizye, who was
removed from the command of the army when the Afghans returned
from Persia, and upon whom Ahmed Shah had conferred the title
of Mir or Prince of the Afghans ; his accomplices were Meuheubet
Khan, Iiedoo Khan, and several other Afghans of less note, vho
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with him .perished by the hands of the executioner, as well as ten
men from each of the tribes most deeply compromised. These
executio~~s
were the first which had taken place by orclrr of Ahmecl
Shah, and many of the chiefs, being apprehensive that he might on
some other occasion adopt the same severe measures against themselves, disputed his right to inflict the punishment of death. After
the executions were over they agitated the question whether or not
the [ex tulionis should be applied to the Shah and his family ; they
also wished to limit his power, or rather to subject it to their
approbation ; but Ahmed Shah suppressed with encrgy this feeling
on the part of the chiefs, and his dete~minationand justice soon
produced tranquillity in the countries subject to his dominion.
Reassured by this favourable result, he meditated the conquest
of Rhorassan, a project which he had conceived immediately he
ascended the throne. At that period Shah Rolth, grandson of
Nadir Shah, reigned in this province, where he had with difficulty
established himself after great opposition on the part of the chiefs. '
His principal antagonist was Moomeen Khan, governor of Tchinaran, who had even succeeded in taking possession of Meshed,
and induced the army to proclaim him Shah of Persia ; but after
having exercised the sovereign pnwer for a few days only, he gave
umbrage to the troops, who mutinied and put him to death. This
event enabled Shah Rolth to reassume his rights; his satisfaction,
however, was not without alloy, for several other chiefs who had
the same object in view as Moomeen I<han spread anarchy and
confusion in all parts of I<horassan. Ahmed Shah thought, therefore, that this was a most propitious opportunity for his purpose ;
and in 1750 he marched into that provincewith an army of 70,000
men.. Herat was then governed by the Arab Serdar Emir Khan,
an old commander-in-chief of artillery under Nadir Shah, who held
the city in the name of Shah Rolth Mirza ; this chief, feeling that '
he was not strong enough to meet the Afghans in the field, placed
the citadel in a good state of defence, and 114th a garrison of picked
men retired ,within its walls. T o the townspeople who were ready
to defend the city he ordered that money, provisions, and arms
should be distributed, and despatched a messenger to Shah Rolrh
Mirza requesting his prompt assistance.
T h e inhabitants of Herat now sustained a siege for fourteen
months in the most heroic manner, trusting always that this assistance, twenty times demanded, and as often promised by the prince,
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would at length reach them ; finding themselves, however, deceived
in their hopes, and being reduced to the greatest distress, they surrendered a t discretion and opencd the gates.
Emir Khan, who, from the citadel, witnessed the fall of the city,
determined to make one last effort in its defence, and descended
into the suburbs with his little band ; but being assailed in front
by the Afghans and in the rear by some I-Ieratees who were of
their party, his soldiers were soon exterminated, and the Emir
hacked to pieces on the spot. Fifty men whom he left in the
citadel were the only troops that surrendered to the Afghans, and
their lives were spared.
Shah Rokh M i m had been prevented from going to the relief
of Emir Khan by circumstances which he could not control, for he
was hardly able to maintain his own ground in Meshed, the possession of which was Clisyuted by a score of competitors. The
general-in-chief, Yoosoof Khan, had at the outset beaten them dl,
but this chief, ils brave as he wbs faithful, fell in a combat which
took place between his troops and those of two princes of Khorasean.
One of then], by name Mir Alem, belonged to an Arab tribe of
the Seistan ; the other, Djnffer Khan, was chief of the I h d i s h
colonies of Boodjnoord. These Khans, after the death of the
brave Yoosoof G a n , seized Meshed and imprisoned Shah Rokh ;
but when the moment arrived for dividing the authority and the
plunder they could not agree, and, assisted by their respective parti-.
sans, came to blows. I n this conflict 3lir Alem proved the victor, and
remained sole master of the city. After having obtained this advantage he made every preparation to resist Ahmed Shah Suddozye,
repaired the fortifications, provisioned the place, and after having
confided its defence to the inhabitants, whom he believed he could
trust, he left Meshed, determined if possible to pounce upon Herat.
In this attempt he was disappointed, for, on arriving at ToorbutSheik-Jam, he was himself surprised by the prince Timoor Mirza,
who, with the advanced guard of the Afghan army, was marching
on Meshed. Recovering from the first feeling of astonishment a t
this untoward incident, Mir Alem attacked his adversary with the
greatest intrepidity and made him give ground; but a charge of
3000 Belooch cavalry commanded by Nasser Khan, chief of Kelat
in Beloochistan, carried disorder into the Emir's ranks, and his army
was cut to pieces. Mir Alem immediately gave up all idea of
keeping Meshed, and retired in the direction of G.hain to his tribe.

Nasser Ullah Khan, the son of Shah Rokh, who was in the field
with a small pzrty of horse when he heard this good news, entered
Xeshed, delivered his father, and placed him a t the head of affairs.
Anxious to terminate the object of his expedition, Ahmed Shah
now appointed Dervish Ali Khan, Hazarah, to the government of
Herat, and, rejoining his advanced-guard with the rest of his troops,
a few days afterwards arrived under the walls of Meshed, which he
invested on all sides, and vigorously besieged. His attacks were,
however, repulsed with energy, and he suffered during several
months considerable losses that were not compensated by any corresponding success. l n spite of the vigilance and the discipline
which Ahmed Shah maintained, a night rarely passed without his
being surprised by Nadir M r z a or Nasser Ullah Khan, who, a t
the head of a few select horsemen, came down upon the Afghan cc;lmp
when they were least expected, and did not retire until they had.
placed a good number of their adversaries A o ~ sde combat. Asiatic
armies have no conccption ho~vto protect themselves from night
attaclrs by placing main guarcls, pickets, or videttes ; so that Ahmed
Shah's forces were always surprised by these onsets, which, being
cleverly conducted, annoyed them much. Mamech Khan Zaferanloo, governor of Tchinaran, who had attached himself to tlie
fortunes of the grandson of Nadir, gave him also very usef~il
support; he supplied the town with provisions, his cavalry made
daily attaclrs upon the rear of the Afghans or pillaged and laid
waste the environs of the city and thcir camp. Although the besieging army amounted to an effective force of 60,000 men, they were
never able to overpower, or even seriously to check, this handful of
cavalry, who dealt such heavy blows and numbered not more than
a thousand men. Matters remained in this state during four
months, after which Ahmed Shah, who had not expected to meet
with so obstinate a resistance, finished by listenmg to the propositions that were made with a view to an amicable arrangement, and
consented to raise the siege of Meshed on condition that his son
Sindjar Mirza, who had remained a prisoner with tlie Persians
after the death of Nadir Shah, should be restored to him. Several
of Ahmed Shah's relations, whom Emir Khan had carried away from
Herat where his family resided, were also to be given up, and on
the reccipt of a large sum of money the Afghan ling agreed to
retire from before the place.
These conditions having been duly fulfilled, Ahmed Shah, with-
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out troublirlg himself about his rear, proceeded at once to lay siege
to the fortified city of Nishapoor, situated in a plain exceedingly
fertile, where his army could easily find subsistence. This t o m
was then governed by two persons of equal authority-one,
bbbas I h o l i Khan, of the tribe of Beyat, which numbered 10,000
families, residing- around Nishapoor, and on which he relied for
support; the other, I-ladji Seif Eddin, a native of the city; and
both determined to offer a stout resistance. Ahmed Shah was
satisfied by simply investing the place, deferring the siege to a later
period, when, accordil~gto a promise made him by the latter, he
hoped to be able to obtain possession of the city. For himself,
this persona&e in his letter to the Afghan monarch, he laid
down his arms the very day of Ahmed Shah's arrival; but he
added that it would require some time before he could overcome
the obstinacy of Abbas Kooli Khan, who had decided upon fighting. In thus ,acting the cunning I-Iadji was only desirous of gaining
time, and the Afghan sovereign was his dupe, for he negotiated
and temporised so long, that the winter set in before he had
opened his trenchcs; the snow fell heavily, the army were soon
in want of provisions, and cold m d hunger cruelly decimated the
troops. At length the severity of the season was such that the
beasts of burden perished, and the Afghans were compelled to
abandon their tents, baggage, ammunition, and artillery. After
having destroyed the former and spiked the guns, they threw them
into the kariz, or subterranean aqueducts, communicating with the
surface by shafts, and then retreated, leaving a long line of corpses
and baggage-animals on their track. Another division of their
army, which had been detached against Ali Murad Khan, the
chief of Tubbus,
also nearly exterminated ; those who escaped
the sword succumbed in their flight to the severity of the weatheand such was the intensity of the cold that at the halt made a t
Iiiaffer Kaleh 18,000 .of Allmed's soldiers died in one night, and
on the following day very nearly the same number perished in
attempting the passage of the Heri-rood, near the town of Russan.
The river was frozen, but it gave way under the crowd of fugitives,
who were swallowed up in the icy waters ; those who had retreated
by other roads were scarcely more fortunate. The Serdar Djummeh
Khan, who held a, command in this expedition, left a short sketch
of it, and one of the incidents that he relates is worthy of mention,
as it appears to us unique in history. H e assures us that, in order
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to preserve himself from the excessive cold, and therefore from
death, which was the certain consequence, only one way suggested
itself, which he adopted; this was, to disembowel some of his
camels, in the inside of which, enveloped in a blanket, he each night
took up his quarters, and in this way he passed from one to another as they got cold, killing seventeen between sunset and sunrise.
T h e disasters of this retreat continued until the wretched remnants
of the Afghan force reached Herat, a t which time all that remained
of Ahmed Shah's brilliant array of troops were a few miserable
beings more resembling skeletons than soldiers. A few days after
his arrival in the city, Ahmed Shah perceived thaC the governor,
Dervish Ali Khan, profiting by his distressed position, was intriguing to seize his person and raise himself to power upon his
master's ruin ; but Ahmecl., anticipating his intention, ordered him
to be arrested and thrown into prison, appointing his son Timoor
Mirza governor in his stead ; he then left for Kandahar, with a view
of recruiting his army.
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IN the following year, namely, in 1751, having completely
repaired his disasters, Ahmed made a second inroad upon Khorassan. Every cavalry soldier carried with him two battements* of
iron for casting shot, which were placed in store directly he arrived
with his army under the walls of Nishapoor. T h e siege of this
city was now pressed with great energy ; the Afghan monarch
cast a gun upon the spot, which threw a projectile weighing
472 Ibs. English, and one month was employed in casting, boring,
and placing this monster gun on its carriage. When fired i t
produced a most terrible effect, the walls a i d houses being pierced
through and through, but it burst the very first time it was
used. T h e citizens of Nishapoor, ignorant of that fact, were
so terrified by the destrilction which this single bullet occasioned,
that they despatched several of their chiefs to Ahmed Shah t,o
inform him that they surrendered at discretion. Abbas Kooli
Khan, who held the citadel, refused however to acknowledge this
surrender, and attacked the Afghans s t the moment they were on
the point of entering the city ; but he was repulsed in a n instant,
and reduced t,o bhe alternative of soliciting in person the clemency
*

A battement of Hemt is equal to 6 lbs. English.-Farrier.

of the conqueror. Ahmcd Shah clctaincd him as a prisoner in llis
camp, and lie subsequently accoiillx~nicdhim to Kabul : the Afghan
conqueror, having perceived in this chicf very considerable talents,
and a fiankncss of disposition in wliich Ilc t h o ~ g h hc
t could conficle,
gavc him his sister i l l n~arringc; lie also bcstowed one of his
daugllters on Abbas I<ooli's son, aftcr which hc scnt him baclc to
Nishapoor, as governor of t h t cit,y. ITil.lliflg thus satisfactorily
established his power tl~crc,Al~lnctlShall, thiiilti~~g
he had cause
.
cornplai~ltagainst Shah l i o k l ~hlirza 311d his sons, who had been
hostile to him in his second campaigu in I<horixssan, again laid
with this nlovcn~cnt lie
siege to Meshed. Co11tcnl~~orane0~1~1y
dctachcd a corps of cavrdlry luldcr tllc orders of the Serdars Jellan
Khan and Nasscr Rhan of ICclat, to s~tbtll~e
tlic districts of Toon
and Tubbus, and t;xke ~~evcngc
fin- the dofei~.twhicl~the Afghans
had sustained during the prcc,cchg ycur at tlie hands of Ali
Murad Rhan. Tl~cscScrda.rs connnc~~cctl
operations by devastating the country, aftcr which t h y ~narcl~ccl
against thc govcriior
of 'Fuhbus, whom they nwt :~.t I<a.kl~nk,a. sninll villagc situated
near Gourmabacl, and tlicrc fi)light oilc of t , h ~nlost obstinate an~l
bloody battles that is to bc found in thc annals of l'crsiaii history ;
such was the tenncity and fury of t l ~ ccombatants, that, when
ammunition failed on but;l~ sitlcs, t h y dismounted from their
horses, and, drawing their wbres, elid not ccc~sct,o strike till the
death of Ali Murad, who awivcd a t the rlosc of the conflict;
this determinccl the issue of thc l ~ t t l n ;untl
,
the remainder of his
men, for thb most part of i h b trillcs, took to fliglit. Much of the
crcdit of this victory was lilorc cspccinlly duo to the bra.vel-y of
Nasser I i l ~ a nand his Bcloocl~ccs,who Lc:l~avc.~l
lilic heroes.
After this tlic Afyllms took posscssioii of Toon and 'Pubbus,
and committad cvcry Iri11d of cxccss 1~1)onthe i~~linbitluits
of tliose
towns : firc mcl sword did tllcir work, m ~ (to
l tlicrsc wcro ;~ddcdviola; i l l wl~icll]laving indulged
tion, murdcr, pillngc, ; ~ n dtlov;rst,i~.t.ioi~
sufficiently, t h y again jtri11cc1 t h : royi~l( I ~ I I I~xrrying
I~,
with them
a considerd)le booty. Wljilc thc: sc~tl;lr..;of A1111wd S l ~ a l\ ~w e
obtaining thcsc s ~ ~ c c s s cthat
s , sove:r(-ig~il ~ r ~ w ~011
! c lthe siege of
Mcsliecl with vigo~n.,but hc II;LI~,111) to tllis pariotl, 1~cc1-1S C ~ U C ~ ~ J
more fortu~~i~.t,c
tlian in t,lw I)lx!c.c!tli~~g
yc;u-. 'I'll(: i i ~ l ~ d ~ i t ~ i i i t ~ ,
aninlatcd by religioris fi~.ni~ticisrn,
t l ~ f i ~ ~ ~ ttllc~nsc~lvc~s
lvtl
with intrcpidity, ;mcl thc Afghans suflcl*cd hcilvy losscs in their encountcrs
with the enemy ; their resources also climinisl~cddaily, and provi-
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sions became very scarce, which obliged Alimed to detach 2000
of his cavJsy in the direction of Subzawar and Shah Rood Bostam,
to procure supplics. I n this enterprise they perfectly succeeded,
and were returning to camp with 2500 beasts of burden laden with
plunder, which had greatly encumbered and delayed them, when
on reaching the halt of Xbbasabad the foragers fell into an ambuscade, in which were postcd 1500 lcadjar horse from the environs
of Asterabad, who fell upon and completely routed them. A great
number of Afghans were killed or made prisoners in this affair ;
the plunder fell into the hands of the Icadjars, and the survivors,
numbering scarccly a thousand, regained the Afghan camp.
Ahmed Shah, seeing that his efforts to take Meshed would prove
ineffcctud, and fearing that the winter, \+hich was now approaching, might cause a repetition of the disasters of the preceding one,
accepted the terms offered him by Shah Rokh Mirza. These were,
that Ahmed should leave him in quiet possessiou of Khorassan and
support him against the ambitious chiefs of the province, on condition that Shah Rokh should acknoaledge his suzerainty, that
money should be coined in his name, firmans and other official
documents bear his seal, and the districts of Toorbut Sheikh
Jam, Bakharz, Toorbut-hai-darieh, and Khaif, bc made over to
him. A treaty, drawn up on this basis, was signed by the two
contracting parties, aRer which Ahmed Shah, thinking that the
power which he had thus consolidated was a sufficient guarantee
against the ambitious projects of Assad Khan, an Afghan chief,
of whom we shall have occasion to speak hereafter, returned
to Hcrat, where he occupied himself in carrying out numerous
It vas from hence
rcforms in the army and administration.
that he sent Beghee Khan, one of his viziers, with an army to
subdue the countries beyond the Oxus, inhabited by Uebeks,
Hazarahs, and a few Afghan families, who had not yet acknowledgcd his dominion. After having engaged in several combats,
but not very scrious ones, Beghee Khan seized upon Meimana,
Andclrhooye, Alihcheh, Shibbergan, Serpcul, Bslkh, IChulm,
Badakshan, and Bamian: he organized the various districts he
had conquered; and having appointed governors, with whom he
left troops to keep the inhabitants in awe, he returned to Ihndal~ar,
where Ahrned Shah had previously arrived, and this sovereign,
to recompense Beghee Khan for the ~erviceshe had rendcred
him, added to his title of vizier that of Sedre-azem.
(t
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I t has been mentioned that in isolating Khoraesan from Persia,
and placing the former under the authority of Shah Rolch Mirza,
his vassal, Ahrned Shah acted with a view of protecting himself
against the projects of Xesad Khan, an Afghan Serdar, of the tribe
of the Ghildjzyes. After the death of Nadir this Serdar had been
fortunate enough to maintain his authority in the Azerbaidjan, of
which province he was govcinor. H e was a man of great firmness,
brave, and more enlightened than are ordinarily the individuals of
his nation ; and his justice, his equitable views, and the partiality
which he manifested in favour of the sect of Skahs, drew around
him a great number of partisans. Seeing his power and popularity
thus increased, he declared openly his pretensions to the possession
of I r k , Khorassan, and even proposed to push on to Afghanistan,
and dethrone Ahmed Shah, whom he considered as an usurper, for
in his opicion the throne belonged by right to a chief of the tribe
of Ghilcljzyes ; but he was arrested in his march eastward, ancl
recalled to Irak, by serious events that occurred in 1753. Kerym
Khan, of the tribe of the Zencls, after h a ~ i n gmade his authority
acknowledged in Fars and the other southern provinces of Persia,
took advantage of the hatred which their populations felt for
everything that bore the name of Afghan, to raise a large army,
and with this he marched against Assad Khan, with the view of
forcing him beyond the Persian border. This chief, who had
already advanced as far as Damghan, retraced his steps, met his
antagonist a t Rasbeen, attacked him immediately, and with such
effect, that Kerym Khan was completely beaten, and so hotly .
pursued, that he was obliged to abandon Ispahan and Shiraz,
without being able to offer even the slightest resistance. H e
subsequently retired to the mountains in the south of Persia, to
shelter himself from further pursuit ; and discouraged by the
reverse he had just experienced, was on the point of seeking refuge
in India to enjoy the repose he so ardently desired, when he was
dissuaded from taking this step by Roostein S~dtan,the chief of the
district of Khecht. This chieftain informed Kelym Khan that
Assad Khan had committed the imprudence of entangling himself
in the defiles which led to his place of retreat ; that this ill-judged
movement w o ~ d dinfallibly lead to his destruction, because the
country people, who were on the side of the Zend chief* and

* Of the army of Assad Khan one-third were Afghans, and the other two G e o r
gians, Kurds, and Tiurks of Azerbdc?jnn.-Ferric,.
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detested the Afghans, were acquainted with d l the advantages
and difficulties of the ground, and, profiting by such knowledge,
would make the narrow gorges and defiles through which the latter
were marching a last resting-place for his enemies.
Convinced by this reasoning, Iierym Khan decided upon renewing hostilities, and placed his troops under the orders of Roostem
Sultan, giving him full power to act as he thought fit; accordingly this chieftain halted for Assad Khan a t the defile of Rooma,
which extends about a mile and a half along the summit of a high
mountain, and through this the Afghans could only advance in single
file. The Persians placed themselves behind the fragments of
rocks which lay scattered along the p a , and waited till the enemy
occupied it from one extremity to the other before they attacked,
when, with a perfect unity of action and inconceivable energy,
they fell upon the whole line. Every shot &om the long matchlocks of these expert marksmen carried death into the Afghan
ranks, while their bullets fell harmlessly against the rocks, behind
which their adversaries had ensconced themselves. All those who
could escape from this hornet's nest endeavoured to make good
their retreat and regain the plain, but here they found ffesh
opponents, who had' turned the position and attacked them with
fury. I t was in vain that Assad Khan tried to rally his troops
and renew the fight ; his efforts were unavailing, and he was obliged
once more to retire. A few days after, while continuing this retrograde movement, he was overtaken by Mohamed Hoosein Khan,
Kadjar, another aspirant to the Persian throne, when the remainder
of his army was destroyed, and Assad Khan only escaped with his
life by seeking refuge in Bagdad. Not meeting here with the support he expected, he passed on to Georgia, where the Prince Heraclius gave him no better reception ; and worn out and dispirited
by his many disappointments and personal sufferings, and being
without a hope of success, he finished by making his submission
to Kerym Khan, who gave him high rank a t his court and
treated him with every consideration. Assad Khan remained to
the end faithfully attached to Kerym Khan, and this was the last
attempt made by the Afghans to seize the throne of Persia.
Ahmed Shah-experienced some disquietude in seeing Assad Khan
thus submit to the Persian monarch, but Kerym Khan, having
plenty to do in maintaining the tranquillity of his own kingdom,
never again made the slightest hostile attempt to annex Afghana 2
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istan to Persia : it was however believed a t Kandahar that he was
no stranger to the revolt of Nasser Khan, chief of Relat and
Beloochistan, of which we shall have occasion to speak.
Subsequently to his return from Khorassan Ahmed Shah had
been under the necessity of proceeding three times to India, as
well to establish his authority in the Punjab, where great agitation, fomented by the Mahrattas, was almost permanent, as to
curb the turbulent spirit of that people, who were not less unmanageable than the Mghans. Nasser Khan had taken part in
all these expeditions, and distinguished himself in each of them :
he had recognised the suzerainty of Ahmed Shah from the time he
ascended the throne, and had always been well treated and generously recompensed by that sovereign ; but nevertheless the Belooch
chief revolted against him and proclaimed his own independence in
1'758. Ahmed Shah exhausted every means of conciliation
towards Nasser Khan, whom he esteemed, without being able to
bring him back to his allegiance, and a t length sent a division
of his army against him, but the chief, who had been for some'
tlme prepwed for this crisis, was not intimidated, and directly
he was informed of the arrival of Ahmed's troops he marched to
meet them. A battle was fought near the village of Pringuez,
situated about seventy miles from Kelat, in which the Afghans .
were completely beaten, and obliged to retire to a distance of thirty
miles from thence. The Serdar in command iminediately despatched
a messenger to the king to demand reinforcements, and Ahmed, fearful lest such a check, though of little consequence in itself, shoull
acquire importance from the exaggerated manner in which the
circumstarlces might be detailed to the tribes recently subdued,
put himself a t the head of this second division, and hastened to
the support of his discomfited troops. Nasser Khan, assailed by him
near the camp o'f Mestook, situated three miles and a half from
Pringuez, was defeated, and obliged to retire in all haste to Kelat :
this town he had previously placed in a good state of defence, and
within its walls he now took refuge. Ahmed Shah followed him
close and invested the place ; the position of the citadel on an
eminence was exceedingly strong, and this circumstance, and the
want of unanimity that existed amongst the Afghan serclars, u7ere
the causes that led to a protracted siege, and eventually to no
advantageous result. I t was in vain that assaults were made on
five different occ;a<ions ; they all failed, because the various chiefs
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would not, and did not, support each other ;and at length the Shah,
perceiving he could gain nothing by prolonging the conflict, consented to a treaty which replaced Nasser Khan under his suzerainty, and obliged him to furnish a contingent of troops on every
occasion that the Afghan monarch made war beyond the boundaries
of his kingdom. I n this case the chief of Kelat was to receive a
sum of money and munitions of war every time he took the field.
Nasser Khan also stipulnted that he should not be compelled to
furnish such contingent for the sake of supporting this or that
Suddozye chief, or their successors of that or any other tribe, or
be obliged to take part in the internal quarrels that might arise
amongst the Afghans themselves. This was the only condition
bearing the charactor of vassalage imposed upon .the Belooch chief,
who was now exempted from the tribute which he had previously
paid to Ahmed Shah ; and in order to make the treaty more binding
the king married a cousin of Nasser Khan's, after which he returned
.to Eandahar, and he was shortly obliged to leave for India to
put down the troubles which had q a i n broken out owing to the
intrigues of the Mahrattas. This people incited the population to
revolt, aud seized the country, which was the appanage of the Mogul
Princess, the wife of Timoor h'lirza.
" The Malwattas," remarks Sir John PUlalcolm, " became formidable in the reign of Shah Jehan, and during thirty years that
Arungzebe passed in the southern provinces of his empire his chief
occupation was to subdue the Mahrattas ; but this he found impossible, for they never awaited his attack. The country was laid
waste and his troops continually harassed by men who, fiom the
lightness of their frames, were no burden to their horses, and who,
fi-om habits of hardihood and abstemiousness, required little either
for shelter or support. I t seemed in vain to war with a foe who
.was intangible, and whose glory lay in the rapidity of his retreat ;
.for the Mahratta soldier, though brave, boasts more of his power to
e1,ude than to attack his enemy. JTThen the empire of India fell to
pieces a t the ' death of Arungzebe, and Mahomedan princes and
nobles were all ranged against each other, the Mahrattas, by continuing united, made a rapid and surprising progress. Besides the
great possessions which they actually occupied, they had compelled
not only the paramount sovereign of India, but almost every ruler
of a province, to pay them a considerable part of their annual col-
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lectiol~s,*that their habitations and fields might remain in safety.
At thc period when Nadir threatened invasion, the city of Delhi
~l
-/itself was subject to this d i s y n c ~ f i tribute."
The disgraceful tribute of which Sir John Malcolm here speaks
was agreed to by the Indian princes at the period when Ahmed
Shah marched against the confederation of the I\Iahrattas, and the
latter used all the influence they possessed in the various principalities of India to force those princes to send their contingent of
troops to take part in the war in which they were about to engage
against the Afghans.
Ahmed Shah Gomlcanee, the sovereign of Delhi, had been deposed in 1753 by his vizier Ghazee Rlian, and that functionary
placed his nephew Alemguiir on the throne in his stead. This
prince, utterly destitute of ability, was assassinated by Ghazee in
1760, when the usurper. seized upon the sovereign power himself ;
and Ahmed Shah, Suddozye, heard of this event a few days before
he arrived a t DIooitan, as well as of the junction of the Mogul troops
with those of the Pllahrattas.
T h e various populations of India had been in an unsettled state
ever since Nadir Shah seized upon Delhi; but at the death of
Shah Nahmood, emperor of the Moguls, anarchy was rampant.
The princes of India, tributaries of the Mahrattas, ardently desired
to deliver themselves from the yoke imposed upon them by this
confederation of plunderers, and Ahmed Shah, Suddozye, sent secret
emissaries to their courts in order to work upon and strengthen this
feeling. With a view of giving them time to do this he advanced but
slowly, and occupied himself in orgmising the territory which he
had recently conquered in Scinde and Mooltan. H e then entered
the Punjab, which the Mahrattas evacuated a t his approach without
fighting, so that he arrived at Lahore unopposed, and there he
encamped. The Indian princes obeyed the injunctions of the Nahrattas, and, in spite of the intrigues of Ahmed Shah, sent their
several contingents, which, when united, formed an a m y of 200,000
men, of which 70,000 were cavalry, supported by twenty pieces'of
artillery of large calibre and 200 zirnboorelrs.
Ahmed did not take the field until the whole of this formidable

* This was levied under the various
names of Ckoute, Desmokee, kc.
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army vas assembled in the environs of Delhi. H e then advanced
to meet it, and came up with the enemy on the banks of the river
Bar; but in consequence of the depth of that stream and the want
of pontoons, he was obliged to wait a few days until the water had
This mas all the more disadvantageous to him, inasmuch
as he could only obtain provisions for his troops on the side occupied
by the enemy ; and as the Mahrattas were vigilant in watching the
fords which they fortified, the Afghans soon felt the effects of
a scarcity in their camp ; some of them murmured loudly, and
others prepared to desert, when a fortunate occurrence, the result
of the clever policy of their sovereign, took place, which, producing
abundance at once, revived their hopes. Shooja-ed-Dooulet, the
Prince of Lucltnow, had submitted to the Mahrattas only because he
could not avoid it, and, suddenly leaving them, proceeded to the
Afghan camp, followed by several other Indian rajahs and 25,000
men, which made the effective force of Ahmed Shah's army 85,000
men-45,000 being cavalry and the remainder infantry-with seventeen pieces of cannon and eighty zimbooreks. There were about
10,000 non-combatants in the Afghan army, whereas in that of
the Mahratta confederacy one-thirclmight be set down as belonging
to thaj class, such, for instance, as servants, sutlers, drivers in charge
of oxen, ponies, camels, &c., and thus not more than from 100,000
to 110,000 troops could be brought into position.
Shooja-ed-Dooulet, having provisioned the Afghan army, and
overcome the hesitation of the Serdars, vho considered the passage of
the river as a thing impossible, it was resolved to give battle. On
the 7th of January, 1761, therefore, Ahmed Shah, Suddozye, ordered
the Serdar Samut Khan, Yoosoofzye, to cross the river with 5000 cavalry and attack the BIoguls-which order he promptly obeyed ; but
the greater portion of his horsemen were carried away by the rapidity
of the current, and the fire of the enemy's artillery made such havoc
amongst them, that the survivors remained in a state of indecision.
Ahmed Shah, perceiving this corps required support, sent two others
to its assistance ; but the Serdars Delaver Khan, Isakzye, and Zal
Beg, Popolzye, who commanded them, and who mere at variance
with Samut Khan, did not heartily executeethe order they had received, and allowed Samut's troops to be cut up. The king saw the
state of affairs at a glance, and, alive to the least thing that might
compromise him as to the issue of the conflict, mounted his horse
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and plunged into the river, followed only by hilie guards. The Serdars
comman&ng the divisions which had remained immovable were '
now obliged to advance, for the troops were ashamed to see their
sovereign braving death while they remained passive spectators
of the combat. The Mahrattas redoubled the fire of their artillery
to repulse this attack, and this was so terrible that the surface of the
river mas covered by the corpses of men and the carcases of horses,
and its waters became crimsoned with their life-blood. But the
afghans gained at length, though with heavy loss, the opposite
shore, and with hearts burning for revenge fell upon the enemy,
whom they finally put to the rout; 20,000 of them remained on the
field of battle, also their artille~yand baggage, and the victors
obtained a rich booty. This memorable and bloody battle was
fought on the plains of Paniput, a few pasasanlgs north of Delhi.
Shooja-ed-Lhoulet had up to this time formed but an incorrect estimate of the bravery of the Afghans; but after ha6ng
been an eye-witness of it, and remembering that they were not
very conspicuous for their notions of gratitude, and might perhaps
be wanting in that which they owed to him, he regretted that he
had assisted them-nevertheless he remained faithful to his new
ally ; a s to Delaver Khan and Zd Beg, who had not obeyed the
order of Ahrned Shah to march to the assistance of Samut Khan,
and feared his anger, left the camp by stealth, taking with them
their men, even before the issue of the day was known. The king,
without making himself very uneasy at this defection, continued
rapidly to advance, and seized upon the Mahratta country, after which
he passed into the Mogul territory, when the usurper Ghazee
Khan, seeing his kingdom invaded, determined to obtain, if possible,
the mediation of Shooja-ed-Dooulet, and thus make his peace with
Ahmed Shah. T h e Prince of Lucknow was not werse to undertaking this negotiaiion ; but on condition that Ghazee Khan, as in
duty bound, should surrender the crown to the legitimate sovereign,
and further pay a n enormous contribution to the expenses of the war.
These severe terms having been accepted, Ahmed was desirous of
placing Shah Alem, the son of Alemguir, on the throne, and,
upon his refusal to be r~instatedin his rights, his son Jehan-booght,
a s yet only a child, was raised to the musnud.
Matters a t Delhi having been thus settled, Ahmed Shah proceeded in the direction of the Punjab to maintain order there, and
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was preparing to march to the southern provinces of India when he
learnt that the Mahrattas had moved upon Delhi. H e returned,
therefore, in haste to the support of his new ally; whom he had the
good fortune to save from the danger that menaced him, for the
Mahrattas retired at his approach. Whether Shooja-ed-Dooulet
had really intrigued with them to bring about the fall of Jehanbooght, or whether the serdars, jealous of his influence with the
Shah, deceived Ahmed in order to effect his ruin, the result was
that the Afghan monarch, who ought to have shut his eyes, a t least
for the moment, to the accusations brought against the Prince of
Lucknow, demanded from him a large sum of money ; but Shooja,'
indignant a t the request, dctermined not to comply with it, and,
clandestinely leaving the camp with his troops, retired to his own
country. This desertion, added to that of Delaver Khan and Zal
Reg, with their 10,000 horse, seriously reduced the strength of the
Afghan army, so that Ahmed Shah was no longer in a position to
prolong the campaign, but, satisfied with the immense treasures lie
had collected during the wzr, he returned towards his own territory, to which he was, as it happened, recalled by an event of some
importance.
Some ambitious, and consequently discontented serdars, had, after
their flight &om the royal camp, joined Delaver Khan and Zal
Beg, who, supporting the revolt of a nephew of Ahmed Shah's, by
name Abdul Khalek Khan, proclaimed him king a t the fortress of
Girishk, and subsequently moved in triumph towards Kandahar.
Previously to this Hadji Djemal Khan, of the branch of the Zergueranees, had likewise proclaimed himself king a t Randahar after
the departure of Ahmed Shah for India, and had even coined
money in his own name ; but having heard of Ahmed's victories, he
thought it would be more prudent to renounce the royal position he
had assumed and stand on one side. Abdul Khalek, less judicious, made incredible efforts to secure his object. When Ahmed
Shah became thoroughly aware of what was passing in his capital,
he considered the circumsta.nces of so little importance, that he did
not think it necessary to return there in person, but sent the Isakzye
Serdar, and Abdullah Khan, surnamed Shah Pecend Khan, with
a strong division of cavalry, to put down the rebellious proceedings
of his nephew and the serdars who had joined him, recommending
the Khan, above all things, to use the utmost despatch and endea-
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vour to arrive at Kandahar before they could reach it fiom Girishk ;
he was not, however, in spite of his exertions, able to do so until after
the revolt had taken root there, and Suleiman Mirza, the eldest son of
Ahmed Shah, who governed in the absence of his father, had been
expelled from the capital. The greater number of the revolted serdars had only supported the usurper because they believed the report
which had been circulated by Delaver Khan and Zal Beg that
Ahmed had lost the battle of Paniput, and met with great reverses
and disasters in India; but they deeply regretted their folly in this
unlucky bi~sinesswhen they were made acquainted with his success
* a n d saw Abdullah'Rhan and his cavalry make their appearance. '
Thinking, therefore, that the only way to obtain the Shah's pardon
was to make a prompt submission, they, with few exceptions, went
to the camp of the latter, to whom they delivered up the city, and
also Abdul Khalek hiniself. When he left Delhi, Ahmed Shah
had gone to the Punjab, and thence to Peshawur, 'to re-establish
his authority, which had been somewhat questioned ; and' it was
during this journey that he received a letter from Abdullah Khan,
announcing. the manner in which he had terminated his mission-the king, in his reply, desired him to strangle his nephew secretly,
a command which he imrnedialely put into execution.
T h e disorder a t Peshawur was great when Ahmed arrived
there, as well in the town as in the neighbourhood; and several
months elapsed before tranquillity was restored, and matters resumed
their ordinary course. A t this period snow covered the ground to
the depth of three feet, and the Shah was obliged to wait for the
spring until he could return to his capital ; he wrote, therefore, to
his son Suleiman Mirza, desiring him to take every possible means
in his power to capture the serdars Delaver Hhan and Zal Beg, who
had so treacherously deserted him, and to put them to death. The
prince wrote therefore to the latter, feigning a friendship and promising perfect oblivion of the past-and this in the name of his
father-if he would pa.y him a visit a t Kandahar. Zal Beg accepted the invitation, and, with perjury truly Eastern, Suleiman
Mirza put him to death directly he entered the town. Delaver
Hhan was less inclined to confide in the prince's word than his
unfortunate friend, and instead of proceeding to Kandahar, as
he had previously promised to do, he fled to Herat, and placed
himself under the protection of the prince Timoor Mirza, second
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son of Ahmed Shah, and governor of that city. From a spirit
of opposition to his brother Suleiman, with whom he was on bad
terms, Timoor received the fugitive in a somewhat eager manner,
and showered honours and benefits upon him, which mere increased,
even to prodigality, each time that the reiterated orders arrived
at Herat to put him to death.
Ahmed Shah left Pesha~vurat the commencement of spring,"
and remained the whole summer at Kabul, arriving at Kandahar
about the middle of autumn, a t which period he experienced an
attack, and with more intensity than ever, of that terrible malady.
which had forced him long before to substitute an artificial nose of
silver for his own, which had sloughed away. This malady, called
by Abdullah Khan Djuzam (which in Persian signifies leprous,
and a small ulcer) arrived towards the close of this year a t such
a fearful height, that the Shah determined to proclaim his second
son, Timoor Mirza, his viceroy and successor to the throne of
Afghanistan. The serdars, astonished a t this decision, which
appeared to them unjust, inasmuch as it mas to the prejudice of
his eldest son Suleiman Mirza, assembled, and, having come to a
resolution, presented a respectful request to the Shah Ahmed i n
favour of that prince. I n this document they allowed a feeling
of something like discontent to appeay,'that they had not been consulted in a matter of so grave a nature. The Shah replied, that in
acting t h ~ ~hes had not consulted his own particular bias, and that
in making his selection he had been guided entirely for the public
good. " Timoor," said he, " it is true, is younger than Suleiman,
but he is infinitely more capable of gove~ning.yout,han his brother."
The serdars wished for a proof; the Shah simply replied that
Suleiman had never been able to conciliate the esteem and affection
of the tribes ; that he was violent without clemency ; that he had
never been able to foresee or put down a revolt ; and, in short, that
he hastily put to death the Serdar Zal Beg. " But," said the
serdm, "it was by your order." " Did I not also order Timoor
to put Delaver Khan to death? " replied Ahmed ; " and what did
he do ? Political reasons might induce me to order two culprits to
be put to death, but other secret reasons, which were known to the

* The manuscript of Abdullah is entirely Gthout dates, the author is therefore
unable to give any.-Pe~-rier.
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prince Suleiman, ought to have led him to disobey me, as his brother
did." T h e serdars appeared satisfied with these replies, which
seemed to embody, as it were, his opinions for the future guidance
of the princes of the blood.
When Ahmed Shah had induced the serdars to acknowledge
his son Timoor lMirza as his successor, he retired to a palace he , .
.
had built a t Tobeh-Maharoof, situated in the midst of the Suleiman
mountains, the cradle of his tribe. From hence he watched over
the government; but after four or five years had elapsed, his
disease having rendered him incapable of any further continuous
labour, he entirely abandoned ~ u b l i caflairs to the governors of
the various provinces of his empire, and expired shortly after,
namely, in 1773. Y q h o o t Khan, the chief of his eunuchs, and
a person in whom he had great confidence, kept his death a
profound secret, and wrote imrnecliately to Tinioor Mirza, who
was still governor of I-Ierat, to come with all speed to Kardahar
and take possession of the throne. At the same time that he
transmitteci this information he set out hmself, talring the royal
corpse with him ; this was placed in a litter, and the curtains being
carefully drawn was completely concealed from every one. T h e
adroit eunuch approached the litter &om time to time, as if to
-receive some order from his sovereign, or give him some refreshment, remarking to those of his escort who wished to make any
request or a n inquiry about his health, that, being extremely unn~ell,
the Shah had ordered that no one should be allowed to disturb
him. Yaghoot Khan also took with him the Shah's jewels and
treasure, which were carried by mules, and always preceded
the royal litter, so that he might be able to have his eye constantly upon them. No one discovered the deception during the
greater. part of the journey; and it was only about a day's march
from Kandahar, when the prince Suleiman Nirza came out to
receive his father, that it was necessary to make the Shah's death
public. T h e se;dars, who were present on this occasioli, were
nearly all attached to the party of this prince, from whom they
had received brilliant promises, and they immediately returlled ~ t h
him to the city, and proclaimed him Shah of the Afghans.
Xhmed Shah, Sudclozye, reigned twenty-five years and a few
months : he was free finom most of the crimes commonly found in
individuals of Eastern nations ; such as drunkenness, whether from
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wine or opium, duplicity, avarice, cruelty, and one which need not
be mentioned; he was always a most firm supporter of religion.
On his accession to the throne he changed the name of his tribe,
which was Abdalee, to that of Dooranee, which signifies a person of
noble and ancient birth ; and he took the title of Doorveranee, i. e.
] ~ e a?.ound whom convages the noble and ancient tribe.
In order to increase the numbers of the Afghan nation Ahmed
connected with it all the tribes of doubtful origin, Eimak or Belooch,
speaking the P d t o o language, who were settled in the various
provinces, particularly in the district of Furrah and on the banks
of the Helmund. There was a clause in his will forbidding his
succesors to cut off the nose or ears of any one, no matter whom ;
and this mas based upon his own sufferings, for the Ieprous disease
having destroyed his nose, arid Nadir Shah, to punish him for an
act of insubordination, having cut off one of hk e m , he had deeply
felt the deprivation of these orgari. H e also desired the Dooranees to ally themselves one with another, and not to give their
girls in marriage to strangers ; that for the future the succession
should go entirely to the son and to the exclusion of the daughters,
who up to that time had part,icipated in the property left by their
father; that a t the death of an Afghan his nearest relative, the
father and son excepted, should marry his widow; and if there was
no relative, the widow should reside in the house of her deceased
husband, and live on the proceeds of his property till her death ;
that when a married woman died without having a child, her
father, brother, or other relative could not demand her dower from
the husband ; he also abolished divorce, and withdrew -from the
master his right to kill his slave. H e abrogated the custom of
bending the body and kissing the earth before the sovereign, whom
he commanded henceforth to be saluted by carrying the hand
straight to the forehead ; he granted permission to sit in the presence of the monarch only to the syuds and priests, to whom he
conceded the privilege of dining every Thursday evening with
the sovereign, in order that he might be able to converse with
them on the sciences and religion. The laws he made during
his reign he caused to be rigorously executed, and commanded
that his descendants and successors should do the same after
him. H e accumulated great riches, but they consisted of the
plunder which he had taken from his enemies ; the revenues of
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Afghanistim, properly so termed, never found their way into his
private coffers : he gave his troops their pay in person. The name
of Ahmed Shah becamc glorious throughout Asia after the battle of
Paniput, which was olie of the causes that led to the rapid decay
of the Mogul empire. The petty chiefs of Khorassan, who all
acknowledged his suzerainty, and oFered but .a timid opposition,
he would have brought into complete subordination, had it not,
been for the six campaigns which he made in the Punjab, India,
and Beloochistan, which absorbed all his time. H e saw that
repose demoralized his troops, and he kept them always in a high
state of discipline. I t was by this.system that he was enabled to
'
maintain himself securely upon the throne, as much as to the great
clemency that he constantly manifested, and which induced him so
continually to pardon the rebellious chiefs who could not bring themselves to bow under the yoke of obedience, and between whom he
was obliged to be the peacemaker. His reign was remarkable for
the good which he spread around him, and his generosity and simple
arid modest demeanour in the midst of courtly pomp made him
loved by allwho approached his person ; he was of easy access, and
administered justice upon the most equitable principles, without a
harsh word even to those who deserved it ; he was conciliating, p e ~ suasive, and no one ever complained of the judgments that he gave.
EIe greatly extended the limits of his empire, which, at the moment
of his decease, were as follows: the frontier to the north was defined
by the O m s and the mormtains of Eiafferistan ; to the south, by the
sea of Oman ; to the east, by the mountains of Thibet, the Sutlej;
and the Indus; and to the west, by Khor'asan, Persia, and
Kerman.
But Ahmed Shah is much more deserving of eulogy for the talent
.
with which be subjected the various Afghan tribes to his laws,
than for having given such a vast extension to his kingdom, or for
the victories h e won. The princes who prior to him governe'd
the Afghans exercised but a nominal aut.hority over the nomade
tribes, for they listened only to the orders of their own chiefs.
Ahmed Shah conciliated the majority of these, and reduced to
obedience the few .who were hostile to him. T h e nine Serdars
who had served with him in the army of Nadir formed a Council
vhich he always consulted in questions of state : he adopted
no measure of importance without their approbation, and never
'

'
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failed in any promise that he made them. His government in
short resembled much more a federative republic of which he was
the head, than an absolute ponarchy. After a victory he always
gave up a large part of the spoils of the enemy to his soldiers ; he
never adopted an arrogant tone of superiority with their chiefs
which could hurt Dhe feelings of those with whom he had once
been on equal terms, and who had elevated him to the sovereign
power.
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Kabul becomes the capital Sons of Ahmed Shah Dervish Ali Khan -Afghan
principles -Walee Khan and his sons put to death- Flight of Suleiman Mirza
- Timoor Mirza esters Kmdahas -Resides at Kabul - Euzzilbash cavalry
organised -Timoor marches againat Sciude -Conflicts between the Kaloras
and Talpooras - Timoor Shah takes Bawalpoor- Establishes the ICaloras in
Scinde - Fresh disturbances in Scinde - Medad Khan is beaten at Djioond Fethi Khan Talpoora succeeds to power- Timoor takes the field against the
Emir of Bokhara- Bdkh and Akhcheh become independent -Timoor returns
to Kabul - Events in Khornssan -Afghan army marches on Jleshed Mamech
K h u - Capture of Tchinolm -Death of Medad Khan -Fresh insurrection
in Khornasan - Afghan army advances into that province -Conspiracy to take
Timoor Shish's life-The plot fails-Ameleh Khan is put to death-Talue
of ns oath in au Afghan sovereign -Death of Timoor Shah Character of that
monarch -Sons of Timoor.
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THEAfghans never really enjoyed their independence till the
reign of Ahmed Shah, and the national disposition was probably
modified at this epoch. The liberty of speech and action in which
they were permitted to indulge contribnted without doubt powerfully to develop that independent manner and rustic pride which
still characterize them in our own day-a conquered nation for
generations, they became all a t once conquerors. This sudden transition took place it is true under Mir Mahmood, but was only
thoroughly developed under Ahmed Shah, Suddosye ; it inspired
them with confidence in themselves and roused a superiority which
had up to that period been dormant ; in a word, the national mind
had been formed.
T h e city of Kandahar was considered the capital of Afghanistan
during the reign of Ahmed Shah, but he only resided there during
the autumn and winter ; he went to Kabul in the spring and
summer, alternately changing his place of abode from one city
to the other, that he might constantly enjoy an agreeable and
temperate climate. H i s son Timoor Shah altered this state of
things ; for he withdrew the title of capital from Kandihar and
transferred it to Kabul, which was subsequently the royal residence during the whole period that the dynasty of the Suddozyes
occupied the throne of Afghanistan.

/
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Ahmed Shah left eight sons, namely, Suleiman Mirza, Timoor
Mirza, Chahab Mirza, Sindjar Mirza, Yezdan bakhch Mirza,
Silrander Mirza, Darsb Mirza, and Perviz Mirza. T h e Prince
Timoor, Walee of Herat, named by his father as his successor, did
not hear of his death till he received the letter written to him by
the eunuch Yaghoot Khan, bnt he learnt before he left Herat
that his brother Suleiman Blirza had been proclaimed king a t
Kandahar by a few Serdars, at the head of whom was the Shah
Walee Khan, first minister of the deceased Shah. The delay
which took place before Timoor proceeded to his capital arose
from the uneasiness occasioned him by Dervish Ali Khan,
Hazarah, a subtle chief, and a dangerous traitor, who had recently escaped from the dungeons of Herat, in which Ahmed Shah
had imprisoned him after his return from Meshed. A party
hostile to Timoor had rallied round this Khan ; nevertheless the
prince, under a promise of pardon, was clever enough to induce
him to come within the precincts of his palace ; where, according
to Afghan usage, which consists generally in a perfect disregard
of the value of the most solemn oaths, he put him instantly to
death, and gave the command of the Hazarahs to the Ssrdar
Mohamed Shah Khan, a member of the same tribe. After this he
appointed his own son, Mahmood Mirza, Governor of Herat ; but
as he was desirous that he should accompany him to Kandahar, he
named Islam Khan, Popolzye, his vizier, as the Zom~nz tenens of
his son in t.hat office, after which he assembled his troops and
marched against Suleiman Mirza. On his arrival a t Furrah he
was joined by a great number of partizans who had already
abandoned the cause of his brother, but amongst all those who
deserted Suleiman the most important accession to his cause was
the Shah Walee Khan, who had great influence over the Afghans.
This personage brought his two sons and two of the principal
Dooranee Serdars to the camp of Timoor, which was then at
Siah-ab ; but the prince, fearing to be hampered in the government
by this old servant of his father, and desirous also of striking
terror into the traitors by a severe example, ordered their heads
to be struck off directly they appeared before him. The party
of Suleiman Mirza, terrified by these executions, was at once
dissolved, and t.he usurper finding himself thus deserted fled to
India, accompanied by four followers who alone remained faithful
to him.
1T

Timoor, surrounded by all the great and powerful families in the
kingdom, and accompanied by a numerous army, now made his
public entry into Ihndahar with much pomp and circumstance,
and was at once acknowledged king by the assembled Serdars ; Lut
he made only a short stay in this city, the population of ~ h i c h
had become odious to him from having taken his brother's part:
as a punishment he deprived it of its title of capital, which as
we hare already said he transferred to Kabul, to which place
h e at once proceecled with hjs army, leaving his son Mahmood
provisional Governor of Kandahar. The reign
- of Timoor continued for twenty years, and during this period he almost always
gassed the winter at Peshawur, and the remaining seasons of the
year at Kabul. On ascending the throne he augmented the pay
,
of the Afghan chiefs, and gave the tribes a great extension of
territory; seve~alof the serdars received appointments of great
trust and high command and titles much esteemed at the court of
an Asiatic sovereign.
The Serdar Payendeh Khan, son of that Hadji Djemal who had
renounced his pretensions to the throne in favour of Ahmed Shah,
Suddozye, was confirmed in the command of the powerful tribe of
.
the Barulrzyes, and honoured with the title of Sera-fraz Khah.
,
'
Delwer Khan, the Serdar who deserted at the battle of Paniput,
received the title of Medad Khan, and the pzda of Serdaree
.
Serdarane, " General of Generals." Kazee Feiz Ullah, Pich-nawaz
of the king, received the title of Kelane Kelauter, " Greatest of
the Great." Timoor Shxh had such an implicit confidence in this
Serdar that he never did anything without consulting him. Abdul
Latif Khan, one of the descendants of Sheik Ahmed Zindeh Pjr,
was appointed lieutenant of the kin-gdom and receiver-general of the
taxes. Noor BIohamecl Khan, Baber'ee, was made president of the
court of accounts ; and lastly, Iltifat Khan, chief of the eunuchs,
was appointed chief treasurer and custoclian of the crown jewels.
All these personages had the rank of ministers, and Timoor ordered
as a general rule that' the principles of justice, equity, and a mild
course of conduct should be observed towards every one ; but he recommended them to employ the chiefs of tribes as little as possible
as public functionaries, for up to this period they had generally
held the appointments, and almost always abused their authority.
T h e Shah's guards were selected from the tribe of Isakzye, and to
this the Serdaree Serdarane belonged. A division of 12,000
,
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ICtnzilbash horsemen was also organized under t.he command of
the Serdar Mohamed Khan Beyat, the pay of their officers was
augmented, and Timoor.chose from amongst these the companions
of his debauched habits, for he had a great predilection for wine
and other pleasures. H e paid with great punctuality every halfyear the salaries of the officers of his court, and the army every
year.
Timoor Shah was only twice at the head of his troops to meet
his enemies ; all the other wars in which he was engaged mere conducted by the Serdaree Serdarane, Medad Khan, Isalczye. T h e
first occasion on which Timoor took the field was in 1779 in the
campaign against Scinde, which had revolted. The governor of
this province, a vassal of the Afghan sovereigns, and admitting
their suzerainty, had endeavoured to throw it of?' a t the time tbe
Mahrattas rose in his htlier's reign, and Ahmed Shah had subdued
him even before the battle of l'aniput, making him pay a very
large sum of money as arrears of tribute, and as an indemnity for
the expenses of the war; after which Ahmed forgave him, and
m~intainedhim in his government. This chief belonged to the
tribe of the Kalora, and had the title of Emir of Scinde. Mir Fethi
Khan, chief of the Talpoora tribe, a rival of his, attacked him in
June, 1779, massacred a great number of his people, and dispossessed him of his government. T h e Kalora chieftain fled to
Kandahar. from whence he addressed a petition to Timoor Shah,
who a t once took the field with his army to reinstate him in his
rights. The king began by seizing Bawalpoor, in which place he
found immense riches, and upon these he laid his hands. The insurgents after this success did not hold their ground anywhere, and
their chiefs fled from the province, which the Shah placed under
the control of the .ICdora Emir, and then returned to Kabul ; but
he had scarcely left Scinde when the chief of the Tdpooras,
again entered that territory and once more drove out the Kaloras.
The embarrassments under which Timoor laboured at that time
prevented him from promptly repressing this fresh outbreak : aud it
was only in 1786 that the Serdaree Serdarane Medad Khan could
march there with a small corps d'armde, with which, on its entering
Scinde, the contingent of the Khan of Kelat was to form a junction ;
this chief, however, was bound to the Talpooras by family ties, and
on various pretences did not bring the ,reinforcement which by
treaty he was obliged to furnish. I n spite uf this contretemps
n 2
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Medad Khan marched upon the insurgents with his small force,
but, being attacked by vcry superior numbers near the village of
Djioond, he was beaten and obliged to retire and fortify himself in
that locality.
Mir Fethi Khan then entered into negotiations with the
Serdaree Serdarane, demanded to be iiwested with the same rights
that the Shah of Afghanistan had formerly aclrnowleclged, and
which had been held by the chief of the Kaloras, promising for
the future an exact payment of the tribute as well as the sum then
due for arrears. Medad Khan accepted this arrangement, which
was confirmed by his sovereign, bnt Mir Fethi Khan, who only
wished to gain time to collect his treasure and his forces, in order
that he might defy his s~~zerain
with the greater chance of success,
refused to pay the tribute the third gear after his installat'ion as
Governor of Scinde, and proclaimed his independence. Timoor
Shah being unable to send troops and thus oblige him to return
to his duty, Scillde remained independent of Afghanistan upAo
the time of the Shah's death.
The second occasion on which this sovereign took the field in
person was in his conquest of Sarmncand and Bokhara, to punish
the inhabitants of Balkh and Akhcheh, who had d r i p out t,heir
Afghan governor and revolted against him at the instigation of
S~lltanMurad Khan, Emir of Bolchara, and of n'ravar-ul-nahar.
T5Then the Shah approached Balkh, those who had raised the
standard of rebellion, and in whose support Sultan Xurad Khan
had sent a contingent of troops, left the town to oppose the Shah,
and encamped at a short distance froin ,him. If Timoor Shah had
a t once attacked the Uzbeks he would most certainly have crushed
them, for his al-my was much superior to theirs, not only in numbers
but in the spirit of the troops ;but the rivalry which existed between
the aerdars, and the vexation felt by those who coinnunded the
tribes at being obliged to leave their lucrative appointments, caused
them to temporize and thus compromise the success of the Afghan
arms; and his attempts to conciliate these chiefs were so prolonged
that the army was at last completely without provisions.
The fall of Timoor Shah was the object of the serdars, and this
they hoped to accomplish without its appearing to be their fault,
trusting that his successor would grant them the advantages which
they had hoped, but in vain, to receive from him. The king penetrated their design, and to avoid an irreparable disaster came to an

.

understancling with the rebels, withdrew from the conquest of
P;Savar-ul-nahar, and retired to Kabul, preserving a feeble appearance
of authority on Ballrh and Althcheh, which from this day became
pretty nearly independent. They accepted, it is true, a governor
named by Timoor Shah, but they took care previously to point out certain persons from amongst whom that officer sl~onlctbe taken. The
authority of the governor thus chosen was very limited; thc people
he governed merely furnished him with the means of subsistence for
himself and a very small number of personal servants ; but they
paid him neither taxes nor salary and subjected him to every bind
of annoyance. The consequence of this was that Timoor Shah
was at length unable to find any person who would accept the
appointment of governor of these turbulent citics, which led to a
hundred jokes and witticisnls more or less vounding to the feelings
of the sovereign, particularly from those who were hostile to him.
The Loutis, who ~vandered from town to t o m with monkeys and
other animds, taught them to cast earth upon their heads (a sign
of the deepest grief amongst Asiatic:;) when they were aslrecl whejher
they would be governors of Balkh or Akhcheh.
From t l ~ eperiod at which Timoor Shah succeeded to the throne
Khorassan had been in a permanent state of revolt. Shah Rokllrh
Nirza, who recognised the suzerainty of this sovereign as he had
done that of his father, claimed his assistance against his old friend
Manlech Khan of Tchinaran, who had five years before seized and
continued to hold possession of Meshed, in which city he exercised
R most fearful, tyranny.
Timoor Shah sent 30,000 men, under the
orders of the Serdaree Serdarme, to overthrow the usurper.
On his arrival a t Meshed Mamech Khan left the city and shut
himself up in his fortress of Tchinaran, in which place Medad
Khan thought it would be as well not to disturb him ; he contented
himself therefore by ordering his villages to be pillaged, his territory
ravaged, and, replacing Shah Rokh a t the head of the government
of Meshed, he returned to Kabul; but he had scarcely reached
the c~1pit.dwhen news was brought to him that Mamech Khan
had been enabled to collect a few thousand horsemen, and once
more devastate the province, and that his position became every
day more menacing. Timoor Shah was obliged to send Medad
Khan to put down this fresh revolt, and on his arrival Mamech
Khan win retired within the walls of his fortress, but this
time the Afghans laid siege to the place, and soon forced him

102

PLOT AGAISST TIMOOR'S LIFE.

CHD. VIIL

to surrender at discretion. The Serdaree Serdarane, however,
treated &Ia.mech with generosity, left him in possession of his
Khanat, and was sabisfied with accepting a light contribution in,
money towards the expenses of the war and a thousand beasts of
burderi loaded with provisions : after which he set out on,his return
to Kabul; but the simoom blew with such intensity when he arrivedin the plains of Furrah that he died, and with him a great number
of his soldiers.
A few days subsequently to this circumstance the Rhorassanees
were informed of it and immediately rose against the Afghans and
their protCg6 Shah Rokh Mirza, which obliged Timoor Shah to send
a third army the following year to reduce them to obedience. H e
placed these troops under the command of Ahrned IGan Noorzye,
son of Nasser Ullah Khan, who, although with great difficulty, succeeded in putting down the revolt. From this moment up to the
end of the reign of Timoor, the Afghans were never engaged in
any conflict; nevertheless the year preceding the death of that
prince was remarkable for an event in which the Shah was nearly
coming to a violent end.
I n accordance with his usual custom Timoor went to pass a few
months a t Peshawur, but this year he remained at that, city a longer
period than usual, detained there by an insurrectional movement
which threatened to develop itself further and extend as far as
Lahore. Arseleh Khan, of the Mohmund tribe, and Y q h o o t Khan,
chief' of the eunuchs of the late Icing, who with several other
Afghan chiefs were dissatisfied with Timoor, determined upon his
ruin. It was agreed amongst them that Yaghoot Khan, who
commancled the guard of the royal harem, should connive a t the
entrance of Arseleh Khan and his people when the king retired
there, and put him to death, after which they were to proclaim his
nephew, Iskander Khan, a son of Suleiman Mirza, king in his
stead.
On the day agreed upon for the execution of this conspiracy,
2500 hill-riflemen, and as many resolute inhabitants of Yeshawur,
well armed, suddenly assembled in a large open space covered
with ruins, habitually deserted and situated on the side of the
grand square opposite to the citadel, on which a few thousand
Kuzzilbash horse, forming the king's guard, were always encamped. I t was about two hours after noon, the time a t which
eastern nations take their siesta ; the palace guard were therefore all
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asleep, or very nearly so, and the conspirators made choice of this
moment to penetrate into the citadel by a sally-port, of which
Yaghoot Khan had given them the key. By a rare chance
Timoor Shah had not yet fallen asleep, and, hearing the tumult
and a distant hubbub of voices,- he perceived a t once that he was
threatened by some impending danger, and quickly retired to the
summit of a tower a t one of the angles of the citadel looking into
the large square. The assassins, never thinking for a moment that
he would hide himself in a place where no one ever put his foot,
did not search for him there and went on ; but when they returned
they were attracted by his shouts, and saw the king waving 1Js
Cashmeer turban in the air as a signal of distress to the Goolam Kuzzilbashes, who were snoring below ; the conspirators endeavoured
to get at him by breaking the doors, but one of them, being ironbound and padlocked, resisted all their efforts to open it, which gave
the guards time to come up and vigorously attack the insurgents,
who were quickly reduced to the simple contingent of the mountaineers, for the Peshawur men had dispersed when they saw that
the alarm mas given. The Goolams, who were soon supported by
other troops, cut the conspirators to pieces, and but very few of them
were enabled to escape-drseleh Khan fled to his tribe, who lived
in the valleys enclosed between the mountains of the I-Iaicht-naggar,
a rough country, full of difficulties, in which the Afghan cavalry
would have had but very little chance of success had they ventured
to pursue him. Timoor employed cunning in his attempts to seize
the culprit ; he feigned forgiveness and a wish to pardon Arseleh
Khan, declaring daily at his dur.bar, and also in private, that he
admitted he had been occasionally unjust towards him, and that
he desired nothing more than to be able to repair the injuries he
had done him. H e made theae sentiments well known in public;
and when he knew they had reached the ears of Arseleh Khan, he sent
one of the p e a t nobles of his court to him, accompanied by a large
suite of servants carrying a Koran, on a page of which he had
inscribed an oath that he would pardon his fault, and a5xed his
seal to this document. Arseleh Khan, placing confidence in the
sanctity of the book which had received on its pages this solemn
promise from the Iring, invited the envoy and his suite to lodge
in his own house, treated him with great splendour and consideration, and after a few days returned with the embassy to
Kabul ; the Khan's throat was cut the day that he entered the city.

Timoor Shah, a little reassured by the death of this chief, now
ordered a massacre of the pople of Peshawur who had joined in
the revolt, and fixed the extent of it to one in three of its inhabitants ; this command v3s unfortunately but too well obeyed, and
P e s h a m r mas very nearly depopulated by these executions, which
were preceded and followed by a general emigration.
From this period Timoor Shah became suspicious, morose, aqd
restless, and his clemency, which had till then rendered his reign
remarkable, entirely ceased, and it terminated in an act of unparalleled cruelty. His last days passed away in alternate paroxysms
of remorse and fear ; he could not qtLiet his conscience and a1)solve
it from the guilt of the wholesale slaughter of which we h n e just
spoken, nor the nwrder of Brseleh Khan, brought about by perjury, and also having carried off by force the wife of an Afghan
of I<andahar, to give her to a certain Mohamed Khan, one of his
favourites, who had conceived a passion for her. Timoor Shah
survived only ten months after the attack on his life; and his
death, in 1793, was occasioiled by an inflammation of the intestines, accompanied by violent fits of vomiting. Several of his contemporaries, whom me have had occasion to consult on the subject
of his death, assure us that he was poisoned by one of the women
of his harem, the sister of a Popolzye chief, who was hostile to him.
I n spite of the several acts which have just .been mentioned, the
reign of Timoor Shah is cited in Afghanistan for the justice,
equity, and paternal feeling with which 1~ treated his subjects.
H e had many difliculties to surmount ; for the serdars who had
placed his father on the throne, and divided with him the direction of affairs, considered themselves much more like the tutors
of. his son than his councillors. The king endeavoured for a
long period to release himself from this thralclom, but, seeing that
his efforts were vain, he gave himself up to that life of ease and .
effeminacy with which European authors have so sharply reproached him, without ,reflecting whether it was possible for him
to follow a different line of conduct. They would have been less
severe if they h a d given themselves the trouble to inquire what
were the causes of this apathy. They heard from the Afghans
that which they have themselves repeated; but we must not forget
that this people admit amongst the number of their great men
those only who gorge themselves with pillage, who carry war and
devastation everywhere, and who satisfy them in their eager desire'

''

.

,-.

vnr.

HIS CHARACTER.

I O ~

fur riches; it was only by employing such means that the great

Ahmed Shah, a sovereign, be it observed, highly to be respected
an Afghan, was enabled to make himself popular with the plundering tribes of which his nation was composed. His son, instead
of enriching them by continual wars, was obliged to come to the
assistance of those he had to protect by taking funds from his own
treasury ; and this was quite enough to bring upon him the slander
and ill feeling of the people. An Afghan loves to live at other
people's expense ; everything which tends to make him respect the
property of his neighbour, to be subject to laws which prevent him
&om ransacking and destroyicg, is opposed to his nature ; is it,
therefore, astonishing that, being animated by'such sentiments, the
reign of Timoor Shah should appear to him weak and effeminate ?
1had occasion, dduring my journey in Afghanistan, to converse with
some respectable serdars, who, having held high positions at the
court of this sovereign, were able to appreciate his character. These
individuals assured me that the intelligence and activity of this
pince were equal to his courage and firmness ; and it was these
qualities which had led his father to give him the preference over
his other sons; but it would have been absolute folly for him to
have entered into an opcn struggle wit,h the old serdars, who were
venerated by the Afghans, with a view of concentrating all the
power within his own hands, for this contest could terminate only
to his disadvantage, and would have ended in his complete ruin.
H e preferred the wise and prudent path of reasonable concessions
to that dangerous, and always uncertain, one of civil war ; if he
was debauched, it may be affirmed that in this he only imitated
the majority of Eastern sovereigns-even those who rank highest
in the pages of historians. They have always considered, and will
always consider, so long as there is no change of habits in Asia,
the abuse of the physical powers and pleasures as the first and most
imprescriptible of their rights. Timoor, however, without doubt
would have been less effeminate if, like hi5 father, he had had
the power in his own hands; but, not having serious subjects to
attend to, he gave himself up to frivolous ones.
When the serdars who had been the companions of Ahmed Shah
were dead, their sons succeeded to the influence which the former
had taken in the itEairs of government, and Timoor was unable
to resist their demands. These chiefs disposed of the tribes ; they
could alienate them from him in a moment, and he was, therefore,
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obliged to be on good terms with them. Unfortunately these young
serdars lvere passionate and ambitious; being without the esperience of their fathers, they never knew how to preserve amongst
themselves that union which had existed amongst the.latter ; and
.
Timoor, instead of finding in them the characteristics which are
necessary to triumph over clifficulties, passed his time in endeavouring to heal their misunders~andings,which could not be done without a great deal of tact, so that their feelings should not be wounded
and that he should still appear to preserve the authority of a sovereign over them. I t was the just medium that Timoor adoptcd
with them all, and the clever concessions which he made to ambitious
chiefs eager for change, which assured to him a reign of twenty .,
years, exempt from the scenes of anarchy that stained with blood
those of his successors. I t was in consequence of his sons not
having followed their father's example that they were hurled from
the throne of Afghanistan, and ended their days by the sword or in
exile.
Timoor Shah left thirty-six children ; of these twenty-three were
sons, namelyHumayoon Mirza.-His mother was of the tribe of Suddozye.
Mahmood Mirza, I-ladji Firooz Eddin Mirza. -Their mother
was of the tribe of Popolzye.
Abbas Mirza, ICohendil N1irza.-Their mother was of the tribe
of Isakzye.
Zeman Mirza, Shoodja-001-Moollc 31irza.-Their mother was of
the tribe of Yoosoofzye.
Ahmed Mirza, Mohamed Sultan Mirza, Yezdane Bakhch
Mirza.-Their mother was of the tribe of Noorzye.
Rechver Mirza, Sultan Ali Mirza, Nadir Mirza.-Their mother
,
was a great-grandchild of Nadir Shah.
Eyoob Mirza, Hassan Mirza.-Their mother was a Popolzye.
Echreff Mirza, Muzafer Mirza, Djehan Wala Nlirza.-Their
mother was of the tribe of Etchekzye.
Mohamed Murad Mirza, Mirane Mirza, EIoosein Mirza.Their mother was of the tribe of Mohamedzye.
Achem Mirza, Chapoor Mirza.-Their mother was a Mogul.
I t is essential that the reader should notice with attention the
names of those princes who are born of the same mother, because
the half-brothers habitually detest them, and in cases of revolt
are nearly always united against them. I n taking up arms they

are nearly always sure to have the support of the tribe to which
their mother belonged.
Nearly all these princes were, as may be seen by the above
table, born of Afghan mothers, with the exception of Kechver,
Sultan Ali, and Nadir, .who were descended from a great-pand&ild of Nadir Shah, and Achem and Chapoor Mirza, whose
mother was a daughter of the Mogul Emperor Ahmed Shah Gourkanee, whom Timoor married in 1750. A11 these princes had
each from ten to fifteen children ; those who survived the disasters
which have befallen their dynasty have sought refuge in India,
where the greater number of them are pensioners of the East India
Company.
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AFGHANISTAN,
at the ,death of Timoor Shah, comprehenclecl the
principalities of Cashmeer, Lahore, Peshswur, Kabul, Ballill,
Khulm, Kandahar, Mooltan, and Herat ; those of Kelat and
Beloochistan, as well as Persian Khorassan, acknowledged her as
suzerain. Scinde also, though not having paid for five years the
tribute agreed upon by Mir Fethi Khan, chief of the Talpooras, was
nevertheless classed as amongst the number of her dependencies.
Less far-sighted than his father Ahnlcd Shah, the deceased prince
had neither designated the son who ' w a s to succeed him to the
throne, nor obtained the recognition of m y one of them by the
serdars. T h e majority of his sons at the time of Tirnoor's death
were governors of various provinces. The eldest, I-Tumayoon Mirza,
his successor to the throne by right, was at I h d a h a r , Mahmood
Nirza a t Herat, Abbas Mirza at Peshawur, Zeman Mirza a t
I<abbul, Shoodja-001-Moollc a t Ghuznee, ICohenclil a t Cashmeer ;
and the royal corpse had not received the rites of sepulture when his
sons were already disputing the succession. The majority of them
had hastened to Kabul to be present when their father drew his
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last breath; the others, amongst whom were Humayoon &firza
and Mahmood Mirza, remained a t their governments, where
they had made themselves beloved by the people, and might reasonably hope for their assistance and support in retaining their
power. Mahmood Mirza had promised his support to Humayoon
Mirza to aid him in seizing upon the throne, supposing that his
to it was disputed ; and the latter, in acknowledgment of
this service, had promised to confirm him in his government of
Herat. The good understanding was not so complete amongst
the other brothers assembled at Kabul.
-4bba.s Mirza, the fourth son of Tirnoor Shah, renowned for his
Herculean strength, had, in the first instance, a chance of obtaining
possession of the throne ; but the serdars having refused to sanction
his election before his father's obsequies were performed, the untoward delay moclified the chances which he might have had of
success ; for each serdar attacliecl himself to one or other of the
princes, and endeavoured to influence him in favour of his own
particular interests. T h e consequence of this was a complete dissension amongst the chiefs-each
party flew to arms, and blood
flowed in the streets of Kabul.
T h e most powerf~iland influential of all the serdars was Payendeh Khan, a son of that Hadji Djemal who withdrew his pretensions ,to the crown in favour of Ahmed Shah. Like his father he
was the head of the family of the Mohamedzyes, and commandingin-chief the tribe of the Barultzyes. This position gave him great
influence amongxt the people, who, after the descendants of Sudoo
had been raised to the throne, had withdrawn from them a portion
of their regard, which, replaced by fear, had been bestowed upon
the descendants of Moharned, whom they considered as alone capable
of maintaining their privileges against the excessive power which
they had given to their kings. Payendeh Khan gave his adhesion
to Zeman Mirza, the fifth son of Tirnoor, and succeeded in attaching to his party the most influential of the Afghan nobility
and the chiefs of the Kuzzilbashes a t Kabul. Amongst the
former were Ahlned Khan, Noorzye ; Fath-Ullah Khan, Suddozye ;
Noor Rlohamed Khan ; Emin-001-Moolk ; Emir Islam Khan,
Djevanchir ; Djaffer Khan, Djevanchir ; Moharned Khan, Beyat ;
Emir Ullah Khan, Logheree ; and many others of as high rank
and equal power. With their assistance he was enabled in the first
instance to calm the general excitement, and subsequently to ele-
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vate the Prince Zenian to the sovereign power in the following
manner :O n the proposition of Payendeh Khan, the princes agreed to
assemble with the chiefs of tribes in order that the latter might .
proceed in all liberty to the election of a sovereign taken from
amon@ the former. Each of the sons of Timoor, accompanied by
the serdars, came to this meeting ; and in conformity with an understanding which had been already agreed to, no one had any arms,
either concealed or otherwise, about his person. The place selected
for this gathering belonged to Payendeh Khan ; he had previously,
and with great secrecy, strengthened all the doors and windows,
and arranged the apartments in such a manner that no prison could
have been more secure. When the princes were assembled, and
some time had been occupied in discussion, Zeman, whose pzrtisans had purposely abstained from appearing there, suddenly,
under some slight pretence, left the assembly. Payendeh Khan,
who, to prevent any suspicion, had not uttered a word in favour of
his candidate, followed him out of the room, after which all those
who remained in the house were placed under lock and key, and
troops stationed round it.
T h e various factions, deprived of their chiefs thus retained prisoners and receiving no instructions, allowed them~elvesto be persuaded by Payendeh Khan, and acknowledged Zeman Mirza as
their king. The new sovereign kept h ~ sbrothers in confinkment during five days without giving them anything to eat save
two or three ounces of bread daily, the only way in which he could
bring them to recognise his election. \]'hen they and the chiefs
who had shaved their captivity were released, they resembled so
many skeletons, and left the inhospitable and treacherous roof
under which they had passed these five days of suffering, only to
be transferred to the citadel of the Bala Hissar, within the walls of
which Zeman thought it would be prudent to place them.
T h e new sovereign commenced his reign by settling a pension upon the old and devoted servants of his father, and by various
concessions attached to his person those serdars who had been
opposed to him ; but some few others, for the sake of example, he
put to death ; and as, after all, the Afghans were obliged to have a
king, they contented themselves with the one that had thus been
elected, who met with no further opposition in Kabul.
Humayoon Mirza, informed of the blow thus levelled a t his
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righ;hts as the eldest son of Timoor, protested against the usurpation of Zeman, and accelerated his preparations for war ; his
brother, Mahmood Mirza, did the same ; and a good many partisans came forward at their appeal to overthrow the usurper.
~~t &man Shah, who could dispose of the greater and the richest
portions of the kingdom, who was in possession of the royal treasure and the most warlike of the troops, did not remain inactive ;
a very short space of time he had assembled a sufficient force to
put down his two antagonists, and, directly he mas in a position to
take the field, he marched on Kandahar. Though Bfahmood had
not yet come to his assistance, Humayoon Mirza advanced boldly
to meet Zeman, and came up with him at the little town of Kelat-iGhildjzye ; a battle ensued between the rival brothers ; Humayoon
was completely beaten, and obliged to fly into Beloochistan, where
he found an asylum at Kelat with the Emir Nasser Khan.
Mahmood Mirza, retained at Herat by the necessity of calming
the excitement that reigned there, was not able to act up to
the promise he had made his brother I-Iumayoon to come to his
support ; and Zeman, after the defeat of the latter, made preparations to subdueMahmood, when several revolts which broke out a t
Kabul forced him to return there. A t this period evil councillors obtained a power over the mind of the Shah ; they persuaded
him that. the weakness and condescension of his father to the
s e r d a r ~had alone checkeil the increasing impulse given to the
prosperity of Afghanistan by his ancestor Ahmed Shah, and they
recommended him to alter this system, and concentrate the absolute
power in his omn hands.
T o effect this object Zeman Shah commenced by taking the
great appointments of the state from those who had inherited them
as sinecures since the reign of that monarch. Even Payendeh
Khan himself, to whom' he was indebted for his throne, was not
made an exception by the instiptors of this violent change, for
his influence considerably diminished, and these dismissals did
not long suffice to appease the fears that his ambitious advisers
suggested to Zeman Shah. Individuals of consideration were
attracted to court on the faith of solemn oatns, arrested, imprisoned, or put to death, and these sanguinary executions spread
consternation in Kabul, the citizens of which were soon brought
under a yoke of iron. Such useless cruelties alienated the
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Afghans from their new sovereign ; and his brothers, who were
released from tlie citadel almost immediately after they had been. .
incarcerated, dispersed over the different provinces, and everywhere excited disobedience to his authority. Obliged to conspire in
secret in presence of the troops that were sent to suppress the disorders of which they themselves were the instigators, they nevertheless
ceased not by their intrigues to endeavour to accomplish the fall of
their relative, and continued very dangerous to his power. Shah
Zeman, fearing that a general reaction would be manifested against
him, was afraid to put those who were in his power to death, as it was
in the first instance his intention to do ; but these quarrels between
the sons of Timoor Shah were the prelude to scenes of carnage, in
the midst of which the dynasty of the Sudddzyes was to end.
I t was about this time that Agha Mohamed Khan, founder of the
dynasty of the Kadjara in Persia, sent Nohamed Hoosein Khan,
I<5t~aguzloo,as ambassador to Shah Zernan, requesting the cession
of Balkh, which he required in order that he might be able to
undertake in all sccurity the expedition which he proposed to make
against Beghee Khan, a t that period king of Bolchara. Z e m m
Shah, being then greatly embarrassed, could not refuse this concession to the Icadja~,who was a t Meshed with a numerous army ;
he consented, therefore, not only to his demand, but promised ,
also to assist him with his own troops. Subsequently Agha 310hamed Khan having been called to the west by the ,menaced
invasion of the Russians, this treaty was never carried out.
During the events that we have related above the fire was
smouldering which was so soon to burst forth in the midst of the
Afghan nation. T h e Punjab, annexed to the Icingdom by Ahmed
Shah, attempted to regain its independence, and the Shah Zeman
immediately took the field to chastise the rebels ; but he had scarcely
crossed the Indus when he learnt that, assisted by the Emirs of
Beloochistan, his brother Humayoon had seized upon Kandahar.
This intelligence obliged him to put off his expedition to Lahore,
and he set off by forced marches, and by the direct road across the
mountains, to attack t$e former city. On the approach of his brother,
Humayoon was betrhyed by his Afghan pwtisans, who wished to
seize and deliver him up to Zeman ; but, assisted by the Beloochees,
h e succeeded in escaping from them, and again fled to Beloochistan.
The Shah sent a thousand cavalry in pursuit of him, from whose
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clutches he escaped for several days ; but having, unfortunately for
him, returned on his road to gain Herat, they came up with and
arrested him in the district of Zen~indavar~
after which, and in
obedience to the orders they had received from Shah Zeman, they
put out his eyes. T h e Shah, delighted with this fresh act of cruelty,
which, he fancied, ought to strengthen the power he had usurped,
thou& of marching against the Emirs of Scinde, as much with the
desire of punishing them for the support they had given to FIumayoon, as to force them to pay the arrears of tribute which they
owed, and which they had ceased to pay several years before the
death of Timoor Shah.
Shah Zeman had reached the Bolan Pass when he heard
that Mahmood Mirza, after having established his power a t
Herat, had ji~sttalien the field with an excellent army, and intended to advance upon his rear while he was engaged with his
enemies in Scinde. Forced therefore by necessity, he came to terms
with Fathi Ullah Khan Talpoora, and for the sum of 300,0001.
gave up the remainder of the arrears, which amounted to three
times that sum, and confirmed him in the gov'ernment of
Scinde, after which he moved by forced marches to meet his
brother.
Mahmood Mirza, quite as well informed of the movements of
Zeman as the Shah was of his, halted when he heard of the king's
return to Kandahtlr, and having taken up a position in the mountains
of the Siah-bend, across which he had advanced, only moved forward
when he learnt that Zeman mas two or three marches from his
encampment. The two armies came in sight, and attacked at
Gourrek, a large village situated -between Girishk and Zer~lindavar,
and fought with fury during fifteen successive hours. At length
fortune declared itself against Mahmood Mirza, who, beat.en,
turned, and cut off from his communications, was obliged to fly and
retire within the walls of Furrah, followed only by a hundred of
his dependants.
After this Shah Zeman, without giving himself any further
trouble about his antagonist, marched straight upon Herat, and
encamped under its walls, but several assaults which he made
were repulsed with energy, and he was on the point of retreating
when the mobher of Mahnlood Mirza arrived in his camp to make
proposals in the name of her son, who she assured Zeman had no
desire for the throne, and would be quite satisfied simply with the.
I
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The Shah, who was anxious to carry his
government of &rat.
arms to other points that were seriously menaced, was delighted
with the proposition, and accepted it immecliatetly.
Iiamran Xirza, the son of Malimood, and Hadji Firooz Eddin,
his brother, who had been appointed governor of the city in
i7Xahmood's absence, had remained within the citadel, and were
afraid to go into the town lest the fortress should be taken from
them by some treacherous act on the part uf the garrison. Not
having received any information respectiag the transaction which
had just taken place between the two brothers, their joy was not
greater than their astonishment when they saw Zeman Shah in full
retreat, which they attributed to the arrival of i\lahmood Mirza a t
the head of fresh forces. Desirous, therefore, of making a d i ~ e r sion in his favour, they assemblecl in haste the troops that nrere at
hand, and pursued the Shah ; but they had scarcely reached the
rojal residence of Roouz-bagh, situated sewn miles south of &-at,
when the Parsivan, Kdech Khan (a serdar of the Taymoonis, suzerain lord of Khaff, a man of great influence in the principality, and
reputation in warlike affairs), who had been intrusted by Kalnran
and Firooz Eddin with the command of the citadel during their
absence, despatched a inessenger to Zeman Shah to inform him
that he held the fortress at his disposal, and that he ought to come
immediately and occupy it wit11 his own troops.
The princes, informed of this unfortunate circumstance, returnecl
instantly to Herat, which still held out for them, and attacked the
citadel on all sides ; but it was in vain that they cannonaded it.
Xalech Khan, whom they summoned, and ordered to return to
his duty, answered only by redoubling his fire. The place was
strong, well provisioned, and capable of resisting any assault for
several months, while it required only two days for Zeman Shah
to come and occupy it. Directly he appeared, the princes, seeing themselves abandoned by their p~rtizans,fled in the direction
of Ehorassan ; and Zeman, meeting with no further opposition, .
took possession of Herat, where he remained four months. He
appointed his soil Raissar Mirza governor of the province, and
gave the command of the Heratee troops, as well as 1000 Afghan
horse, to the Serdar Kalech Khan, who had delivered up the place
to him. Zeman Khan, Popolzye, was appointed Vizier to IIiaissar
Mirza, and received the title i l l p u ~ t i b z ~of
s governor of Persian
Khorassan, which Zeman Shah had the intention of uniting with
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Afghanistan. With this view he left a corps of troops with the
popolzye Serdar, independently of those commanded by Icalech
Khan, in order that he might be enabled to invade that province,
$he conquest of which was resolved upon. After having taken these
measures the king returned to liandahar, where he remained but
a &ort time, and a few days after arrived at Kabul.
But Mahmood IiIirza, without either money or an army, could
do but little, and came to the determination of going to Teheran
and demanding assistance from Feth Ali, the Shah of Persia,
who had for some years been seated on the throne of the Kadjars ; and this sovereign promised him support and his reinstallation in the government of Herat, on condition that he admitted
his suzerainty. This occurrence took place in the year 1798,
&ring which the revolt of Sedik Khan obliged Feth Ali to proceed to the Azerbaicljan ; but before his departure he recommended
Mahmood Mirza to the care of the Emir Assad Ullah Khan,
governor of Iiachan, and son of the Etl~emaclDooulet, Hadji
Ibrahim of Shiraz. Mahmood Mirza followed the Emir Assad
Ullah Khan to Hachan, but, observing that Feth Ali Shah prolonged
his stay in the north of his kingdom, the prince got weary of waiting for the support that had been promised him, and wrote to the
Shah, requesting that he might be permitted to leave the residence
which he had assigned him. The King of Pelsia having consented
to.this request; Mahmood proceeded to - Khorasan, where he hoped
to be able to raise some recruits ; nor was he deceived in this
hope, for RIir Ali Khan, an Arab, the governor of the district of
Ghain, espoused his cause, and they took the field with 3000
infantry, marching in the first instance in the direction of Furrah.
The inhabitants of this city were favourable to the cause of Mahmood, and directly they heard of his approach they came out several
days' march to meet him, when a great number of them enrolled
themselves in his army.
The news of the arrival of Mahmood Mirza had spread rapidly
in Herat, much exaggerating his succces, and he was described
as having arrived a t Furrah with 50,000 men, subduing everything on his road. These reports carried consternatinn into the
minds of the citizens,; all those who had deserted the Prince
Mahmood, dreading his anger, made their preparations for depzrture ; and the Prince Kaissar, himself believing in the accu-
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racy of the intelligence, repaired and provisioned the citadel in
great haste ; but more truthful accounts followed and modifiecl the .
alarm of the prince and the scared inhabitants.
The report of' this triumphant march brought to Mahmood Nirza's
standard a reinforcement of several thousand men ; amongst these
was the Noorzye Serdar, Djabber Khan, who brought with him a
contingent of a thousand horsemen ; but when he saw what a small
army Mahmood's was, he repented of the step he had taken, and
under cover of a dark night quitted the camp, and proceeded in
great haste to Herat, where he made the real state of things
known. Reassured by this iriformation, ICaissar Nirza assembled
the troops of Kalech Khan, and, uniting them to those of Zeman
Khan, Popolzye (who, on learniiig the news, had returned
promptly from Khorassan, i n the direction of which he had moved),
nlarcliecl with these two &visions against his uncle. Mahmood,
seeing that Furrah wasfavourable to his cause, left that town on his
right, advanced at once to meet his opponent, came up with and attacked him near the village of Emaret, and routed him completely.
Thevanquished army retired in haste to Herat, and closed the
gates. Nahmood Mirza followed, but, being unable to invest
the place entirely by reason of the smallness of his force, he
determined to encanlp a t a spot on the banks of the Heri-rood
about three miles from the walls. The Vizier Zeman Khan, having
discovered that the sympathies of the Heratees were in favour of
Jfahmood, conceivecl that a temporizing line of conduct could
not but be advantageous to the latter: he resolved therefore, as
force was not on the side of Haissar, to obtain the victory by cunning. After having obtained the pelmission of 'that prince, he
wrote a letter to Mir Ali Khan, the Arab, as if it was the reply to
some terms of arrangement which the latter had made to Eaissar
Mirza, and which consisted in his obtaining some favour of that
prince, in exchange for which Mir Ali promised to deliver Mahmood Jlirza into his hands. The adroit Vizier confided this letter
to an intelligent man, and advised him to manage in such a
way that he should be suspected and arrested by some of the
prince's troops, and then preteud great anxiety that the letter in
question should not be seen. The scheme was carried out as he
wished ; the camp guard seized the messenger and conducted their
prisoner to Mahmood Mirza, to whom they presented the letter
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which they had taken. Xahmood, alarmed at the marc thus
revealed to him, asked the advice of an Afghan noble, BIohamed Akrem Xhan, as to what steps should be taken, and he
advised him to avoid by flight the trap that had been laid for
them.
Nevertheless, the contents of this letter did not remain so entirely
a secret from Mir Ali Khan, but that he received some information
respecting it. H e hastened, therefore, immediately to Mahmood,
and swore and prot.ested in the most energetic terms to the truth of
his devotion to his person and his cause. The prince feigned to
believe him; but, when night came, he fled from the camp, accompanied by his son Iiamran, his brother Hadji Firooz Eddin,
the Serdar Alrrem Khan, and a few devoted servants ; and when he
thought himself in safety he sent his son and his brother to Teheran
to claim the promised assistance of Feth Ali Shah, proceeding
himself to Bokhara to endeavour to interest the Emir in his
favour.
Mahmood Mirza had scarcely left the camp and his ally Mir
Ali Khan, than Icaissar Mirza was inforn~edof the fact, and he
profited by the confusion and astonishment into which this event
had thrown the Ghainians, to fall upon and rout them thoroughlya great many were made prisoners and brought to Herat. A s for
Mir Ali IChan, he had great difficulty in effecting his escape, and
reached Ghain with only a few horse, having met much privation
and danger on the road.
Shah Zeman, then at Kabul, was soon informed that his brother
Mahmood had returned to Afghanistan, and some false reports
'induced him to believe that Kaissar Mirza, after having been beaten
at Emaret, had also evacaated the city of Herat on the approach
of Mahmoocl, who hai3 taken possession. H e therefore assembled
his army without loss of time, and took the field with a view to its
recapture, for the country and the roads were so thoroughly scoured
by the partisans of Mahmood, that no messenger l~arlbeen able to
reach him with true intelligence of the actual state of things; it
was only 011 his arrival at Herat itself that he knew positively what
was passing. Delighted to find that the evil mas not so great as
he had anticipated, he encamped his army on the banks of the
I-Ieri-rood, and, followed by his court, subsequently entered the
city. When he learnt that his brother had gone to Bokhara he
immediately despatched the Kazee, Abdul Irak, to the Emir
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of that country, to represent that by the terms of the treaty
concluded between Tiinoor Shah and the Emir he was bound
to deliver up Nahmood Mirza to him as a disturber of the tranquillity of the Afghan kingdom ; but that, nevertheless, if he
found himself bound by the duties of hospitality, he should
remain satisfied if he would order the prince to be watched a t
Bolchara in such a manner that he could not escape and again
foment discord in his dominioris. Sultan Ali Murad detained the
Afghan envoy for some time a t his court without giving him a
categorical answer : he finished, nevertheless, by promising that
Mahmood Mirza should be detained in his capital, and that he
t should not have it. T h e
would answer for it with Itis head t l ~ u he
'
Kazee left Bolchara without having comprehended the mcaning of
these words of the Emir, who had dwelt especially upon the last '
part of his reply, the real and secret intention of which was to
gratify upon the fugitive prince the mortal hatred which he felt for
the family of the Suddozye:; his death was indeed only deferred
at the earnest request of a great and influential Uzbek nobleman,
by name Fez1 Ahmed, who interested himself in 11isbehalf. Mahmood, informed by Fez1 Aluned of the plot which mas in preparation against his life, managed to deceive the kigilance of his guards
and fled to Khiva, when Mohnmed Rahim Ichan, the sovereign of
that Khanat, for some time treated him with great hospitality ; but
as in the end he was unable to render him the assistance which he
required to renew the war, Elahmood Nirza left Khiva and rejoined
his son and hls brother at Teheran, to which city he had sent them
subsequently to his flight from the camp of the Emir of Ghain.
After a residence of four months a t Herat, Zencan Shah received.
letters from the governor of Peshawur informing him that on his
departure from Kabul the Sikh mountaineers of Yambou had made
.
a descent upon Lahore, and plundered and sacked the city.
T h e Serdar Ahmecl Khan, at the time governor of Lahore, did
his best to frustrate their intention ; he went out and attacked
them, but his solcliers fled a t the first onset, and the Khan was killed
in endeavouring to cover their retreat. On the receipt of this disastrous intelligence, Shah Zernan appointed Mir Efzel Khan, son
of the Serdaree Serdarane, Medad Khan, vizier to his son Kaissar, after which, taking. with him Zeman Khan, Popolzye, in whose
military talents he had the greatest confide~lce,he left immediately
for Kabul by the difficult and mountainous road which traverses
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'the country of the Waznrahs, Poocht I<ooh, accompanied only by
one hundred and fifty horse. As to the mass of his army, artillery,
and baggage, he sent them by Kandahar, under the conduct
of his minister Vefadar Khan and the ~ e r d i rAhmed Khan
Noorzye. Zeman Shah, who arrived in the capital in twelve days,
took a large sum from his treasury to make formidable preparations for carrying on the war with activity ; and directly the troops
which arrived by way of Kandahar had joined those he had just
raised he left for the Punjab. T h e Silch mountaineergabandoned
Lahore at his approach and retired into their fastnesses ; he therefore took peaceable possession of the city. As the inhabitants had
taken no part in the last revolt, in which they had been maltreated
by the mountaineers, he thought he could place confidence in
them, and consented to the request whicl~ they made, namely,
that in future the governor of Lahore should be selected by the
Shah from amongst the principal Sikh chiefs, to'the exclusion of
the .Afghans. H e chose, therefore, for this post one of them, by
name Runject Sing, who had even then acquired a great reputat,ion
for talent and courage ; and after having duly installed him, Zeman
Shah depimted on his return to Kabul. This march was for him
and his army one long series of misfortunes; his artillery and a
great part of his baggage were lost at the passage of the Jelum ;
the rain, which fell in torrents and almost daily, had so broken
up the roads that they were impassable; the soldiers, worn out
by their suReerings, either dropped to the rear or deserted, and
the plundering tribes took advantage of the distressed condition
of the army to pillage the baggage and strip the stragglers, who
were incapable of defending themselves. I n fact, it was the de'his of
. all army of attenuated men, which, harassed by a thousand miseries
and privations, that Zeman succeeded in bringing into Peshawur.
Here he remailled a month to rest and refresh his troops, after
which, having installed his brother, Shooja-001-Moolk, as governor
of the city, he proceeded to Kabul, where he made but a very short
stay, for he was under the necessity of going on to Kandahar
in spite of the severity of the winter to suppress the disposition to
revolt in that city.
Such revolts originated more especially in the discontent which
the powerful tribe of the Barukzyes felt a t seeing their chiefs, the
&Ioharnedzyes, set aside and debarred from holding any public
appointment, and meeting with no consideration at court. The
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reader should remember that, from the day on which Sudoo and
Mohamed had been raised to a superior rank by Shah Abbas the
Great, the descendants of the first had enjoyed under the Seffavean
dynasty an almost regal power in Afghanistan. The descendants
of the second, without having so great an influence, held nevertheless
the highest appointments in the state, and were not less venerated
than the Suddozyes. IlThen Ahmed Shah ascended the throne,
he, out of gratitude to Hadji Djemal, a chief of the Mohameclzyes,
respected the privileges of that family, the chiefs of which constantly
held the most important commands in his army and the great
offices a t his court. Timoor Shah, who followed the example of
his father, had the tact always to attach them to his party, and
Zeman Shah was the first who clued to alter this state of things,
which, sanctioned by time, had all t h e force of law.
Payendeh Khan, chief of the Mohamedzyes, was, as we have
already remarked, stripped of all the appointments that he held,
and this was the first grievance of the Barultzyes against roya1t.y.
The prime minister of Zeman Shah, Vefadar Khan, although belonging to the royal tribe of Popolzye, was of low extraction.
T h e Shah did nothing without having first taken his advice,
and this personage was the instigator of all the harsh measures
Ghich the Shah had adopted %%inst the great families of the
kingdom ; Vefadar Khan found his own interest in the confiscations
which habitually followed, and they also delivered him from dangerous rivals. Zeman remained deaf to the milder counsels
which were given him, and a fatality seemed to urge him forward from day to day in this impolitic and unjust path. The
prime minister, having sprung from the lower ranks of the nobility, was despised by the. higher, and he revenged himself by
oppressing them and elevating unknown persons in their place,
who became so many tools in his own hands. The system
thus adopted by Zeman of governing in the most absolute
manner, without the concurrence and support of the serdars, had
nevertheless, up to this time, produced only irritation in the public
mind, and some partial revolts ; but the discontent was general,
particularly amongst the most influential and powerful chiefs, who
had all of them been more or less despoiled. Although Vefadar
Khan was not ignorant of the extent to which he was detested by
these persons, he played nevertheless a double game, and nourished
in their minds sentiments of hostility to the king. The Khan en-
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deavoured to compromise his sovereiq in their eyes, by making
them believe that, in whatever he did, he simply executed the wishes
of the Shah, and that his intervcntion with the king was the means
of saving them from much greater disasters. His friendly protestations were always accompanied by hypocritical marks of interest in their behalf, such as the remission of a tax or the concession of some land, and led them to believe that he had great
difficulty in procuring these favours fiom the Shah, regretting that
it was not in his power to render them a greater service, thus leading them to hope that they would be in a much better position
in future. In this way he by turns flattered and caressed all parties, boasting everywhere the favours he had panted, and seeking
every opportunity of laying upon the king all the odium of his
tyranny and the bloody executions 4f which he himself was the
sole originator, hoping by such conduct to overthrow his s'overeign,
and by these intrigues attain himself the regal power. H e fancied
he should obtain his end by exciting, when the propitious moment
arrived, a tumult amongst the people, and expected to receive the
support of the new serdars of his own creation, who were devoted to
him. His numerous emissaries glided amongst the populace, and,
though apparently perfectly disinterested, worked upon them for the
vizier's own purposes. The brothers of the king also were undcr
his influence, and he made use of them and led each in his turn
to believe that he was endeavouring to raise him to the throne.
The intrigues and underhand practices of this ambitious man proved
that he had as much craft and subtlety as he had talent for governing ; th'e steps he cook were always well considered, and to
the point, and his plan was so well conducted that i t might have
succeeded if he had had the boldness to bring it more rapidly to
an issue; but the heads of a few more serdars, who had taken
umbrage a t him, were wanting : he temporized, therefore, and this
delay was fatal.
T h e Afghan serdars, for the most part discontented, formed
a secret league, in order that they might come to some understanding as to the measures that must be taken to free themselves from the iron yoke and sanguinary persecutions which
weighed upon them ; but to give a greater chance of success to
their enterprise, they delegated five of the most powerful amongst
them, who alone were to decide upon the means to be ernployedthe others binding themselves to be ready on the day appointed,
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and to execute without hesitation whatever should be determined
upon. A s the police of Vefadar I h n was perfectly organized,
a n d nothing escaped their Argus eyes, t.he five delegates fixed upon
the house of a dervish, in high repute for his sanctity, as their
place of meeting, for his residence had been always frequented by the
most cousiderable of the Afghan nobility, who went by the appellation of his murids. H e never received more than six persons a t a
time, a n d his door was shut against every one until these six departed to make way for others. Payendeh Khan had the cleverness to induce this holy man to join the conspirators, and he trusted
that, by meeting a t his house and taking advantage .of the custom
so long established there, he and the other delegates would escape
the inquiries which might arise. After a lively discussion a t
one of these meetings, in which each of them stated the grievances of his tribe, it was admitted that their nation had suffered
beyond what any men of spirit could tolerate-that Zernan Shah and
his minister ought to be overthrown, and the first replaced by
the prince Shooja-001-Moolk, his half-brother, at that time governor
of Peshawur.
T h e chiefs present at this meeting were Payendeh Khan, Mohamed Sherif Khan, Moonshce Bashee (cashier-in-chief), Yoosoof
Ali Khan, chief of the eunuchs, Sultan Khan, Roorzye, and Rahim
Khan, Alizye. Before sepnrtzting they fixed upon a day for the
execution of their project, and also drew up several articles, forming
a kind of constitution, which they were to give to their countrymen.
T h e principal clauses in this document were, that henceforth the
crown should be elective ; that the Serdars alone had t.he right to
vote a t such election, and also to depose those sovereigns who
proved themselves unworthy of the trust which had been reposed i n
them. But unfortunately the conspirators procrastinated, and their
plans were betrayed to the prime minister by the Moonshee
Bashee. Vefadar Khan, thinking this an admirable opportunity
of getting rid of his principal opponents a t one fell swoop, immediately informed the Shah of the conspiracy which had been
revealed, who recommended that the greatest secrecy should be
observed, and a t once relieved his guards, of whose fidelity he
was doubtf~d,replacing them by others on whom he thought he
could rely. T h e following day he made considerable presents
t o his servants and officers, am1 also to the people, to dispose
them in his favour, and on the succeeding one sent for all the
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chiefs who were concerned in the plot ; but separately, and under
the petext that he was desirous of conversing with them upon
public affairs, so that they should not have the least suspicion
of his motive. However, on their arrival at the palace, they were
seized and imprisoned in the citadel. A few hours after the Shah
asce,nded the throne in great state, and, ordering them to be
brought into his presence, demanded why they had conspired
against him? to which they replied, that they had sworn to dethrone him, but not to put him to death; that they never could
have had an idea of attacking his royal person if they had not been
firmly convinced that dl their representations to induce him to
dismiss his vizier would be fruitless ; it was his ruin alone they were
bent upon, and it was t.he hope of putting an end to this wretch
that had led them to conspire against their king. After having
listened to this avowal, Zeman Shah ordered them to be executed in his presence, their. bodies to be left on the public square
outside the citadel, and remain there for three days exposed to the
public gaze.
As he now feared some movement on the part of the Barukzyes,
the chief of which tribe he had just put to death, he ordered
that all the Mohamedzye serdars should be arrested, but the
greater part of them, having been warned in time, were enabled to
save themselves by flight, or take refuge in the mosque of Ahmed
Shah,-a sanctuary never violated. Fethi Khan, the eldest son of
Payendeh IShan, who was more particularly sought after by the
express orders of the Shah, with a view of putting him to death,
also escaped the vigilarice of the solcliers that were sent in pursuit
of him. Having received notice of their intentions, he got over
the walls, and, having excellent horses awaiting him in a garden
adjacent to the city, he reached Girishk, seventy-three miles distant,
in eight hours. From thence he took the road over the mountains
and across country, in order that no trace should be found of him,
I
and directed his course to Persia, where he rejoined Mahmood
Mirza, who, a s we have already remarked, had, for the second time,
taken up his residence a t the court of the Kadjars. On this occasion, as on the former one, he hod been very well received by Feth
Ali Shah, who had placed himself at the head of an army, with
a view of reinstating him in his government of Herat; but on
his arrival at Nishapoor he learnt that fresh disturbances had
broken out in the Azerbaidjan, which obliged him to return to I m k
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with his troops, and dismiss Mahmood Mirza, to M-horn he p v e a
subsidy and assigned Turchiz as his place of residence, promising
that he mould send him troops when ordcr was restored in the
north of the empire, so that thc prince might proceed against Herat.
I t was at Turchiz that the Serdar Fethi Khan joined Mahmood
Mirza, and the greater part of his brcthers soon arrived a t the
same place, who, like him, hacl also their father's death to avenge.
After the sanguinary executions of the chiefs a t Randahar, the
Afghans in all parts of the lringdom rose against Zeman Shah.
T h e Punjab and Pesha~vur in particular openly raised the
standard of revolt. There aere also some attempts at insurrection
in Kabul, which obliged the IGng to proceed there in great haste ;
but fearing also for the tranquillity of Kandahar, he left there
a part of his army, and the Serdar Mil- Ali Klian, a devoted,
energetic, and intelligent man, as governor.
While Zeman Shah was in a state of complete uncertainty
as to what stcp he should take to pacify his kingdom, Fethi
Khan, who had, as nell as his brothers, devoted himself to
the cause of Mahmood DIirza, urged that prince to enter Afghanistan once more, and ovelthrow his brother. Their pressing solicitations at length prevailed, and he marched on Ghain, but,
on his arrival in that district, he saw that the inhabitants did
not feel disposed to parclon him for the check they had sustained, owing to his flight when they furmed part of his army
before Herat, and that in consequence they were very little inclined
t o assist him. Mahmood almost regretted having left Turchiz,
and thought of returning ; but Fethi Khan somewhat restored his
courage, and induced him to renounce this intention. A t the
same time he sent two of h n brothers to the fortress of Furrah,
to endeavour to keep matters quiet and obiitin intelligence ; this
was easy enough, for the inhabitants of that town were entirely
devoted to hlahmood Nirza, to whom they opened their gates
when he presented himself before them, accompanied only by
eighteen horsemen, which formed d l his army. This success
obtained for him the support of some chiefs of Khorassan, and he
soon found himself a t the head of a small force. H e then made
a n appeal to the Afghan nation, and in the manifesto which he
issued he drew a vivid picture of the cruelties and vices of Zeman
Shah and his ~ninisterVefadar Khan, and announced his design
of marching on Kabul, to deliver the people from their oppres-
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sion. The tribe of the Rarultzyes, who recognised Fethi Khan.
as their chief, hastened en masse to place themselves under the
orders of their young general, and this example was soon followed by the greater number of the Dooranee tribes, when Mahmood marched on Kandahar. The governor, Mir Ali Khan, informed of his approach, went out to meet him a t the he.ad of
four thousand cavalry, but, completely routed and forced to fly, h e
had scarcely time to refre within the citadel. Mahmood Mirza
followed him step by step, and invested the city, which he besieged without success during forty-t~-o days. At length, on
the forty-third the assault was given, and Fethi Khan, who
conducted it, was the first man that scaled the malls, and his
soldiers followed rapidly. They were treacherously aided by
Balrhch Khan and Hassan Khan, two Afghan chiefs, who, ostensibly of the Shah Zeman's party, mere secret.1~doing all they
could to make that of I\fahmood Mirza triumph, and but for their
help the place would not have been taken without great difficulty.
When Mir Ali Khan saw that the affi~irwas desperate, he .ordered
these two traitors to be brought into his presence, and, feeling
sure of their perfidy, put them to death on the spot, after which he
mounted his horse and escaped by a secret door, accompanied
only by a fern horsemen.
Directly Mahmood Nirza was in possession of Kandahar h e
was obliged to levy a large sum upon the inhabitants for the
maintenance of his army ; but the persuasive manners and talents
of Fethi Khan induced them to support this contribution without murmuring, and they remained devoted to the prince. On
hearing what was passing a t Kandahar, Zeman Shah sent an
army of 15,000 horse, under the command of the Serdar Ahined
Khan, against Mahmood, for he was averse to leaving the capital
himself for fear he should lose it in his absence. This officer
was but little satisfied with the Shah, and still less so with his;
minister Vefadar Khan, and, in the hope that he would be better
treated by Mahmood,'he went over to .him, with all his army, a t
Mookpoor. I n anticipation of ulterior events, Shah Zeman had,
after the departure of Ahmed Khan, assembled fresh troops, but:
when they heard of the defection of the corps under that serdar
they a t once disbanded and retired to their homes. An outbreak
occurring at the same ti-me in Kabul, Zeman Shah was under the
necessity of evacuating the city and retiring in the direction of
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Jellalabad. On leaving the gates of the capital lie had with him
only two hundred cavalry and four hundred artillerymen, with their
guns, stores, and anlniunition ; his minister, Vefadar Khan, and the
Serdar Zeman Khan, Popolzye, were the only chiefs who remained faithfill, and they retired with hinl and his party withill
the fgtified village of Koleh Aclieg, the name of its owner, and immediately set to work to repair the walls and provision it. From
hence a fi,esh appeal was made to the partizans of the Shah, and,
as the royal treasure was still in his hands, he was joined by a
pretty good number of' recruits, but much more in the hope of
receiving high pay than from any devotion to his person. However that might be, Zeman again found himself in a position to
give battle to his brother.
After the 15,000 cavalry of Ahmed Khan had joined the army
of lllahmood Nirza, the prince marched rapidly upon and seized
Iiabul, without meeting with the slightest resistance. The Emir
Islam Khan and Djaffer Khan, two Ihzzilbash chiefs, who only
could have defended the city, were allied by marriage to the
Mohameclzyes, and went over to their side t.he moment they
appeared.
Nahmood, thus successful, decided upon dislodging Zeman
Shah from the fortif ed position he had taken up. The task was
a difficult one, for the latter had snved all l ~ i s artillery, while
the prince had not one single piece to oppose to him. Nevertheless, he hesitated not, and again took the field. The armies
of the two brothers met at the halt of Ouchpane, when that of
the Shah was completely beaten and dispersed, and he had t.he
greatest difficulty in regaining ILleh Acheg. Mahmood followed him, and immediately assaulted his adversary's stronghold,
but, defended by both nature and art, and ga~risonedby brave
men determined to die for their king, it resisted for eleven days
the continuous efforts of the besiegers. Iilowever, the time had
arrived when they could hold out no longer, and the Shah, accompanied by the serdars who were with him, escaped during the night,
and retired into another small fortress near Jugdulluk, also belonging to Acheg Khan. This chief, alarmed a t the probability
that disastrous consequences might result to him for the hospitality he had shown to his sovereign, sent a messenger to Wahmood
to inform him of the Shah's retreat. T h e prince immediately
sent a serdar, with a strong escort and a surgeon, to the spot
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which the Khan had designated, when Zeman was taken prisoner,
and, in conformity with the orders of Mahmood, his eyes were
immediately put out - a punishment he richly merited for the
same cruelty which he had practised upon Humayoon Mrza,
his elder brother. Vefadar Khan, Zeman Khan, Popolzye, arid
Mohamed IChan, the brother of the Vizier, also taken prisoners
with Shah Zernau, n-cre sent to Kabul, and there publicly esecuted. Thus terminated the career of this ambitious minister, who .
could only govern by intrigue and murder, and this in order that
he might supplant his master, which he mould have done, had not
his courage failed him at the moment his plan was on the eve of
execution. H e perished by a death to which he had condemned
hundreds, and which he so thoroughly deserved himself.
Though blind, Shah Zeman, with the assistance of a fern devoted
friends, subsequently managed to deceive the vigilance of his guards,
and fled to Bokhara, where fresh misfortunes awaited him. Elis
daughter, who followed him in his exile, and who was remarltable ,
for her great beautyj was torn with violence from him by the Emir
I-Iaidar Turreh, who had inherited from his father a hatred of the
Suddozye family. After this abduction he mas on the point of
putting Zeinan to death, which would infallibly 'nave happened, if
he had not again succeeded in malring his escape.
From Bokhara this Iring, hitherto so powerful, but now so unfortunate, went to Herat, which was then governed by the Prince
Had,ji Firooz Eddin, half-brother of- the Shah Mahmood, who
respected hie misfortunes and gave him a generous rec.eption ;
and after having treated him in the most hospitable manner
during several months, he gave him an escort which secured
his safe retreat to India. Zeman retired to Loodisna, where
he lived on a pension from the East India Company, devoted to
the observances of his faith, and did not a t any subsequent period
mix himself up with the revolotions of which his country was so
frequently the theatre after his fall. H e was still living in 1846.
This prince, like all the Afghans, was cruel ; but this arose much
more from the fact. that he was influenced by a bad minister,
in whom he placed too much confidence, and who knew how to
inspire him with chimerical fern, than because he was of a naturally cruel disposition, and wished to gratify it. His greatest
crime was, that he was absolute, and would reign on that principle.
This wounded the pride of the serdars, and was in opposition to
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the received opinions amongst them as to the extent of the sovereign power. W i t h a different vizier, he might have hoped that
his reign would be as long, and possibly more glorious, than that
of his father, for he was personally very brave, very active, always
on horseback, bringing one wax to a conclusion only to commence
another; nor was he wanting in intelligence: but he lost all his
future chances by making the Mohamedzye chiefs discontented, for
their rights to the great offices of the state mere quhe as sacred in
the eyes of the Afghans as those of the Suddozyes to the throne.
T h e moment he endeavoured to abrogate those rights his fall became certain ; but, in spite of the sanguinary executions he was
guilty of at the instigation of his minister, the Afghans have a
greater respect for his memory than that of any of the ot,her sons
of Timoor Shah.
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AFTERseven years of conflict and misfortunes 3Iahmood Mirza
ascended the throne of his fathers in the year .1800, and when
Zeman Shah was overthrown he took the title of Shah, and
made his solemn entry into Kabul. H e behaved with the utmost generosity to his troops, even to s u c l ~an extent that he
exhausted the greater part of the treasure accumulated in the
coffers of the state by his ftther and grandfather. H e also.
enriched the chiefs who had assisted him, and gave them the
highest appointments a t his court: the Serdar Fethi Khan received
the title of Shah Doort Khan; * Shere Mohamed Khan, son of
the Vizier Shah Velee Khan, was named Mooktar-ed-Dooulet, and
to him was delegated the government of the kingdom ; the Serdar
Abdu1l;~li Iihan, Ali Kioozye, father of Y ar Mohamed Iihan,
who had been confined in the Bala Hissar by Shah Zeman, was
rcleased from that fortress, and made Governor of Cashmeer ; and,
finally, he scnt his son Ramran Mirza, with several brothers of the
Serdar Fethi Khan, against siooja-001-~oolk,who commanded at
Peshawur, to take the city and seize that prince. Shooja did
not wait for them, but fled a t their approach; so Ramran took
possession of Peshawur without any fighting.
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A few capital punishments, which Mahmood ordered after his
installation to power, excited a little irritation a~uongstthe nomade
tribes, the chiefs of mhich had more especially felt the effects of
his anger ; but as these rigorous measures affected his adversaries
only, the Shah's party felt no uneasiness, and considered that he
had a right to chastise those who had been opposed to him,.
Nevertheless the Ghilcljzyes, the born enemies of every Abddee
sovereign, revolted a t the outset against his authority, and were
desirous of placing one of their own tribe upon the throne;
Mahmood was obliged to send the Serdars Fethi .Khan and
Ahmed Khan against the rebels, who beat them in four or five
encountcrs, and terminated the revolt by malrng them conform
to the existing state of things.
On the other hand, fortune came to the aid of the Shah Mahmood ;
for ICaissar Mirza, the son of Shah Zeman, lost the government of
Herat, and this without any attempt on the part of Mahmood to
dispossess him of it. T h e circumstances were as follows :Mir Etiel Khan, the Vizier of I<aissar Mirza, conceived the
idea of overthrowing the prince immediately after the fall of hisfather, and a t this intrigue he worked ardently, and formed with
great ease a powerful party on which he coulcl entirely rely.
When he thought he was sufficiently powerful, he resolved on
putting I<aisaar to death, but the prince, informed of the plot in
time, escaped from Herat, and sought refuge a t Uaff-rooge, a town
of Khorassan, leaving his wives and children under the protection of the Serdar Iialech Khan, who, though less influential than
Mir Efzel Khan, was still sufficiently powerful not to be apprehensive on account of the support-and protection -he gaye to this
unfortunate family.
After the flight of Kaissar Mirza, Mir Efzel, well convinced that
Shah Mahmood, occupied at this time with the Ghildjzyes, could
not by any possibility come and disturb him, endeavoured to establish his authority in Herat. 'l'hs: inhabitants, who were attached
to him, would not agree to this except with a certain reservation; but, on the other hand, they rejected and repelled the
secret intrigues of Ralech Khan, the antagonist of the usurper,
who wished to assassinate him. The Heratees demanded that
Efzel Khan, though retaining the appointment of vizier, which
they guaranteed him, should receive as governor, in the place of
Kaiasar Mirza, one of the blood royal, unless he preferred the
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return of that prince himself; but Mir Efzel, fearing the resentmerit of the latter, hastened to find a succes~orapreeably to the
wishes of the people.
Hadji Firooz Eddin, who, as we have already remarked, retired
to Teheran, had on leaving that capital gone on a pilgrimage
to Mecca. On his return Afghanistan was groaning under the
sanguinary executions of Shah Zeman, and the war was then going
on between him and Mahmood Mirza ;the Hadji, who was anxious
not to be a witness of these sad scenes, retired therefore to Turchiz
in Khorassan, whiqh the Shah of Persia had assigned to him as his
residence, and here he occupied himself in the purchase and sale
of horses, camels, and other beasts of burden. An envoy from
Mir Efzel Khan came to him there, and- proposed for his
acceptance the government of Kerat ; but this prince, devoid of
ambition, and caring little for the grandeur of such a position,
declined the offer, preferring to continue his commercial pursuits.
This refusal was not at all to the taste of Mir Efzel, who, pressed
by the intrigues of Kdech Khan, was more earnestly solicited from
day to day to recall Kaissar Mirza. T o allay, therefore, the
impatience of the people, he pretended that' he had received a
letter fro111 I-Iadji Firooz Eddin accepting the government of the
city ; .this, however, he had himself forged, and, contemporaneously with making the letter public, despatched in haste a few
horsemen to 'l'urchiz, who, under the pretext of wishing to purchase
some, horses, induced the prince to meet them in a retired spot,
when they carried him off by main forc,e, and brought him to
Herat, nolens volens, where he was obliged to accept the title of
Governor.
I<aissar Mirza, seeing that his uncle had carried the da;y
him, would not submit to the decision of the Reratees,
and marched against Herat at the head of a small .army of
Afghans and Khorassanees, which he had succeeded in raising.
IIadji Firooz allowed him to advance as far as Shekivar, a
village situated twenty-one miles west of Herat, where he
attaclred his adversary, when Ixaissar was completely worsted,
111 acc,ordance with a plan
and obliged to take to flight.
upon previously, and of which the troops had been
informed, the prince after his defeat directed his course southward into the plain of Bakooa, where the fugitives went to
rejoin him ; when they a11 arrived he marched against I<andal~ar,
IC 2
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hoping to surprise Kamran Mirzn, who commanded there, and
capture that city. I n this attempt, as it turned out, he was
successful, but a few days after the inhabitants revolted, and drove
him out of Kandahar. Kamran Mirza, who had retired to Kelat
i Ghildjzye, waa recalled by them, so that these two princes
succeeded each other three times during the space of two months,
according tts the party which supported either had the upper hand ;
nevertheless Kamran Mirza finished by remaining master of the
position, and Kaiesar fled once more.
Mallmood Mirza had been the sovereign ruler of Afghanistan
during two years and six months, when the city of Kabul became
the scene of sanguinary disorders, originating in a religious scllism
between the Afghans, who are Soonees, and the I<uzzilbashes
of the sect of Sliiahs; these riots seriously compromised the
power of Shah Mahmood, nevertheless he surmounted the difficulty, but the support he gave to the heretical Shiahs alienst.ec1
the Afghans from him, and contributed greatly to his fall, which
took place some short time after.
Thcse disorclers were occasioned by a circumstance arising out of
the horrible inclination the Persians have for a vice which it would
sully these pages to mention. Some of the I<uzzilbashes secreted
for sevcral clays a young Afghan lad of great beauty in their house,
during which timc he was treated in the most infamous manncr,
and this not only fi-om their depraved passions, but from their
hatred to Soonecs. Restored to liberty, the youth informcd his
parents of what had takcn place, when they immedilttcly complained
to Shah Mahmood ; but the king, not wishing to alienate the Kuzzilbashes, whose adhesion had been, and might be again, of great
service to him, refused to legislate upon the matter, and forwardecl
it to the religious tribunal .from which it came. The injured
parties, although dissatisfied in that. the Shah eluded their complaint, nevertheless conformed to his orders, and proceeded to
the mosque to c o ~ ~ s uthe
l t Syud Mir VaEz, a man highly venerated
by the Afghans, and whose hostility to the Shah Mahmood was no
secret to any one. When the complainants appeared, the Syud
was preaching to an immense crowd of persons, and they interrupted him to make known their business with loud cries and
rending their clothes. On learning the nature of it, Mir Vaez
at once gave them a fetvo authorising the extermination of all the
Shiahs in I<abul, whom he held in detestation. When it was
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known that this fetvo had been issued, the Afghans assembled in
arms, and in great numbers, around the mosque, and afterwards
went,. full of excitement, to exterminate the Ihzzilbashes. The
first place to which they proceeded was the quarter of the Khaffis,
a people originally from Khaff, massacred all those whom they met,
and pillaged and burnt their houses. Recovered in some degree from
the first movement of surprise which this sudden attack had caused
them, the Kuzzilbashes assembled, fully determined to defend their
property and their lives to the last extremity. Nevertheless, their
situation became every moment more critical, for, after a stout defence of two days, they saw, on the morning of the third, all the
heights that commanded their position occupied by the Afghans
from the neighbouring villages, who had come to the assistance of
the citizens. The Shah Mahmood had sent Mooktar ed Dooulet
and Ahmed Khan several times to the assailants, to endeavour to
prevail upon them to desist from their sanguinary intentions, but
this step, instead of appeasing, only irritated them the more,
excited as they were by the mollahs and some serdars, who were
jealous of the favour .shown to the Ihzzilbash chiefs by the Shah.
ARer four chys' fighting, during which four hundred persons at
least, and on either side, had lost their lives, the Serdar Fethi
Khan, who, by reason of the alliances which existed between his
family and the Kuzzilbashes, had, up to this time, refrained from
taking any part in the affair, became alarmed, and, apprehensive
that things might take a still more serious turn, was anxious to put
some bounds to the furious harangues of Mir VaBz, who spared not
even royalty itself. Fethi Khan therefore stepped forward, and,
with his brother, declaring in favour of the Kuzzilbashes, rushed a t
the head of their partisans upon the disturbers of public order, and
dispersed them with matchlock and sabre, to the great regret
of the serdars opposed to Mahmood, who were also envious of the
favour in which he was held by his sovereign. From this moment
they conspired against them, and swore to overthrow them both.
An occasion for doing this did not present itself for two years, when
Fethi Khan was obliged to march with an army to Bamian to put
down some disorders amongst the I-Iazarahs. Immediately after
his departure, Mir VaEz, the Serdar Ahmed Khan, and Moolctar ed
Dooulet, the principd chiefs of the conspiracy, sent an express t a
the prince Shooja-od-Moolk, the younger brother of Shah M.ahmood, requesting him to come immediately to Kabul, and overthrow

the latter, promising to give him their support and that of the
Afghans in general. This prince, who had received information of
this plot long before, was not very far distant fi-om Peshawur, which
11ehad secretly approached, and, on the receipt of the letter written
him by the conspirators, advanced rapidly towards Kabul with a11
the men he could collect. Shah Mahmood was one of the last
persons who heard of his arrival, for no one had revealed the fact to
him, and he only ascertained it by remarking the excitement which
everywhere ~revailed. He was not a person who could suggest to
himself the energetic measure5 which the esigencies of the momcnt
required, and the man of action who had placed him on the throne,
and through whom he governed, namely, Fethi Khan, was at a
distance, and wholly ignorant of what was passing at Kabula11 the warriors who had been despatched to him by Shah blahmood had also been detained, and could not join him in person,
for he was closely watched in his palace.
Feeling the imminence of his danger, Mahmood took refuge in
the Bala IIissar, and the inhabitants, satisfied by keeping an eye
upon him from the outside of the citadel, went in crowds to meet
Shooja-001-I~Ioollr, whom they brought into the city in triumph,
and placed on the throne amidst the loudest acclamations.
,
I have, up to this point, followed the manuscripts of two Eastern
authors, whose works I have frequently quoted in the course of my
narrative : that of Mirza Ali Mohamed has led me only to the
close of,the Afghan dominion in Persia; from that period, up to the
arrival of Shah Shooja at Kabul, I have drawn my materials from
the writings of -4bdullah Khan IIeratce, pich-Ii7rettnet, gentleman
of the chamber, or equerry, to the Shah ILmran of IIerat; but
I must add that his narrative is very summary and destitute of
dates; and I have been obliged to make researches elsewhere to
find those I have recorded. I have also joined to the information
taken from his manuscript many othcr particulars which 1 collected
myself during my travels in Afghanistan, from the mouths of contemporaries of Shah Timoor and of his sons, who themselves took
part in the evcnk of those times. The reign of Shah Shooja-ool&'Ioollc is the one upon which I am not so well informed, and,
having no European library to refer to, it will be impossible for me
to fill up the very important omissions which, without doubt, exist
in the history of this reign.
The first act of Shall Shooja, as king, mas to seize Shah
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Mahmood, delivered up to him by his own guards, and to
order the lex taliouis to be enforced by putting out his eyes, as
Jfahmood had done those of the Shah Zenlan; Mooktar ed
Dooulet having interceded for him, Shooja revoked this order out
of consideratio~lto his supporter; but he detained the ex-king a
prisoner, and confined him in a dungeon of the Bala Hissar.
After having taken this precautionary measure, the king confided
a division of his army to his nephew Raissar Mirza, the son of
Shah Zeman, in order that he might turn Kamran Mirza, a son of
Mahmood Shah, out of Icandahar, where he commanded; but,
meeting half-way Alem Khan, nephem of the Serdar Ahmed Khan,
he learnt, greatly to his satisfaction we may presume, that this had
already been done. The inhabitants had risen a t the instigation
of Alem Khan, and driven Kamran from the city ; no opposition,
therefore, was offered to the prince on entering I h d a h a r , of
which, in virtue of new orders from his uncle, he became govelllor.
On leaving the city, Ramran Mirza took the road towards Herat,
where his uncle Hadji Firooz Ecldin gave him a kind reception, and
confided to him the government of the district of Furrah, adjacent to
ICanclahar, where he was in a position to observe the events that
were passing in that city, and to lay hands upon it by surprise, or
otherwise, as occasion might present itself.
Some time after EIaclji Firooz Eddin, influenced by his mother,
who was also the mother of Shah Mahmood, consented. to march an
army against ICabul, and make an attempt to release his brother ; he
gave the command of these troops to his son Malek ICassem Mirza
and his nephcw Kamran Wirza. The prince ICaissar, tardily informed of their march, came out nevertheless from Kandsthar and
attacked the EIeratees near Iialeh d'Azim Khan, but he was beaten
and forced to fly once more, leaving the victol~smastersof Icandahar.
H d j i Firooz Eddin had scarcely obtained this success when hc
learnt that Mohamed Velee Mirza, Governor-General of Khorassan,
had marched an army commanded by the Nziib Mohamed Khan
ICacljar to take Herat. Ele therefore recalled his nephew a i d his
son, who abandoned in their turn Kandahar to ICaissar Mirza.
While awaiting their arrival, Hadji Firooz Eddin assembled in
haste a few thousand horse of the Eimak tribes, and moved out
of Herat to meet the Persians; the encounter took place near
Chekivan, but he was beaten and obliged to make a speedy retreat
into I-Ierat, which w3s soon besieged by the victors. The Persians

.

'

136

SHAH SHOOJA MARCHES ON SCINDE.

C ~ A PS. .

had good artillery, and their troop; had received for some time past
a certain amount of instruction and organization on the European
system ; they might therefore hope to make themselves masters of
the place in a short space of time. But this hope was not realized,
owing to their want of vigilance, for the Afghan princes, returning
from Kandahar, fell upon their rear, which they put to the rout,
while Hadji Firooz sallied from the city and attacked them in
front, so that, taken between two fires, they must have thought themselves fortunate in being able to effect their retreat with the loss
of a few hundred men killed and three or four guns taken. They
repaid themselves however for this check by ravaging the country
through which they retreated, and bringing with them to Meshed
more than one hundred thousand cattle.
This was the first time after the death of Nadir Shah that the
Persians put forward their claims to Herat ; since then they have
made very many attempts to take it, without more success than in
this instance : nevertheless they have exercised from this period a
certain influence upon its governor, who, for the sake of being a t
peace ~ 5 t hthem, acknowledged, although evasively, the suzerainty
of the Shah of Persia after this attack ; and agreed to pay a tribute,
the terms of which were left altogether undetermined: neither the
amount nor the time it was to be paid was stated ; it was much or
little according to circumstances and the means which the Persians
might have of enforcing pzyment. Shah Shooja had enough trouble
to consolidate his power in Kabul, for a thousand factions were in
a state of agitation around him ; he punished some and compromised matters with others, and had at length succeeded in establishing some order. The Serdar Fethi Khan, after his return from
&mian, attached himself to his party and became one of his ministers ; it was this chief who advised him to give up his life of repose
and make war, which alone could conciliate and obtain for hini the
respect of the Afghans. As the Shah had a predilection for a
military life, this advice was adopted, the invasion of Scinde resolved upon, and, after having asembled an army of 30,000 men,
the king marched on that country. The chicf of the Talpooras
endeavoured to avoid the storm, and sent his minister W d e e
Mohamed Khan to the Shah, offering to pay him 320,0002. which
he was indebted to him for arrears of tribute ; but the Serdar Fethi
K l ~ who
q saw the king was inclined to accept this offer, opposed it
in every way that he coulcl. His advice wodd most probably have
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been listened to if disastrous intelligence had not been received from
Kabul: the northern tribes were in a state of agitation, and the
capital itself was not tranquil ; which reasons induced the Shah
to terminate his misunderstanding with the Emirs of Scinde and
accept the 320,0001., which having done he returned in great haste
to Kabul. Having restored tranquillity there, he made an expedition eastward, with a view of retaking possession of Cashmeer, and
reducing the Serdar Runjeet Sing, Governor of Lahore, to obedience ;
but he failed in this enterprise also, and returned to Kabul, having
suffered considerable losses.
Though Shah Shooja's reign was so short, it was nevertheless one
of those which had the
chance of being prosperous. The
Afghans seemed t,ired of the demon of discord, but unfortunately
there was nothing of a conciliatory character about the Shah; be
alienated those whom he had the greatest interest in attaching to
his cause, and an unforeseen occurrence, by which he ought to have
obtained strength, served only to excite in him the love of absolute
authority, and in the end turned to his prejudice.
The British government, after having subdued in succession all
the sovereigns of India one after the other, saw itself menaced in
the middle of its triumphs by a danger against which it sought
to protect itself by all the means in its power. The Emperors
Napoleon and Alexander had just agreed to undertake an hostile expedition against India, passing through Persia. Feth Ali Shah, who
then reigned in the latter count.ry, was not SO stanch an ally that
England could trust him ; she thought therefore of establishing
her first line of defence beyond the Persian frontier, and sought the
friendship of the Afghans to form her advanced guard. With this
policy in view, the Governor-General of India sent Mr. Elphinstone
as ambassador to Kabul, where he made a treaty of alliance offensive and dcfensive with Shah Shooja-001-Moolk; the ambassador
was exceedingly well received, and each day the Shah gave him a
fresh entertainment in the royal palace. T h e siege of Herat, which
Mohamed Velee Mirza had just undertaken, and t l ~ eresult of
which had been so unfortunate, was the counterpart to this embassy.
I t is well known how the rupture which took place between France
and Russia; and the ascendancy obtained by England a t the court
of Teheran by scattering her gold on all sides, led to the failure of
Napoleon's plans, which might otherwise have been completely
successful, and overthrown the then political state of India.
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Shah Shooja-001-i?lIoollr had the repubtion, and with reason,
of being the most talented of the sons of Timoor Shah. With
great firmness of character and tried conrage, it was plainly to be
seen by more than one circumstance that he was not a man to
support, intrigues, or serve as an instrument to a pal'ty. I t was,
therefore, a little against the grain that the serdars had submitted
to the coercicrn of Mir Vaez, Ahmed Khan, and Mooktar-edDooulet, the result of which was the elevation of Shah Shooja to the
throne ; for they clearly saw that under such a sovereign they must
take a straight course and obey witho~~t
making those representations which the Afghans love so much to present to their superiors.,
Pressed by circumstances, they could not do otherwise than accept
the candidate for the throne without conditions, for his usurpation
was the only means by which they could withdraw themselves
from the vengeance of Shah Mahmood, and that of the Serdar
Fethi Khan, in the eyes of whom they had become ostensibly
compromised since the unfortunate day when the Soonees and
Slliahs had massacred one another in the city of Kabul. Nevertheless, they still hoped that .in accepting Shah Shooja as king he
would keep his authority within just limits; but they were mistaken,
for the Shah, who at once penetrated their intentions, cut short.
all their demands from the very clay he ascended the throne,
by an act of sovereign power of the most absolute character. This
tyrannical' feeling soon Became habitual to him, .and it increased
by degrees with all those who displeased him, however powerful or
influential they might be. The Mohamedzyes themselves were
deprivecl of their appointments, and their chief, Fethi Khan, disgraced by the king. T h e serdars, who vegetated in obscurity and
were the least to be feared, were taken from their retreats and
placed in positions of importance-in a word, Shooja shook himself
free from the yoke, and transformed everything, and he never afterw a d s gave any proofs of that independent spirit which had led
others to have such an high opinion of him when he was only a
prince of the blood. But it must be admitted, and tb his praise,
that he was always grateful to those who had raised him to power :
Mir V d z , Ahmed Khan, and Mooktar-ed-Dooulet, were much
more his friends than his dependents ; but this friendship could not
preserve them from the sac1 fate that awaited them ; and they fell all
three from the elevated rank in which fortune had placed them by
the revolutiolls which the Barultzyes and their numerous adherents
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stirred up amongst the Afghans. Mooktar.ed-Dooulet, obliged to
give up the post of vizier in favour of the Serdar Akrem Khan,
was in prison, and it was without doubt from the day that he retired
from affairs that the decadence in the reign of Shah Shooja may be
dated. The Serdar Ahmed Khan, less unfortunate than Mooktar,
died sword in hand, while putting down a revolt in which the
most faithful of the Shah's friends lost their lives. The sons of
these two chiefs, who exercised so great a n influence over the
Afghans, took from that time part in the revolt, and from this
moment the reign of Shah Shooja-001-Moolk was nothing more than
a succession of dangers, sufferings,-andbitter anxiety. If he had
been content to remove with some show of reason those who impeded
the march of government by their intrigues, or if, while repressing
them with more severity, he had acted with jmtice on the flagrant
proofs of their crimes, the restless disposition of the Afghans would
not have been alarmed, and he might have aspired to a reign not
less glorious than that of his grandfather Ahmed Shah, with whom
he had more than one point of reeemblance. But he was capricious
and singular like his brother Zeman, whose cruelty was necessary
to consolidate the power in his own hands.
Discontent soon became general amougst all classes of Shah
Shooja's subjects, even amongst his most devoted adherents, who
also m~umuredloudly ; but without talting into consideration their
irritation and remonstrances, he continued to give vent to his
haughty and absolute disposition. T h e Afghans, who saw.in him
the most talented of the Suddozyes, resisted for a long time the
wislles of their eerdars, who, habituated to raise and depose their
kings, were anxious to be rid of him ; and the want of agreement
on the choice of a successor which they must give the nation
was the l;?a.on why they delayed his fall indefinitely. There is
even some probability that this prince would have been able to
maintain his hold upon the throne if the Serdar Fethi Khan had
not been amongst the numbel. of his adversaries ; Shooja imagined
he could despise him, and, instead of conciliating him, which would
have been the wisest course, he did everything to increase his dissatisfaction. This false policy cost. him dear.
After his disgrace Fethi Khan, disliking Kabul as a residence,
proceeded to Randaha~,his 'native city, and in the environs of
which the greater part of the tribe of the Barukzyes ~esided. When
he arrived I L i s s x Mirza was governor, and he ~romisedthat he
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should be respected and protected by him as long a s he did not
interfere in the affairs of government. Fethi Khan was not then in
a position to make conditions, and mas obliged to accept those which
were offered him; but he prepred everything in secret for the
restoration of Shah Mahmood. Whether Kaisar was informed of
this, or whether he thought the step necessary to his uncle's safety,
he ordered the serdar to be seized on his leaving an audience which
had been accorded him; and the officers who were commissioned to arrest him precipitated themselves upon him with such
violence that he fell with his face to the ground, and knocked out
several of his teeth. Profiting by this circumstance, they gagged
him to stop his cries, bound his feet and his hands, and made him
a close prisoner; his young brother, Dust Mohamed Khan, who
was near him, assisted by a few servants, attempted his rescue, but,
overpowered by numbers, he was obliged to tihe to flight to escape
the same treatment. H e succeeded, however, in collecting a few
hundred Barukzyes in the city, and with these attacked the citadel,
but, received by a volley from the garrison, he was obliged to retire,
and, hastily leaving' the town, retreated to the fortress of Girishk,
the governor of which was devoted to his family. After this he
scoured the plain of Bakooa with the Barukzyes who had followed
him, plundered the caravans, and soon found himself in possession'
of 6!)01., which he spent in obtaiiling recruits and adherents to his
cause.
The Serdar Fethi Khan had previously to his arrest despatched
his brother Shere dil Khan to Ihbul, with the view of facilitating
the escape of Shah Mahmood from prison, and recommended him,
above all things, not to permit my Afghan to take part in this
enterprise, but to employ Kuzzilbashes exclusively. This Persian
tribe, a s we have already stated, consisted of 12,000 families when
they were brought to Kabul by Nadir Shah, but subsequently to the
death of that conqueror their numbers had considerably augmented.
Up to the reign of Shah Mahmood the Afghans treated them
upon a footing of equality, but after the sanguinary conflict
which arose between them on the occasion of the horrible crime
committed by these Persian colonists they were oppressed in every
kind of way, though Fethi Khan llad always remained on good
terms with them, which led them very naturally to assist him in
delivering Shah Mahmood. The undertaking was a difficult one,
for Shah Shooja, kept him closely guarded ; but whatever night have
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been the vigilance of his gaolers, the I<uzzilbashes finished by
evading it. Tools were sccretly conveyed .to the prisoner, al:J
such was the energy with which he used them, that in eight hours
he had dug down to the conduit by which he was to escape beyoncl
' the city wdls. I t was night when he gained the outside, and the
Kuzdbashes, who were on the watch, conducted him to a tomb
in a churchyard situated near the walls of the Bala Hiaar,
Lnd, having covered the place of his retreat with branches and
earth, they retired, rccornmending him to have patience for a few
days until the pursuit which it was certain would take place began
to slacken. The next morning s hundred emissaries were dcspatched 011 every side, with orders to put him to death directly
he fell into'their hands, but the majority of then1 soon returned to
inform the Shah that their endeavours to find hiin had been
unavailing. After having passed several days in this subterranean
abode, i\lahmood learnt that his brother had made useless search for
him : he therefore left his retreat in the middle of the night, and,
accompanied by Shere dil Khan and a few devoted adherents,
galloped southward, when they were soon joined by Dost
Mohamed Khan, in whose company they plundered three rich
caravans With the proceeds of these robberies they were enabled
to raise a small force, after which they acted upon a larger scale ;
the villages were in their turn put under contribution, and they
then laid siege to ICandahar.
During three months Kaissar niirza repulsed all the attacks of the
besiegers, but after this, being without either provisions or nmnitions
of war, he came to a compromise with them, setting the Serdar
Fethi Khan a t liberty, on condition that they raised the siege and
retired from Randahar. When the serdar was released, hIahmod
Shah was strongly inclined to break his promise, and constrain his
nephew to give up the city, but Fethi Khan prevented him; he
represented to him that the, throne was at Kabul, and not a t
Icandahar, and this determined Mahmood to march on the capital ;
they left, nevertheless, two thousand Barulczye horse encamped within a short distance from the former city.
When Shah Shooja heard that ICandahar was besieged by
Mahmood, he collected his troops and left Kabul with 25,000
picked men to relieve it, but after s few days' march more than
half deserted; the I<uzzilbashes especially all left his court and
returned to Kabol, which obliged the Shah to fall back on his
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capital, but he had scarcely arrived there when a revolt forced
him to evacuate it, and he retired and took up a position in a vast
plain swrounding the gardens of Neemla, near Gundamuck. Shah
Mahmoocl and Fethi Khan, who followed him close, remained in
Kabul only long enough to take possession of it ; they then confided
it to the care of the KuzzillDashes, and hastened against Sliah
Shooja, whose army was advantageomly posted and numbered
20,000 combatants. Though mustering only 3000 horse, Fethi
Khan charged them with irnpctuosity at a moment when they
least expected it, and before they had even t'inie to form up in
order of battle : the result was a complete rout, for it threw
the mass into utter confusion; fear took possession of them, and
they fled fiom the field. Akrem Khan, the vizier of Shah Shooja,
was killed, and the king escaped to the mountains of the Iihyber,
abandoning on the field of battle all his baggage and tlie royal
treasure, which, independent of a sum of 2,000,0001., contained
precious stones of immense value. Shah Mahmoocl secured an
enormous booty, and entered Kabul amidst the acclamations of
the inconstant people of that city, mounted on an elephant which
Shah Shooja had orderecl to be richly caparisoned for his own
triumphant entry into the capital.
Shah Shooja, remained only a short time in the Khyber, and
retired soon after towards the south, where he hoped, by joining
his nephew, Kaissar Mirza, to take the off'ensive and regain his
crown. Directing his course towards Kandahar by the mountains
bordering the I n c h , he obtained some recruits on the road ; but in
spite of the secrecy with which he endeavoured to conduct his march,
it became known, and, to add to his disgrace, his nephew was.
driven from Kandahar by the Serdar Poor clil Khan, a brother
of Fethi Khan. BRer this Poor dil Khan attacl~ccl Shooja
with superior forces, who was fortunate in being able to eswpe
by a rapid flight ; this was in 1509, four months having elapsed
between his first and second defeat. Powerless rather than discouraged, he retired shortly after to Loodiana, where he resided
near his brother the Shah Zeman, living from that time, like that
prince, on the bounty of the East Iudia Company, but not before
he had gone through miny severe trials.
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SIRALEXANDER
BURNES,
an enlightened and conscientious traveller

I

I

in Afghanistan, gives a sketch of the life which Shah Shooja led
after the battle of Neemla. This narrative was taken from a
little work written by Shah Shooja himself; I made every endeavour when in Afghanistan and Persia to procure this book, but
without result-as it is highly interesting, I present it here from
the pages of Burnes.
After Shah Shooja-001-Moolk had been defeated a t geemla he
had wandered as a fugitive in various corners of his domitions;
and his adventures, which have been detailed by himself in a
small volume, are replete with interest. After his discomfiture a t
Kandahar he was seized by Ata Mohamed Khan, the son of
his formcr vizier, and subjected to much indignity. H e wxi for
some time confined in the fortress of Attok. The lancet was fiequently held over his eyes ; and his keeper once took him into the
middle of the Indus, with his arms bound, threatening him with
instant death. The object of such severity was to extract from
him the celebrated diamond called Koh-i-Noor, or mountain of
light, which he was ltnown to possess. I n the mean while Ata
Mohamed Khan proceeded to Cashmeer, and carried the captive monarch in his train. 0 1 1 the fall of that valley he was
released by Futeh Khan and joined his family at Lahore. His
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queen, as I may well call the WaRadu 13egum, the most influential lady of his harem, hail used every ~ersuasion to prevent
Shooja's placing himself in the power of Runjeet Sing, but he disregarded her advice, and in the end had ample reason to regret
his having neglected it. This lady was a woman of most bold and
determined character; and her counsel had often proved valuable
to her husband, both in his da):s of power and disaster.
A t Lahore, while a t the nlcrcy of the Silths, and absent frok
her husband, she preserved her own and his honour in a most
heroic manner. Runjeet Sing pressed her urgently to surrender
the Koh-i-Noor, or valuable diamond which was in her possession ;
and evinced intentions of forcing it from her. H e also sought to
transfer the daughters of the unfortunate king to his own harem.
The queen seized on the person who conveyed the message, and
had hiin soundly chastised. She also intiniated to the Naharadja,
that, if he continued his dishonourable demands, she would pound
the diamond in a mortiw, and first administer it to her daughters,
and those under her protection, and then swallow it herself : adding, ' May the blood of all of us be on your head ! ' This lady
succeeded in the end in escaping from Lahore disguised as a
Hindoo ; and planned the deliverance of her husband, which shortly
followed. This was only effected at the expense of' the great
diamond. A narration of the circumstances relative to its surrender would prove interesting, but it would be out of place in
this sketch. I t is sufficient to mention that an imprisonment of
the closest nature, insult, and even hunger, fell to the lot of this
ur~fortunatemonarch.
" The ungenerous part which the king of the Silths was ellacting
towards her husband aroused the energies of the queen, who had
settled herself a t the British station of Loodiana She arranged
the placing of liorses on the road, and Shooja and his people
made every exertion in Lahore. They hired all the houses which
adjoined those in which they lodged, and opened a pasage into
the street by c u t h g through seven walls. A few hours after
the household had retired to rest, the Iring descended by the aperture and issued into the street in the dress of the Punjab. T h e
city wall had yet to be passed, and the gates were shut. Shooja
crept through the common sewer of the city, and fled with two
or three servants towards the hill country of Kishtwar. Here he
once more raised the standard of a monarch, and planned an
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attack on Cashrneer, in which he was assisted by the Xajah of
Kishtwar. The expedition would have been successful, for the
Governor of Cashmeer had evacuated his frontier position, but an
untimely season bloclted the roads with snow, interrupted the
supplies, and once more frustrated the hopes of Shah Shooja.
Wandering by a cheerless and ungenial country, the Shah a t
length reached the British station of Sabathoo in the outer Himalaya, from which he repaired to Loodiana, where his family had
found an asylum. H e here joined them, and has since shared the
bounty of the British Government. Few monarchs and few men
have been subjected to greater reverses of fortune than Shooja-001Moolk ; and we find our sympathies enlisted in his cause by,&
Irnowledge of his misfortunes."
Shah Mahmood had now for the second time reaped the h i t s
of the clever combinations of Fethi Khan, whose military talents
were completely developed. I t was much more in answer to
his appeal that the Afglians, particularly the powerful tribe of the
Barukzyes, had responded, than from any wish which they had
to see Shah Mahmood again upon the throne. This prince,
although tried by many vicissitudes, had learnt nothing by adversity; he wished for power bith reference only to the sweets of
life and the pleasures which i t procured, leaving to others the cares
of government. I t was on the Serdar Fethi Khan that he heaped
these, either because he was convinced that it was impossible for
him to reign without the co-operation of that chief, ur from a feeling of gratitude, or, more likely still, because he was convinced of
his great capacity ; he made him his prime minister, gave him
the most extensive powers, and laid upun him the difficult task of
governing the Afghan nation. From this time he gave himself
up .to, and gratified, his depraved inclinations ; efl'erninate and
self-indulgent, he thought of nothing but his pleasures and
orgies of every kind and description, living in utter ignorance
of all that was passing around him. Fethi Khan did not abuse
this unlimited confidence, and soon restored to his country the.
splendour and glory of the days of the great Shah Ahmed, which
had totally disappeared since the pacific reign of his son Timoor.
T h e name of Fetlii Khan soon became celebrated and popular
througl~outCentral Asia ; the Afghans more especially held him
in the greatest admiration, and had, on the contrary, t,he greatest
contempt for their Iring. Nevertheless such was at this epoch
,
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the veneration they had for the Suddozycs, that they never
thought of dethroning him in fhvour of his fortunate and able
general. I t is true many persons have given Fethi Khan credit
for the most ambitious views, but on a close examination of the
facts one remains convinced that this chief was sincere when
he protested his devotion to the Shah, and was contented with the
high position to which his sovereign had raised him. What indeed
could he gain by becoming king ? only another title, which would
haye caused him immense embarrassment, and a host of enemies,
without giving him more power. All the affairs of the kingdom
were submitted to his discretion ; he made his brothers in succession
governors of all the provinces; he had the administration of the
finances and the army ; his orders were not subject to the least
control. What could he desire more ? Nothing ! and Shah
Mahmoocl considered himself extremely fortunate in having as
his minister a man who fulfillecl his responsible and arduous
duties so well. But those who envied the minister did not find
him to their liking, and were constantly seeking for an opportunity
of inspiring the weak monarch with chimerical fears ; amongst
these was his son Iiamran, but his intrigues had no other result in
the first instance than to cause his own removal from office, and
under the following circumstances.
Kamran Mirza, after having rejoined his father under the
walls of Kandahar, returned with him to Ihbul. This prince,
although still young, had already become remarkable for his
haughty exterior, cruelties without number, and a great inclination
for debauch, and he mas on the point of proceeding to Kandahar as
governor of that province when. he made himself conspicuous by
circu~nstances of a most odious character. His cousin Kaisear
Mirza, son of Shah Zeman, had not followed the example of Shah
Shooja, as after having been removed from 'his government, of
which Kamran was going to take possession, he made his submission to his uncle Shah Mahmood, and remained from that tjnle
a t Kabul ~~ncler
the special protection of the Serdar Fethi Khan.
I<amran Mirza, who still entertained great resentment against the
.prince for all the disappointments he had made him feel on various
occasions a t Kandahar, ordered him to be seized one morning, and
put to the torture, with a view of forcing him to give up some
diamonds which he had forgotten to take with him in one of his
hurried flights from that city, and which he pretended had fallen
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into his cousixl's possession. Shah Mahmood, having been informed
of this circumstance, immediately interfered, and made him release
his nephew, but a few days after, Kamran, meeting Kaissar
Mirza in one of the royal gardens, apostrophized the latter in most
opprobrious terms. Kaissar had the imprudence to reply, when
Kamran felled him to the earth with a wrestler's club which he
took from the hands of a person in his suite. Fethi Iihan seized
this opportunity of representing to Shah Mahmood how his son
with such a disposition might compromise himself with a nation so
susceptible as the Afghans, and it was determined between the king
and his minister that no appointment should be given to I<amran
Mirza, and that he should for the future remain at court under the
surveillance of his father. From this moment the hatred of the
prince was redoubled against the vizier, and he was ever after
mixed up in all the intrigues and conspiracies that were' formed
against him.
The first object of Fethi Khan, after the restoration of Shah
Mahmood to power, was to make the Emirs of Scinde and Beloochistan return to their duty ; he then reduced to obedience the
greater part of the tribe of the Hazarahs, settled in the heart of
the mountains of the Pasopamisus. H e also restored order in all
the provinces; made the laws, the observance of which had been
very much relaxed, to be respected; regulated the administration, which, up to that period, had been in a most intricate
state, giving rise to the most nefarious exactions and embezzlements of the most scandalous kind ; and lastly it might be said
that security reigned everywhere. This remarkable man. united to
a superior genius a great aptitude for governing and for war:
not one of his predecessors had been able to reduce rebels
to obedience with the same promptitude, or keep them afterwards in the path of duty; he struck hard, but he was generous
after the victory was gained, and shone by his excessive liberality : always in the midst of combats, he still found time
to direct the helm of sta;te, and was ready for everything,in activity he had no equal. H e was the eldest of twenty-one
brothers, all men of mark, who powerfully assisted him by their
support; he placed them, as we have already said, at the head
of the provincial governments, putting much more faith in
them than in the princes of the blood or ambitious serdars,
who, jealous of his fame, were occupied only in creating embarL 2
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rassments for him, or in endeavouring to injure him in the
opinion of his sovereign. Hadji Firooz Eddin was the only prince
whom he allowed to remain unclisturbecl in his government of
IIerat; and this, simply because the troops were occupied elsewhere ; his fall was therefore delayed. H e intrusted the government of Beloochistau to his brother Rahim dil Khan, who resided a t Shikapoor. Poor dil Khan was installed a t Kandahar ;
Sultan Mohamed Khan a t Peshawur ; Shere dil Khan at. Glluznee ;
Kohendil Khan a t Bamian; and the others under their orders
in districts of these provinces; he nevertheless ret,ained some of
them near his person. Amongst these were Moharned Azim
Khan, Djabber Khan, Nawab Assad Ullah Khan, who were men
of capacity, and assisted him in the administration of affairs.
His young brother, Dost Mollarned Khan, had the entire charge
and manqement of his household, which did not prevent hiin from
mounting his horse and fighting like his other brothers.
After having completed the preparations for war, in which he
had been engaged during two years, Fethi Khan marched in
1811 against Cashmeer, which had thrown off the Afghan clominion, and was then held by the Serdar Attah Mohamed Khan, a
son of the vizier Akrem Khan, killed a t the battle of Neemla. H e
would also have willingly marched against Runjeet Sing, governor
of Lahore, who, after the fall of Shah Zeman, had proclaimed his
independence in the Punjab, but it would have been undertaking too
much a t a time ; moreover the vizier preferred making use of him in
his plans for the reconstruction of the empire, and falling upon
him afterwards when he had no further necessity for his services.
EIe therefore induced him to sign a treaty, in which he gave him
nine lacs of rupees (90,0001.), to be taken from the revenues of
the p-o&ce of Casllmeer, on condition that the Sikh a m y should
assist him in reconquering that country : this treaty was concluded on the banks of the Jelum, where the two chiefs met,
attended with a su.fficient escort. The Afghan minister had
with him eighteen of his brothers, who advised him to put an end
to the Sikh chieftain a t this meeting, offering themselves to
be the assassins. Fethi Khan rejected this proposition, but
much less because he would not be guilty of a base action,
a thing which Asiatics never loolr upon in the light that we do,
than because he required the support of the Sikh army, twelve
thousarld men of which formed a junction with his immediately
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after the treaty was signed. On receiving this augme~ltstion of
his forces, he proceeded towards Cashmeer, by may of Bember.
The little army of the rebels had posted themselves in the defiles of
the Pir-pindjal to dispute his passage, but, seeing themselves menaced in front by Fethi Khan, and in fhe rear by his brother
Kohendil Khan, who had turned their position with a corps of
cavalry, they retired without fighting. The Afghans had, therefore, no one to disturb them in their advance, and they took possession of the plain of Cashmeer without opposition. The city also
. had scarcely been invested when it surrendered at discretion, and
the citadel alone, to which the Serdar Attah Mohamed Khan had
retired, continued to offer any further resistance ;nevertheless, after
thirteen days of negotiation, that chief, rather than be besieged,
capitulated. H e was a inan of great talent, energetic, brave,
influential, and respected by the Afghans. Fethi Khan wished to
make a friend of him ; he treated him, therefore, with great distinction, and recommended hi111 to the good offices of Shah Mahmood. Runjeet Sing tried, but without success, to induce Fethi
Khan to confer npon him the government of Cashmeer ; but the
vizier, who saw the drift of his proposal, namely, to reimburse
himself in the first instance the expenses of the war, and afterwards to ensure to himself the payment of the sum guaranteed
by the treaty, eluded his request, and confided the administration
of this fair province to his brother, the Serdar Mohained Azim
Khan, who, after him, was the eldest son of Payendeh KhanRunjeet was therefore minus his expenses, and did not even
receive the nine lacs of rupees which had been promised him.
Frustrated in hi ambitious design, he turned his attention to
Attok, a fortress situated on an eminence close to the Indus,
commanding the principal passage of that river; and the governor, who was a brother of the Serdar Attah Khan, having surren.dered this important place to him, in consicleration of rt lac
of rupees, and certain promises which satisfied his ambition, the
Sikhs, on entering Attolr, openly abandoned the Afghan party, and
hstened to put the place in a good state of defence.
\Vhen Fethi J.<han was informed of the desertion of his allies,
he quitted Cashmeer to march against Runjeet ; sending forbvarii his brother Dost Mohamed Khan, a t the head of two
thousand horse, to clear the way, and followed close with all his
forces. On the approach of the advanced guard of the Afghan
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the Sikhs descended into the plain of Tchatch, which lies to the
east of Attok, and toolr up a position about three miles and a half
from the fortress, on some hills where they had not only the
advantage in the ground, but also that of securing the only
spring of water in the country. Dost Mohamed Khan, who,
for a reason so important, felt the necessity of seizing this point,
and desirous of distinguishing himself in the first command
with which his brother had intrusted him, fell with impetuosity
upon the S i k h without waiting for the arrival of the Afghan army,
which followed him a league in the rear. I n this charge he
captured the enemy's astillery ; but his silccess did not last
long ;the Sikhs rallied, and, after having received reinforcements,
renewed the attack with a force eight times. superior to his.
Finding that he had committed himself, he sent an express to
Fethi l a a n to hasten his marcb, and while awaiting his reply
valiantly resisted the enemy, and would neither retire himself, nor
c x d d the Sikhs force him to do so. Unfortunately the Dost's message never reached Fethi Khan, the messenger taking a wrong direction and losing his way. The vizier was also led iuto error by
persons ill-informecl of what had transpired, who assured him that
his brother had been killed and his division nearly destroyed, and he
made therefore an e'chelon movement towards t,he Indus in order
to avoid the Sikhs, ordered the heavy baggage to be burnt, and
crossed the river without being disturbed by the enemy. Though
tardily made acquainted with the movements of the Afghan army,
Dost Mohsmed hesitated not to retreat by the road it had taken,
the Sikhs retiring to Attolr. Fethi Khan, under the pressure of
threatening circumstances which arose in the west of Afghanistan,
was obliged to give up for the time his belligerent policy against
Rur~jeetSing ; indeed he was compelled to weaken the garrison of
Cashmeer to reinforce his army. This encouraged the Sikh chieftain to make several inroads on the territory of that province, the
revenues of which he seized, an act the Afghan governor could not
prevent.
Before entering upon the details of the new campaign which the
Serdar Fethi Khan had to sustain against the Persians, it is necessary, in order that the reader may comprehend the motives which
led to the war, that we should look back a little ,at the events
recorded in the preceding pages.
I t has been mentioned that the prince Hadji Firooz Eddin,
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removed with violence from Turchiz by the orders
Khan, had in the year 1800 been elected, in spite of himself,
sovereign Prince of Herat. The just and mild character .of his
rule had obtained for him the love and respect of dl classes of the
.population : ambitious individuals, who wished to overthrow him,
were unable to find support anywhere, and during the sixteen years
that he had governed this province he was never seriously disturbed
except by the unfortunate expedition of Kaissar Mirza, and
those which were almost annually sent against him by the Shah
of Persia, Feth -4li, who laid claim to the principality as having
once formed part of that kingdom. But up to this period Hadji
Firooz Eddin had paralyzed his efforts, sometimes by repelling
the' Persians by force of arms, but more frequently by paying a
small tribute which was exacted from him ; nevertheless, he had
always protested against the pretensions of the Persian monarch,
and declared that Feth Ali Shah had no more legitimate claim
upon Herat than he had upon the other countries which had
emancipated themselves from the donliniou of Persia during the
last century ; that the dynasty of the Iiadjars had, it is true, established itself on the ruins of a vast empire, but that these remains
had been absorbed in the organization of several kingdoms, which
in forming themsel~eshad taken less account of territorial limits
than of the races which inhabited them ;that none of them had the
right to impose laws upon the others without their consent ; that the
independence of these races, particularly that of the Afghans, had
been made sacred by the elevation of the Suddozyes to the throne,
the king then on the missnud being the third of that tribe ; that a s
the granclson of Shah Ahmed, founder of this dynasty, he reigned
as the legitimate sovereign over a province the majority .of the
inhabitants of which were Afghans ; in short, that Feth Ali Shah
in his capacity of Shah of Persia was not more justified in making
this claim upon Herat, than the Afghan princes would be in laying
claim to the possession of Ispallan, Shiraz, or Rerman, for the
simple reason that Mir Mahmood and Mir Echreff had reigned
over those provinces. I n support of these arguments, I-Iaclji
Firooz Eddin sent detachments of troops across the frontier to the
assistance of some chiefs in Khorassan whom Feth Ali Shah had
not yet been able to bring under his rule. Of this vast province
he really possessed only Meshed ; Nishapoor, Koochm, Boojnool-cl,
Tubbus, Toorbut, Haidarieh, and Ghain were pretty nearly incle-
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penclent, and, ~ ~ n d ethe
r anthority of the khans with whom the
Governor of Herat had just entered into alliance, a.nd in exciting
whom against Feth Ali Shah he hoped to give the Persian army
enough occupation to prevent it from being sent against himself.
H e *a,however, mistaken, for after a vigorous efl'ort Feth Ali
Shall finished by triumphing over their insubordination. T h e
anger which this sovereign felt against Hadji Rrooz Eddin, who
had povoked it, became fatal to the latter ; he soon saw Herat
menaced by a formidable afmy, and necessity obliged him to have
recourse to the aid of Shah Mahmood, whose assistance was almost
a s dangerous for him as the enmity of the Shah of Persia.
When the Persian battalions were all assembled a t Meshed,
Hoosein Ali Mirza, son of Feth Ali Shah, took the command. Kalech
Khan, the celebrated Serdar of the Taymoonis, a man dreaded by
the Heratees, also joined the Persian prince with a contingent of excellent troops, and, if they had at once entered upon the campaign,
there can be no doubt that they would have talcen Herat ; but
FIoosein Ali Mirza delayed the march of the army for a reinforcement of several guns of large calibre which he coulct have done
very well without. This gave the Vizier Fethi I h n time to come
to the relief of the place ; his troops cleared the two hundred
leagues which separated them from Herat with a rapidity unexampled in that country, and arrived there before the Persians
had even crossed their own frontier.
I t was not without good reason that Hadji Firooz waited till
h e was in the last extremity before he claimed the assistance of his
brother. Duriug the sixteen years that he governed Herat he
had always been independent of him, though they were on good
terms. I t was only when the successes of Fethi Khan in Beloochistan and Scinde made him fear that he should be removed from
his government, that he wrote to the latter protesting the truth of
his respect for and submission to the king; but directly the
vizier had left those provinces to proceed to Cashmeer, he kept only
half the promises he had made. It is true he coined money
in the name of the Shah Mahmood, but he never paid him a farthing of the tribute which had been agreed upon.
~ e t h Khan,
i
who was too much occupied in the'East to enforce
a more complete submission, appeared for the moment to rest
satisfied with this state of thiugs at Herat, but Hadji Firooz
..Eddin clearly understood that the vizier was only temporizing with

OUTRAGE ON HADJI FIROOZ.

him, and that, as soon as he was relieved from the embarrassments
which had arisen with Runjeet, he would in his turn be obliged to
conform to his brother's views. I t was, therefore, with very great
r e g e t that he saw himself obliged to call thi.s general to. his
assistance, whom he had so great an interest in seeing employed
anywhere rather than a t Herat; but there was no time to
hesitate, for the danger that menaced him left him no other alternative.
Fethi Khan arrived at Herat towards the close of 1816. I-Iadji
Firooz received him with great honours, and made him protestations of fidelity and friendship; but his conduct betrayed
the fears that mailed him, and contributed more than anything
else that had occurred up to that time to deprive him of his
government. Well convinced that if Fethi Khan entered the city
his own power was at an end, he permittcd him to do so with an
escort of fifty horsemcn only ; the army was obliged to encamp
under the walls. The vizier dissimulated his displeasure, and
even accepted the proposition with an outward appearance of
respect; but he rendered this of a very illusory character by
the choice he made of tlie persons who accompanied ,him. All
these were allied to some family or other in ~ c r a t arid
; they soon
induced their relatives to make common cause with them ; so that
on the fourth day after the vizier's. arrival they delivered up to him
the gates of the city- the citadel surrendered on the following day.
He also arrested Haclji Firooz Eddin, and sent him, but under
honourable escort, to Kabul, to give the king an account of his long
administration. Fethi Khan had not up to this point passed the
limits of justice ;but whether he was animated with a certain feeling
of resentment against t.he prince, or that his orders were exceeded,
he was deprived of all his riches, and, as-they were concealed in his
harem, this sacred asylum was forced, and the party deputed to
seize them, of whom his brother Dost Mohamed was the commander, made an .indiscriminate pillage ; the princesses were
even stripped of their clothes, and the Dost himself tore off a sash
ornamented with precious stones which supported the trousers of
the daughter of Shah Mahmood, the wife of his own nephew
Malek Kassem Mirza, son of Had$ Firooz Eddin.
Mir Efzel Khan, Isalrzye, who h d much assisted in the elevation of
I-Iadji Firooz Eddin to power, afterwards became his prime minister.
H e was the most influential person a t Herat after the governor,
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and strongly opposed any appeal to Fethi Khan for assistance, but
the advice of Hadji Agay, one of his officers, had prevailed over his.
Foreseeing that which subsequently took place, Mir Efzel Khan
resigned' the command of the army and retired to Persia before
the arrival of the vizier, and it was a happy thought of his, for the
latter put out the eyes of EIadji Aga?, and Efzel Khan would have
shared a similar fate.
After these measures, which Fethi Khan thought necessary
for the securhy of the lringdom, had been taken, he marched
against. the enemy, encamped in fiont of the town of Kussan,
about sixty miles from Herat, situated in the plain of Ki&r
Kaleh, on the extreme frontier of Persia and Herat. The battle
cominenced at dawn of day. The Persian prince, Hoosein Ali
Mirza, had a splendid army under his command, which he disposed as follows :-In the first line he placed four regiments of
regular infantry, under the orders of the Serdar Zoolfagar Khan ;*
this general, to give confidence to his newly organised troops, who,
appreciating only cavally, were grievously disconcerted a t not
being in that a m of the service, ltilled his magnificent Arab
horse in front of his division, and placed himself at their head on
foot. I n spite, however, of this proof of courage, when his corps
was attacked by the cavalry of Shere dil Khan, brother of the vizier,
i t was completely routed ; they rallied, however, after a time behind
the caravanserai and ruins on one side of the plain, and furiously
recommenced the combat, which lasted till four o'clock in the afternoon, when the Persians, having 10,000 men hors de combat, began
their retreat. A charge of cavalry rnade just at the right moment by
the Serdar Kohendil Khan, also a brother of the vizier, turned t,his
retreat into a complete rout, and the Persians precipitately abandoned the field. Fethi Khan immediately advanced to ascertain
the position of things in his front, but he received a spent ball in
his mouth, and, falling from his horse, was obliged to be carried to
his tent. This fact having become known amongst the Afghans,
they thought their chief was dead, and the Persians victorious ; and
losing a t once all the courage they had so recently displayed,
broke as if seized with a sudden panic. T h e first fugitives who
arrived at Herat spread terror through the city ; a part of the inhabitants left a t once, and the remainder prepared to receive their
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new masters, when Fethi Khan :arrived very Zc p r o p s to restore
for his wound was not a serious one, and he was always
able to direct the affairs of government.
The Persians retreated with scarcely a halt as far as Meshed,
and were not a little astonished to learn a few days after their
defeat that the Afghans believed that they were the victors, in
spite of their having lost their artillery and baggage, which were
not, it is true, taken possession of by their adversaries until nine
dais after the battle.
After this victory, which disgusted the Persians for some time
with the idea of attempting to take Herat, Fethi Khan occupied
himself in fixing the revenues of the province, and in reconstructing the dilapidated fortifications of, the city. His just and
enlightened administration obtained for him the esteem and affection of t.he inhabitants. I have had opportunities of conversing
with many Heratees who were acquainted with this remarkable
man, and they spoke of him with veneration. His virtues were as
great as his courage ; he was completely devoted to the glory and
interests of his country; his fame was carried to the highest point
by his last victory ; and he was making his preparations for the
conquest of Khorassan, when a fearful catastrophe deprived
Afghanistan of this worthy man, and annihilated the generolls
designs which he had conceived for her, and which would have
made that kingdom as prosperous and powerful as it had been
under the g r e a t ~ h m e dShah.
Eamran Mirza, a monster of vice and ferocity, guiltless of ever
having felt one noble or generous sentiment, witnessed with the
greatest displeasure the successes of Fethi Khan, by whom he had
been prevented from taking part in the government on account of
the murder of Kaissar Mirza. From that day-he had thought only
of taking vengeance upon the vizier, and sought every opportunity of
rendering him an object of suspicion to his father, to wllom he spoke
in depreciating terms of all his actions; he tried also in every possible
way to excite the jealousy of the other serdars, who were already
only too much disposed to side with him, and who always fell in with
his views when he brought any complaints to the notice of the
Shah ; but Mahmood, delighted to find himself powerful with so
little trouble, and enabled to gratify his own depraved inclinations
without being obliged to take any part in pubiic aEairs which
were so well conducted, refused for a long time to believe in the
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disloyal and infamous accusations brought against his minister.
Obliged however to listen continually to a repetition of them, and
thinking over his extraordinary success, and the influence he had
obtained in consequence, he at length finishecl by entertaining a
few misgivings, but he was completely amazed when he saw
I-Iadji Firooz Eddin arrive at Kabul. This prince protestecl
loudly against the manner in which he had been treated by
the vizier, the invasion of his harem, the loss of his property,
and spared no exaggeration to make his brother believe the
accuracy of his statements. ICanlran i\Iirza cnme to his aid,
and used every effort to convince the king that his royal dignity
had been insulted in the person of his brother, thus brought
before him loaded with chains like a vile criminal, and also in
that of his own daughter, the wife of Malek Kassem, from
whose person Dost Mohamed Khan had stripped the last vestment which could protcct her from his gaze and that of his
associates. The serdars, who were ~L':L~OUSof the vizier's power,
supported these representations, bringing to the notice of the feeble
monarch a host of other disgraceful actions of which they said
Fethi Khan had been guilty. They assured the Shah that he had
determined upon his ruin ; that the king ought to be beforehand with him, and put him to death ; that therc were at his
court twenty chiefs braver and more capable than he was; until
at length Mahmood Shah, yielding to the lowest feelings of
jealousy, had not the strength of mind to resist their arguments,
and he gave a n order that the eyes of Pethi Khan should be
put out..
Kamran would not rely upon any one but himself to execute
this diabolical sentcnce : he kept the king's instructions as secret as
he could, and left for Herat immediatcly, towards the close of
1817, to b e sure of his victim. The prince had broken his parole,
for i t had been agreed between Mahmoocl Shah and his vizier
that he was not to leave the court, and that fact must have been a
warning to the latter, who was also told by his friends of the fate
that awaitcd him; hut he would not believe in such base cruelty
and ingratitude, and took no precautions to guard himself from
the malice of his enemies. H e received the son of his sovereign
with the most profound respect and the greatest honout, and,
instead of evincing any r n i s t r ~ ~seemed
t,
as if he wished to induce
him to forget the past, intreating him that he would for the future
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go hand in hand with him in consolidating the power of the
Suddozye dynasty and raising the glory of the Afghan nation.
The vizier had been to him every morning to receive his orders
since the prince arrived at I-Ierat; the best intelligence seemed to
exist between them; and Fethi Khan had already accused his
friends of having given themselves up to chimerical fears, when,
one day on entering.the Bagh-Shah (a royal palace outside the
city, and the residence of the prince), he was arrested with his
suite, which consisted only of twenty persons, and his eyes were
immediately put out.
The same fate was reserved for the three brothers of the
vizier, namely, Poor dil Khan, Shere dil Khan, and Kohendil
I<han, who, during the time that this abominable cruelty was
being committed, were in the royal palace of the Tchahar-bagh in
the city, quietly playing at chess. Generally speaking, they accompanied their brother in his visits to the prince, but on this day,
Poor dil Khan being indisposed, he dispensed with their attendance. When Kamran saw that the three other victims had
not come within reach of his vengeance, he was suffocated with
rage, and sent a detachment of soldiers to arrest them immediately. Fortuna.tely, however, one of their servants, hearing by
accident of the danger which threatened them, ran to the palace
and, informed them of what had occurred, but he had scarcely
fulfilled this act of devotion when the satklfites of Kamran Mirzs
filled the court of the Tchahar-bngh. Flight was .now almost
impossible, for every mode of egress was carefully guarded,
and the only mode of escape was to put a bold front upon the
matter, which the three brothers did. They were accompanied
by only two servants, one armed with a sabre, the other with a
daggkr, and Poor dil Khan, being unwell, retired to a terrace of
the house with them; but Shere dil' Khan, arming himself with
the sabre, and Rohendil Khan with the dagger, rushed upon
the soldiers wit.h such impetuosity and resolution, that the fellows,
thinlting, in all probability, that they were supported by their
servants, fled terrified from the hause. Taking advantage of
this moment of panic, the two heroes promptly rejoined their
brother, and from the terrace leaped on to that of a home
adjoining the palace without being seen, and escaped to their
residence with the utmost haste. After having 'armed themselves to the teeth, they mounted their horses, and accompanied by
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a few of their followers took to flight, but on arriving a t the city
gates they fo~md two hundred soldiers there to dispute their
passage, and through these they had to cut their way. Shere
dil Khan and Kohendil Khan were fortunate enough t,o do so
without receiving a scratch, but Poor dil Khan, weakened by siclrness, had his horse killed under him, when a score of men threw
themselves upon him, bound his hands, and carried him to Kamran
M i a . T h e prince, seeing that two victims had still escaped him,
dissimulated the regret he felt, and assured Poor dil Khan, whom
he put in prison, that no harm would befall him, hoping that he
would be able to make use of him a t a future time as a means of
securing by craft his principal adversaries.
Eamran Mirza remained some time longer a t Herat, endeavouring by promises and presents to secure the army to his own
interests ; but always preoccupied with the idea of completing his
sanguinary work, and putting to death the brothers a d adherents. of Fethi I<han, he went to ILmdahar, where'-he hoped to
succeed in this object.
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AFTERtheir flight from Herat Shere dil Khan and his brother
sought refuge in the fortified village of Nadalee, situated about
twenty-three miles from Girishk, which belonged to Adeh, the
mother of Fethi Khan. From thence they despatched emissaries
in all directions to rouse the nomade tribes. A great number of
the Barukzyes responded to their appeal, which formed the nucleus
of a little army, and ibis was soon increased by numerous deserters
from the royal forces, who would not serve under Kamran.
The piice, observing that the detachments which he sent from
the city were constantly destroyed or repulsed by the partizans of
Fethi Khan, employed the arts of cunning to lead his brothers
to fall into his net. H e had dragged about with him the unfortunate minister, and endeavoured to persuade Poor dil Khan,
whom he took from his prison, that he had put his brother's
eyes out only to raise him to the post of vizier: a t the same
time he gave him a magnificent robe of honour, made him a
serdar, promised that the firman of vizier should be sent to
him as soon as Shere did Khan and Kohendil Khan had made
their submission, and pressed him to write and tell them to
come to Kandahar. Poor dil Khan appreciated this brilliant
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promise a t its exact value, but he appeared as if he believed the
prince and entered into his views; he assured him of his entire
devotion, and behaved as if he intended to keep his word,
but two days afterwards he fled, and to their great joy reached'
his brothers a t Nadalee, for their measures had been almost
paralyzed up to that moment by the fear they experienced
that he would be treated by Kamran in the same way that he
had dealt with their eldest brother. His presence also brought
fresh recruits to their ranks, for the ~ f ~ h a nhad
s - great confidence
in him; they considered him as one i f the mosttalented of the
sons of ~ a i e n d e hKhan, and in the differences which existed
between themselves almost always requested him to be the
arbitrator.
Icamran Mirza, irritated by the flight ofPoor dil Khan, which he
might have foreseen, revenged himself on the unfortunate. Fethi
K l k , upon whom he inflicted a thousand o u t r a ~ e sand cruel
tortures. Having perceived that a ray of light still remained in
the eyes of his victim, he himself introduced a hot iron into the
orbits in order to dry up every part. It was in this condition that
the butcher dragged him to Ghuznee, mhere the Shah Mahmood
awaited him, but his colwageous minister never asked for mercy,
and, by his firm and resigned bearing, showed himself as greet in
adversity as he had been generous in the esercise of his power.
such cruelties pactised upon such a man merited punisIlment
indeed, and seventeen brothers of the victim soon united to take
their revenge. Their names were as follows :The Vizier Fetlli Khan
Mohnlned Azim Khan.. . . . .
Tiruoor Khan
........
Poor dil Khan . . . . . . . .
Shere dil Iihnn . . . . . . . .
Iiol~endilXhau . . . . . . . .
12ahim clil Khau . . . . . . . .
Mir dil Khan
........
Dost Moharned Khan . . . . . .
Emir Mohamed Khan.. . . . .
Djemal Khan
........
Sultan Mohamed Khan
....
Yar Mohnrnrd Khan . . . . . .
P i r Nohamed Khan . . . .
Syud Mohanled K h n . . . . . .
Nawab Assad Khan . . . .
Narvsli Samut Khan . . . . 1:
Namab Djabbar Khan . . . . . .
DjumhB Khan
........

Dead.

,.

By the same mother

I,

By the same mother

By the same mother

I

D&.

,.

Living.
Living.

)

Dead.

By the same mother

..

Son of a slave

..

Living.

,,

Moharned h i i n Khan, who, after Fethi Khan, was the eldest
of the sons of Payendeh Khan, governed Cashmeer. Being ill at
the time he heard of the atrocious cruelties inflicted on his hlind
brother, he could not then joiii his relatives, but he raised t h e
standard of revolt in this province against the Shiih Mahmood,
and sent Dost Mohamed Khan before him to Kabul, in order
that he might work upon the population to rise in favour of their
cause. This young chief was the very man for such an undertaking, for, as it has been shown, he had already made himself remarked on s e ~ e r a l occasions for courage and military
talents, though at the moment his. services were required he was
in prison, and the following were the reasons that led to his
captivity.
A few days prior to his attacking the Persians a t Kirtar Kaleh,
Fethi Khan ordered him to give up some magnificent pearls t h e
Dost had purchased, but which the vizier had already selected for
himself, and stated thus much to the merchant who had them o n
sale ; he also required him to restore the girdle ornamented with
brilliants which he had taken from the daughter of Shah &hmood when he broke into the harem of Ijadji Firooz Eddin. But
Dost Molia~nedobstinately refusing t o comply with his wislies,
it produced a rupture between them, when the latter, fearing
the consequences of hi brother's anger, departed secretly from
the royal camp, and went to Cashnieer ; Mohamed Aziin Khan,
who was own brother to the vizier, took his part, and demanded
that the brilliants and the unlucky pearls should be surrendered
to him for the pdrl~ose of being forwarded to Fethi Khan, w l ~ o
had foreseen that the theft would give rise to complaints a n d fresh
intrigues against his family.
T h e Dost, again refusing to restore these valuables, was detained
a prisoner until they came to release him in order that he might
a s i s t in avenging the brother by whom and for whom he had been so
severely treated. The voice of honour, and revenge for blood, a n d
still more the conviction that he had been in error, spoke more powerfully to his heart than his resentment ; he therefore collected a
small corps of men, and advanced boldly against the capital. Shah
Mahmood, plunged in debauch, w s incapable of watching over his
own safety, andfrom the nloment the insurrection broke out confided the care of Kabul to his grandson Djehanguir M ~ r z a ,son of
Kamran, with whom h e associated, as his lieutenant and responnr
. . .. . ..
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sible adviser, his new vizier Mohamed Attah Khan, Popolzye : .
after this Mahmood retired to the fort,ress of Ghuznee, from
whence he wrote to his son to come and rejoin him. Dost Mohamecl
Khan, having completely beaten the detachments w11ich Djehanguir
Mirza sent against him, entered Kabul, and obliged that prince
to seek safety in flight; he also took Attah Mohamed Khan
prisoner, had his eyes put out on the public square, and subsequently sent him away into the mouutains.
After having been rejoined by Djehanguir Mirza, and a few soldiers who were with him, it was not long before Shah Mahmood
was surrounded by the troops which his son Kamran brought from
Kandahar-much
weakened it is true in numbers, and much
discouraged, bnt still ablc to afford him the hope of reducing
the insurgents if he had been a clever man. The army having
halted a few clays a t Ghuznee to give I h n r a n a little repose,
116 marched to Kabul to put down the rebels; but Mohamcd
Azim Khan, who, now re-established in health, had just joined
Dost Mohamecl, sparea him half his journey, and, midway between Ghuznee and Kabul, offered him battle at the head of four
thousand men. T h e prince, who had twelve thousand, was not in
the least doubtful of success, but he was wrong in his estimate
of the feeling of his troops; for, on the night preceding the
conflict, they passed over to his adversary. Mohamed Azim and
the Dost pursued ICainran immediately to the walls of Ghuznee,
and soon obliged his father and himself, and those who supported
their part.y, to evacuate the town.
Shah Mahmood, made desperate by this last disaster, ordered
Fethi Khan, who had now been deprived of his eyesiglit. eight
months, to bc brought into his presence, and commanded him to
write to his brothers, and desire them to return to their duty. But
the unfortunate vizier calmly replied that in losing his sight h e
had lost also all his influence over his fellow-men, and that he no
longer occupied himself with the affairs of this world. The king,
enraged a t this answer, orclerecl him to be put to death, and his
enemies, the nobles of the court, were charged with the execution
of the sentence; Iiamran Mirza, himself the most cruel of the
Suddozyes, struck the first blow, and a t this signal the rest drew
their daggers, rushed upon him, and strove who should make hiln
feel the greatest torture and suffering. They flayed him alive,
disjointed his members, which they drew from his body one by one,.
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and a t length decapitated him; which put an end to his a g d e s .
His corpse, thus mutilated, was abandoned to the public executioner, who cut it in pieces, threw them into a sack, and carried
them to Ghuznee, where they were interred.
Not a sigh or complaint escaped Fethi Khan amidst these
horrible tortures : he was sustained by the courage of a hero, and
the calm of a pure conscience.
A general cry of -indignation arose from one end of Afghanistan
to the other against the murderers of this great man, and those
who had remdned faithful to the Suddoqe party, not from:a feeling of sympathy, but from a sentiment of duty, now left i t ; eveo
the personal friends of the king were moved with compassion at
the manner in which his old and faithful servant was put to death ;
and there were very few serdars whose jealousies were not subdued
by his sad end.
Shah Mahmood, a wanderer and a fugitive, had now only a
few servants around him, repulsed, harassed, and tracked, and
obliged to shuu inhabited places, he dared not stop even in.
the most desert spots, so hot was the pursuit. The dangers he1
underwent were incessant ; he suffered every kind of privation,
having nothing to support life but roots and wild fruits. Nearly
dead from hunger, and in the last stage of despair, the fugitives
endeavoured to reach Kandahar, which Kamran,. on leaving
Ghuznee, had confided to the care of Gul Mohamed Khan,
Popolzye ; but he soon learned that the city had fallen into the.
hands of the Moharnedzyes, and that with the assistance of Mir
Efzel Khan, Isakzye, Poor dil Khan had seized it. After Fethi
Khan lost his sight, Efzel returned from Persia to live in the midst
of his tribe, encamped in the environs of Koohnichine, a fortress
situated on the banks of the Helmund, which belonged to him,
and Poor dil Khan, without giving himself any concern as to the
antagonistic feeling which existed between Mir Efzel Khan and his elder brother, came to him and demanded his assistance and
that of his tribe ; this was conceded, and the Mir joined the
Blohamedzyes. The two chiefs then marched against Kandahar,
which surrendered to them after a feeble resistance ; but the governor Gul Mohamed Khan escaped, and reached I-lerst, the
garrison of which was devoted to Kamran Mirza, and the former
knew how to keep them in obedience.
Sl-la11 Mahmood, being informed of this forhnate circumsbnce,.
M 2
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immediately directed his steps towards that city, but, being completely without provisions and menaced 011 all sides, he was obliged
to take the least frequented and accessible roads ; the number of
his followers diminished day by day, hunger, fatigue, and privation accompanying them everjwhere. I t was in this condition
that they crossed the Paropamisan chain, inhabited by the Hazarahs Poocht-Kooh, who, though enemies of the Afghans, nevertheless inspired them with less terror than the latter. A t length
Mahmood reached Herat, having with him only his son Kamran,
his brother Haclji. Firooz Edclin, and eleven servants who were
devoted to him.
But discord soon divided this royal trio. Kamran Mirza hacl
only desired the fall of Fethi Khan in order that he might himself
direct the government ; he commenced therefore by seizing upon
all authority; Shah Mahmood, who, not without reason, attributed
his misfortunes to his son, resisted these attempts and determined
to govern for himself, .which daily produced between them the
most violent scenes ; and, Hadji Firooz Eddin, wearied with these
intertninable discussions, obtained permission from the king to retire
to Meshed, which he did immediately.
For some time after ..their arrival a t Herat Mahmood and his
son were alarmed . b y the threats of the Persians, who seemed
disposed to set up anew their claims upon the city, but Shah
Mahmoocl and Kamran did not make this matter so much a question
of amour propre as did Hadji Firooz Eddin, for they admitted
without protest the suzerainty of the Shah of Persia, bound themselves t.o pay, him tribute, and thought themselves fortunate in
being able to remain on such conditions the peaceable possessors
of the Iast refuge that they were able to find i n Afghanistan.
I n 1819, a short time after this agreement had been concluded,
Kamran Mirza, tired of the tenacity with which his father maintained his rights a s sovereign, drove him from Herat, but Shah
Mahmood, having collected a small army amongst the Eimalts,
laid siege to the city in 1820. H e was however beaten and
obliged to fly to the Hazarahs Zeidnat : nevertheless he did not
consider himself vanquished, and for a . time appeared to have
recovered the energy of his youth to fight his son. After having
reinforced his army he returned in 1521, and besiegcd Herat a
second time ; but having invested it for a few days, the serdars
interfered between father and son, and effected a reconciliation,
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upon the understandiug that Shah Mahmood was to have the title
of king, and enjoy all the honours, and his son the power he so
much coveted.
While these two princes were disputing in the west the possession of one corner of Afghanistan, the other portions of the kingdom passed into the hands of the Mohamedzyes and the Sikhs.
The former mere too much occupied with their mar against t.he
latter, and their differences with one another, to carry their arms
against Herat, and repaid themselves by agitating that province
with rumours and secret conspiracies, so that Kamran had at first
great difficulty in making his authority respected, and when it was
a little strengthened he had to repulse the attacks which were
made by his adversaries from the exterior.
When Hadji Firooz Eddin, by no means satisfied with the conduct either of his brother or his nephew, retired to Meshed;
he met there the famous Serdar Kalech Khan, Taymooni, who
represented to him how wrong he had been to leave Herat, where
neither Mahmood nor ICamran had the least chance of being
able to maintain his position, while he, Firooz Edclin, who had
governed that country for years to the general satisfaction of the
people, would most assuredly have been before long raised by
them to the sovereign power. This serdar said, in short, all that
he could to awaken his ambition, and offered his support to
reinstate him in power. T h e prince for a long time resisted
these arguments, but at length, overcome by hie solicitations, decided upon taking Kdech's advice and reign again over a people
and a province which he had rendered happy and flourishing
for sixteen years .of his paternal administration. Kalech Khan
made all the preparations which could suggest themselves to the
mind of a clever man, and the expedition was undertaken in 1822.
I t was kept so secret that I<amau Mirza, vho had gone to hunt in
the country round Ihssan, a town situated about fifteen hours from
IIewt, on the road to Meshed, was surprised by the advanced
guard of Hadji Firooz, and very nearly made prisoner; the
devotion of four of his servants, who defended his house, and
were all killed at the entrance, while he gained the fields by a back
door, alone secured him the opportunity of flight. Arrived a t
Herat, he immediately despatched his minister, Attah Khan, and
several other officers, in a11 directions to assemble the contingents of
the nomade tribes, who promptly arrived to his assistance and ,
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relieved the city. ?S71iile these troops, under the orders of Attall
I i h q kAli ICioouzye, attacked the army of Hadji Firooz, the
prince Kamran left the city a t the head of t ~ thousand
o
Afghans,
and fell upon the enemy's rear. The conflict lasted thirteen hours ;
very little powder was expended, for the two armies fought with
cold steel foot to foot, and perhaps no more ohstinate battle was
ever fought under the walls of Herat ; when it was over there
might be counted more dead bodies than living men. The victory nevertheless remained for a long time uncertain, but the
death of ICalech Khan turned the tide of battle in favour of
Kamran. This serdar had singled out and pursued the prince
with fury, arlcl in a few yards more he would have crossed
swords with the miscreant tort.urer of Fethi Khan ; but fortune
mas not in the ascendant for him, his horse came down in a
ravine and injured the khan's neck in the fall. IIis soldiers,
seeing him in this disabled state, turned and fled, and, the enemy
having made him prisoner, Kamran sabred his foe himself-on
this occasion as on every other lie showed himself ferocious in the
combat, and cruel when victorious. IIadji Firooz was also
captured, and he worlld not have been spared any more than his
general if Shah Mahmood had not interfered energetically in his
favour; but he was subsequently confined in the citadel, where he
was closely nratched.
The prince Kamran was scarcely delivered from this danger
when he was called upon to deal with another. The united
chiefs of Khorassan attacked Herat in 1823; this expedition
was undertaken by order of Fcth Ali Shah, King of Persia,
to force I h m r a n to pay the tribute, which under various pretexts he had never done. During three months the Khorassanees made many unsuccessful efforts to take the city, and they
did not leave the province until they had completely ravaged it.
These inroads of the Persians were frequently renewed, and
I h m r a n repulsed them all by force of arms whenever there was a
chance of his coming victorious out of the contest ; but he much more
frequently met czncl bent to the storm, as I-Iadji Firooz had been
forced to do before him, by paying a small tribute to the Sha.h of
Persia, a$ in conforming to some frivolous ceremonies of vassalage.
Kamran Mirza had scarcely shaken off these enemies from
without when he had to contend with disagreeable complications
within the province of Herat, and in the year 1824 they extended
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to the districts which up to that time had been pretty quiet.
That of Furrah more particularly pushed matters to the last
extremity : the inhabitants finished by separating theniselves from
the capital to form an alliance with Kandahar, and Kamran was
obliged to march in person with an army to reduce them to
obedience.
Before departing on this expedition the prince took every precaution to preserve the tranquillity of Herat in his absence. A t
the time Shah Mahmood accommodated matters with his son, he
lost all his influence, and was forced by Ramran to retire
to the Bagh Shah, a palace situated about a gunshot from
the city, where he could at his ease give himself up to his
depraved inclinations. T h e citadel with a good garrison was
confided to the charge of Moustapha Khan, Zoori, who had
always been devoted to him, and he appointed his maternal uncle
Miharned Hoosein Khan governor of the city, with the title of
vekil. These two personages were to have equal authority and a
voice in the direction of affairs, and Kamran hoped that in opposing
one to the other he would be able to secure a greater guarantee
for their fidelity. His eldest son, Djehanguir Mirza, was left in
I-Ierat to control their actions, but t.hey held this prince in little
consideration, who became simply the promulgator of the orders
which they gave, and not the representative of the regal authority.
The Vekil Mohamed Hoosein Khan had great influence in the
city, and the Serdar Moustnpha Khan a still greater in the army.
At first they seemed to act perfectly well together; but they mere
united only in appearance ; each sought secretly to overthrow the
other, and to put Kamran on one side that he might govern in
his place. They also attempted to dissimulate their ambitious
purpose from one another, when an occurrence wholly unexpected
arose, and made them participate in concert in a revolt which
each of them had individually premeditated.
The troops left for Furrah in the hope that, as stated by
Kamran, they would receive their pay directly they arrived in that
district, but this promise not having been performed they began
to murmur, and the prince was forced to send to Herat for money.
One of the officers of his household, by name i\leuhvalee Khan,
was charged with this mission, and to him lcamran gave a
note of hand for six thousand tomauns, which he ordered his uncle
Mohamed Hoosein Khan to pay with the least possible delay.
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Mcuhvalec Khan perfornled this duty in the most haughty and
arrogant manner, because the money was not ready ; the V e l d
begged him to have patieuce for a few days, but the officer demaiided that the sum should be give11 him on t3heinstant, and apostrophized EIoosein Khan in menacing and opprobriol~sterms. T h e
Serclar Bloustapha Khan, who xas present during this altercation,
representeci to his colleague that Meuhvalee Khan must be cognizant of some evil intention which Kamran entertained towards them :
c c For," said he, " if a subordinate addresses us in such a manner,
what will not the prince do when he returns? " The imagination
of these chiefs, already prepared for revolt, soon became heated ;
they immediately arrested the messenger, and decided upon overthrowing ICamran ; but when they came to discuss the basis upon
which the governmcnt mas to be established, and who should be its
chief, they found it was not easy to come to an understanding
betneeu themselves, and the question was adjourned. Nevertheless, they agreed upon the main point-namely,
the overthrow of the prince I<an~ran; and also that his son Djehanguir
must be comprumised in the eyes of the people, and rendered
odious by being induced to conmit some unnecessary act of
cruelty. T h e y began, therefore, by making him issue a proclamation that his father's rule was at an end; and it would seem
that this princc, then about twenty-two years of age, agreed very
willingly to this proposition, thinlril:g without doubt that there was
no more harm in taking the place of his father ICamran than
there had been in his dethroning Rlahmood Shah. Accordingly
Djehanguir was proclaimed Sovereign Prince of Herat, and his
first act was to pronounce the condemnation of Meuhvalee I.han.
T h e sentence was a terrible one : they first cut off his nose, his
ears, and his fingers, and from hour to hour scored him with sabrewounds. T h e agonies of this unfortunate man lasted two days,
after which one of the officers of Djehanguir Mirza dragged him
through the bazaars, and in a loud voice invited all those who
were friends of the new sovereign to throw a stone at Lhe
wret,ch, while two hundred men, who had been assembled there
previously by the serdm and the Veld, also stoned the miserable
sufferer.
Directly Mohamed Hoosein and Moustapha Khan had attained
their object by compromising Djehanguir with his father, and
making him detested in the eyes of the Heratees, they improvised a
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revolt by which the prince was overthrown and imprisoned, and
the executive power placed in their own hands. Tllis was the critical rnoment for these ambitious men, for they had penetrated the
intentions of each other. T h e Veld, who did 11ot feel himself
strong enough to attack the serdar openly, and dislodge him from
the citadel, released l-Iadji Firooz from the prison in which he.
was confined, and made the citizens aclmorcrledge him as their
sovereign. Moustapha, I<han, thus forestalled, saw very well that
he could not obtain ai~ything from the inhabitants if he stood
&ne, fo; Haclji Firooz was their idol; they still remembered
how much happiness they had enjoyed during his administration of
&'airs, and his return to power filled them with joy. As a counterp i a e to this, the serdar went to the Malimood at Bagh Shah,
, whefe he lived p~ettynearly forgotten, and was ignorant of what
was passing in the city, with the intention of setting him up as
an opponcnt to IIaclji Firooz. This done, blood soon flowed in
I-Ierat, and Moustapha Khan, defeated in the first conflict, was
obliged to shut himself up with the old king in the citadel, fiom
whence he cannonaded the city,, which, to avoid complete destruction, surrendered at discretion,
This second reign of I-Iadji Firooz Eddin lasted only eighteen
days: the victor Moustapha Khan obliged him to return once
iriore and seek refuge a t Meshed, to which city he was folloived
by the Vekil. The former was still alive in 18.15 ; I saw him in my
woy through Meshed in that year, and received these details from
his own lips.
After the deposition of Djehanguir Mirza, and when he saw the
power as he thought escape from him by the election of Firooz
,
Eddin, Moustapha Khan, thinking his chances of success were
small, and calculating still less upon Shah Mahmood, sent an
express to Kamran Mirza to beg him to hasten his return, promising to stand firm for his party until he made his appearance.
The prince hastened to adopt this suggestion, and arrived under the
walls of EIerat the day after his uncle Hadji Firooz and the Vekil
had retired from the city, but he found the gates closed ; for the
victorious Moustapha, having now no other competitor, replied to.
the summons to open them that he knew no other sovereign than
. Shah Nahmoocl, would obey his orders only, and that those
orders were that his son should not be allowed to enter the
city.
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Ramran invested the place immediately after he received
this message, but he had scarcely opened his trenches when he
was obliged to retire to Laush-Jowaine, a fortified castle and
position to the south of Purrah, to avoid a battle with Shere dil
Khan, Mohamedzye, whose forces nere much superior to his.
This serdar had been sent against him by his brother Poor dil
Khan, the sovereign of ICandahar, as much to avenge the death of
Fethi Khan as to seize upon, Herat, and this conquest, added to
the others which he had made to the eastward since the fall of
Shah Mahmood, would have made them masters of {he whole
of Afghanistan, as we shall see hereafter.
Shere dil Khan, not having succeeded in obtaining possession of
the place by simple summons as he had expected, commenced the
siege, but he was soon forced to raise it, and finally to retreat
towards ICanclahar, finding himself between two fires ; for an army
from Khorassan, commanded by Mohamed I<han, Garai, whom
MoustapLa Khan had called to his support, was in the neighbourhood.
T h e usurper, now being rid of Hadji Firooz, of Kamran, and of
Shere dil Khan, satisfied the expectations of his ally Mohamed
Khan, Garai, with a sum of money, and by paying his expenses
during the campaign ; but not feeling sufficiently secure even
after this, he thought that the best method of maintaining his
position was to destroy all those who had opposed him. Blood
again flowed on all sides, and revolt was the only resource that
remained to the miserable Heratees by which they could deliver
themselves from this tyrant.
Syud Mir Sedilc Khan, chief of the Afghan branch of the
Berduranees, a tribe from which.the majority of the citizens of
H e r a t had sprung, invited the prince Kamran to approach the
town as secretly as he could, declaring that when he arrived they
would admit him. T h o ~ g hI h m r a n had since his last flight been
deserted by very nearly the whole of his army, he did not hesitate
to accept this dangerous invitation to regain his power, and,
reaching Herat about midnight, his march not having been discovered, the Syud admitted him into the place without the prince
having been compelled to fire a single shot. T h e remainder of the
night was occupied in making the arrival of ICaniran known to the
inhabitants, .and the citadel in which Moustapha Khan residcd
was surrouildcd a t sunrise by ten thousand armed men, who aroused

CHAP.SIT.

HIS NISERABLE END.

171

him by a well-sustained fire of artillery and vdleys of musketry.
The serdar, -surprised by this sudden attack, lost a few men
in the first instance, but after a few hours he c~mpletelyorpnised the defence, which during a month was most vigorously
conducted, and he only made up his mind to surrender when the
towers, shaken to their foundations by the explosion of mines,
were on the point of falling, and large breaches opened a wide
passage for the besieging army. In this extremity he sent the Serdar
Dost Moh?med Khan, Popolzye, one of his party, to Icamran, to
offer his submission : a t the same time he invoked the clemency of
the conqueror, and sent him a Koran, opened a t the verse which
recommends Mahornedans to bear no hatred, and forgive each
certainly very far from a good
other their faults ; but the
Mussulman, and, as I have already remarked, a rare example of
ferocity, fell upon the messenger and cudgelled him with a dervish's stick which he happened to have in his hand.
Moustapha Khan, appreciating clearly from this incident the
kind of fate that awaited him, defended himself with desperation
for ten days more-it was a lion encaged. . . A t last the assault
was given; the place fell ; Moustapha was taken prisoner, and
s~~ffered
the most dreadful, of deaths. His body was burned with
hot irons, his flesh torn with red-hot pincers by shreds ; covered
with wounds and nearly flayed, he was bound to a large tree a t
the entrance to the citadel, and on this spot the people congregated to spit in his face, and covered him with every kind of
excrement. At last they ripped open his belly, and he expired
after enduring seven days of the most fearful agony. T h e
tree to which he was bound was standing in 1845. Kamran
Mirza punished his fathcr, Shah Mahnlood, for having assisted the
serdar in this revolt, by depriving him of his wine during one
whole month, which was to him a terrible infliction. As to his
son Djehanguir Mirza, he gave him his liberty, but with it,
as a small recompense for having assisted in dethroning his
father, two thousand cuts with the bastinado on the soles of
his feet, forgetting that, he had been guilty of the same crime
himself. I n this family the son, grandson, and grandfather were
all equally worthy of each other, and strove to distinguish themselves by the most odious crimes. Such is the Afghan character :
the people of Afghanistan honour that which is vile with us.
From the death of Moustapha Khan, not one year went 'round
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without Kamran's. seeing sonle ambitious character putting his sovereignty in question. Alternately victor and vanquished, his reign
was nothing more than a long drainit of intestine wars, conspiracies,
and revolts, followed by the most atrocious executions. He cruelly
put to death all who were opposed to him, even those whom he
merely suspected : and numbers of these unfortunate beings were
t~n;ornn under the feet of elephants, or to hungry tigers, ~ v l ~ i c h
he kept for this purpose. There was in his revenge a barbarous
ferocity of wllich it would be difficult to form a conception ; and
the most disgusting feature in it was, that he delighted to be himself
the executioner of the sentences wliich he pronounced. In Europe
the memory of Kamran would have been execrated for ages, but the
Afghans see things in another point of view ; courage so called is
in their eyes the greatest of all virtues : it stands in place of every
other, and to take vengeance upon an enemy, to kill and massacre
plenty of human beings, passes with them for courage. Directly a
prince, a chief', or a person of lower grade is in the possession of absolute power, he ought to prove that he has it by the nuusacres he
orders. They cannot comprehend why an enemy vanquished or disarmed should be pardoned, and they regard this as an act of weakness and pusillanimity. I n their estimation he who makes the most
victims is the most powerful, the most honoured; and it is very
doubtful whether there is a family in Herat ahich has not been
deprived of some one of its members by Kamran. NO~V
that he
is dead, the people flock in crowls in pilgrimage to his tomb.
lT7ith such sentiments it is not surpfising to see the history of tliis
nation broadly traced in characters of blood.
'

DEATH OF MAHIMOOD.

CHAPTER XIII.
Death of Shah Mahmood-Kamim is suspected of murdering his frtther-He
indulges in every kind of excess -Death of Attah Khan -P a r Mohamed Khan
is made Vizier of Herat-Hostility of t h e Persians against this principnlityIntrigues of dbbtu Mirza- Yar Mohamed arrives at Meshed- He is put to the
torture by the Persinn prince - Is clelivercd by the h t h a r B s h i - Measures of
Yar Mohamed-.Revolt of the Syud Mohamed Sedik-He
is betrayed by
Kamran and executed -The Shah is closely watched by Yar Mohnmed - His
sons are disgraced - Project of Mohamecl Shah on I-Ierat -The Bflrukzyes consent to the restoration of Shah Shoojs-He plays the despot, and is overthrown-Eyoob
succeecls him- Mohrtmed .Azim Khan marches against the
Sikhs- Runjeet Sing successful against the Afghans -The battle of Xoochero-The Afghans are beaten-Death of Azim Khan-The
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that serclw-His son Habib Ullah Khau succeeds him.

KAMRAN
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days of his father, the Sl~ahMahmood, who was found dead in his
hath in 1829 ; some assert that he was poisoned, and some
that he wasstrangled, by the command of his son, who was tired of
seeing him raised to power like a puppet every time an ambitious
man revolted against himself. From the time of his father's
decease Kamran took the title of King ; he then seemed to have
lost all energy, and retired within the walls of the citadel of
Herat, remaining almost a stranger to the affairs of government, the direction of which he gave up to his minister, the Serdar
Attah Khan, Ali Kioouzye, who had given him many marks of
his attachment, and in whom he had entire confidence ; after which,
and following the example of his father, he commenceh a life of
drunkenness, opium-eating, and every Eastern vice.
This alteration in the conduct of the prince awakened the hopes
of every party, and each wished to try its strength in several
disturbances, but the vigilance of Attah Khan suppressed them
with so much energy that thcy withdrew into the shade, and made
no hrther attempts during his lifetime. This able man, who
had distinguished hilliself as much in war as in the civil administration of his country, died in 1830, leaving three sons, serdars
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like himself. I n conformity with the custom of Af$anistan, where
the office of prime minister is hereditary like the crown, it was
expected that the eldest of these sons, the Serdar Dine Noharncd
Khan, would succecd his father as vizier. Though young, 11c hid
shown himself worthy of this distinct,ion by his bravery in the
field and his military capacity, of which he 11acl given proof on
several occasions; but, surrounded by intrigues, he refused to
accept power, and abancloned his ~.ightsto his cousin, the Serdar
Y ar Mohamecl Khan, who, having lost his father at a very tender
age, hncI been brought up with him in. the house of Attah Khan.
The minister had always evinced a great predilection for his
nephew, and freqaent,ly expressed an opinion anticipatory of his
future greatness; and Shah Kamran, influenced by a certain
mollah, Mohamed Athar Bashi, the apothecary-in-chief, who
flattered his passions, and administered his drugs to excite them,
accepted Yar Mohamed Khan as his vizier.
'rhis young serdar, who was distinguished for hi courage
and cleverness, had made nun~erouspartizans amongst the Ijcrutees. H i s father Abdullah Khan, Ali I<ioouzye, although of
noble extraction, was not in the outset a very great personage ; but he rose by merit, and became governor of Cashmeer
a t the period when Shah Mahmood first ascended the throne.
T h a t sovereign released him from prison, in which he had been
confined by Shah Zeman, and placed him in this high position ;
thus fortune favoured him, and his son's career was even more
successful.
T h e dkbut of Yar Mohamed in admizlistrative affairs justified
the selection which had been made in his person ; it is, however, to
be presu~iiedthat he a t once turned his views towards the assumption of supreme power, for all his acts tended constantly towards
the accomplishment of his ambitious projects. As firm as he was
vigilant, he always held his adversaries in check by depreciating
them ;he successively removed those most dangerous to his interests
in a manner that did not produce too much discontent, and
endeavoured to smother the rivalry existing between the various
tribes on whose support he could rely ;he proceeded, in short, like
a clever and intelligent man, and the Shah Kamran, confiding in
him, followed his advice in all respects. But Yar Mohamed had
been minister scarcely a year when one of those events so frequent
in Afghanistan arose to check for a moment his dawning fortunes.
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A t the cominenccment of 1832 Feth Ali Shall, always preoccupied with the idea of joining the province of Herat to Bersia,
assembled 30,000 men a t Meshed under the command of Abb;ls
nilirzn, the heir allparent to the throne. For some yeilrs past
ltussia had encroached considerably on the north of the Persian
territory; England ha? done the same thing in the south, to
the prejudice of the Indian .princes. Nevertheless, she 1;ad mot
made a progress that would enable her to secure as much influence
in Persia as the Tzar. She commenced, therefore, by fearing that
the Shah of Persia, whom she had abandoned to the Muscovitcs,
would undertake the conquest of Herat, and this much morc in
accordance with the wishes of the Emperor Nicholas than his own.
England was alarmed a t this demonstration on the side of Inclia of
which I-Ierat is the key, and brought forth all the springs of her
clever policy to prevent it, or at least to paralyze the effects of it.
She was, however, in the first instance, somewhat reassured by the
reflcction that,, the Persian army being direc,ted by English officcrs,
could only obtain s~ichsuccess as they would pcrmit. The East
India Company was also clever enough to induce Fetli Ali Shah to
turn the expedition fiom its original object for a time, and reduce
the petty chiefs of Khorllsscm, who had given only a nominal o h diencc to Persia since the reign of Nadir Shah.
On his arrival at Meshccl the prince Abbas Mirza dcspatclierl
one of his officers to the Shah Kamran to request him to send his
'minister there in order that they might consult together, and
endeavour to terminate their differences in an amicable manner.
The character of the prince inspiring the vizier with every confidence, he accepted this invitation, and went to Meshed attended
by five hundred Afghan horse; but instead of coming to an
arrangcrr~ent as Y ar Mohamed hoped, libbas Mirza originated fresh and serious difficulties, and Yar Mohamed was very
soon obliged to confess to himself t,hat he had been led into a
snare. With great secrecy, therefore, he immediately sent off his
men by small detachments to Kootchan, then governed by Reza
I<ooli Khan, who had not been subdued by Abbas Mirza, and
recommended them as brave fellows who could powerfully
assist the ally of his sovereign in the defence of his fort, which
Yar Mohamecl considered one of the outworks of Herat. He
then addressed a communication to the Persian prince containing
most energetic protestations on his strange proceedings with regard
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to himself; but it was all very fine for him to invoke the inviolability of an ambassador's person, or the rights of individuals ; no
one listened to him, and a few clays after, the prince, fearing his
energy and talents, gave an order that his movements should be
carefully watched. After this Abbas Mjrza endeavoured to bring
him to consent to an arrangement relative to Herat, but the vizier
would not concede anything which he considered prejudicial to the
interests of the Shah Iiamran. The princc even w i l t so far as to extract two of his teeth to cure his obstinacy, when by the intervention
of some great personages this cruelty, unworthy of one of the Persian
royal family, was abandoned. T h e Athar Bashi, however, soon
arrived to offer himself as an hostage in the place of Yar Uohamed,
who returned to Herat ; but the vizier not having sent the prince
the ransom which he had consented to pay to save his life, the
Athar Bashi was placed in great danger : the death of Abbas
Mirza, which took place towards the close of the year 1833,
facilitated his release, xhich he succeeded in obtaining at the cost
of 10001. paid to those who had charge of him. I-Ie also promised
to send them a similar sum when he reached H a a t , but this he of
course took very good care not to do.
The intrigues of the English at the court of Feth Ali Shah to
prevent the expedition against Herat from being carried out, only
partially succeeded ; the troops were occupied in reducing the
small fortresses still unsubdued of Khorassan, and two years
elapsed between the period at which they reached Meshed, and
the time when Mohamed Mirza, the eldest son of the hereditary
prince of Persia, encamped under the walls of Herat with a corps
cl'nrmh to effect a preliminary investment of the place. This
was to be succeeded by a regular siege on the arrival of the rearguard under the command of his father, but Mohamed Mirza hacl
scarcely pitched his tcnts under the city walls when he heard of
the death of Abbns Mirza, in consequence of which he raised
his camp, and retreated on 3Iesl1ed.
When Yar Mohamed escaped from the Persians he retook, and
with a strong hand, the reins of government : nevcrtheless his vigilance could not prevent the revolt of the nornade po1)ulation in some
of the districts situated in the north and east of the principality ;
blit, an active general as 'well as a clever politician, he marched
without delay 'against the rebels, and subdued them with as much
promptitude as vigour. H e subsequently led his troops southward,

.
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and made Kamran's authority respected in all the Seistan. After
this he returned to Herat, and continued to take a firm course in
furtherance of his secret designs.
Towards the close of the year 1834 an Indian Mussulman, who
had been a sergeant in the East India Company's service, came to
Herat, and offered his services to the Shah Kammn, which the
- vizier accepted, and from this time the infantry, till then held
in little estimation there, was drilled, though very indifferently,
on the European system.
Taking advantage also of a few years' peace which ensued after
the retreat of the Persians, Yar Mohamed repaired the fortifications
of the city, which in consequence of the numerous assaults they had
sustained were partly in ruins. EIe created villages, invited the
populations from a distance to settle in them and cultivate the
land lying untilled or unredaimed, and would have done a t that
time what he did at a later pcriod, encouraged industry and commerce, and cleared the roads of myriads of robbers who had
'infested them, but such measures would then have injured his
own interests. I t is true that he governed, but Shah Kamran
reigned, and he had the tact to make the odinm of the plundering and discontent on the part of the people, fall upon the king,
while he managed to secure to himself all the praise of whatever was good. If from the moment of hie elevation to the post of
vizier he was remarkable for those qualities which are with di5culty
found united in an Afghan, he was nevertheless not exempt from the
vices of his countrymen. During the entire reign of the Shah
Kamran he was as avaricious, cruel, and implacable as it is possible
for an Afghan to be ; but unfortunately this is frequently necessary
with people of this nation, though in his extortions and sanguinary
executions he was not always guided by any regard for the
public weal : his ambition on such occasions was concealed
under a veil of devotion which he affected to feel for his.prince
and his country, and the serdars, who aere not his dupes, were
continually on the alert to overthrow 'him, but without the least
success.
Amongst the numerous revolts which he had to repress, that
which broke out a t the commencement of 1837 gave him the most
serious uneasiness. I t was headed by the same Syud Mir Sedik
Khan, Berduranee, who had surrendered the town of Herat to the
Shah Kamran when he was dethroned by the Serdar Moustapha
N
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Khan ; but less fortunate on this occasion, Mir Sedik, having failed
in his enterprise, was taken and executed. The unfortunate Syud
had entered into this conspiracy with the full knowledge and consent of the king, who, beginning to perceive that his vizier was
more powerful than himself, and even restricted his personal liberty,
was anxious to throw off the shackles which impeded the freedom
of his actions. Rut he did not dare to strike openly, and it was
actually the Shah himself who in a drunken fit revealed the plot
t o Yar Mohamed, and thus caused the death of Mir Sedik Khan
as well as that of many other chiefs who were completely devoted
to him.
After this occurrence the vizier removed from the court such
of the king's advisers as mere attached to him, and by degrees
replaced them by his own creatures. H e preserved to the Shah all
the external appearances of respect and obedience, but he found a
thousand ways of eluding his orders and his wishes when they mere not
in accordance with his own views ; and in fact he did as he pleased.
Shah I h m r a n , warned by his wives, his sons, and other relatives,
who detested the vizier, at length perceived clearly where all this
mould end, but there was not one spark of that feverish ambition
remaining in him which caused the death of Fethi Khan. T h e
state of drunkenness in which he continually lived paralyzed all
his energy, and he never seriously attcmpted to deliver himself
from the tyranny which his minister imposed upon him. H e readily
gave his consent, it is true, to a secret league formed by a powerful
party to overthrow Yar Rilohamed, a conspiracy a t the head 'of
which were his own sons; but he withheld h3s co-operation on ~ w o
or three occasions at. the very moment when his minister was to
have been put an end to, and at length finished by discovering the
plot to him himself. Yar Xohamed disposed of the chiefs who
had formed these intrigues, and punished the sons of his sovereign
by reducing to a very small sum the allowance which they received
from the state.
Such was the situation of affairs a t Herat, when towards the close
of the year 1837 Mohamed Shah, King of Persia, again laid
siege to that capital, and took up the idea which his grandfather
Feth Ali Shah had entertained, of adding this province to his dominions ; and this desire was all the more intense, inasmuch as he
considered that he was bound in honour to recommence asiege which
the death of his father Abbas Mirza had alone induced him to
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abandon before he had even fired a shot. The execution of this
project was highly satisfactory to the Russian government, for it
admitted the validity of the Shah's claims upon I-Ierat, and found
independently of these many other legitimate and powerful motives
for approving of the expedition undertaken by that monarch.
Amongst them was the refusal of Shah Kamran to liquidate the
arrears of tribute which he had pledged himself to pay, and the
sums of money taken by his vizier from several Persian caravans
travelling through his territory. T h e English, who had done
everything in their power to prevent the first expedition against
Herat from being carried out, opposed the second in a still more
decided manner; but as the consequences connected with this
event were of so grave a nature that we cannot treat them summarily, we will enter at a later period into the details of the
varioils phases through which it passed. I n the mean while
we ]nust retrace our steps a little to give some account of what
happened in Kandahar, Kabul, and Cashmeer after Shah Mahmood
and his son Kamran had been driven from Afghanistan proper.
Once master of Kabul, the Serdar Mohamed Azim Khan, who,
on the death of the vizier Fethi Ehan, became the oldest surviving
son of Payendeh Khan, reunited the scattered remains of the
Afghan army, and re-established security and order; but his
brother the Nawab Djabbar Khan, by whom he was represented in
the government of Cashmeer, had great difficulty in escaping the
snares set for him by Runjeet Sing, and in suppressing the revolts
which arose from the intrigues of his clever and powerful neighbour.
His other brother, Rahim dil Khan, had been obliged to fly from
Shikapoor immediately after the death of Fethi Ehan to escape
from the Beloochees, whom Shah Shooja, who had hurried from
India, had induced to revolt against him.
Poor dil Khan had remained master of Kandahar, but not
thinking himself suficiently strong to maintain his power as
sovereign, and having no hope of receiving any succour from
Mohamed Azim Ehan, who had quite enough to do in Kabul, he
sent his brother Kohendil Khan to Shikapoor, to propose certain
terms to Shah Shooja, which, if accepted, would lead to his restoration to the throne of his ancestors. This prince insisted that
the sons of Payendeh Khan assembled at Kandahar should swear
on the Koran that they were sincere in their devotion to his person,
and after having obtained this pledge he proceeded to thak city,
N 2
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from whence he wrote to Moharned Azim Khan to claim his rights
over Kabul and Peshawur. Mohamed Azim having given in
writing, a similar declaration to that of his brothers, and sent it to
the Shah, Shooja set off imlnediately to join him at Peshawur
where he then was, and Poor dil Khan accampanied him with a
strong escort. Mohamed -4zim Khan was in perfect good faith
when he consented to the restoration of Shooja-ool-Moolk, for his
position was not less embarrassing than that of Poor dil Khan,
and he had very great difficulty in maintaining his authority over
the northern provinces of the kingdom. Foreseeing well that the
divisions whkh had crept in between his brothers would lead, ere
long, to the loss of the sovereign power in his family, he thought
that the only may of consolidating the influence of the Mohameclzyes was to call in a S ~ t d d o z ~prince,
e
whom they would place
like a puppet on the throne, and preserve for themselves all the
executive power. The restoration of Shah Shooja was therefore to
be effected on this basis and understanding; but such a mode of
proceeding was by no means satisfactory to that prince, whose
imperious and absolute character had not been softencd in exile,
and who wished to ascend the throne without making any conditions, or entering into any engagement, either with individue,L1s or
the people at luge. Mohamed Azim Khan, thinking that he might
bring the king to admit as sacred the right of his fa,mily to the
first ofices in the state, re-established him on the throne, and this in
spite of the knowledge that he had of his intractable character.
But Shooja, without taking any account of the ulterior consequences of his conduct, manifested almost from the outset liis
arrogance without disguise ; he treated Mohamed Azim Khan
and Poor dil Khan as rebels, took offence because one of their
cousins used a palanquin, and ordered that for the future this honour
should be reserved for the princes of the Suddozye family alone.
Mohamed Azim and his brothers exhausted all the powers of
argument that could be dictated by consideration and wisdom to
induce Shah Shooja to listen to reason, but, finding him immovable
in his absolute views, they would not permit him to proceed to
Kabul ; the prince therefore left the camp, situated thirty-five
miles from Peshawur, and retired within the walls of that, town,
with a small body of Sikhs who had attached themselves to his
person, to which were added a thousand Afghans of the discontented tribe of the Mohamedzyes. Mohamed Azim Khan, des-
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perate at having created fresh difficulties for himself by thus
recalling Shah Shooja, immediately laid siege to Peshaw.ur with all
his army. The prince could not hope to hold the place for any
length of time ; nevertheless, he defended himself, hut was eventually obliged to evacuate the town sooner than he had expected.
His magazine took fire and destroyed all his munitions of war ;
two hundred of his men were killed by the explosion; and an
enormous breach was made in the city wall, which opened an easy
passage for the troops of Mohamed Azim.
Obliged to make a precipitate retreat, the Shah managed to
.reach Shikapoor, whene the Emirs of Scinde consented to receive
him. Sir Alexander Burnes states that they ceded the place to
A series of intrigues set on foot by his enemies
him and adds,--"
expelled him even from' this retreat, and he fled by the circuitous
route of the desert of Jaysalmere to Loodiana. The conduct of.
Shah Shooja was ill-calculated to support his falling fortunes : he
,forgot the dignity of a monarch in low intrigues with his subjects,
in which he tarnished their honour as well as his own. T h e
fitness of Shooja-ool-Moolk for the situat.ion of sovereign seems
ever to have been doubtful. His manners and address are highly
polished, but his judgment does not rise above mediocrity."
I n the year 1819 Mohamed Azim Khan gave way to the representations of-Eyoob Mirza, another son of Timoor Shah, who came
to his camp, and promised him that, if the Khan would place him
on the throne, he would appoint him his vizier, and give him all
the power, having no other ambition than that of perpetuating
the possession of the throne of the Afghans to the descendants of
the great Shah Ahmed, and to see money strack in his o m
I n short," remarks the author of the work we have just
name.
quoted, " Eyoob said, ' Make me but king and permit money to
be coined in my name, and the whole power and resources of
the kingdom may rest with yourself; my ambition will be satisfied
with bread and the title of king.' These conditions were accepted,
nor did this puppet monarch ever violate or attempt to infringe
the terms by which he had gained the name and trappings of
royalty, but continued a tool in the hands of Azim Khan,
who was nominally his vizier. So degraded was now the state of
the Royal house of Kabul, that the very robe of honour with which
the minister was installed into the viziership of the empire, was a
portion of his own property, and had been sent privately to the
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Shah, who conferred it on the vizier with all the pomp and
display of royalty. Several of the young princes who aspired to
the throne were delivered over to Eyoob and put to death."
Eyoob kept therefore the promise which he had made to Azim
Khan, even beyond what he had permitted himself to hope. T h e
Afghans will have in their kings activity, courage, and energy of
character, but Eyoob was distinguished only by nullity the most
complete : he thought of nothing but himself, and yet he could not
escape the fatality which seemed to pursue the sons of Timoor
Shah. Some letters which he wrote to his brothers Shah Mahmood and Shah Shooja having been intercepted, Mohamed Azim
drove him out of Kabul, and put his brother Sultan Ali Mirza to
death, as he appea~edto have encouraged the king in breaking
the pact which united him with the Mohamedzyes.
This would seem to indicate that Eyooh, in giving up so readily
the royal authority, obeyed from necessity rather than choice,
and without doubt only waited for a favourable opportunity to
obtain it ; but be that as it may, neither plan succeeded. A t the
same period at which Sultan Ali Mirza was put*to death at Kabul
by Azim IChan, another brother of that prince, Mohamed Murad
Mirza, fell under the sword of Kohendil Khan at Eandahar, for a
reason similar to that which had led to the fa11 of Eyoob.
For several years past the affairs of government had weighed
heavily upon Mohamed Azim Khan ; the order he established
after having driven Shah Shooja from Peshawur had, after the
dismissal of Shah Eyoob, again given place to agitation :the public
mind was to be qnieted; the serdars mere to be satisfied or put
down to procure tranquillity for the ltingdom, and that was not an
easy thing to accomplish. Mohamed Azim Khan in his desire to
smooth all these difficulties wished to proceed with some degree of
regularity ; he commenced therefore by marching against the
Sikhs, who, since they had occupied Attok, had taken possession of
some of the Afghan territory which surrounded it, and began to
be very unpleasant neighbours to the Dooranees.
T h a t remarkable man Runjeet Sing, profiting by the enfeebled
state ,to which so many troubles had reduced the Afghans, !had
taken from them in succession Attok, Mooltan, Derrehghazee
Khan, Leya, and Cashmeer. Nawab Djabbar Khan, the governor
of this last province, had been forced to evacuate it, and suffered
great loss in effecting his retreat ; the Sikh troops had eves pursued
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him to the right bank of the Indus, and at one time menaced
Peshavur. Eight thousand of Runjeet's soldiers, under the command of Boodh Sing, had also just made, from weak entrenchments
hastily thrown up, an heroic defence against a population of fifty
thousand Afghans. The Sikhs, up to this time enslaved, proved
by these brave deeds of arms that their nationality had boldly
developed itself; they felt the necessity of constituting themselves
a separate and compact power ;and as this first and sudden impulse
of the natural genius of this people might become fatal to their
neighbou~,there was not a moment to lose in repulsing such
formidable adversaries. Azim Khan therefore marched a body
of troops towards the quarter that was threatened; but though
they obtained marked and somewhat numerous advantages over
Runjeet, they were not able to force him to recross the Indus,
which on his invasion of the Afghan territory his cavalry had
passed by swimming at a spot where there was no ford-a feat
unheard of before in the annals of war in that country.
3!!oliamecl Azim Rhan had endeavoured to rouse the fanatical
feelmgs of his soldiers by proclaiming a holy war, but, not having
been able Co arrest the success of this modern Porus by that device,
he was obliged to march in person against him. The Sikh and
Afghan armies met a t Noochero in 1822, the latter being divided
into two corps by the Kabul river. The vizier Azim Rhan had
conceived his plan of operations very badly : for he and the greater
part of his brothers were on the southern side of the river with the
second division, which it was impossible to move to the support of
the first when it was attacked in person by the whole of Runjeet's
forces. Nevertheless it sustained the fight valiantly : the infantry,
posted on an eminence, and protected by several pieces of cannon,
received the onset of the Sikhs without flinching, and repulsed four
successive charges which they made with the whole of their cavalry ;
it was only when a fifth was given that the Afghans were obliged
to fall back, and with the loss of their guns-Runjeet conducted
this charge in person, and brought up the whole of his reserves.
Mohamed Azim Khan and his brothers were spectators of
this sad disaster without the power, as it is said, of being able
to remedy it ; a oircumstance which seems incomprehensible,
for the runaways found no difficulty in crossing the river and
rejoining them, as did likewise a corps of Sikhs who pursued them.
How then did it happen that Azim Khan could not do the same ?
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But supposing the Afghan general had committed this first error, i t
was easy for him to repair it by attacking the Sikhs in their passage
of the river, which he did not do ; the fact was,his heart failed him,
and he took to flight. His apologists have endeavoured to justify
his retreat by saying that it was caused by the shouts that were
heard in the Sikh camp on the night preceding the battle, which
led Azim Khan to believe they had received large reinforcements. But even if this version of the aflair was correct, the
error, not to say stnpidity, of allowing the Sikhs to cross the .river
without making any attempt to stop them, is not the less great ;
besides, it may always be said that the Afghan general did not
advance merely to retreat, but to fight, and that he might a t least
have saved his guns and his baggage which he abandoned. The
Sikhs, taking advantage of the panic that seized their adversaries,
marched on Peshawur, of which they took possession, and destroyed
the citadel.
T h e right bank of the Indus remained'in the power of the Sikhs
after the battle of Noochero, and Peshawur was an advanced post
over which Runjeet reserved the right of suzerainty. H e g a w
the government to Sultan Mohamed Khan, one of the brothers of
Azim Khan, enforcing a small tribute, hoping by this means to
increase the disunion amongst the sons of Payendeh Khan, and
turn it to greater account.
Mohamed Azim Khan, overwhelmed by all these reverses, and
suffering from the effects of a wound which, from his habits of
drinking, had become very irritated, left the army, the temporary
command of which he gave to his brother Dost Mohamed Khan,
and took the road to Kabul, where he hoped to recover; but this
hope was never realized, for he had not sufficient strength left to
reach the city, and died a t the village of Latu-bend about two
days' journey from the capital. For some time past he had felt
convinced his end was approaching, and hastened to collect all his
wealth, which amounted to 2,700,0001.*
Azim Khan left this
enormous sum to his son Habib Ullah Khan, and a few hours
before his death he made him swear to employ it and his life in
revenging his father's defeat and the misfortunes of hi country.
T h e character of the vizier Mohamed Azim Khan has been
estimated very differently by different persons according as they
were partizans of the Suddozyes or the Mohamedzyes, but the

* I learnt this from Kohendil

Khan, hia sons, and his brother.-Ferrier.
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of impartial individuals in Afghanistan are of opinion that
he was a man of moderate abilities, and not equal to his mission ;
that he was wanting in firmness ; that his military talents were of
a mediocre character; and that his love of wine and ardent spirits
was so great that he had the commalid of his faculties but for a
very short time during the twenty-four hours. H e was, however,
gentle, conciliating, and showed great urbanity of disposition.

CI-IAPTER XIV.
Proceedings of Habib Ullah Khan -Divisions between the sons of Payendeh
Khan- Hahib Ullab I a a n at war mith his uncles -Poor dil Khan interferes
in Kabul -Union of Soltan Mohamed and Dost Mohamed Khans -Shere dil
Khan and Poor dil Khan establish peace between their brothers - Dost' Mohamed
~ a i nat variance- His rivalry mith Sultan Nohamed-That
prince at
P e s h a m r - Sir A. Burnes'a opinion of him - Kantlahar -Pow dil Khan and
Shere dil K h n -Character of the latter-Sir A. Bumes's opinion of the
Kand.ahar chiefs - Character of Dost Mohamed -Sir A. Burnes's opinion of him.

I-IABIB
ULLAHEEAX
had sworn to his dying father that he would
take no rest until he had exterminated the Sikhs, but his courage did
not correspond with his promise; it is true he continued the war,
but without energy ; and it was only by the power of money that
he was euabled to maintain for a short time his troops in obedience.
Brutalized by his passion for drink, a vice which he inherited from
his parent, he felt very little for the misfortunes of his country.
His mother endeavoured, but in vain, to stimulate his zeal, and
lead him to appreciate more honourable sentiments; but he
remained deaf to her solicitations, This apathy in their chief
discouraged the inferior officers, who by degrees abandoned him,
while the serdars and his uncles neglected the national defence
and interests to quarrel for power amongst themselves. From this
period the sons of Payendeh Khan were more disunited than even
the Suddozyes, and rushed into a number of little wars which continued during several years, until a few of them had succeeded in
definitively establishing themselves in the Afghan principalities.
Ballrh, Khulm, Koondooz, and Badalishane had shaken off the yolie
since the fall of Shah Zeman, and governed themselves. As to
Scinde, Shah Shooja was the last of the Afghan Icings who received
trihute from that country, and after his disasters the Talpoora
Emirs considered themselves as completely independent.
Hahib Ullah had scarcely exercised his power six mouths when,
his money being spent, all consideration for him was a t an end ; in
Kabul he had only a mere shadow of authority remaining, and that
was soon disputed by his uncles. As to Sultan Mohamed Khan,
who had been made governor of Peshawur by Runjeet, he was not
satisfied with the small revenues of that province, which he was
obliged to share with his two brothers, Pir Mohamed Khan and
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Syud Mohamed Khan. Dost Mohamed Ehan had made a party
for himself, and resided at Ghuznee.
The army of I-Iahib Ullah Khan, considerably weakened by
desertion, was not in a condition to measure its strength with those
of his uncles united. Aware of this, he sent his brother Akrem
Khan to Kandahar to represent to their uncle Poor dil Khan the
danger there would be to him if he permitted his brothers Sultan
and Dost Mohamed Khan, who then had the reputation of being
ambitious and restless characters, to acquire an influence in his
neiglrbourhood superior to his own, for it might lead to their
creating disturbances in the principality of Kanclahnr, and possibly
end in their taking it from him if he was not upon his guard ;
Alcrem Khan also sent him a few of their letters which had
been intercepted, and in which such intentions had been clearly
manifested.
Poor dil Khan, alarmed a t the danger which menaced him,
sent his brother Shere dil Khan to Kabul a t the head of a few
thousand men, and this serdar met Dost Mohained Khan on the
road, beat, and forced him to retire upon Jellalabad, and then
proceeded to Kabul. There, however, instead of giving any .
assistance to his nephew Habib Ullah Khan, he deposed him,
plundered him of his riches under a threat of killing him, and united
the remnants of his army with his own. T h e vanquished chief by
way of consolation now plunged into every kind of debauch, and
eontinued to reside at Kabul, where he still lives in a miserable
plight, given up to excesses of the most filthy kind. Akrem Khan,
his younger brother, died after his return to Kandahar ; he was a
brave and resolute man, and no friend to ambitious characters: his
death was supposed to have talcen place from the effects of poison.
When Sultan Mohamed Khan and Dost Mohamed Khan saw
the turn affairs had taken at Kabul, they put a stop for a time to
the fratricidal war they had carried on since the death of Azim
Khan, and united their forces with a view of seizing that province.
They then marched against their brother Shere dil Khan, who a t
their approach retired within the walls of the Bala Hissar, not
having sufficient troops to meek them in the field. Here he had
great difficulty in maintaining himself during the winter of 1825.
T h e season was very severe ;the roads were covered with snow, and
impassable ;and it was only in the spring, and after he had been
five months besieged, that Poor dil Khan could bring him reinforcements from Kandahar. Directly these arrived thky attacked
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Sultan Moha~nedand Dost Xohamed, and defeated them after
a most sanguinary struggle. Nevertheless, these serdnrs did not
consider their cause a hopeless one, and again prepared to try the
fortune of war, when Poor dil Khan, by a generous resolution.,
stopped the further effusion of blood. H e went almost alone to
the camp of his brothers, and pictured to them all the calamities
which the quarrels and divisions of t,he sons of Payendeh Khan had
brought upon their country. " Let us stand close," said he ; " and
to prove to you to what extent our union is dear to me, I will return
to Eandahar, and abandon Kabul to Sultan Mohamed Khan,
our eldest brother ; but, before I retire, y0~1must swear to me, as
well as all our brothers now present in both camps, that nothing
shall disunite us for the future." This generous proposition was
accepted, and a good understanding reappeared for some time
amongst the members of this heroic family."
But Dost Mohamed Khan took the oath that Poor dil Khan had
exacted only because lie felt convinced that his brothers would never
support him in his resistance, but he felt very angry that Sultan
W h a m e d Khan, who was already in possession of Peshawur, had
been preferred to h i m i s sovereign of Kabul, in contempt. of the
rights that he thought he had acquired by the courage he had
everywhere displayed, and by his great popularity with the
Afghans; and without doubt this chief was the hravest ancl the
most talented politician amongst the brotllers of the vizier Fethi
Khan, and had thus contributed more than any.of them to overthrow the Suddozye family. With him vexation and spite
overruling every other consideration, he foreswore himself and
prepared to carry arms against Sultan Mohamed Ehan ; however,
there was, it is true, a deadly enmity between these two brothers,
which had its origin in a love affair. One of the widows of the
Serdar Azim Khan was a member of the royal family of the
Suddozyes, and, according to the established custom in Afghanistan, was obliged to marry one of the surviving brothers of the
.deceased. Sultan Mohamed Khan, who greatly admired her,
had, in the first instance, some chance of becoming her husband,
and a few conferences had already taken place on this subject,
when Dost Mohamed, who knew how to render his homage acceptable, made his appearance and married the beautiful widow. Sultan
Mohamed Khan never forgave him this outrage, and swore to
mash it out in his blood vhenever an occasion should present itself.
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During the space of two years did Sultan Mohamed and Dost
Jfohamed carry on a merciless mar one against the other, bnt it
terminated in 1826, when Dost Mohamed, victorious on all points,
was enabled to establish definitively his authority a t Kabul.
Mollarned Khan, Beyat, a serdar of the Euzzilbashes, gave him his
support in consequence of the blood relationship which united
them. His sister was the mother of Dost Molramed Khan ; and
without the support of the Euzzilbash chief the Dost would haye
had great difficulty in obtaining this triumph over his opponent,
who was assisted by the Sikhs.
Sultan Mohamed Khan, thus thrown back upon Peshawur, had
also the annoyance of finding himself more and more brought
under the power of Runjeet Sing. The Maharadja had, up to this
time, been satisfied with receiving a small annual tribute from the
Afghan chief, but, when he saw that Sultan Mohamed was beaten
by the Dost, he demanded that one of his sons should be delivered
up to him as a hostage, and reside a t Lahore. I t would have been
easy for Sultan Mohamed to escape this difficulty by becoming
reconciled to Dost Mohamed Khan, who was quite willing to receive
his advances, and had even taken the initiative in this respect ; but
Sultan Nohamed thought it preferable to persevere in the hatred
he felt to his brother, and made his complete submission to the
Sikhs-the sworn enemies of his country and of his religion.
I was not able to reach Peshawur myself, and could not therefore judge of the state of this province or collect any information
respecting the manner in which it was governed by Sultan Mohamed
Ehan, but I will supply such information by giving some passages
from the work of Sir A. Burnes, who visited that city in 1832.
" T h e government of Peshawur has been held by a member of
the Barukzye family since Futteh E h a n placed Shah Mahmood on
the throne of Kabul. Yeshawur owed allegiance and contributed
to the support of the kingdom till the year 1818, when the vizier
was put to death. Azim Khan, his successor, exacted tribute for
it during his lifetime i n the name of Eyoob Shah. Since that time
it has formed a separate chiefship like Kabul and Eandahar, now
subject, however, to the payment of a yearly tribute to the Sikhs.
I t is governed by the Serdar Sultan Mohamed Khan, who shares
its revenues with two other brothers, Pir and Syud Mohanled
Khan. A large portion of the country is alienated to different
individuals, and the net revenue falls short of nine lacs of rupees
per annum. The younger brothers enjoy three lacs, and-the chief
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defrays from the remainder the entire expenses of the country, the
~ numerous
~
families of
tribute to the Sikhs, and likewise S U F ~ Othe
two elder brothers, who fell in battle and to whom he succeeded.
" T h e power of the chief is confined to the plain of Peshawur,
and the hills of Kohat, which form its southern boundary. That
plain is well known as one of the richest portions of the Kabul
dominions. I t is of a circular shape, about thirty-five miles broad,
highly peopled and cultivated, watered by nature and art. Within
this limited space there are numerous villages which pay no taxes.
T h e Khuttuks, a tribe of Afghans in the cast, hold the country for
twenty miles west of the Indus for the small sum of 12001. annually,
which they render to the chief of Peshawur. T h e villages on the
west, and the Ehyber hills, do not pay anything ; and those north
of the Kabul river, witn some few exceptions, enjoy a like immunity.
T h e only places of note in the chiefship are Peshawur and Hushtnuggur, which are described by Mr. Elphinstone. Peshawur has
fallen into a state of decay with its change of rulers, and it is
doubtful if it boasts of a population of one half the hundred
thousand souls which occupied it in 1809. Hushtnuggur is the
seat of one of the younger brothers ; Eohat is held by the other.
T h e military strength of Peshawur is unimportant. Its contingent
of troops cannot be rated above 3000, two-thirds of whom may be
cavalry. T h e chief might rally round him a numerous body of
irregulars, or, as they are called, ' ooloosee ;' but they are badly
anned, and not to be relied upon. Six pieces of artillery, and
two hundred regular infantry, complete the power of the chief of
Peshawur. W i t h money the services of the Khyberees, and other
hill tribes, may be purchased on an emergency ; but the chief has
no treasury. I n a religious war with the Sikhs, an infuriated
population may be always raised, and has proved itself formidable
on a late occasion, when the Syud Ahrned preached his crusade in
this country ; yet the whole of these combined form a diminutive
force, as compared with his neighbours on the east and westthe Sikhs, and his brother of Kabul. The political influence of
Peshawur is as limited as its military power. The Sikhs have
exacted a tribute from it since the death of the vizier's brother,
Azim Khan, and retain a son of the chief as a hostage for its fulfilment. I t now amounts to sixty horses, with son~erice, which is
pecu1ia.r to Peshawur; and it is annually enforced by an army
which crosses the Indus, and lays waste their territories if not
speedily paid. T h e amount of the tribute depends on the caprice
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of Ru"jeet Sing, but the Sikhs will not make a conquest of
this country. Without Mahommedan auxiliaries they could not
retain it.*
u The chiefs of Peshawur and Kabul, who are brothers, are a t
enmity. T h e power of Kabul is far more consolidated than that
of Peshawur, but the latter'has an ally in his brother of Kandahar,
who would resent any attack either on Peshawur or his own cou1ntry.t
The chiefs of Peshawur and Kandahar have been some time past
concerting an attack on Kabul ; but it is not improbable that the
territories #of both may ere long be threatened, and perhaps taken,
by the Khan of Kabul. In such an event, the chief of Peshawur
woulik call in the aid of the Silrhs. This would probably be given,
since Dost Mohamed of Kabul would never consent to the annual
tribute now paid to Lahore by his brother of Peshawur. Serdar
Sooltnn Mohamed Khan entertains hopes of being able to interest
the British Government in his cause should it decliue. No chief
,in the kingdom of Kabul entertains a higher respect for the
British Government than Sooltan Moharned ~ h a b . This has
always been shorn by his attention t o Europeans who have entered
his cour!try. If misfortunes fell upon him, he might be a useful or
a dangerous partisan. H e might espouse the cause of the King
Shah Shooja-ool-Moollr ;though that monarch is no favourite with
his family ; yet the inconsistency and inconstancy of the Afghan
chiefs are yroverbial. I n any dificulty the chief of Peshawur
would be ably assisted by Fir Mohamed, but his other brother is
destitute of energy and enterprise. The whole of the Barukzye
family $ entertain a dread of Shah Shooja-001-Moolk, and the Prince
Kamran of Herat. The one, if aided by the British, would drive
them from their usurped authority ; and the other, if assisted by the
Persians, might perhaps fix himself on the throne of his ancestors.
Sooltan Mohamed Khan bears a fair reputation, but his government is most oppressive and vexatious. His agents and underlings
practise all manner of exactions ; goods are taxed far above their
value ; and the currency is constantly altered and depreciated.
An enormous tax is levied on the water-mills which grind the flour,

* Burnee is not quite accurate here, being dead, Kohendil Rhan governed
for Peahawur w a actually invaded by Kandahar when I visited that city.the Sikhs and governed for a number of Ferrior.
gears by General Avitabile, who was the
$ Burnea should have written Moterror of the Afghan8.-FB-rier.
hamedsye, for Barukzye is the designat Poor dil Khan and Shere dil Khan tion of the entire triba.-Ferrier.
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and it falls heaviest on the lower orders of the people. The chief
is a man about thirty-fire ;he is ambitious, and at one time held
the government of Kabul. H e is well educated, and with good
talents ; possesses an engaging manner, he reads and writes and
transacts his business in person. H e has not the art of settling
disputes, and his court presents a scene of confusion which is
hardly to be described or believed. The complainants intrude at
all times and places, and state their grievances in the most free
and republican manner, yet nothing is ever settled, and the population are heartily disaffected. Like Afghans, the chief of Peshawur
and his relatives live from hand to mouth ; they are liberal of
what they possess, and have no ~ e a l t h . I have been informed that.
they could not retain their government without this open-handed
liberality. The chief of Peshawur has rallied round him some of
the most celebrated of the Dooranee nation, who share his bounty.
T h e sons of Altram Khan, and the Moolrhtar o Doula, Shah
Shooja's two ministers, a8 also one of the celebrated Mir Weis, are
among the number ; the lat.kr is an officer of the chief of Peshawur.
The only son of the Vizier Futteh Khan likewise resides with Sultan
Mohamed Khan." *
I t has been stated that ~ a n d a h i rhad fallen into the hands
of one of the Moharuedzyes, namely, the Serdar Poor dil Khan,
immediately after the death of the Vizier Fethi Khan. This serdar
had, like Sultan Mohamed Khan,. divided his 'principality into
several districts which he had given to his half-brothers, Shere dil
Khan, Kohendil Khan, RLthim dil Khan, and Mir clil Khan.
Shere dil Khan, who had the reputation of being the bravest and
the most enterprising of the surviving sons of Yayendeh Khan, had
received from his brother. the command-in-chief of the army of
Kandahar. Unfortunately this energetic man died while still
young, in 1829 ; a few months after, his brother Poor dil Khan
followed him to the tomb, and the power then reverted to their
next eldest brother, Kohendil Khan. Such had been the paternal
and enlightened administration of Poor dil Khan, that his successor,
on whom the Randaharians had founded the same hopes, was by
general acclamation placed at the head of affairs. I t would appear,
however, by the following extract from Sir A. Burnes's work, that these
hopes were not realized; for this is the opinion of that officer
respecting the government of Kohendil Khan :4

This serdar has left him, and has long resided at Kmdahar.-Ferrier.
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- 16It has been already mentioned that Shere dil Khan
fled from
Kabul to Kandahar, and fornled the present chiefship with the
spoil of his nephew. H e was a man of singular habits, in some
respects resembling his brother Futteh Khan, but morose as well
as cruel. They give an anecdote of his lopping off the finger of
one of his boys, telling him a t the same time, if he cried, that he
could not be his child or a Barukzye. The young fellow bore it
with great ptience. Shere dil Khan in his flight to Kandahar
was accompanied by four brothers. H e himself is since dead, as
also one of his brothers. Kanclahar is now governed by Kohendil Khan, supported by his two surving brothers, Rahim dil
and Mehr dil. The revenues amount to about eight lacs of
rupees ; his force consists of 9000 horse and six pieces of artillery ;
but as the city is situated in the heart of the nooranee country,
and near. the native seat of the Barukzye family, he could perhaps
increase his cavalry on an cmergency.
"The government is not popular, nor would it appear from the
acts of' oppression that it deserved to be so. T h e chief is on bad
terms with most of his neighbours. I n common with all his family,
he is inimical to Kaniran of Herat, and has a t different times
attempted to seize that city. He is also a t issue with the chief of
Kabul. T h e connesion between the Peshawur and Kandahar
branches of the Rarultzyes is very close and secure ; but their
united efforts will not, in all probability, injure their brother of
Kabul. The Kandahar chief also seeks to form a settlement on
the Indus; and has for several years past sent his troops to
threaten Shikapoor in Scinde. T h e Ameers of that country have
been hitherto able to resist his attacks ; but, a s there is an open
and easy commtmication between Kandahar and the Indus by the
Bolan pass, the chief is not likely to discontinue his endeavours in
that quarter. In a disorganized state of Scinde he might easily
possess himself of Shikapoor ; and such a state of events seems by
no means improbable in the country of the Ameers. T h e chief
of Kandahar would gladly interest the ruler of the Punjab in his
cause ; but it is not probable that he will procure his assistance,
as he himself looks upon Shikapoor with an eye of cupidity."

* Gurnes apprars to .hnve thought
that Sbere dil Khan was the sovereign
of I<nndahar; and this is notsurprising,
for Poor dil Khan gave up to him the
entire direotion of affairs, and the
A f g h m considered him as their chief

tle facto ; but Poor clil Khan enjoyed by
right the prerogatives of a sovereign,
which were never contested by his
brothers, and Shere dil Khan died
without ever having positively reigned.
-Fen+er.
0
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After having endeavoured to shorn the manner in which the
principalities of Herat, Peshawur, and Ihndahar were constituted
subsequcntly to the dismemberment of thc kingdom of the Suddozyes,
i t is desirable that we shouid throw a glance at ICabul, the most
wealthy and important of the Afghan provinces ; and let us in the first
instance commence with its chief, Dost Mohamed Khan, who came
forth victorious in 182 G from his conflict with Sultan Mohamed Khan.
Dost Mohamed was the favourite byother of the Vizier Fethi
Khan, and this predilection was not the 'effect of chance ; but in
spite of the good qualities which were remarkable in the young and
intrepid chieftain, he was certainly not exempt from the ordinary
vices of the Afghans, though di~tinguishedfrom them by superior
intelligence and courage, which manifested itself in many heroic
deeds when he was still a very young man. His manners were
polished and attractive, and one felt irresistibly drawn towards
him. T h e preference evinced for him by Fethi Khan obtained
him the hatred of his brothers ; nevertheless they affected to be
anxious to pay their court to him to please the vizier, but when
a n opportunity offered never failed secretly to play him some
shabby trick. Dost Mohamed was not one to be made their dupe,
but not wishing to irritate them he took no trouble to conceal
his actions, and repaid them in kind a hundredfold for the evil
he receifed ; this increased their hatred, which gave him very little
concern, for, though brave soldiers, his brothers were far from
possessing his capacity and resolution, and in the quarrels which
ensued between them and him he was sure to have the upper hand.
T h e success which crowned all the projects of the Dost, and the
tenacity with which he met these misunderstandings with his
brothers, had procured him the sobriquet of Gurkek (the little
wolf), a name by which he is distinguished amongst them at the
present day. They were very ncarly all opposed to him when he
vished to seize upon Icabul, and yet he triumphed over all their
intrigues, and defeated them every time they came to blows.
Directly his power was consolidated in the principality, he occupied
himself in healing the wounds which so many intestine wars and
revolts had inflicted on the country, and it soon felt the vivifying
and paternal influences of his government. I t is true that the
small portion of the kingdom which had fallen to him did not
allow of his raising a large army and subduing all the other
provinces which had detached themselves from Kabul, like the
Vizier Fethi Khan, but the finest prize in Afghanistan was still
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within his grasp ; he had the good sense to be satisfiedwith it, and,
instead of taking his revenge against his jealous and ambitious
brothers, by dispossessing them of what they had, which he might
easily have done, he preferred to leave them in quiet enjoyment of
their conquests, and occupied himself in malting order, security,
and abundance in his own territory succeed to the disasters of war
and the conv~ilsivethroes of revolution, Elis justice and equity
were admitted by all, and he repressed violence without mercy from
whatever side it arose. The rock upon which all the Afghan sovereign~had made shipwreck up to this time was the insubordinat.ion
of the serdars, who, having the power a ~ l dinfluence over the warlike
portion of the population, and possessing very productive fiefs which
considerably lessened the revenues of the state, took advantage of
these circumstances to agitate the public mind, and to change the
sovereign as it suited their fancy; but the Dost soon niade it clear
to them, and'at their cost, that it was as difficult as it was dangerous for them to endeavour to throw off their allegiance to him.
Without evincing any want of generosity, he obliged them to
moderate their tyrannical conduct towards their dependants, and
lend their support to the development of commerce and agriculture, which he was anxious to improve amongst a people so
idle, as well as to engender in their minds sentiments of a humane
character. The great families submitted unwillingly in the first
instance to this state of things ; but they thought that it was
better to bend to a monarch who was generous, than to attempt
revolts the issue of which must be at the least uncertain, and
which might again place tbem under the insecure and cruel
despotism of the Suddozyes. But we have seen how Sir A.
Burnes estimated the characters of the two brothers a t Peshawur
and Ihndahar, and it will not be out of place to give here the
parallels which he has drawn between those chiefs and the state of
their dependencies, and Dost Mohamed and the condition of Kabul.
" In the year 1826 Kabul fell into the hands of Dost Mohamed
Khan, the present chief, and a brother of the vizier Futteh Khan.
Since then he has greatly extended and consolidated his power.
H e intrusts the town and dependencies of Ghuznee to a brother,
and admits no one else to share his fortunes. The limits of the
chiefship extend to Hindoo Koosh and Bamian. On the west it
is bounded by the hill country of the Hazarahs; to the south
is Ghuznee, and to the east it stretches half way to Peshawur,
terminating at the garden of Neemla. Much of the country is
0
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mountainous ; i t contains a large proportion of arable land which
is most productive. I t lies along the base of hills, and derives a
richness from the soil washed from them. T h e revenues of Kabul
amount to eighteen lacs of rupees. Its military force is greater
than any among the Afghans, since the chief retains a body of good
horse, ~ v are
h ~well mounted and acc,outred. He has also 2000
infantry, with other auxiliaries, village troops, and a park of fourteen
guns which are well served for a native state. This country is
by nature strong and mountainous, though it has good roads
through it.
'' T h e reputation of Dost Mohamed Khan is made known to a
traveller long before he enters his country, and no one better merits
the high character which he has obtained. H e is unremitting in
his attention to business, and attends daily at the Court-house with
the Kazee-o-Mollahs to decide every cause according to the law.
T h e Koran and its commentaries may not be the standard of legislative excellence ; but this sort of decision is exceedingly popular
with the people, since it fixes a line, and relieves then1 from the,jus
v n p m azrt imynit.u-m of a despot. Trade has received the greatest
encouragement from him, and he has derived his own reward, since
the receipts of the Custom-house of the city have increased
50,000 rupees, and now furnish him with a net revenue of two
lacs per annum. One in forty, i.e. 24 per cent., is the only duty
levied in his territory ; and the merchant may travel without guard
or protection from one frollt,ier to another, an unheard of circumstance in the time of the liings. The chief of Kabul, in his zeal for
orthodox government, has deprived his subjects of the luxury of
wine and spirits as being prohibited by his creed. Tlie enactment
has driven the Jews and Armenians fi-om his comitry, since they
h a d no other means to procure a subsistence. A good Mahommedan ought not to regret the 10:s of such luxuries; but with this
single exception I heard of no cowplaint against the rule of Dost
Mohamed Khan. That chief, in common with many of the Afghan
nation, was addicted in early lifc to wine and its concomitant vices.
H i s prohibition of them may be, therefore, capricious ; but he as
well as his court hold out a bright example to the community. T h e
justice of this chief affords a constant theme of praise to all classes :
the peasant rejoices a t the absence of tyranny ;the citizen at the
safety of his home and the strict municipal regulations regarding
weights and measures ; the merchant a t the equit.y of the decisions
and the protection of his property ; and the soldiers a t the regular
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manner in which their arrears are discharged. A man in power
can have no higher praise. Dost Mohamed Khan has not attained
his fortieth year ; his mother was a Persian, and he has been
trained up with people of that nation, mhich has sharpened'his
understanding, and given him advantages over all his brothers.
One is struck with the intelligence, knowledge, and curiosity which
he displays, as well as his accomplishecl manners and address.
H e is doubtless the most powerful chief in Afghanistan, and may
yet raise himself by his abilities to a much greater rank in his
native country.
c ' The differences which exist between Dost 3lohamed and his
brothers lessen the influence of all parties, and would lay open the
state to intrigue and faction if invaded. 'She family of Barulizye *
have nothing to fear from any otller Afghan tribe, since they
s u r ~ ~ a sall
s in numbers as much as in power.? The chiefs of
Peshawur and Kandahar do not want the wish to injure their
brother of Kabul, but they cannot accomplisl~their purpose. Both
of them have had a footing in Kabul, and l ~ o l rwith envy on the
prosperity of Dost Mol~nmedK h m . Both have emissaries at his
court,, who excite dist~rbance; and both chesish hopes of rooting
out one whom they consider it usurper. T h e task will be found
clifficult, for the chief of Kabul, besides the moderation and justice
which secure him so many friends, enjoys an advantage in his
Persian descent which will prove of material service to him in
adversity. H e holds the warlike clirn of Juwanshire in his interests,
and tilltes every occasion to conciliate this tribe, which has so often
turned the scale in favour of different pretendess to the throne.
H e has acquired their language (the Turkish), and promoted their
interests and wellbeing.
" The Persians of ICabul amount to 12,000 families ; they reside
in a separate quarter of the city, mhich keeps up an esprit tlc c o l p s
among them; it also gives them a knowledge of their power
which may prove s a l u t q or prejudicial to the factions that divide
the country according to circumstances. The state of fear which an
enemy on both sides must inspire has had a bacl effect on Dost
Mohamed Rhan's administration. FVith his o m house as an

* Mohnrned~ye.-Ferric),.
t This is an arror into which B~wnes
has fallen;if it is the family o r branch t o
whichthesonsof PayendehIihanbelonqs
that he refers to, he should have mentioned them aa Nohamedzyes, and that

consists of only four or five thousand
families. If it is the tribe of Barukzye
t o which he nlludes, it is probable that
i t contains 45,000 or 55,000 familes.Fe17.ier.
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object of care, hc is not likely to pursue conquests abroad, or
retrieve the fallen state of Kabul. This alone deters him from
taking Herat, the only province of the kingdom of Afghanistan
nom lleld by a descendant of the royal family, and the Prince
Ramran rules more from tolerance in his enemies than his own
power. H e receives no aid from his countrymen, since the whole of the chiefs of Afghanistan are his enemies, and desire his destruction, in revenge for the assassination of their brother Putteh Khan.
Herat has, therefore, become a dependency of Persia. The town
itself has of late been several times entered by the troops of that
nation, and only spared by the ready tender of money on the part
of its governor." I t was threatened in September, 1633, by the
Prince Royal in person, who made a pecuniary demand, and also
required that the coinage of the city should be struck in the name
of the Ring of Persia. I t is probable that both these requests will
be granted,t since Kamran would gladly hold his power on any
terms. T h e Persians do not appear to contemplate any permanent
settlement in Rerat, since it would incur the expense of retaining
a force that would diminish the tribute now gained from it.
Ramran is said to be in possession of some of the crown jewels of
Kabul, and derives a large revenue from Herat, which is situated
in one of the most fertile countries of the world. By this wealth
he is yet able to retain about his person some of the Afghan chiefs,
and can raisc a body of 4000 or 5000 horse. H e has no political
connexions in any quarter ; but still clings to the hope of being .
able to re-establish the monarchy of his father. H e has the
. character of a cruel and tyrannical man, is destitute of friends, and
odious to his countrymen.
" The same causes which prevented Dost Mohamed from marching
against Herat prevented him also from making some endeavoto wrest Mooltan and Dera Ghazee Khan from the Sikhs. He last .
year made a demonstration against Jellalabad, a district between
Kabul and Peshawur, worth about seven lacs of rupees a year.
H e will probably annex it to his power, but until able to coerce
or subdue either Peshawur or Kandahar, Dost Mohamed Khan
cannot rise above a chief, or be aught than one among many in
Afghanistan. I n the present state of politics in that country he
is nevertheless the most rising man in the Kabul dominions."
* This is an error; the territory has
been entered, but the city not.-Ferrier..
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C H A P T E R XV.

-

Shah Shooja takes u p arms against the Barukzyes Dost Mohamed Khan marches
to the relief of Kandhar-Shah Shooja receives a check - That sovereign is
completely defeated- He retires to K e h t - Sultan 3lohnmed arrives at Kabul
-ivIachinations of that serdar against Dost Moharued Khan -Resolution of
the latter-The Dbst, now elected Emir, marches against. the Sikhs-Defeats
them at Djamrood- Sir A. Burnes at Kabul -The English are hostile to
Dost Mohamed-Sumner's account of the llussisna and the English in Asia
- Mohamed Shah determines to invade HerclC -He is supported by the
Russians.

SUCHwas the state of things when Burnes visited Kabul in 1832.
The result of his opinion, as of my own, which is also that of the
Afghans in general, is that Rohendil Khan, the sovereign of
' I h ~ d a h a r ,had not the same superiority of mind as his brother,
and was far from following in the same steps. The people were
discontented with him, and he might have been reproached,
as well a s Sultan Mohamed Khan, who did not govern a t
Peshamur a whit .better than he did, with sentiments of jealousy and
hostility t o Dost Mohamed, whose enlightened and loyal g o ~ e ~ n rnent they sought t o impede and ridicule in a manner little
honourable to themselves. Ambition is an unfaithful mirror, which
reflects things n~uch leas in their natural aspect than that in
which mankind is pleased to colour characters and personal
interests. With these perverted feelings, Kohendil Khan and
Sultan Mohamed Ii han constantly pursued a. hostile line of conduct towards their brother, who was desirous of being on the best
terms with them; and they accused him, but without the least
reason, of wishing to seize their territories-there
was danger
for them it is true, but this danger was in another quarter.
Sultan Mohamed Khan, already subdued by Runjeet Sing, was
on the eve of being totally overthrown Ly the Maharadja, and, if
Kohendil Khan did not succumb to him first, it was because he
owed his preservation entirely to the generous support which he
received from his brother Dost Mohamed Khan, as we shall now
see.
Shah Shooja-001-Moolk, although often beaten, had not re-

.

200

PROCEEDINGS OF SHAH SHOOJA.

Cna~.XT.

nounced his right to the throne. From the ~ e r i o dat which he was,
for the first time, overthrown by Fethi Khan, he had made eight
attempts to regain it by force of arms ; he failed-but his courage
remained unshaken, and he had succeeded in interest.ing the
Anglo-Indian goverument in his fate. They required a sovereign
i n Afghanistan devoted to their views, but, afraid to assist him
openly, the Governor-General supported his cause with some Sikh
regiments, with which, through his intervention and promises of
concession of territory on the part of Shah Shooja, Runjeet Sing
agreed to furnish the Suddozye prince. This fact has been
proved by the letters of Sir Claude Wade, s t that time political
agent a t Loodiann, which letters were found amongst the baggage
of Shah Shooja-001-Moolli after his defeat ; a good many anlongst
them were addressed to some of the Afghan serdara. The British
agent excited these chiefs to revolt, and assured them that his
government would lrnom how to appreciate the support that they
might give to their legitimate sovereign.
I n January, 1834, Shah Shooja quitted Loodiana; in the month
of May he crossed the Indus, and, in the first instance, seized upon
Sliiliapoor, belonging t o the Emirs of Scinde, but to which he
laid claim. R e then marched towards Kandahar a t the head of
an army of 22,000 Afghans and Hindostanees, the latter drilled,
and manceuvring on the European system, and observing its
discipline, some of them being deserters from the Company's
service.
Kohendil Khan, having assembled in haste what troops he could
collect, marched to meet the Iring as far as the valley of Pisheen
to close the passage, but he was defeated and obliged to make a
rapid retreat on Kandahar, whence he despatched messenger
after messenger to inform Dost Mohamed of the storm which
had burst upon him. On the reception of this news the chief of
Kabul made the following reply : " Whenever you are menaced
let me know, and, as I am your enemy now, so I will be your
friend then." After which, forgetting the just complaints which
he had against this ungrateful brother, lie remembered only the
ties of kindred and blood which united them, and hurried to his
assistance with his army. But, before setting out, he despatched
an officer to Sir Claude Wade to ascertain from him if it was true
that the Shah was openly supported by his government? that if
his reply was in the affirmative, he should think about it; if, on .
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the contrary, i t was in the negative, he should fight. The political
agent of the Company replied that the Indian government had
taken no part in the expedition, but that Shah Shooja had its best
wishes for his success.
The "best wishes" of the English government. did not stop
Dost Mohamed ; his march, which he had delayed in order that he
might receive the reply of Sir Claude Wade, he now hastened ;and
it was indeed high time that he should arrive a t Kandahar, for Shah
Shooja had taken up a position between the old and the.new city,
and pressed the siege closely. The ground from which he opened
his attack was intersected by numerous watercourses and covered
with large gardens, enclosed with mud walls, in which the soldiers
rnade many gaps to pass through; and these obstacles were far
from favourable to the manccuvlw of cavalry, of which arm the
greater part of both armies was composed ; nevertheless, conflicts
took place daily on both sides in these labyrinths. The encounters
mere the more murderous, inasmuch as the combatants, surrounded
by walls, preferred being killed on the spot to yielding one inch
of ground, and such closc fighting soon weakened both parties.
Shah Shooja had great difficulty in repairing his losses, though the
advantage on the whole was on his side, and on the 29th of June,
1834, he made a general assault upon the place. His troops
displayed great bravery ; four times repulsed, four times they
returned to the aaault, but a t last they were obliged to retreat,
leaving the ditches of the town filled with their dead and mounded.
The Dost's army arrived at this juncture, and from that day Shah
Shooja was under a double disadvantage, for he was obliged
to divide his forces to repel the sorties of the besieged commanded
by Kohenclil Khan, and the attack of the Dost in his rear.
This war, or rather this butchery, lasted during fifty-four days,
and the Afghans affirm that 16,000 men were lrilled before the
place.
After having lost a pitched battle against Dost Mohamed Khan,
Shah Shooja fought only to clear a passage for himself and his troops,
and make good his retreat to Shiliapoor; but hotly pursued by
t)e Mohamedzyes, he was cut off from his communications, and
thrown back upon the interior of the kingdom. Soon after he was
abandoned by his soldiers, and had only fifty horsemen with him
when be arrived a t I-Ierat, and demanded a refuge and hospitality
of the Shah Kanlran ; but his nephew, who never loved him, and
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was afraid that he might intrigue with a view of supplanting him,
refused him permission to enter the city. The defeated Shah
was therefore obliged to retire upon Furrah, through the arid
deserts of Beloochistan. What he suffered in traversing its parched
and burning sands, under the scorching rays of the sun, without
food or water, wanting in short everything, is incredible, and the
Mohamedzyes, who pursued him, were on the point of taking him
prisoner a t the moment he entered Kelat Nassir and Tas safe
from further rnolcstation. The Emir of this town had freed himself
from the Afghan dominion during his reign, but he received him
hospitably, and furnished his guest with the means of gaining
Loodiana in a manner suitable to his rank. Here he again
resided, pensioned by the English, who reserved him for a new
invasion in which he subsequently lost his life, and England met
with the greatest disaster that she was ever called upon to register
in the military annals of her Indian empire.
Mohamed Akbar Khan, the favourite son of Dost Mohamed
Khan, distinguished himself, in the campaign that had just
terminated, by a courage which might almost be termed foolhardy, and military talents which even then gave indications of
v h a t his future career might be.
This victory definitively confirmed the Mohamedzyes in the
possession of eastern Afghanistan ; but, instead of profiting by it to
strengthen their position, it became the signal for fresh dissensions
amongst them, the result of which was the recall of Shah Shooja
a few years later, supported by an English army. While Dost
Mohamed Khan was gone to assist his brother against this expatriated sovereign, Sultan Mohamed Khan had been removed from
his government of Peshawur by Runjeet Sing ; forced, therefore,
to retire to Jellalabad, he, with a view of remedying this reverse, thought he might profit by the absence of Dost Mohamed
Khan to seize Kabul. His two brothers, Pir Mohamed Khan
and Syud Mohamed Khan, joined him in this enterprise, which
they had already commenced when they heard of the victory the
Dost had gained a t Kandahar and at the same time his return
to Kabul. They therefore remained some days undecided as to
what line they should adopt; but the success of theil- plan being,
to say the least, doubtful, and they not as yet committed to
it, they gave up the project, petended to feel an ardent desire
to be on the most friendly terms with their victorious brother, and
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went boldly to meet the Dost to congratulate him on a success
which, as it annihilated d l their hopes, they cursed from the
bottom of their hearts. Although informed of their faithless
Dost Mohamed thought it would be better to leave
them to think that he was ignorant of their schemes, imagining
that in acting thus he might bring their dissensions to a close.
H e received his brothers, therefore, with courtesy and all the
appearance of sincere friendship, and spared nothing to attach them
to his cause. Moreover, directly he returned to ICabnl he determined to revenge the affront which had just been put upon them by
Runjeet, and proclaimed a holy war against the Sikhs ; nevertheless, before undertaking it, he was desirous of exalting himself in
the eyes of the Afghans, and received from a council, composed of
the serdars of the principality, the title of Sovereign Prince.
Mir Vaez, the grand Mollall of Kabul, proclaimed him Emir ool
Moarnerime," and on this occasion repeated the same form of
cerem~nialthat had been used at thc coronation of Ahmed Shah
and his successors. When the festivities of his enthronement
were over he sent 0000 horse against the Sikhs commanded by
one of his brothers, but, as they obtained only a doubtful success,
he left Kabul and placed himself at their head ; the Afghans were
encouraged by his arrival, but the result was not more fortunate
than before. This was owing to the intrigues of Sultan Mohamed
Khan and his brothers, who were negotiating secretly with Runjeet
Sing ; and the Emir Dost Mohamed, having convinced hi~nself
of this fact, abandoned the war, which could only be disastrous
to him, and returned to Kabul. There he occupied himself in reinforcing his army, intending to enter a t some f u t ~ r etime upon another campaign, with greater chances of success, which were not to
be hoped for so long as Sultan Mohamed Khan was ready to play
the traitor.
All the public functionaries of whose fidelity the Dost mas not
perfectly sure were now dismissed; he made his sons governors
of the various provinces and districts, and further intrigues failed
in consequence of the wise measures which he adopted. Sultan
Mohamed Khan and his two brothers, seeing that they were wholly
powerless in Kabul, threw themselves completely into the hands of
Runjeet Sing, who appointed the former governor of Rota, a
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fortress in thc north of the Punjab, the inhabitants of which were
for the most part iV1ohamedans.
The Sikhs, finding that Dost Nohamed hesitatecl to renew the
attack, mistook his discretion for fear, and Haree Sing, governor
of the Maharadja at Peshawur, threatened some villages dependant on I<abul, and was guilty uf numerous exactions against. the
Afghans of that country. The Emir, wearied with all these
annoyances, declared war against Runijeet, and gave the command
of his army to his sons Nohamed Efzel Khan and Mohamed
9 k b a r Khan, wit,h orders to advance immediately against the
Sikhs. This time fortune declared in favour of the Afghans. They
attacked their enemies at Djamrood, near the entrance of .the
Khyber Pass, to which they had advanced, and defeated them
completely ; their general, I-Iaree Sing, being killed in this battle.
T h e Emir, who evinced great inoderation after his victo~y,respected
the territory of his enemy, and claimed the intervention of Lord
Aucltla~~d,
Governor-General of the British possessions in India.
H e demanded that the Indus should for the future be the line of
demarcation between the two states, and consented on this condition to abandon Cashmeer to the Sikhs for ever, though it was
a n ,Afghan province, and the majority of the population were his
countrymen. Lord Auckland rejected these reasonable popositions; and, in his reply, left Dost Mohamed only a hope that
Runjeet Sing wonld be requested by him to restore the government of Peshawur to his brother, Sz~ltunn/[U/mrned Khan ;adding,
that he could not, consistently with the friendly relations existing
between the Maharadja and the East India Company, force him to
inalie a restitution, the legitimacy of which was, in his eyes, a
questionable point. Burnes was sent to I h b u l to make known
this decision of his Excellency t,o Dost Moharned ; and the Emir
naturally preferred leaving Pesha5qur to Runjeet, to seeing it
again in the hands of his mortal enemy, Sultan Mohamed I k n .
I t was about this time that the army of Mohamed Shah, king of
Persia, marched against Herat, and the Emir was far from
desirous of forming a treaty with that sovereign, for all his 8ympathies were with the English, and he had done everything in his
power to enter into a sincere alliance with the East India Cornpany ; but Messieurs the Directors would listen to nothing ; they
had admitted as a principle, that the consolidation and extension
of Runjeet Sing's power, under their immediate protection, was
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a counterpoise against every evil that could happen to them, and
every advantage the Russians could gain arising from the Treaty
of Turlcomantchai signed between the latter power and Persia in
1827. Hence arose the tenacity with which the East India Company supported the i~ivasioris of the Mahdradja and rejected the
loyal concessions of the Emir Dost Mohamed, who from that
moment had no other hope of safety than by allying himself with
Russia and Persia.
Let us not, hom-ever, anticipate, but come to that famous siege
of Herat, which was nearly altering the status of every country in
Ccntral Asia. Almost all those persons who have wntten on the
changes which it occasioned during the last few years in Afghanistan have allowed n party spirit more or less strong, with which,
God be praised, the author has nothing to do, to influence their
opinions. Merely a traveller in the country, my constant aim was
to search for truth, and to speak it with impartiality ; having no
political interest to defend, nor dignity or diplomatic pride to
maintain, free from constraint, and having been able to lllix
with a11 classes of the population, information came to me from
all sides, and many fresh cilmmstances were revealed to me. I n
adding them to those already linown, I have given a sketch of the
whole, and endeavoured to make it as accurate as posslble with
respect to the events that have recently talcen place in Central
Asia. T o attain this object with the greater certainty, I have
selected finom amongst the narratives, which have hitherto appeared,
those which seemed to me to contain the most exact detail of facts,
borrowed from them whatever appeared to be true, and rejected all
that seemed open to the suspicion of a single doubt.
The extracts are from the text of these authorities, which could
not gain by a transformation of style, and the information that I
have collected is added. I shall begin by giving the reader
an idea of what were the respective positions of the English
and the Russians in Asia, at the time the siege of Hcrat was
undertaken, but a reservation is necessary on my part. Though
assenting to the mode in which the writers whose works I am
about to make use of, and who have examined matters to the
core, have appreciated them, I do not intend to be responsible
for any remarlrs that can \round the susceptibility of any
nation which is the subject of them. M y object is to makc known
facts without malice or prejudice, to give these facts impartially,
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with simply their historical interest attached to them, and not to
recriminate against any individual whatever. T h e first quotation
is taken from a work by Mr. George Sumner of Boston, who
seems to me to have treated what relates to the English in a
manner which is tolerably satiifactory. The following is his
opinion :I t has been generally thought that the war made on the
Afghans by the English was to be attributed to a fear of the
encroachments of, and invasion by, Russia, but it has since been
aclmowledged that this fear was only a chimera. Let us examine
this question. First, to make the subject more clear, we mill
speak of the position of England in the East : there we see an
immense empire, with more than 100,000,000 of subjects, a large
army, large revenues, and towns containing a million of inhabitants,
entirely under the control and government of a company of
merchants and capitalists, who, tranquilly seated behind their
counters, give their instructions and orders to their agents, and in
less than eighty years have succeeded in raising a power which
seems almost to equal that of Alexander or Tamerlane.
" T h e condition in which they found the various states of India
was no doubt exceedingly favourable to the increase of this empire ;
but another cause, tending almost equally to that increase, was the
vast field that it opened to talent of every description, and the
facility that every able officer, however low his rank or position,
there found of at.taining wealth and distinction, by cou&geously
devoting himself to the interests of those whom he served.
" I t ought to be remarked, in speaking of the facility with which
India was subjugated, that the plan of conquest adopted a t the cornmencement by Clive, and since constantly folloved by the English,
did not originate with them. I t was conceived by the French
General Dupleix, when that talented officer commanded a t
Madras. His proposition to the French government was immediately rejected, and drew upon its author reproaches that the most
recent biographers have not endeavoured to remove-indeed they
have continued t.hem. It was to employ only a smal number of
European troops in the conquest of India, and to take advantage
of the dissensions amongst the princes and rajahs of the country,
to foment discord in their different states, and, finally, to assist
any one of them who, after his success, showed a disposition to
become a docile instrument in the hands of the nation that had
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supported him. Divide et impera. By adopting this plan the East
India Company has morltecl' by degrees to the north and north-west,
invading, one after the other, princes, rajahs, and emirs, and even
the Great Mogul himself had to accept their alliance and submit
to their rule. The Company has occupied Delhi, the capital of
the empire of Aurungzebe, crossed the Sutlej, rendered tributary
the sovereign of Lahore, and has travelled thus far without knowing
when or where it ought to stop, until it found itself face to face
with anot.her power, of which the mind was as active and the
resources as great, of which the interest and capability of advancing
southwards were just as unlimited as those of England acting in the
opposite direction-that power is Russia.
" When the expedition of the Shah of Persia against Herat, in
1835 and 1836, was determined upon, the northern limit of the
states belonging to the English, and paying taxes to them, was
the river Sutlej, which flows south-west, and joins the Indus a t a
distance about 200 miles north of Delhi.
" Beyond, and in the delta formed by the Sutlej and the Indus,
is the Punjab, the kingdom of the Sikhs, with their remarkable
sovereign, Runjeet Sing of Lahore. R e had hastened to treat with
the British government in 1832 ; Burnes said of him that he
might be regarded as one of the most faithful allies of the English,
and the Maharadjah proved this by joining with them against the
Afghans.
" Crossing the kingdom of Runjeet, we come to the unhappy
country of Afghanistan, which witnessed the recent disasters of the
British army. T o the north of Ihbul, the capital of that province;
extends a portion of the Himalaya range of mountains, across
which, in summer, there are a t least two passes open to caravans,
leading direct to the Khanats of Badakshane, Balkh, and Bokhara.
With these Russia has formed great commercial interests, but the
government of that country pretends that she has not yet any wellestablished political relations there.
'' From Kandahar, another city in Afghanistan, the road is open
towards Herat, on the Persian frontiers, and, passing through Persia,
we reach the Caspian Sea and the southern boundary of Russia.
Between Afghanistan and Russia then there is on onk side, besides
the three IGanats that we have mentioned, a vast extent of deserts,
and on tho other sidk is Persia, which, like Turkey, seems scarcely
to have forgotten its past spleudour and ancient.renown. This
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nation, enfeebled within and powerless without, has become more
and more tottering, and seems ready to fall before the first enemy
who shall attack her with vigour.
Thus it is evident that the country of Afghanistan, of which
Europe thought very little 6fty years ago, is without doubt destined
to be the theatre of important events, on which the powers of
Central Asia will be tested, and their destiny decided.
a It was in Afghanistan, that Alexander the Great, on his
march towards the Indus, stopped to rest his soldiers, who ate
with delight the refreshing fruits of the villages in which we
now find I k ~ b u l . Through it also passed Ghengiz Khan and
Tamerlane, when they undertook their expeditions to India. On
this distant point is now fixed the atte~ltion of the two great
countries, who look upon it as the pivot on which, in some degree,
must turn their respective interests in India. Count Nesselrode,
in a despatch of October 20th, 1838, recommended England to
respect Afghanistan. ' Great Britain and Russia,' said he, ' can have
but one desire, that of maintaining peace in Central Asia, and
supporting the independence of the peoples who are the legitimate
possessors and the a~icientinh;~bitants.'
" T h e friend of England, Runjeet Sing, was not arrested in his,
progress by this manifestation on the part of one of the greatest
powers of Asia. He had.already committed depredations in Afghanistan, reduced Peshawur to a state of vassalage, and prepared other
more hostile movements towards the south-east. When the Shah
of Persia, remembering that his dominions had in former times extended to Delhi, determined to recover or reduce Herat (which ha.d
been part of his legitimate possessions, and which is the capTtal of
that province of Afghanistan situated farthest to the north-west),
he was probably instigatedJo attempt this reassumption of his ancient
rights by Count Simonich, then Russian minister at Teheran ; a t
least i t was supposed so."
T h e position of the English in India, and the tendency of
their future policy, are clearly set forth in this extract; but it
would not be of much interest if it were not followed by a
sketch of the Russian policy in Central Asia. This question was
considered in 1843, in a monthly review, by " A. Chodslco,"
who has proved himself as well informed as the philologist of
Boston. After having rapidly traced the efforts which had been
made by the cabinet of S t . Yetersburgh to render its policy
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dominant in Europe, and, above all, in Turkey, the writer turns
his attention to Asia, and unfolds, with startling truth, the successive invasions of the Colossus of the North on that continent.
The reviewer commences by citing the opinion of a contemporary
historian : " Vainly," say Les~w," were the dangers pointed out
of permitting this intrusion of an enslaved and barbarous people
into the system of European politics ; Russia has been elevated as
much by the errors of others as by her own genius. The last treaties
with Turkey, Persia, and the powers assembled at Vienna, have
established her dominion on the right bank of the Danube, at the
extremity of the Gulf of Bothnia, and from the Vistula to Kamtchatka. She commands the Black Sea, she suffers none but hcr
own armed flag to float over the Caspian, and the shrine of the
Kadjars is placed under her protection." After this quo tation
the reviewer continues : " Subsequently to the year 1819 Russian
agents left Tiflis, envoys to the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara. Their
instructions were to obtain the abrogation of the trade in slaves,
and to announce their mission as the accomplishment of a great
duty on the part of the head of the Russian empire. Russia, who
had generally imposed slavery upon civilized nations, pretended
to restore liberty to slaves, and she knew not how to proceed
otherwise than by the sword : she threntened to conquer. The
Autocrat expected the refusal that his envoys returned with, but
he wished to give a colour to the war for which he was prcparing, and his battalions were already marching from Tiflis upon
Orenburg. Their reports also informed the Emperor Alexancler
that his projects against Turkestan were premature; he could not
ensure his object until he had deprived Yersia of the states she
possessed on the borders of the Caspian Sea, and that conquest
could not be attempted without further success against Turkey.
But the patient constancy with which Russia carries on her schemes
is well known ; aggression against Turkey would dissipate any suspicions that might arise, while an invasion of Persia would only
confirm them. The disposition of the Greeks to revolt was therefore
encouraged, and Alexander showed himself again in the character
of defender of an oppressed people. But he contented himself
with pleading their cause with the Sultan ; and several influential
personages of his court having endeavoured to turn to their advantage the discussions that arose in 1823 with the Forte, to
provoke a rupture, the Emperor sent them into exile.
P
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" T h e long looked for epoch for the achievcrnent of the project to.
the accomplishment of which all his intrigues had been directed,
arrived in 1524. I n the spring of that year he saw the ambassadors
of the Khirghizes arrive a t his court to render him homage
as the supreme chief of the Tartars. I n virtue of this title he
granted them a code of civil laws,-drawn up in the Russian language
and in the language of their country ; this he bestowed upon them
in consequei~ceof their having acknowledged themselves vassals of
his empire ; the Emperor also promised to visit tlicm, and did in
fact very soon after set out for Orenburg.
" Such was the rash and inconsiderate contempt of tlie nations of
the west for the people whom they called the barbarians of Asia,
that this step on the part of Alexander occasioned no suspicion.
The country of the Khirghizes att,racted no attention, though it wa.s
the very same kingdom of Iiharism, forinerly so powerful, and
which once entirely ruled Central Asia.
" A brilliant reception awaited the Tzar at Orenburg. The
khans of the nlost distant tribes came there to acknowledge their
prince, and proclaim aloud his sovereignty. The Russian journals
were filled with accounts of the homage which the numberless
hordes scattered over Asia came to ofier to their new chief.
Thcy had bestowed upon him, as formerly on their celebrated
Temondjine, the Tartar surname which signifies T h e GreutestDjenghis.
" T h e Emperor soon quitted Orenburg to visit some of the
Khirghiz hordes, and was satisfied that he should find in then1 all
the submission. that lie could expect from their nomadic habits.
" Alexander went again to Orenburg in 1825, and took the
empress, then an invalid, with him, intending to leave her at
Tangarsk, the climate of which place, the mildest in Russia, would,
it was hoped, re-establish her health : but as, on the contrary, she
grew worse, he would not quit her. I t was then that he was
attacked by the mysterious malady which had a1rea.d~carried to
the grave his father, the Emperor Paul, and which also terminated
his own life, for he had drawn upon himself the same enemies.
"Everything was in readiness for the Persian war, and the commencement of it was in the following year the first act of his successor; it might therefore from that moment be concluded that
Nicholas was worthy to continue the policy of Alexander. The
rupture of the treaty of Gulistan appeared to be the worl~ of
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Persia, and the conjecture might be read in the papers that she
was emboldened to that step by the secret intervention and promises of England.
The treaty of Turl<omantchai, of which the preliminaries were
signed November 3rd, 1827, was the res~dtof this clever comedy.
Russia acquired two khanats which in a military point of view commanded the Persian provinces, occupied the countries south-west
of t,he Caspian Sea, and succeeded to the rights which Persia had
preserved over that Turlromania which had been the ancient
kingdom of Samarcand. These rights were of the same nature as
t.hose recognised by the Khirghizes, and became much stronger,
being thenceforth exercised by the acknowlcdged chief of the
Tartar nation.
" Nevertheless, whatever dangers were- revealed, the blindness of
England continued and manifested itself by the impolitic battle of'
Navarino, in which the Turkish navy was almost entirely destroyed. The result of it was the treaty of Adrianople, arid afterwards that of Uilltiar Skelessi, which confirmed to the Emperor
Nicholas his preponderating influence in Turkey.
" T h e successor~ofAlexander then appeared sure of the expected
triumph of the policy so long followed in Asia. His numerous
army was concentrated upon Orenburg, and orders were given
for the opening of the campaign in the first fine weather of 1831,
when the insurrection in Poland suddenly obliged him to march
his troops to the Vistula.
"The British ministry was the first that opened its eyes, as is
proved by its intrigues to cause, though prematurely, the breaking
out of the rebellion ;.and it sacrificed that unf?rtunate people to
its own safity, by hurrying them into action to avoid being taken
a t a disadvantage itself.
c c Taking immediate measures for the protection of the Indian
Empire, of which the chiefs, absorbed in commercial calculations,
had too much neglected the political interests, the ministry addressed to the Governor-General, Lord Auckland, fresh instructions ; and it was a t this time that 'Captain Conolly and Lieutenant Burnes were sent on their respective journeys. The first
started from St. Petersburg to pass through the countries of the
Khirghizes, Turlrestan, and Persia, while the second left Delhi to
explore Afghanistan, Bokhara, and Persia. Burnes had already
shown great capability in other expeditions, but the object of his
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travels was not dissembled. I t was evident that his purpose was
to investigate the intrigues of the Russians, and the extent to
which their efforts to lay the foundations of political power in
Turkestan, under the n.ppearance of commercial intercourse, had
succeeded. Burnes allowed it to be seen that he was convinced
the project of marching an army across so much arid and uncultivated steppe was impracticable ; but the passage of his narrative
in which he insists with the greatest force upon this assertion
suffices to prove that he had presented Lord Auckland with notes
and information to the contrary. Here follows the passage :
' When one has met with and felt such a horrible scarcity of
water, and found pasture for the horses so difficult to obtain, ophthalmia so prevalent, and so many other impediments, it will be
understood that this desert can with difficulty be crossed even by
a few squadrons of light cavalry. But who would think of crossing.
i t ? If the descendants of the Scytl~iansand the Parthians have
the pretension to enter upon this conflict, they can do so without
exciting much attention from Englishmen.'
If the traveller
thus deluded himself; one may be allowed to think that his British pride had strangely blinded him. What difficulty could
there be in procuring water in a country from which the river
had only been turned aside ? What obstacles could hinder tI:e
raising of forage in a country lately so fertile and of which the
sterility" was so recent
This sketch gives a very accurate idea of the object the Tzar
had in extending his dominion towards the south ; it is atonishing
therefore that the English Government should have been alarmed
a t the project formed by the Shah of Persia, under the advice of
Russia, to sieze Herat. MTe will admit, like many other persons,
and as several newsplpers have done, that the possibility of a
Russian expedition to India is a chimera. if we had based our
opinion, as there is everything to lead us to suppose these writers
did, on the authority of Burnes ; but as the Goverllment at CaIcutta knew very well that the obstacles were not so serious as this

?"t

* The district of Merv .here spoken
of was ravaged by t h e Tartars and
Usbeks in 1786.
t The critic is perfectly correct in
his remarks upon Hurnes, and, had he
possessed more information, he might
have added, that in t h e winter and in

the spring grass and water are to be
fomd everywhere in the deserts of
Ehivn a d Bokhara. The facility with
which a Russiw expedition could thus
reach India has been shown in 'Caravan
Jonrneys.'-lierrio..
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officer wished them to believe, the Governor-General in Council
was right to take precautions ,against any invasion which could be
from the north of Europe into central Asia. H e ought
indeed to have done this with more energy at the outset, and kith
less delay, by which means he would have avoided many diplomatic embarrassments, and many iniportant disasters, the wounds
from which will not be healed for a long space of time, though,
without doubt, England gained her object. Herat has remained
independent, and Russia has retired within the limits st,ipdated in
the treaty of Turkomantchai, while England has brought her
frontier up to the west bank of the Indus, and passed that river at
two points ; Pesfiawur i11 the north, and Shikapoor in the south,
are two tztes-de-pont which cover the principal approaches t o the
river, and menace the Afghans. But let us not anticipate.

Fll:ST DIPLOLIX'I'IC DISCUSSIONS

CHAPTEIZ XVI.
First diplomatic discussions relative to the siege of Herat --Mr. Ellis is succeeded
by Mr. ?&'Neil- The Persians invade the principality of Herat - The minister
of the Shnh plays n double game - Captnin Eldred Pottinger at HeratRussian officem in the Persian camp -Samoun Khan -Colonel Elaremberg Geueral Eorotiski -Colonel Semineau-Siege of Oorian - Recrimination against
the latter officer -Russian und English agents in the Persian camp -Their
hostility against Colonel Seluineau- Opentions at the siege of Gorian-Fall
of the place -Shere Mohamed Khan - Yar Mohsmed's reply to his brother Duration of the siege.

IThas been already remarked that the idea of laying siege to
Herat for the purpose of effectually putting a stop to the incursions of the I-Ieratees on the Persian territory, and forcing Kamran
to pay tribute, originated with Mohamed Shah, but it should be said
that immediately the subject was made known to the Russian Government it met with its eager s ~ ~ p p o and
r t encouragement; not
because the views of Russia extended a t that period so far as to
undertake an invasion of British India, for she was not then in the
least prepared for so great an enterprise, but because she ever
obeys that spirit of forecast, evolteil by Peter the Great, which
always leads her, whenever an opportunity presents itself, to extend
her 'infl~iencein the direction of the Indus, as she did not long ago
to the. banks of the Bosphorus a t Constantinople. At that time
the Russians were contented ,with t,he possessions which they held
in Asia, but they could not, as clever politicians, see without
jealousy the successive invasions of England ;they therefore forced
her to extend her frontiers out of all reason, exciting her fears
by demonstrations of an ambitious character, hoping by that
means to make her consume with greater rapidity the immense
resources a t her command, and to irritate the numerous peoples she
has subjected, who serve her much more from a sentiment of fear
than because they are habituated to, or love, her rule.
T h e projects of Mohamed Shah on Herat beg,zn to see the
light about the cornmencement of 1835. Mr. Ellis, then British
minister a t the court of Teheran, at once informod his government
of the fact by pointing out the active part which the Russian
minister in Persia, General Sinwitch, had taken in connexion
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with the resolution which had been formed by the Persian
monarch. The British Ambassador danced atttendance in the
diplomatic antechamber eighteen months to persuade Lord
Palmerston, the Foreign Ninister of Her Majesty, of tlie com$city manifested by Russia in this war, which was evidently
undertaken with views hostile to England. I t was in vain Mr.
Ellis informed his Lordship that, after having offered his mediation
to smooth the rnisunclerstanding eisting between the Shah of
Persia and the sovereign Prince of Herat, the Persian Government
had refused to allow Major Todd, the officer attached to his mission, t,o be the hearer of his letter to Shah Icamran ; and that he
was obliged to place it in the hands of the Persian authorities
in order that it might reach its destination; in other words, to
besubmitted to the supervision and control of Russian agents.
The British minister further stated that Count Simonitch openly
encouraged the war against Herat, that each day he hastened
forward the preparations as well as the concentration of troops at
Teheran, promising, in the name of his government, subsidies of all
kinds and even the support of some Russian regiments. I t was
equally useless that, under the profound impression that he foresaw
a very serious misfortune impending over his country, Mr. Ellis
wrote to his superior thus :-"I have the complete conviction that
the English Governmellt cannot permit the extension of the Persian
Empire, in the direction of Afghanistan, without placing the interior
tranquillity of British India in danger. This extension will bring
Russian influence to the very tlxeshold of our Indian Empire ; and
as Persia will not, or dare not, enter into a sincere alliance with
England, our policy for the future should be to consider her not a s
a barrier which covers India, but as the first parallel from whence
the assault will be given."
Lord Pdinersto~~"
was not much moved or affected by this information: his policy at that time was not anti-Russian, and he
persisted in seeing in the reports of his subordinate a t Teheran,
only, and perhaps unreasonably, timid anticipations which nothing
could justify. Left without instructions, obliged very frequently to
have recourse to his recollection as to what the English policy had
* An article from the pen of Mons.
A. Thomas, in the 'Revue des Deux
Moncles,' has furnished me with valu--

able information on facts relating t o
these negotiations.-Fwrier.

been during his service in India, to enable himself to make a few
feeble remonstrances to Mohamed Shah, and almost always censured by his chief for the fears which be expressed, the unfort~mate
Nr. Ellis did not know what part he was to play a t Teheran.
T h e minister of Russia, on the contrary, always advanced boldly
in the warlike policy which he connselled, and had driven the Shah
to carry on : supported by his government he d q e d everything, and
his most trifling wishes were accepted as orders by the Court of
Teherau. If Lord Palmerston, pressed by Mr. Ellis, was hardy
enough to make a few weak remoiistrauces to the cabinet of St.
Petersbnrg, Monsieur de Nesselrode denied facts as clear as the
sun, and it was almost by menaces that he replied to the constant
demands of the English minister that a good understanding should
exist between the two governments upon the affairs of Persia. The
noble Lord, deceived by Russian duplicity, considered it a crime in
his minister at Teheran to have seen too well and appreciated too
clearly the state of t.llings there. The Prime Minister had been
disturbed at a moment when the Russian alliance was without
doubt necessary to him, as a balance, and he could not make up
his mind to open his eyes to an event and give his attention to a
subject which took him by surprise and deranged his plans.
T h e correspondence of the Foreign Office relative to this affair
is nothing more than a series of reproaches upon what Lord
Palmerston then denominated chimerical ideas, which his subordinate had conceived respecting General Simonitch ; his Lordship
requests Mr. Ellis to act in concert with that diplomatist, respecting
whose intentions, so far as he is concerned, he is quite satisfied, and
to make confidential representations to the Shah's Government on
the embarrassment which his inconsiderate aggression against Shah
Kamran must expose him to. In short, he has nothing to transmit
to Mr. Ellis but timid counsel to assist him in meeting an evil, the
cause of which his Lordship obstinately refuses to comprehend ;
he will see nothing because he is determined to avoid a conflict
with Russia, and he keeps on such good terms with that power as
to embolden her to redouble her cxertions in encouraging the Shah
to seize upon I-Ierat. However, this cautious policy could not save
Lord Palmerston from the consequences of the entanglements
which it created for him, and he finished by being completely the
dupe of his own acts. He believes the word of the Cabinet of St.
Petersburg, and yet he doubts more and more the accurac-y of the
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reports of his own n~inisterat Teheran. T h e far-sighted Mr. Ellis
then has to endure all the ill-iiumour of Lord Palrnerston, and he
is recalled without mercy for not having been able to stop events
the development of which was owing to the too great confidence of
his chief in the assertions of the Russian Government.
The noble Lord still endeavoured to disguise to himself the check
which his policy had inflicted upon English influence in Persia ;
nevertheless he ~.ubsequentlymade choice of an energetic man, well
known for his hostility to Russia, to fill the post of British minister
at the court of Teheran. Mr. M'Neil belonged to that schoul of
diplomatists who are perfectly happy in the midst of agitation, and
for whom European principles disappear before the necessities of the
tortuous diplomacy of Asia. After having passed twenty-five years
in India or Persia, he had returned to .England towards the end of
the year 1534, and, not approving of the policy that had Been
followed by his government in Persia since the accession of
Mohamed Shah to the throne, he had, through the press, fought
the question with all the obstinacy inherent in the English character, stating that there was no necessity for drawing the sword
from the scabbard to baffle the Russian intrigues a t Teheran,
that it was only requisite for England to declare distinctly to the
Shah her opposition to the war with Herat for that monarch to abstain from carrying on any further the preparations for the expedition. This view of the subject, one so simple, which Lord
Palmerston ought to have adopted from the first, at length broke
i n upon his Lordship's mind, but nevertheless he preserved it as a
last resource in case he should find thz Shah intractable in every
other way ; and as he was aware that Mr. MLNeil was active even
to restlessness, resolute even to temerity, his instructions were
similar to those which had been given to Mr. Ellis. The new
Envoy was desired to discourage the ambitious projects of the
Shah, and to offer his mediation in arranging the n~isunderstanding
which had arisen between Persia and Herat; in short, he mas to
coritinue a spectator of Russian intrigues without being able to
offer one energetic word in opposition to them. Mr. NcNeil was
not more successful than his predecessor, and complained to his
government with as much force as perspicuity, demanding that
his instructions should be extended in order that he might have
the power of acting with some hope of success. But Lord
Palrnerston appeared to send him duplicates of all the replies that
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h e 11ad formerly given to Nr. Ellis. I-Tis Lordship could not yet
~ n a l xup his mind to take the initiative in a vigorous opposition to
Russia, and hc endeavoured to maintain a peace wliicl~that power
seemed little ansious to preserve. Lord Palmerston w a s not very
fortunate in his appreciation of diplomatic affairs, for, when he
certified in his letters to the sincerity of the part played at Teheran
by Couut Simonitch, that nobleman admitted his bad faith in his
owu correspondence. The noble Lord waited witl imperturbable
tranquillity till reparation should be made by the Persian Government for conduct with wl~ichhe was offended, and this at the very
moment when Mr. M'Neil received the assurance that the Shah
declined to make any ; and as Lord Palmerston had purposely
deferred sending his instructions, his envoy found himself opposed,
with his hands tied, to the ever active manoxvres of Russia, and
t h e determination of the Shah to seize Herat.
T h a t which Messrs. Ellis and BI'Neil had foreseen at length
occurred ; the Persians took the field in 1837, and in the month
of October entered the province of Herat ; but it is necessary to
add that the encrgetic representations which Mr. McNeil made to
the Shah on his owrz 7-esponsibilityhad led to indecision and a slight
sensation of fear in the council of his ministers, which the nonrealization of the promises made eighteen months before by
General Simonitch also powerfully contributed to develop. T h e
Persians had waited, but in vain, up to this time for the material
intervention promised by Russia, and the Russian diplomatist, who
had been urged to give a guarantee in writing to the effect that
it would be forthcoming, had just refused to do so. Mohamed
Shall had conceived some just apprehensions upon this subject,
qhich led him for a moment to t,hink of renouncing his project,
for he was afraid that his quondam ally would abandon him in the
height of the conflict which the war with Herat might cause
between himself and England. But the cleverness of Count
Simonitch surmounted this dificulty also, and the Shah took the
field without an aft,erthought, determined to seize upon the fortress which he wasgoing to attack ; but his prime minister, Hadji
Nirza Agassee, a n old and obstinate man, directing as he pleased
the.opinions of the King, was far from sharing these sentiments.
H e readily consented that the Persian army should invest Herat,
but. he had secretly decided in his own mind to allow the siege
operations to languish until the Russians had fulfilled the verbal
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stipulations which their diplomatist had made with him, and, as
these engagements were never carried out, the city was not talcen.
This resolution of the Vizier is the solution of the enigma which so
many persons have attempted, but in vain, to discover. Twentyfive days at the utmost ought to have been sufficient to take Herat ;
nevertheless it sustained a siege of more than nine months, to the
great displeasure of Mohamed Shah, who, deceived by his ministers and generals, was ignorant that there were some amongst them
who had been gained over to the English party and intended to
retreat without having accomplished the projected conquest But
the folly and incapacity of the Yersian officers in directing the
operations of the siege, as well as the eccentric measures adopted
by the prime minister, were more than sufficient to cause the failure
of the enterprise without the addition of bad faith.
The newspapers assured us a t the time, and many persons still
think so, that the Persian army was accompanied by many Russians,
officers and men, when it marched against Herat, and that the
place was defended by several English o5cers ; there is.exaggeration in these two assertions which I will clear away.
I n the treaty of 1813 between England and l'eisia it was stipulated that, if war broke out between the Persians and the Afghans,
the English Government should remain neutral, but it might nevertheless become a mediator if requested to do so by both parties.
We have seen that Eng1and.u~to this time had not failed on her.
paart with respect to that clause ; but the eagerness with which the
Russians had advised the Persians to undertake a siege that threatened the dearest interests of England, without doubt induced the
Governor-General to pay very litde attention to it, and he sent
Captain Eldred Pottinger to defend Herat. The Indian newspapers pretended that " this officer, travelling in the neighbourhood
of that city, entered it by chance a t the moment the siege commenced, and that it was with his assistance and advice as well as
the encourqcment yiueri by the Englisl~ Goae~nment, that the
inhabitants were enabled to hold out for nine months." T h e first
part of this assertionis not accurate. Captain Pottinger, sent by his
Governme,zt with a secret missiolz, arrived a t Herat disgui'sed as a
I-Iindoo physician, and was known there only to three merchants of
Herat, who were devoted to English interests--Shah Kamran and
his vizier did. not hear of his arrival until the army invested the
place. This was the moment chosen by the English officer to
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offer the support of his professional services, a s well as subsidies
of all kinds on the pnrt of his Government, to assist the Shah
ILmran in making a stand ,against the Persians. This offer
was accepted with joy, but such wasstill the discretion of the chiefs
of Herat that the inhabitants were actually not aware that the
pretended Hindoo physician was an English officer, until Mr.
M'Neil arrived in their city in March, 183s. From that moment
Captain Pottinger resumed his European uniform, and did not
attempt to conceal himself any longer, H e was the only Englishman who remained in the place during the whole period of
the siege; but it should be added that Major Todd and some
few other officers, who were like hiniself attached to the Persian
embassy, entered the city on several occasions with a flag of truce,
and it is reasonable to suppose that the advice of these o5cers was
calculated to strengthen the resolution of Yar Moharned Khan in
continuing the defence.
, A s to the Russian officers, there was not one in the Persian army,
fbr the Sertip" Samsoun Khan, of Russian origin, could not be
considered such ; he had resided in Persia for many years, and,
having refused to take advanwe of the amnesties granted by
the Emperor of Russia to his subjects who were deserters, Samsoun Khan was much more of a Persian than a Russian, as all
those who lmem him could aver. Besides, his military knowledge
was too mediocre to influence the operations of the Persians, for
his rank in the Russian army had never been higher than that
of a quartermaster sergeant of dragoons. A t the time of the
siege he commanded the Persian battalion of the Chaldean,
Armenian, and Nestorian Christians, to which were attached seven
or eight hundred Russian deserters, nearly all of whom aere
common soldiers ; a very small number of these had been sergeants
and corporals, and they had for the most part arrived in Persia
long before there was any question of the siege of I-Ierat. [These
deserters were, in 1839, in consequence of the representations of
the British Government, reclaimed and given up to the Emperor of
Russia, and that event led to a new conflict bctuwn Russia and
Persia. T h e Shah, on the ground of the duties of hospitality, refused to give up these Russian deserters, but the Emperor Nicholas
just a t that moment visited his Trans-Caucasian provinces, travelling
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indeed as far as Erivan ; and to this place 3"ohamed Shah sent his
eldest son, Nasser Eddin Mirza, to compliment his Russian Majesty.
Count Simonitch then declared to the Shah that,, if' he did not give
upthe Russian deserters, the heir to the Persian throne should remain
an hostage in Russia until he did so; there was therefore nothing
to be done but to yield, and to this alternative the Shah consented.]
Nor can it be said that Lieutenant-Colonel Blarernberg, of the
Russian Engineers, was attarshed to the Yersian army, for he
formedpart of the mission of Count Simonitch. I t is true t,hat these
two superior officers were actively mixed up in the affairs of Herat,
but in a diplomatic sense ;-they never ostensibly directed the
operations of the siege, and their position was simply t h t of
advisers.
Two other European officers were in the service of the Shah :
one of them, General Boroffski, a Pole and a Russian subject, had,
through the protection given him by the English, advanced to this
rank in the Persian army, but he had never served in any p a ~ tof
Europe, and had no military experience whatever ; he was reported
brave, but courage alone is not sufficient to direct the operations
of a siege.
The other was General Semineau, a t that time Colonel of Engineers, a Sardinia11 subject, and an old officer of the Empire, serving
in the Shah's army as a Prenchman-his mother was French and
born a t St. Tropez, his father a t Nice. The English accused
General Semineau of serving the interests of Russia, because he
performed his duty 3 they were, however, in an excellent position
to know that, when the campaign against Herat commenced, this
officer was on the very worst terms with Count Simonitch. I n Pel.sia, however, duty is a thing which always comes after personal
interest, and there is nothing astonishing in the fact that the
English had great doubts of the Colonel's conduct being clisinterested.
The Count Simonitch and Mr. M'Neil had remained a t Teheran,
but each of them detached an oficer of his legation to the royal
camp. The Russian drgoman'Goutt, and the English Colonel
Stoddart, taking example from their chiefs, carried on an active
paper war. T o the first was attached an officer of cavalry of
the same nation, by name Vikovitch, who had made himself a
reputation for talent in Tartary, and been employed in several
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missions with success. He spoke with fluency several languages
and oriental dialects, arid his government destined him, as we shall
see further on, to prepare t!le way for Russian influence in Afghanistan.
Amongst the Persian nobles, too numerous to mention, to whoin
the Shah had coufided the various commands of his troops, there
was not one who was capable of taking up the encamping ground
fur an army, or directing scientifically the operations of the siege.
1 3 s Majesty n-s obliged to make Colonel Semineau take upon
himself the duties of chief of the staff, and director of the artillery
and engineers, which brought upon him from the first the jealousy
and oppositiou of the Persian officers, who were besides urged to
annoy him by the Russian and English agents, according as his
acts happened to be adverse to the policy or proceedings of either.
' T h e Russian was the first who endeavoured to injnre him, iu the
opinion of the Sliah and his minister, stating that the Colonel paid
and received visits to and from Colonel Stoddart, which was a great
impropriety in the eyes of Count Simonitch, but subsequently, when
h c t s proved that Colonel Semilieau was a loyal and honest man,
though on terms of good social feeling with men of all parties, and
performed his duty before every other consideration, the attacks
came from the opposite side. Unfortunately the Persian Government lent but too willing an ear to this gossip, and such wenkness annihilated all the good that could result from the attive cooperation of this officer in c a r r ~ i n gon the siege.
T h e Persian army advanced very slowly upon Herat, and turned
aside to wage an irregular warfare against the Tu~~comans,
Yamoods,
and Goklans, before repairing to its ulterior destination ; nevertheless, when it arrived under the walls of Gorian, a fortress garrisoned
by the troops of Shah Kamran, and situated thirty-five mileswest
of Herat, in the midclle of a large plain ten miles in width, it then
numbered from 34,000 to 35,000 men, well provided with artillery
and munitions of war. Colonel Semineau ordered the army to
encamp a gunshot from the fortress on ground sheltered by a ridge
of hills which covered it at this short distance. After having
marked out the encampment for each corps, he proceeded to make
a .still closer reconnaissance of the town, and was received by a
sharp fire of muslietry, but he continued his examination of
the place, and, this duty having been accomplished, he retired
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to a short distance from tl~enoise uf the camp, and tmced a
sketcll of the plan of attack which he thought it desirable to
While thus employed, other divieions of t.he army arrivcd
in succession, and with them the Russian agent Goutt, who,
seeking every opportunity of annoying the Colonel, was loud
in his exclamations against the spot he had chosen for the camp.
c L I t is treasonable," csclaimed the liussian, " placing us so close
to the poignard of the Afghans; he wishes our throats cut; he
is sold to the English," &c. kc. Great confusion and tumult
followed, and maledictions without number were hurled at the
Colonel. T h e mules remained still laden, and every one was on
the point of carrying his baggage elsewhere, when the arrival of tlie
Shah put a stop to these irregular proceedings. The Persian chiefs
made their complaints in bitter terms, but the King well knew
their ignorance, for his military studies, which had been directed
by French and English officers, enabled him to form a correct
judgment of the circumstances ; he went himself to the summit of
the hills adjoiiling the camp to ascertain the eligibility of the position, and saw at a glance that the spot chosen by Semineau was a
most favourable one, as the enemy's shot flew over the camp. T h e
Shah therefore maintained the dispositions made by Sernineau, udlo,
ignorant of what had talren place, went, tu communicate with the
sovereign about half an hour after, and was received by him in his
usually kind manner. The Colonel's plan of attack presented three
points, on either of which it could be made with a fair hope of
prompt success : but the one selected was on the reverse side of the
ridgc of hills against which the troops were encamped, for from
thence the ground sloped towards the place. cL Well, then," said
the Shah to Semineau, " it is you who shall direct the attack," and
gave him written orders to the colonels of four battalions to place
themselves immediately under the Colonel's command, and obey
him in everything. These four regiments were the Bahacler-harx
or grenadiers, the Rhasseh or guards, the Demavend, so citlled from
the district of that name, and I<araguzloo, of the tribe of that name.
These troops were employed in making the gabions and fascines
that werc necessary, and on the following night Senlineau brolce
ground and commenced his trenches, but he had then to,avoid
a danger which he did not in the least suspect. The Persian
chiefs, who were ordered to conduct the other attacks, did not
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advance methodically and in silence like the Colonel, but discovered their position to the besieged by a brisk cannonade, under.
cover of which their troops advanced on the open plain, but the
besieged Gorians ~epliedwith a 'musketry fire so well kept LIP
that many of the Persians were soon hors cle combat. The Persian
guns being badly laid, the shot passed over the town at a considerable height, and, after having described their curve, fell into
the middle of Semineau's division, who was not a little astonished ;
nevertheless, after taking some precautions, he proceeded with his
trenches. His plan consisted in dividing his corps into two brigades, to attack an angle of the bastion that it was intended to
destroy ; and when the trenches had arrived at the point at which
the two brigades were to separate, they were to construct their respective batteries, st a good distance from one another. But the
semi-Russian Sertip, Samsoun Khan, of the grenadier regiment, to
whom the Colonel had given the command of the second brigade,
obstinately determined to remain where he was and batter the angle
in front, being a t a distance equal to the point blank fire of one of
his own pieces.
His adviser on this occasion was a gunner, like himself a deserter
from the Russian service, who had convinced him that a cannonshot striking a mark a t a short distance would not make a hole,
but fall to the ground after having struck the wall, and that, to
obtain the most completely destructive effect, it was necessary that
it should acquire greater power in a longer trajet. I mention these
trifling circumstances, to a certain extent foreign to the subjectmatter of this work, only with a view of showing how ignorant the
Persian officers were in general, and Sarnsoun Khan in particular.
Colonel Semineau, after having made reiterated representations
to this officer, and threatened to retire if he persisted in this obstinacy, at length acceded to his wishes, leaving to him all the responsibility of his conduct. As to his own operations, he continued
his trenches in order that he might be able to place his guns on
the spot he had determined upon at the outset.
Samsoun Khan had constructed the embrasures of his battery with
old wooden boxes filled with earth, which were of course knoclred
811 to pieces by the first fire, and ten of his men were killed at daybreak ; his casualties soon amounted to forty-five or fifty, and his
battery was laid completely ope11 This decided him in coming
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round to Semineau's opinion, and to construct,a fresh battery in the
proper place.
If I have been diffuse upon these accessory details of the siege
of Herat, it is not that they are of any real importance, but that
I wish to give an idea of the obstacles raised by Persians, English,
and Russians, a t every step, to impede Colonel Semineau, who
alone was sincere in the prosecution of the war which had been
so rashly undertaken. Samsoun Khan, as a Russian deserter, exercised some influence over the troops, and he was also considered
one of the most ,experienced generals of Mohamed Shah. W h a t
has been stated above will give a correct idea of his capacity, and
enable the reader to itnagine that of his Persian collea.gues, which
was inferior to his, both on scientific grounds as well as courage.
ColonelSemineau had not advanced so rapidly with his trenches,
'or rather towa~dsa result, as the commanders of the other attacks,
who had from the first established their batteries a t too great a
distance from the place ; but with a view to more satisfactory proceedings, he arrived after several days' hard work within five-andforty yards of the fortress, and this without losing a single man.
His batteries, constructed upon the ordinary rules of engineering,
being ready, he gave notice to the king of the hour a t which h e
intended to open his fire, and Mohamed Shah, anxious to see the
effect, took up a position on the neighbouring heights to have a
good view. Semineitu obtained the success which from his able
dispositions he had reason to expect: the great tower at the
angle gave way, and the ricochet fire would soon have destroyed
the smaller towers, which were on the prolongation of this face
and the upper part of the wall which connected them one with
another. Mohamed Shah, who had served in the wars against
Russia.and been present s t different sieges, had never witnessed
anything like this, and exclaimed, when he saw the result of the
fire, " It is only to-day that I understand what may be done with
artillery." T h e Afghans, not less surprised than the Shah, and
alarmed at the disastrous consequences which would follow if the
town were taken by assault, hung out a flag of truce near the angle
of the bastion, and, Semineau having given orders t.0 cease firing,
they advanced to the top of the breach and declared that they
surrendered at discretion. Two hours after, the Serdar Shere
Mohamed Khan, the brother of Yar Mohamed Khan, who commanded in the town, came to the Shah and made his submission ;
Q
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the Persian troops occupied Goria11 the same day, and their army,
which was now a t liberty to advance to the siege of Hernt, arrived
under the walls of that city in the beginning of November. The
Serdar Shere Mohamed Khan wrote to his brother from the camp
to inform him of the reason which had induced him to surrender
Gorian, and advised him not to continue a conflict which the
insufficiency of his means of defence would not permit him to
prolong against the Persian army, for, said he, " there is an European officer with it who can in forty-eight hours raze Herat to the
ground." H e also stated that in persisting in his resistance he
would only lead to the ruin of his country and great misfortunes
for himself; that it would therefore be much better for him to
throw himself upon the generosity of Mohamed Shah and open to
him the gates of the city. Yar Mohamed, indignant a t this
message, replied, '' It may be very well f~:~ou, who knew not how
to die a t your post in defence of the fortress which I confided to
your caxe, to give such advice, but for myself, as long as there
remains one cartridge to fire, a sabre in my hand, and one breath
of life in my body, I will never bow my head before the Radjars : I
mill not surrender Herat until the teeth which Abbas Mirza
ordered to be pulled out of my head a t Meshed are replaced. If
till then the fortune of war goes against me, I shall know how to
escape dishonour by dying in the breach." H e kept his word,
and his heroic defence during nine months is one of the finest
military exploits which modern history furnishes in Asia.
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THEfortified town of Herat, supposed to have been founded by
Alexander the Great, is a quadrangle of 33 miles long on the north
and south sides, and rather more on the'east and west. Its extent
would be immense if all the suburbs were included, particularly
those stretching to the west of the town beyond the Dervazeh Irak,
or Gate of Iralc ;all these suburbs are partially covered with ruins,
and numerous walled gardens about half a gunshot from the town.
A thick.rampart, constructed of earth brought from the interior of
the city, surrounds it and forms its defence. The height of this
rampart is not everywhere equal, but the average may be about
90 feet, and it is supported on the inside by counterforts of masonry.
Earth has also been taken for a distance of 108 yards beyond the
ditch, and used in the construction of this work, and being a pure
clay it has become exceedingly solid. The rampart has the
appearance of a long hill surrounding the city, and on the crest of
it a thick wall has been built about 32 feet high, flar~kedwith
round towers, which, as well a s the curtains that connect them
with each other, are loopholed for musketry; it is only in the
enormous and massive towers at the angles that cannon can be
mounted.
Generally speaking, the ground fiom the edge of the ditch
towards the country, in a radius of 250 yards, is of a marshy
nature ; water is found a t a depth of fiom 8 to 10 feet, especially
Q 2
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on the southern side of the city, for the general inclination of the
ground is from north to south. Streams, which all run east and
west, water the environs and supply the ditch ; and it flows out on
the south side opposite the large tower which forms the angle of
the place, called Iioordj Khakhister, or Tower of Cinders. Wheu
the Persians first arrived before Herat the immediate neighbourhood was well wooded-an
immense number of vines and vast
plantations of poplar, willow, cypress, and above all fir, filled the
Bagh Shah, or IZing's Garden, and bordered the avenue which
extended about a mile thence up to the g i t e of the city.
A t half a cannon-shot south of the town is a canal with steep
banks, supplied with water by the Heri-rood, which is four miles
distant from the city, and on this canal are a great number of mills ;
it is fordable only a t a few points, on which account a t different
distances little bridges have been built, each of a single arch.
There are five gates to the city of I-Ierat. T o the north of it,
near the Dervazeh Melelr, or Meshed, are two citadels-Ark Noon
or the New Citadel, and Ark Keuheuneh or the Old Citadel-which
nearly join each other. T h e first commands the second, in which
there is an enormous round tower, that then served as the palace
of the Shah Kamran.
Also on the north, parallel to the walls, and about 1250 yards from
them, rises the long hill of Talleh-bingui, which 4orms a ridge on
that side. Beyond this hill stands one of the most beautiful
mosques ever built in Asia : it is surmounted by nine minarets,
from the summits of which the interior of the town can be seen,
and its distance from it is about the longest range of a tn-elvepounder. Herat is not commanded by any of the liills in the
environs; Talleh-bingui, which is used for a cemetery, is the
highest.
Mohamed Shah pitched his camp about a mile and a half southwest of the city, on the right bank of the great canal already mentioned, and as soon as his troops arrived he conimanded them to
invest the place on all sides. T o do this was not difficult, for the
Persians were ten times as numerous as the Afghans, who had
only 4000 men to defend it. They had confined themselves to
this small number in order to economise tlie provisions they had
stored up a long time previously, having foreseen the attack they
were now called upon to repel.
T h e first day that the Persians attacked the city the Afghans
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opposed the occupatiogof the suburbs. with as much courage as obstinacy ; it was necessary to dislodge them from each house in succession ; the smallest tuft of trees, the smallest piece of mall, were cover
of which they availed themselves with great readiness, and from
thence directed a most murderous fire on their aggressors. Artillery
did no further service for the Serbaz or Persian infantry than batter
the towers and covcred ways, from which a treble fire of musketry
proceeded. The Afghans had s few pieces of heavy calibre which
they had placed on the large towers, and the fire from these guns
took t.he assailants in flank and occasioned them immense loss.
However, their ardour was not abated, and such was the progress
they made, that, in the evening, the Afghans, fearing their position
would be turned and their communications cut off, at last retreated
and abandoned the suburbs to the Persians, who immediately
surrounded the city and took up a position wherever an inequality
in the ground presented itself to shelter 'them from the uninterrupted fire which proceeded from the ramparts.
Colonel Semineau then made a careful reconnaissance of the fortifications, and traced a plan of attack, which he submitted on the
following morning to the Shah. In this he indicated, as the best
point on which to make a regular approach, the great tower a t the
angle of the city, called Koordj Khodja" Abdul Hamid, of which
he had the opportunity of examining with a glass, from the
minarets of Talleh-bingui, the front within the town. T h e King
thought the plan was an excellent one ;but such was his wretched
vacillation, and so strong were the intrigues of the English party,
that it was never acted upon, and the attack was indefinitely delayed.
The Shah was afraid of offending the different Persian commanders, for, moved by presnmptuous vanity, they refused to be
directed by an European, and promised, if allowed to act for themselves, to take the city in eight days. This emulation amongst his
lieutenants, which evinced itself by false oaths and hollow protestations of devotion, the Shall thought. he ought not to discourage ; and
as each asserted he w ~ braver
s
and wiser than all the rest, he made
each independent in his command, and ordered them to take up
positions according to their own good pleasure on whatever p0int.s
they considered most eligible: they were also to attack as they
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pleased, without any regard to acting in concert, as each would
then derive from his own deeds the honour that 'would attach to
them.
Sad indeed were the cocsequences of these incredible arrangements : everything in the trenches was done a t random, excepting
that it might be saia they agreed on one point only, namely, to
make the greatest possible noise ~ i t h o u tarriving a t any result.
T h e artillery played without judgment on the mhole circumference
of the place, and wasted their shot in a point-blank fire against 'the
rampart, which all the cannon-balls in the world could not destroy.
T h e fi13t operation in each trench was an endeavour to bring down
the tower and curtains on the crest of the rampart, before they
thought of how they were to pass the ditch : to effect the latter purpose the Persian generals could devise no brighter scheme than
letting off the water ; therefore they broke the darn and laid it dry,
greatly to the convenience of the Afghans, who till then could not
get in or out of the city excepting a t the gates, which were masked.
From that time they constantly harassed the Persians by surprises
on all points, the great advantage of exit and entrance having been
given them by their enemies.
Although t,he operations were thus disjointed and subject to the
caprice of a score and a half of commanders in the trenches, Hadji
Mirza Agassee, an old Mollah, entirely ignorant of military science,
reserved to himself the chief direction of the siege ; his object, as
before stated, was to prolong it till the diplomatic struggle in
which he had, with Russia, engaged against England, should be
decided. But as the Shhh had not at that time been convinced by
his arguments, and pressed his generals to take the town as quickly
as possible, the prime minister gave them secret c,ounter-orders to
do nothing ;they fought therefore without a purpose ; men were lost
without necessity, and treason was the order of the day.
Colonel Semineau alone was ignorant of these disloyal intrigues,
and conducted his operatiops on the side assigned to him, the Gate
of Kandahar, with his habitual resolution, but the prime minister
found means to paralyze his best measures by giving. him a s
coadjutors Persian officers who did not execute his orders. On
the other hand, Hadji Mirza Agassee committed a thousand extravagances, more like the lucubrations of a diseased brain than the
rational conceptions of the commander of an army. The following
facts will only give a slight idea of his eccentricities ; were they all

.
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to be chronicled, they would fill volumes-a few only shall be men3.
,'
tioned.
Two or three of the commanders in the trenches, being sufficiently
~owerfulto have nothing to fear from the minister, and being even
hostile to him, had not been favoured prith his views, and having pushed their works with ardour were more prepared to attempt a n
assault; but it was necessary that a diversion in their favour
should be made by the troops in the other trenches. This diver- '
sion was ostensibly promised to them by Hadji Mirza Agassee,
but he secretly forbade those who were to carry it out from doing
so ; the gallant fellows therefore who made the assault found
themselves betrayed, and, crushed by the Afghans, lost heart for
any future attempt.
At another time ammunition was wanting at the moment of
attack ; or the cartridges for the guns and musketry were blank.
This happened several times in the trenches commanded by
Prince Seifet Dooulet ; nevertheless he was not discouraged, and,
after having made the necessary arrangements, applied to the
prime minister for permission to make an attack that should reach
the very heart of the city. His request was granted, but a condition was attached to it, namely, that he must trust nothing to
chance, but make a trial first. '(If you succeed," said he to the
prince, '' do not advance too far, retire after a slight engagement ;
be satisfied with knowing that you have the advantage, that should
be suficient for you ; we shall see later what can be attempted definitively." I n vain the gallant prince represented that the
Afghans were quite ignorant of the works in his trenches, that to
make a simple trial would only serve to expose them, and enable
them to construct other works that might completely neutralize the
effect of his. T h e minister remained ~mmoveablein his determination, and this spirited oflicer was obliged to give up his
cherished hopes of serving his sovereign and distinguishing himself.
From that time the intriguers tempered his zeal by withholding
the ammunition and projectiles that were requisite for the operations he had to conduct; and Hadji Mirza Agassee, saying
that he had scarcely enough himself to defend the king's camp
if it should be attacked, coldly added, "You must do the best
you can, it is your affair." Upon receiving this reply, Seifet
Dooulet, and those chiefs who were similarly circumstanced,
cut some thousands of balls out of the ruins of the marble
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tombs ou the Talleh-bingui, but after they had put their troops
to dl that labour the powder requisite to discharge them a t
the enemy was denied these energetic officers. T h e king had
masked all the gates of the town as soon as he arrived before it,
but a few days after the Hadji said that they ougl~tto give
the Afghans the power to move ont; and the reason he assigned for this strnnge conduct was that the rebels should have
an opportunity of escaping. " If I weye to be master of the town
in ten days," he said, " there would be too many of them to punish."
A t the same time he by degrees formed a Persian party in the
city, who conferred with him, proposing to admit during the
night some of the king's troops, and deliver to him all the artillery
of the Shah Iiamran; everything was agreed upon, and thk
sound of the trumpet was to be the signal for the Fersians
to enter the -city. The trumpet did sound, but the Persians
never appeared ; and, in the& stead, the accomplices in this
treason saw approaching the troops of Yar Mohanled Khan, who
came down upon them and cut them to pieces. Hadji Mirza
Agassee had himself revealed the whole plot to the Vizier of Shah
Iiamran !
Again : Mohamed Shah had ordered that a 96-pounder should be
cast upon.the spot,,which with some difficulty u7asdone, but when it
minister discovered that it required too much
was mounted the
ammunition, and he mas very indignant with the commander of the
W h a t a fool you are !" he said to him ; " cannot you
artillery.
see that this piece was cast far more for the purpose of t,errifying
than of destroying the Afghans? tell your men to fire over the
town ;that will frighten the Shah Kamran, and every morning you
can send a waggon and a few artillerymen round to the other side
to pick up the balls that will haye fallen beyond it."
Thus it will be seen that the prime minister was in no hurry to
take Herat, but neither was he disposed to abandon the siege, for
as soon as the troops were installed he made each battalion clear a
piece of ground and sow it, which plainly showed that he intended
to remain till the next harvest. As long as Mohamed Shah was
not prevailed upon by the Hadji to waive his original ideas of the
siege of Herat, he showed himself far less benevolently inclined
to the Afghans and their adherents than his minister was, and
ordered that all who were taken prisoners should be put to death :
he often commanded that these executions should take place under
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his own eyes, and, when beholding the vast space of bloodstained
ground, was once heard 'to say In Gulistan est," c L This is a
garden of roses."
In another instance, when the treason of Mirza Naghee was detected, the same savage feeling was manifested. That officer was
in a high position at court, and his guilt mas proved by an intercepted letter of his to the Shah IKamran, in which he informed the
Afghan prince of what mas doing in the Persian camp, and recommended him also to warn Mr. M'Neil to hasten his arrival, if he
wished t o prevent the fall of the town. The Shah sent immediately
for the criminal, and, perfectly regardless of the entreaties of the
Hadji, ordered that he should lose his life under the bastinsdo,
and that his body should be exposed on a gibbet before the ramparts of the city.
The prime minister was well aware that his sovereign would
have more than enough to do to annihilate all the traitors in his
camp, and for this simple reason-they were most of them his own
friends ; from that moment he determined to induce the Shah to
participate in his views, and finally succeeded in his object. But
both the one and the other stood so much in awe of General
Simonitch that they concealed from him the little inclination they
had to continue this war with the Afghans, and they prolonged it
only to avoid incurring the indignation of that diplomatist.
Colonel Semineau was no longer an obstacle to the proceedings of
the prime minister, for, shortly after the arrival of the army, he had
by a series of intrigues forced him to abstain from taking further park
in the active' operations. T h e day after that on which the place was
invested the Colonel advanced, with 200 recruits who had arrived
in camp the evening before, to an Imaum Zadeh," situated a t a
short distance from the Gate of Kandahar, and there took up his
position; the ground about it was undulating and very much
broken, and for a considerable space cbvered with burial-grounds,
gardens, and the ruins of houses and out-buildings. Once in possession of the Imaum Zadeh, he entrenched it, and connected it by
some small earthworks with an ab-ambar,? situated abont 11yards
ill front of his position. This brought him so near the gate of the
town as to give rise to a hope that some lucky chance or clever
coup de main might one day or other put the place in his hands,

*

Saint's tomb.

t

Reservoir OF water.

*

234

"

ATTACK O F THE AFGHANS.

CHAP. XVII.

and, had he been at $11 supported in his plans, that would have
happened.
T h e first night he held this post was exceedingly dark, and
favoured a n attack that 2000 Afghans moving silently out of. the
town attempted against it. The Imaum Zadeh mas a t the time but
imperfectly protected by a slight earthwork scarcely finished, and
the enemy crept up to it unperceived, until noticed by Colonel Semineau himself, who was returning from an inspection of his works.
H e had scarcely regained the tomb when a Herculean soldier who
had followed him crawled up the breastwork with his sword raised
to cleave him to the ground, but before he could do so he fell by
a ball from the Colonel's pistol. The Afghans, seeing they were
discovered by this rash action of their comrade, at once rushed
towards the work, and, as they gained the top, would certainly have
remained masters of it if Semineau had lost his coolness for a moment. His recruits, under fire for the first time, stood astounded
a t being thus assailed by at least twice their numher, and but for
the energetic conduct of their commander, which restored their
courage, would have been massacred without dealing a blow even
in self-defence. When they had repulsed their enemies with the
bayonet, the Colonel placed them round the breastwork, conjuring
them to stand, which they had every inclination not to do, annoyed as they were by a well-sustained fire from the walls, though
the stupidity and clumsiness of the Afghans assisted them in no
slight degree. T h e besieged threw fire-balls from the town to guide
their party, but these never reached the Iniaum Zadeh ; they fell
short amongst the Afghans, and consequently rendered them visible
to the Persians, by whose bullets they were cruelly decimated. They
could not return the fire because they had only their sabres with
them, and therefore fell by hundreds on the work ; and after four
hours' hard fighting, seeing that it was impossible to overcome the
resistance maintained by the little garrison, they retircd into the
city.
A Persian Sertip, Meuhbalee Khan, and a relation of the prime
minister, who was posted 200 yards in rear of the Imaum Zadeh with
300 men, with orders to support the Colonel, instead of executing
the duty assigned to him, as soon as he heard the firing made all
his preparatiofls to escaye in case the enemy should reach his position ; but the next morning, when he heard that the men whom he
had abandoned had been victorious in the struggle, and still held
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the post intrusted to them, he could not believe it, and gave as an
excuse for his inaction that he did not consider himself in sufficient
strength to advance to their assistance, that he believed they were
all killed, and consequently that it was useless to try to help them.
The truth was that this inaction fell in with the views of the
prime minister as well as of this coward.
A Persian proverb says, " I t is not always those who sow the
corn who reap the crop," and Meuhbalee .Khan remembered it :
hastily wrapping a handkerchief round one hand, he hurried with
his feigned wound into the presence of Mohamed Shah, and gave
his sovereign a most flowery description of the courage he had
displayed in the defence of the Imaum Zadeh, without even naming
the brave Semineau, but the monarch, enlightened by more trutllful
informers, presented the Colonel with a watch set in jewels, an
acknowledgment of the royal appreciation of his services, which is
in Persia considered as equivalent to receiving a decoration. Notwithstanding the flagrant falsehood in which this craven Meuhbalee
Khan was thus detected, the Hadji insisted upon his remaining the
colleague of Colonel Semineau in the intrenchments in front of the
Kandahar Gate, to the great annoyance of that officer, who well
knew the cowardice, ignorance, and treachery of the Sertip : in an
evil moment, however, he yielded to the desire of the Hadji, and
very unfortunately, for a few days after, in his absence, the Khan
allowed the Afghans to take the works constructed with so much
trouble and defended a t such a cost of life, decamping with the
men under his orders.
From that moment Semineau, who till then had constantly
struggled against the cowardice and treachery of others, ceased to
take any part in the siege, and retired to his tent in disgust, a result
which perfectly fell in with the schemes of Hadji Agassee. Nevertheless, when he waited upon the Shah, this brave soldier hesitated
not to tell him his opinion, and point out to him that he was
betrayed. The weak-minded monarch bent his head and reflected ;
but never profited by the information and advice given to him.
His minister directed his conduct as he pleased, and knew how to
remove from his mind the most unfavourable impressions regarding
himself.
The Afghans distinguished themselves daily by the most daring
attaclts upon the besiegers : sometimes a handful of horsemen would
issue from the town, charge a whole corps of Persian infantry, and
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never retire without making many prisoners or comn~ittinggreat
slaughter; sometimes a detachment would fight till the death of
the last man amongst them : theirs was always hand-to-hand
work with the sabre, and was perfectly murderous. One day
they surprised two battalions of Chaghaghis posted on the Tallehbingui, killed 400 of their men, and carried off two guns.
Their commander, the Sertip Hadji Khan, had very imprudently
a t nightfall of the previous day admitted within his lines 100
Afghans, who besought him to gwnt them hospitality, assuring him
that they had always been on the side of Mohamecl Shah, but that
i t had never been possible for t h e n to escape f ~ o mthe city till then.
T h e too confiding Sertip allowed them to remain with his own men,
and a t midnight they sprung upon the piled alms of the soldiers
sleeping beside them, and with the aid of 2 0 0 of their countrymen,
who had followed them and crept up the hills to the works, made
a frightful carnage, after which they retired with one prisoner, a
'
captain of artillery, and the two guns that he comrnancled.
The Persian army, harassed without intermission by sorties of
this description, never had a moment's repose : it maintained itself
with difficulty, for the provisions mere brought fi-om a great clistance, and often intercepted by parties of Afghans who scourecl
the surrounding country. T h e neiglibourhood of I-Ierat 11ad supplied the bazaars of the camp very well for three or four months,
and these resources would have lasted three times as long if they
had been properly managed ; but they were wasted and nlisused,
and it was not long before the half-famished soldiers of Mohamed Shah were reduced to browse upon clover, and seek for wild
roots to satisfy their hunger. By marauding, in which they were
great adepts, they sometimes managed to procure a little corn or
barley, of which they made coaree bread, and ate it ravenously
half baked.
The beleaguered city m s in no better condition ; tbe Afghans
felt the miseries of famine even in a worse degree than their
enemies. They were iu want of the first nccessaries of life-salt
was sold at 20s. an ounce ; the horses, camels, mules, asses, and
even animals reckoned unclean by Mi~ssulmans,had been consunied,
and the population was dreadfully reduced by hunger. The water
in the canals which supplied the city having been turned off by the
Persians, it was necessary to have recourse to that in the tanks,
which was very brackish, and also insufficient, for most of them
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being supplied from the outside of the town were soon dried up,
and this added one more to the terrible sufferings of the inhabitants. Yar Mohamed placed sentries .on all the cisterns that were
supplied by springs, and the water that rose in thein was parsimoniously dealt out to the people every tventy-four hours. The
bazaars, public squares, and mosques were crowded with sufferers
imploring the pity of the serdars as they went by, and begging
for food; to prove their misery they laid out before them the
corpses of their townsmen who had died of hunger, but the'chiefs,
reduced to extremity themselves, could only encourage them by
words and their own stern resignation. T o all these horrors was
at length superadded the failure of ammunition. Yar Mohamed
Khan, it was true, ordered some to be made, but either the materials were bad or the workmen ignorant, for the powder b~u-ned
in the cannon and left the ball as it was put in.
The original defenders of the city, who amounted a t the beginning of'the siege to 4000, were reduced to half that number in the
first month of the operations, owing as much to the defections
produced by the intrigues of the Russians and Persians, as from
their losses'in action; but, as the Afghans are nearly d l solfliers by birth, Yar Mohamed filled up his ranks with tradesmen
and workmen. Those who were. for defending the place to the
last extremity, a t the head of whom were the Vizier, his cousin the
Serdar Dine Mohamed Khan, and Captain Pottinger, were immoveable in their resolution ; but those who were for submitting,
and who affected to act in the name of the Shah Kamran, were
daily intriguing, and tried frequently to give the city up to the
besiegers ; so that but a handful of brave Afghans were frequently
obliged to repel the attacks from the enemy outside the walls, and
those from their countrymen within as well; but this contest was of
short duration, for the traitors, seeing the fruitlessness of their disloyalty, took refuge in the camp of i\iIoharneil Shah, with the exception of their nominal chief Shah Kamran, who was imprisoned and
closely watched in the citadel, where he could get drunk a t his
ease ; he ceased not to urge the surrender of the place, but, though
Yar Mohamed treated him with external respect, it was long since
he had paid the least regard to his commands.
Amongst the Afghans who had joined the Persian army were
Djelat Edrlin Mirza, a son, and the Serdar Chems Eddin Khan,
a brother-in-law, of the Shah ILtmran ; the former was governor of
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Subzawar, the latter of Furrah, fortified places south of EIerat.
They had brought mith them 1000 Popolzyes and Noorzyes, who
were a valuable reinforcement to the Persians ; also 2000 Hazarahs
of Kalehnoon, who, by the clever policy of Assaf Dooulet, the
matema1 uncle of Mohamed Shah, were attached to the Persian
party. This welcome addition to his forces saved the king from
the necessity of raising the siege so soon as f h m the utterly
destitute state of his army he must otherwise have done, and he
aften~ardsproved his gratitude to these chiefs by bestowing lucrative grants upon all, and continuing their rank in the Persian
army when they followed him in his retreat.
I t has been stated that General Simonitch and Mr. M'Neil had
remained a t Teheran after the departure of the Shah for Herat,
the latter greatly. distressed a t an event which he had long before
announced by anticipation to his owl1 government, but which he
had constantly assured the Persians would never happen. " I n
the present state of his finances,'' he said, " the Shah will never
get 10,000 men together to take into the field!'
The facts had
not justified his predictions, and he persisted against them so far as
to doubt that Herat was attacked, even after the arrival of the
army under its walls; but at last he was obliged to believe it.
Learning that the siege had commenced, and that the place was
on the point of being taken in spite of his intrigues amongst the
Persian chiefs, and the useless efforts of his agent Colonel Stoddart to induce the Shah to retire, he became so alarmed that
he determined to visit the royal camp himself. H e had, it is
true, no order from his government to authorize his blring this
journey, but he provided himself with a very indirect m e from the
Governor-General of India, and arrived on the 8th of March,
1838, under the walls of Herat. The coldness of his reception,
and the displeasure evident in the king's countenance, would have
daunted any less hardened diplomatist than himself; but in spite
of the insufficiency of his instructions, he attacked the question of
the retreat afresh with his usual tenacity, and used all the arguments that diplomacy or even threats could furnish to induce the
Shah to retire, but without success.
The following extracts are from the work of M. Alexandre
Thomas, ' Simple i propos de l'lIistoire Diplomatique,' which has
been my guide in all that concerns the negociations that took
place between Russia, Persia, and Great Britain. This excellent
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work is exceeding1y dry, .but that has not mevented me from consulting i t ; its l e i i t h has obliged me to mike a close abridgment
of a portion ; and to the extracts, which I shall give nearly
I have only added circumstances that had been forptten-for
the asperity of his opinions I leave Mons. Thomas
responsible. " Mr. M'Neil," says this author, " pressed and menaced, but the Shah excused himself as he did to Mr. Ellis-( he
is not a free agent, he is afraid of giving umbrage to the Russian
Government by abandoning the place; if he had known he was
running the risk of losing the friendship of the British Government, he would not have gone so f a r ; if Mr. MLNeilwas in a
position to inform him-that if he did not at once desist he would
be attacked by the British, he mould desist at once: he must absolutely be so spoken to, so treated by Great Britain, to support him
against Russia.'
" Mr. McNeil did his best and gained time : he went from the
besiegers to the besieged, from the city to the camp, carrying,
dictating, changing the concessions of both parties; but when he
went into Herat he was always careful to take with him Major
D'Arcy Todd of the artillery, in order that he might assist Captain
Pottinger with his advice. However, by dint of perseverance and
parley, the British Envoy had succeeded in settling the preliminaries of peace, when the Russian Ambassador reached the Persian camp ; a despatch also arrived from Lord Pdmerston dated
February 12, 1836, enclosing an extract, from one from Lord
Durham, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, in which it was
stated that ' Count Nesselrode said that he was convinced that our
minister had been misinformed, and that Count Simonitch had
never given any such advice to the Shah as that which had been
Lord Palmerston
attributed to him, namely, to seize Herat.'
proceeded, therefore, to address fresh reproofs to his agent, though
it appeared that his lordship was not entirely convinced by Lord
Durham's assertion, for he demanded, timidly it is true, but
still he demanded, from M. de Nesselrode the recall of C.ount
Simonitch from Teheran, and also that of the Russian deserters
employed in the army of the Persian sovereign ; however, this did
not prevent him from writing to Mr. M'Neil that the general was
offended a t his bad opinion of him, recommended him to be less
suspicious for the future, and to live on good terms with his
colleague ;information which, instead of extinguishing, only added
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fuel to the fire. Its first effect was to break off the preliminaries of peace to which the British envoy had brought bot,h
parties to consent; and thc second was immediately to restore
to Count Sinlonitch his influence in the councils of the Shah,
while Mr. MLNeillost all his. This letter from Lord Palmerston
deprived him of all power of action, for it contained not a word
about I-lerat-no notice whatever of Russia ; it seemed to reduce
the pacitic conclusion of the whole affair to the secondary question
of a good understanding between the two diplomatists.
Mr. M'Neil hacl then nothing more to say ; his credit fell rapidly
when it was seen that he was not supported ; annoyances and affronts
of all kinds were put upon the English ; Russia, who recalled her
deserters, exacted the withdrawal of all the English officers in the
service of the Shah ; and by one of those unhappy coincidences to
which Lord Palmerston always exposes himself by his consideration
for doubtful friends, and which only produce vexatious results, the
British oacers were requested to withdraw from the camp before
Herat, just when Mr. M'Neil had received the order to leave
them a t the disposition of the Shah as long as he was .not obliged
to quit the Persian territory himself * H e was almost driven to
the. last extremity-he ought to break all diplomatic relations with
the Shah, and retire without having even o6cially opened any
discussion touching upon Russian intrigues. H e did break them,
and retired for a doubtful and almost insignificant afiont from
t h e Persian court. Notwithstanding the strict orders of Mohamed Shah that no one should have any communication with
Herat, Mr. MLNeilcontinued to have secret correspondence with
the besieged, and a courier with some desl~atchesaddressed to him
was arrested by the Persian videttes; the Persian monarch had
perhaps a right to be more indignant at this than hc was, but he only
sent the letters to the British envoy, and begged him not to expose
himself to have others intercepted. Probably few sovereigns mould
have shown more moderation on such an occasion, but Mr. McNeil
considered himself affronted by this act, which he looked upon as an
infringement of his rights, and insisted upon an apology from the
prime minister; this was refused, and he adopted the refusal as
the basis of his rupture with the Persian Government. Without
taking into account the continued hostility of Russia, which for
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three years had .menaced the barriers of British India, Mr.
i\'lcNeil announces to his own Government his rupture with that
of the Shah in the following terms :-

" ' After

,

.

" ' N d ~ e d June
,

85, 1533.

having exhausted all the means I could devise to
induce the Persian Government to grant me reparation and satisfaction for the violence offered to the messenger, and finding that
I could obtain nothing, I felt compelled, not only in consequence
of the evident determination of the Persian Government not to
grant what I .had demanded, but also because of its perseverance
in a course of proceeding towards me in camp which I felt was
lowering the character of the mission in the estimation both of
Persians and Afghans, to quit the court, and I am now on my
way to the Turkish frontier, where I shall hope to receive further
instructions from your Lordship.
What course the Persian
Government will now pursue I know not : some public act of reparation, which will prove to the people of Pe.rsia and of Central
A s h that we are not with impunity ta be insulted, is in my opinion
iudispensably necessary-I will not say to restore us to our former
position, but to enable us to retain one of any credit or respectability.
Both the Persians and the Afghans in the Shah's camp saw with
amazement the Persian Government treating a British mission a s
a proscribed body, and punishing .persons who ventured to hold
even a casual communication with it ; while some of the members
of the Russian mission took to task, and threatened to get punished
for that offence, persons who occasionally visited a t my tent,
taking some precautions to prevent their being discovered.'
" I n the month of Mayy,11838, before he quitted the camp, the
British envoy despatched Major Todd to Lord Buckland, GovernorGeneral of India, with despatches that informed him of the rupture
which had taken place. After rapidly crossing Afghanistan the
Major arrived in July at Simla, where he .Found his Lordship, who
was greatly impressed with the importance of the letters placed in
his hands ; it has even been affirnled that- they were the cause of
his determination to make war on Kabul the following year.
('On the eve of his departure from the camp Mr. M'Neil obtained
permission.to go into the city once more to make a last attempt 'at
a reconciliation between the Persians and the Afghans ; he passed
the night in Herat, but, instead of fulfilling his promise, it was
found that he had only beeu there to make presents to Shah
R
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Kamran and his adherents to induce them to renounce their
project of surrendering the place. The next day he went to the
Shah, and told him that the Heratees would not hear of peace, and
that he must raise the siege. On the refusal of the Shah, the
British ambassador struck his tents, and left for Tauriz, where he
decided to wait for further instructions from his Government, to
which, on the 11th April, 1538,he wrote as follows : ' The question
of Herat seems therefore to be the question of all Afghanistan, for
i t is no secret to any one that the British Government has been
desirous to prevent its fall, and that Russia, on the contrary, has
been solicitous to see it in the hands of Persia.' "
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MR. &!'NEIL
had scarcely reached Meshed when he allowed free
scope to his resentment against the Persians; and he carried
matters to such extremes, that one is in truth tempted to ask if his
actions ought not to place him under the ban of civilised nations.
On his accession to the throne Mohamed Shah had met with
opposition from three of his uncles, and one, Seifet Dooulet,
Governor of Ispahan, had been supported in a semi-revolt against
him by Sjud Mohanled Bagher, the great Muchteid of that city,
whose power over the masses was great; indeed he could raise
them with a word. The British envoy knew that after the fall of
Seifet the chief of Islam had retained a feeling of resentment
against Mohamed Shah, which he did not even take the pains
to conceal; Mr. MGNeilwrote, therefore, a furious letter to the
Suyd, in which he insinuated that he ought to preach a crusade
a.gainst his sovereign, and left him to believe that he would in sd
doing be supported by the British, who were, he said, attached
to the Persian people, and were angry only with their unworthy
monarch. IIappily the enlightened mind of Syud Mohamed
Bagher saw this attempt in its proper light ; he sent Mr. M6Neil's
letter to the Shah, and replied thus' to the Envoy himself: " T h e
Persians have always been remarkable for their attachment to their
kings, and to you, an European Envoy, less than to any one else
does it appertain to raise a storm in a country where the English
R 2
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have always been received according to the dictates of the laws of
hospitality." Thus mas arrested the progress of an evil which
might have proved immense. "Mr. MWeil," says Monsieur
Thomas, " had not reached Tauriz when he received from Lord
Palmerston a reply to one of his despatches, anterior to that in
which he had announced his rupture with the Persian Government..
I t was after having stretched his patience to the very utmost, and
when there was not the least hope of gaining his point by wisdom
and firmness, that the British Agent received from his Lordship
the permission to act energetically in the name of Great Britain.
" 'The Shah should have been told from the beginning,' said
Lord Palmerston, ' that the British Government ~erceivedin this
expedition a hostility entirely incompatible mith the spirit of the
alliance entered into between Persia and Great Britain.'
" A t the same time an English fleet sent by the Indian Gox-ernment disembarked on the coast of Persia, and took possession of
the Island of Harrack. As soon as Mr. M'Neil received this intelligence he sent Colonel Stoddart, as the bearer of an ultimatum, to
the camp of Mohanled Shah, informing that sovereign that Great
Britain had determined to arrest his prc~jects of conquest in
Afghanistan, and that, if he did not immediately raise the siege of
Herat, the taking of Ihrraclc by the English would be fcllowed by
further and more significant acts of hostility on their part."
England was not ignorant whence this injury proceeded, but she
could hardly attack the source without creating a fresh complication of interests, and English pride is not so hasty as to be unable
to resign itself, wl~endesirable, to a cold-blooded policy. Not
daring t o g o direct to the Russian Court., whose incognito, though
but loosely kept, slie respected, she dealt a sick blow, as if to
warn and disconcert those who would be tempted to try to profit by
their manmuvres. However that might be, Mr. MiNeil armed
with the last despatch that he had received, was perfectly at liberty
to act or tllreaten as he pleased, but the power came too late, as the
oppoltunity w a s lost; the rupture with Mohamed Shah was
complete, and in his reply the British Envoy could only infirm
Lord Palmerston of the extent of the mischief.
I t has been stated that when the Persian army marched fron
Teheran it was accompanied by a Russian officer named Vikovitch,
who quitted it a t Nishapoor, having had numerous andieuces of the
Shah and his prime minister : very soon after he reached IIandahar,

.

.
.

I

CHAP.XTITI. TREATY BETWEEN PERSIA AND KANDAHAR.

245

1

where in twelve days he concluded a treaty offensive and defensive
with Kohendil Khan, Sovereign Serdar of that principality.
After this he went to Icabul, where he remained several months.
Burnes, who had been some time in that city whcn the Russian
officer arrived, was charged by his government with the fulfilment of a mission very similar to that of the Russian ; namely,
to smooth the existing differences between the Emir of Kabul and
the Maharadjah of the Punjab.
Vikovitch was a t first not well received by Dost Mohamed, whose
tendencies were entirely English ; but thc Emir, having found only
hesitation and injustice in the mediation he had requested of Lord
Aucklancl for the settlement of the difficulties existing between
himself and Runjeet Sing, he was in despair, and turned to the
side of the Russians and the Persians.
When the Russian diplomatist quittell I<abul he was accompanied by an Afghan Syud named Yaya, whom the Emir sent to
Mohamed Shah to follow up the negotiations commenced by Vikovitch ; they remained several days at Kandahar, and left with
Mohamed Omar Khan, the second son of Kohendil Khan, who
was charged by his father wit11 a mission to the Persian monarch
analogous to that of the Syud of Kabul. These three personages
arrived at the royal camp a t Herat some time after Mr. M'Neil had
quitted it, and the following is his appreciation of the results of the
Russian officer's embassy.
H e writes to his government., " Before my messenger (Colonel
Stoddart, bearer of the ultimatum) could reach the Shah of Persia,
a treaty had been concluded between the Prince of Kandahar and
his Persian Majesty, and the Russian minister had formally guaranteed the fulfilment of the engagements contracted by the two
parties. A treaty of the same nature was in course of completion
with Kabul also, and Captain Vikovitch, after having been received
by the Shah in his camp, had set out a second time for that city
and Kandahar, furnished with immense sums of money for the
purpose of terminating arrangements so auspiciously commenced to
establish Persian domination and Russian supremacy in all the
Afghan states. The entire colmtry from the Russian frontier on
the Araxes to the banks of t.he Indus had been secretly tampered
with and raised by Muscovite agents, some openly accredited,
others without any ostensible public duty, all engaged in forming a
line of influence which not only counteracted the views arid interests

.

04l6

DECLARATIOX 01; LORD PALMEESTOR. C u ~ r XTIII.
.

of Great Britain, hut disturbed and threatened her empire in the
East."
Lord Palmerston," observes Mons. Thomas, " replied to
Mr. MCNeil on the 27th July, 1838, and wishing to nard off
fresh perils, a s well as the embarrassments pointed out by his
agent, he at last gave up the reserve and temporising with which
up to that period he had acted towards Persia; he discovered
in the treaty of 1514, not a reason for political inaction, as he had
aftirmed at the commencement, but a perfect right of interventio~,
which is what the terms of the treaty most positively deny : nothing
can be more clear.
'If war,' it is said therein, 'should be
declared between the Afghans and the Persians, the English
Government would not interfere on either side, unless its pacific
mediation should be solicited by both the contending parties.'
His Lordship went further even than he had ever done before, and,
not content with pointing out Russian influence as a permanent
sturnblingblock in the way of Pewia, as a fatal snare which Persia
should mistrust for her own sake and in her own interest, he loudly
1)roclaimed that ' the suggestions of Russia were antagonistic to the
peace and prosperity of Great Britain.'
" This was a great effort," says Mons. Thomas, an useless effort
after the extremities to which he had been reduced with Persia,
aimless and without result, if it did not bear upon a point other
than that on nhich it seemed to be directed." The following is an
extract from Lord Palmerston's despatch to Mr. MLNeil,dated
Foreign Office, July 27th, 1838 :-"I have to instruct you to
state to the Shah of Persia, that, whereas the spirit and purport of
the treaty between Persia and Great Britain is that Persia should
be a defensive barrier for the British possessions in India, and that
the Persian Government should co-operate with that of Great
Britain in defending British India, it appears, on the cont,rary,
that the Shah is occupied in subverting those intelwning states
between Persia and India which might prove additional barriers of
defence for the British possessions, and that in these operations he
has openly connected himself with an European power for purposes
avowedly unfriendly, if not absolutely hostile, to British interests;
that, under these circumstances, and as he has thought fit to enter
upon a course of proceeding wholly a t variance with the spirit and
intent of the above-mentioned treaty, Great Britain will feel hermlf a t liberty to adopt, without reference to that treaty,.such mea-
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sures as a due regard.for her own interests and the security of her
dominions may suggest." *
'' Lord Palmerston," remarks Mons. Thomas, "had failed to
preserve the Persian alliance at a time when it might have been
done by moderation and firmness only, and now that it was lost he
adopted violence and menaces to regain it. I t was the British
Government, throwing aside the indecision caused by the fear of
Russia, taking a t last an extreme line, not against Russia, which
it always treated with deference,-not
against Persia, which remained its sturdy enemy under the protection of the Tzar,-but
against the whole of the East, which it then wished to terrify
with the power of Great Britain, and this after having displayed
her weakness for four years. I t now became necessary to raise
Persia from the depths into which she had fallen by accepting the
Russian alliance, and some great exploit was to be performed in
tbe narr.e of England alone ; the weakness with which the Tzar's
proceedings in Penia had been combated was bitterly repented of,
and they must now be stopped in Afghanistan as by a thunderbolt:
SO great was the fear of being outstripped by the indefatigable
activity of Muscovite diplomacy, that it was thought preferable to
destroy it at the outset." W e shall see to what this new system led,
and will judge, of it by its fruits.
General Simonitch made up his mind to leave Teheran when he
saw that Mr. M'Neil had gone to the royal camp, and, in proportion as the reception of the British minister had been cold and
reserved, was his Majesty's manner to the Russian gracious and
expressive of his anxiety to please ;' for as Mr. M'Neil had, in
consoquence of not being supported by his government, lost the
influence that he had at one time succeeded in obtaining, and
had even come to a rupture with the Persian Court, General
Simonitch had become more powerful than ever, and the Shah,
against the advice of his first minister,-was devoted to him body
and soul. This diplomatist was a Dalmatian, who, being in the
French army in 1812 or 1813, was taken prisoner by the Russians,
and after the fall of Napoleon entered their servjce. I t is true he

* Mohamed Shah had renounced
this conventiou long before the British
Government; and when pressed by Mr.
Ellis and Mr. M'Neil to conform t o it,
he said that in his eyes it had been

annihilated ever since the day on which
the Cabinet of London had refused t o
psy to that of Teheran the subsidies
t h a t Great Britain had by the same
treaty engaged to.furnish.-Forrim:
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treated the Persian King with rough respect, which had a certah
effect upon the weak but goodnatured monarch, who entertained
a species of veneration for all those who had served under
that Emperor; and after having been sharply rebuked by the
Russian ambassador for all the deception that had been practised from the commencement of the siege, the Shah ordered the
chiefs of his army to act henceforth in col1formit.y with the instructions of the Russian minister.
Hadji Mirza Agassee, thus thwarted in his scheme of retreating,
exerted himself as much as possible to get these orders revoked, but
in vain. H e then tried to paralyse their effect by manifest ill-will in
furnishing the materials, ammunition, and stores requisite for the
works necessitated by the new arrangements that were adopted. H e
did not conceal the vexation he felt even to General Simonitcll,
and explained his opinion t.o him very categorically. " Why should
I take T3erat ? " he said to the dragoman ; '' why should I espoae-a
crowd of innocent people to perish for the fault of one individual
only ?-of Yar Mohamed Khan, who takes all the revenues of the
province for his ova profit, instead of paying me the tribute ; and who
authorized all the pillage that has been committed by the Afghans
upon the Persian merchant... And then, it would be impossible for
me to keep Herat mith Persian soldiers, idle gluttons, who the
moment they are masters of the place will think only of eating pillau,
and amusing themselves with the women. The Afghans, whose baggage is light enough, for they have never anything to lose, will come
back some day and cut their throats. Besides, you have not given
me the material support that you promised ; on the contrary, you
have taken away the Russian deserters: all this ought to induce
the Shah to raise this unhappy siege, which ruins the country and
creates difficulties with England."
But General Simonitch was not to be impeded by this obstinate old man. He inlmediately sent for Colonel Semineau, whose
straightforward conduct had won his esteem, and in some degree
reproached him for the tardy manner in which the operations
were conducted. T h e Colonel exculpated himsclf by showing
it was not his fault, as treachery and the general ill-feeling had
obliged him to hold himself aloof after the first few days of the siege ;
a t the same time he submitted to him the plan of attack which he had
presented to the Shah seven months before, but never received authority to put into execution. The General then desired Lieutenant-
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Colonel Blaremberg, the Russian officer of Engineers attached to
the embassy, to inspect the works in the trenches, and as speedily
as possible report his opinion of them. M. Blaremberg was soon
convinced that they were conducted in a manner entirely contrary
to the rules of common sense, and that the wisest course to take
would be even then to adopt the plan of Colonel Semineau, arid
this was the one subsequently carried out by General Simonitch.
Fascines and gabions were immediately made in great numbers ;
and as the .soldiers would do not.hing without being well paid,
the Russian minister drew from his own treasury the funds
necessary to satisfy them, and they worked accordingly, but he
alienated the chiefs from his cause because he never gratified
their avarice. They had taken English gold as a soothing antidote
to the excess of their zeal, and would not have been less happy
to pocket that of the Russians as a stimulus to it ; but the General,
thinking perhaps that he should not want their help, never hestowed an obolus upon them, which led to a thousand intxigues
011 their part to baffle the new plan of attack.
T h e following,
taken from Colonel Semineau's notes, will give a rough idea of the
disconnected character of the operations.
For eight months," it is therein stated, "have we fought without result, and 4000 soldiers have been disabled, which in Persia
very nearly means killed, for the slightest wound cannot be successfiilly treated, excepting Lp astrologers, who take the title of doctor
without having the slightest idea of the knowledge that belongs to
it ; besides, they are particularly careful to keep out of the way
- when the army is in the field.
After the expiration of these eight months, during which we had
olily experienced heavy losses, and without any corresponding
result, his Persian Majesty, by the advice of General Simonitch,
sought to enlighten himself by a council of war, a t which he presided in person. After many propositions more or less extravagant
had been made, my turn .came, and I reverted to the plan that I
had given in a t the commencement of the siege. But this raised +
terrible storm against me ; not a chief would confine himself to a
uniform and well-considered line of operations. Each persisted in
wanting to act separately with his own force, and claiming for him:
self the honour of taking Herat or any other success he might
obtain : they therefore with one voice rejected my project. However, addressing myself to his Majesty, who seemed'on the point, of
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yielding to his officers, I represented to him that it rould be folly
to sacrifice the public interest for the sake of individuals; that
each corps would take its turn in the trenches that I intended to
open, according to the rules of war; and that in point of fact the
city could only be taken in the name of Moharned Shah, who ought
to have the honour of the victory, without that circumstance in the
least detracting from the glory that would belong to the generals.
This advice pleased the King ; and as nothing more was wanting to
induce the council to hold the same opinion, the order was immediately given to commence the attack upon the angle of Khodja
Abdul Harnid under my direction in chief. But I had yet to
encounter many a spiteful impediment in the construction of my
trenches, and it was entirely owing to the determination of General
Simonitch that I could partly surmount them. For example, one
day, in the middle of a most difficult work, the Shah sent for me
and commanded me to throw a bridge over a ravine twenty miles
from the camp, which would have occupied several days, and
during my absence my trenches must neccessarily have been a t
a standstill. Happily Lieutenant-Colonel Blaremberg prevailed
upon the King to revoke this order.
'' I opened my first trench at t,lle farthest ruins of the Meuhelle
Arabha," and, having arrived within 437 yards of the edge of the
town ditch, I constructed large and spacious cavaliers, using only
gabions, palisades, and fascines, which I raised to the height of 326q
feet; this height was not sufficient to enfilade the sec,ond covered
way, but one of our batteries had a plunging fire into the first and
the ditch. From the cavaliers I had a good view of the prolongation
of the curtains in the enceinte, as well as along those of the second
covered way. I placed in battery eight 12-pounders on each cavalier, and made the embrasures b portibe, and it was not till everything was complete that I worked from this point to reach the edge
of the ditch of the angle attacked. T h e Afghans had made
galleries with fougasses to defend the approaches, from which they
hoped to obtain great results ; but as these underground works had
been executed some time, it was not difficult to discover, by the
colour of the grass withered above them, the direction they had
given to their mines. A cupo7rike, which they had made in the
ditch, and in sight of my battery, enabled the enemy to communicate
*
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with his mines. T h e y I turned by counter-mines, at which we
secretly worked. When. our . c h k b & mere charged and matches
ready I sent tvo balls at tlie ccapod&.e, which swept it away, and
the people who were in it took refuge in their mines. A t that
moment I ordered ours to be sprung ; the explosion destroyed the
Afghan works, and the miners were suffocated ; from that day they,
abandoned all their works beyond the counterscarp, and of this
circnmstance I took advantage to push my trenches without delay
up to the ditch. B ~ l tthe Afghans, perceiving the object of the
cavaliers, altered their determination, and early in the night established traverses to defend the covered ways on both sides of the
angle of attack ; I was not uneasy at that, because the space that
I required opposite the batteries was free, and they in no way
impeded me in forwarding my works, foot by foot, up to the crest
of the rampart of the town. I would not breach it till I had sufficiently filled up the ditch at the point at which we were to pass
i t ; this I managed to do by three chambers outside the counter-'
scarp, and, springing them all at once, the earth was thrown
into the ditch and filled it. W e then opened from the two batteries in the cavaliers, each of .which was armed with eight pieces
of heavy artillery, consisting of twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four
pounders. The fire from these guns at forty-three yards from
the edge of the ditch, and sixty-five yards?rom the large tower,
took it obliquely, and after a cannonade of four hours, riot
only was that vast and massive work razed to the ground, but
also the-adjacent one on either side of the angle ; I wished to use
some field-howitzers, but, being short, they blew out the cheeks of
the embrasures. On the night of this day, the results of which had
as much astonished the Persians as the Afghans, we filled the ditch
with the fragments of the wall and bags of hay, and a t daybreak
we might have made the assault, but, knowing the daring of the
enemy, and the inexperience of our own troops, I conceived it my
duty to save bloodshed as much as possible, by conducting the
approach in zigzags up to the crest of the breach, where I had
intended to establish a nid de pie, to protect the infantry, who were
to descend into the city. I aslied for the requisite quantity of timber, fascines, and gabions to construct this, which could have been
lone in three days, but a cabal at court had vowed to baffle me
as much as possible ; on this occasion they put the very stars in
requisition against me, declaring that it was absolutely necessary
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the assault should be made on the following day, the 24th of July,
because a happy conjunction of them promised infallible success.
I n consequence four battalions were told off for the assault, and
noon was the hour appointed for storming the place. I t was well
chosen, for the Afghans, overcome by the heat, habitually gave up
,a few hours to repose in the middle of the day, and, till then, the
Persians had done the same ; the former therefore were far from
supposing that this woulcl be the moment selected for the attack,it was indeed a complete surprise. But unfortunately, of the four
battalions that ought to have marched, one only, the Raragudoo,
and that reduced by its losses to 400 men, appeared at the breach.
Pressing had been the demands, the entreaties of these devoted
men for ammunition, and yet seven rounds per man was all
the prime minister woulcl grant them ; and as he knew full well
that the other battalions, being his countrymen, Maliooees, would
not stir a foot, he gave but four to each serbaz. The messengers
I sent into the camp, one after another, to procure what 1required, always returned with a vague answer, and, in short, it
was impossible for mc to obtain anything. On the other hand, the
Sertip Hadji Khan, who had behaved so ill some months before
near the I m i ~ u mZadeh, and who had received orders to hold his
brigade in reserve to support, if necessary, the storming party, went
in quite a different direction, and attacked another part of the city,
in the hope of having the credit of taking it. But this absurd
diversion injured far more than it coi~tributedto the success of the
enterprise. T h e 400 serbaz who threw thenlselves into the breach
quickly disposed of the guard in the covered ways ; they were half
asleep, and a crowd of their comrades, who rushed to their assistance, were swept away by oar batteries, which then crossed their
fire behind the point of attack. This brave band of Karaguzloos
carried the Persian colours to the very crest of. the breach, and had
the courage and constancy there to maintain themselves for hours,
waiting for ammunition, in the mean time using their bayonets,
bricks, and stones, to keep off the Afghans, who in very superior
numbers fired on them in front and flank. The science of the
engineer, and the devotion of the soldier, could avail nothing in
such a position. The 4fghan serdar Dirie Mohamed Khan, who
commanded the defence, fought like a hero. With his pistol he
laid a t his feet the brave Nabee Khan, chief of the Karaguzloos, whose courage and loyalty merited a better fate, and

.
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cut down the trumpeter who sounded the advance, and had just
planted the flag on the'breach, but he could not force that haedful of Persians to retreat ; the death of their chief hiid only
doubly excited them, and the majority of them preferred death on
the field of honour to retreating one single step. I n vain they
called upon the other three battalions to help them; a secret order
retained them where they stood. The gold of England arid the
orders of the Hadji Mirza Agassee had tied them hand and foot.
The soldiers looked on like the habitub of the pit of certain
theatres : each gave his opinion, and with more or less noise or sympathy. ' They'll mount, they'll mount ;' or, ' They will never
do it.' Such were the cries that accompanied these noble Karaguzloos to the top of the breach. I had also demanded the aid of
400 riflemen of the Garai tribe, well known for the correctntss:of
their aim, in order to maintain a sharp and continuous fire from
t,he foot of the entrenched cavaliers upon the faces of the angles of
attack, but what svere my astonishment and indignation to see them
remain passive spectators of the fight ! These sharpshooters were
under the command of a great Persian nobleman, a relative of the
Shah's, who ought to have been more interested than I was in the
taking of Herat ; and when I approached him to express my feelings
a t the conduct of his men, he replied, in the most ironical manner, ' Give them powder and ball, of which they are perfectly destitute, and they will do anythiug you require.'
" I then saw clearly that treachery on all sides would cause the
failure of the assault, and there remained but one man in whom I
had yet a hope left,-this was General Boroffslri. H e had in the first
instance been protected by the English, but his proud nature could
not adapt itself to their demands, and General Simonitch had endeavoured, and with tolerable success, to attach him to the Russian cause,
promising to interest the Emperor in his position, and to endeavour
to procure his recognition of the General as the son of Prince R., of
whom he was the natural child. Boroffski had no military acquirements, but he was brave, and the serba.z always followed him with
the utmost confidence ; about two sections rallied round him, ,and
hurried to the breach to support those who were already engaged,
but he had scarcely reached the ditch when a ball struck him in the
lower part of the body, and gave him the wound which sent him to
his grave. M y eyes followed Baroffski on his way to the assault,
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and I saw him fall mortally woilnded ; I have always thought, from
the direction the ball took, that it came from a Persian musket ;
and I can state as much with regard to myself, for 1was hit in the
shoulder by a ball fi-om behind me as I faced the ramput.
" T h e unhappy serbaz, who were as much disappointed at this
fresh misfortune, and as heartily enraged with their chiefs, as I was,
addressed them in the most insulting tems, but they were a t last
obliged, to their bitter regret, to abandon the breach they had so
valiantly stormed and held for five mortal hours; they slowly
obeyed the bugle that sounded the retreat, and, mutilated as
they were, the shattered survivors of this heroic battalion retired
with mournful steps to their encampment. After having visited the
minister to report to him the result of the operations, and reproach
.
him with his disloyal conduct, I, like those brave men, shut myself
up in my tent, and I determined to renounce the Persian service
for ever, and even my arrears of pay. I told Hadji Mirza that I
should resign, but the Shah, always kind and considerate to me;
pressed me so much not to do so that I yielded to his persuasions ; and as soon as he had obtained my promise to that effect, ' .
he sent me the brevet of General and the red ribbon of the order
of the Lion and the Sun."
General Semineau, having been in entire ignorance of everything
that passed, had acted with his accustomed loyalty of character, and
especially regretted that he had been refused the three days to carry
his works to the crest of the breach, for then treason itself could not
have prevented him from taking this important place. Under cover
of the nid de pie crowning the culminating point of the attack, he
could have established one or two pieces of cannon in battery, the
fire of which would have protected the troops in their descent into
the town ; this would not have been easy, because the interior side
of the e'paulement was raised to the height of nineteen to twenty-two
feet 2d pic, and supported by brickwork which served as a counterfort. A t the top of the kpaulement was a banquette on which two
men would have difficulty in walking abreast, and the Persian soldiers in following this must have been under the murderous fire of
the besieged from the surrounding houses, before they could get to
the ramre which led into the city: all therefore was not done
when the breach was gained. General Semineau, who devoted
himself soldy to his profession of engineer, and interfered not in
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politics, was absolutely ignorant of the .reason for which he was so
pitilessly refused the three days he so much required ; but on the
24th of July, ISM, Colonel Stoddart was expected to arrive
a t the royal camp, with the ultimatum of Mr. M'Neil, by
if he
which the Shah was threatened with war with
did not raise the siege. On the 22nd General Si~nonitch had
received a despatch from M. de Nesselrode, which informed
him that he had been dieavowed by him, that he was recalled
from Teheran, and that he was besides charged to inform the
Shah that his Majesty must no longer expect to be supported
in his undertaking by the Russian Government. Count Simonitch
thought less of the blow thus dealt to himself than of the failure of
an enterprise that he had conducted with such ability, and. partly
by persuasion, partly by threats, obtained the order for the
assault on the day named. Colonel Stoddart could not arrive till
night, the place might be taken by the Persians before the ultimatum arrived, and, its fall being a fait accompli, negotiations might
be continued on a different footing ; Russia could then more positively resist the demands of England : but the treachery of the
prime minister annihilated all the operations of General Semineau,
to whom fortune was adverse in every way. T h e city itself, in
consequence of the intended flight of Yar Mohamed, was on the
point of yielding. That chief could not imagine that the Persians
would loose their hold after having advanced their works so
near, and, when the fight was a t the sharpest, he retired from t h e ,
assault in all haste to make preparations for departure. I n
the act of mounting his horse he sent to the troops to say they
might surrender, but he was detained by Captain Pottinger, who
,entreated him to grant an hour's delay, a t the expiration .of
which time he could leave the city if success attended not the
efforts of his gallant soldiers on the breach, when the vizier acceded
to his request.
T h e British officer, well acquainted with the details of Mr.
M'Neil's policy and negotiation, was not ignorant of the reasons
which led General Simonitch to hurry the assault ; and his pmctised eye soon perceived that, though made with vigour, it was not
supported : he saw the irresolute battalions quite undecided a s to
what they ought to do, and could not mistake such characteristic
signs. British policy had once more the upper hand, and Captain
Pottinger had not prejudged the circumstances when he hoped for
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the retreat of the assailants. I n this terrific struggle the Afghan
women and all the children over ten years of age hastened to the
breach to exert their feeble power in aid of their defenders, and
showered down bricks and stones upon the Persians. The Afghans
had determined to day all their women and children, and afterwards
into the place.
each other, if the Persians succeeded in
Mohamed Shah remained two months inactive under the walls
of Herat after this assault, and in September, 1838, he raised the
siege and retired to his capital. Scarcely had he arrived there
when the Russian Government, not very grateful for his docility,
obliged him to pay a fourth part of the eqenses of. the war stipulated in the treaty of Turkomantchai.
When the Persians retired, Syud Yaya, the envoy of Kabul, and
Mohamed Omar Khan, the envoy of Ihndahar, accompanied the
Shah to Teheran, while Captain Vikovitch, who had presented
them at the royal camp, followed them as far as ICussan, a frontier town of /Herat ; here he turned to the south, and, after
having examined in a strategical point of viex the road which
passes by Khaff, Birdjan, Duroo, and Furrah, he went to Kandahar.
There he had several audiences of Kohendil Khan, to whom he paid
56001. in consideration of an engagement entered into by that prince
to recommence the siege of Herat, which the threats of Great
Britain had forced Mohamed Shah to abandon. I n consequence
the Serdar Nohamed Sedik Khan, the eldest son of Kohendil
Khan, a t the head of three or fow thousand men, entered the territory
of Herat and commenced hostilities Captain Vikovitch remained
forty days at Kandahar, and when he left that city to return to
Teheran great was his astonishment, on arriving at Furral~,to find
the army of Mohamed Sedik Khan encamped there and perfectly
unoccupied, except in the appropriation of the booty it had levied
in the district by carrying fire and sword into every house. H e
had detached a small advanced guard, but that had not proceeded
beyond the small town of Subzawar. This fatal delay, of which
Vikovitch felt the full import.ance, brought on an angry contest
between that officer and the Afghan serdar. Vikovitch demanded
the prompt execution of the convention between himself and
Kohendil Khan, or, in case of further delay, the immediate restitution of the 12,000 ducats; but Mohamed Sedilr Khan 'was highly
indignant. " The money you gave uie," said he, " would not
provide my army with horseshoes. I f you wish me to advance,
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give me as much again." Vikovitch, who knew well that to pay
more was simply throwing the money away, decisively rejected this
proposition, which at one time the serdar seemed inclined to
.enforce, and not by words only. H e even thought of plundering
the Russian officer, and would perhaps have proceeded to personal
violence, had he not been restrained by the fear that the Shah
might make some retaliation upon Mohamed Omar Khan, then 'at
his court on a mission to that sovereign. These facts were told
me by the ruffian himself:
Mohamed Sedik hesitated not to abandon the project of seizing
Herat, and returned to his father to confer upon the plan for
opposing the English invasion, then vaguely rumoured in Afghanistan. .As to Captain Vikovitch, he was obliged to continue his
journey without recovering the 12,000 ducats that were extorted
from him by the Sertlars of Kandahar. After having visited the
fortress of Laush Jowaine and the north of Lake Ruostem, he took
the road by Toon and Tubbus towards Teheran, and very soon
after, returned to Russia, where, as the reward of all his exertions,
he found hinself in fatal disgrace. This crying injustice wounded
him so deeply, that he put a period to his life with his own pistol
in a hotel a t St. Petersburg : it is stated that before he committed
that deplorable act he destroyed the documents that he had collected on his various journeys in Asia.
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IT is impossible to conceive the recltless devastation committed
by the Persian soldiers in the principality of IXerat during the ten
months of the siege of its capital : they made a perfect desert of
that once rich and fertile country. The city, torn up by shot and
shell, was nothing but a mass of shapeless ruins, and the houses,
.caravanserais, and bazaars, were all pulled down to repair the
breaches in the ramparts ; it was in fact a heap of cinders, ruin,
and desolation.
T o crown their misfortunes, the wretched citizens, who had been
nearly starved during the siege, were for a long time short of provisions after it was raised, and the famine was almost as bad as it
had bee11 previously, for the ground had not been tilled, and every
one had consumed the provisions he had laid by before the arrival
of the Persians. All the villages, from seventy to ninety miles
round, had been completely pillaged to supply the besieging army,
and the population of the country stripped of every thing, as were the
citizens who left the city before the siege, and now returned in
crowds to T-Ierat, where there was not a grain of corn to support
them. T h e famine soon made frightful ravages, and produced
every day horrible scenes worthy of cannibals-in fact, its condition was fearful to contemplate.
T o put an end to this misery, Yar Mohamed Khan appealed to
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the chiefs of the small principalities round Herat, and, in the name
pf Nahomet, implored their generosity, and entreated them to send
corn to the desolat.ed city ; a t the same time he remitted the duty
on every description of grain.
The merchants of Turkestan, Randahar, and the Eimak Rhanats
quickly responded to this appeal, but much more with the view of
realizing enormous profits than of relieving such bitter distress.
The majority of the Heratees, not having a groat in their pockets
to purchase bread for their families, in many instances sold themselves to the Turkomans for ten battemens of corn: fathers sold
their children for as small a sum, and the children thankfully sanctioned the bargain which saved them from the terrible pangs
of hunger.
Yar Mohamed entered largely into this traffic, not, as his unhappy
people did, to save their lives, but to replenish his coffers, the contents of which had been considerably exhausted by the war. He
sold to thc Uzbeks all the Heratees who were guilty of the most
trifling rnisdemeanours; and when they saw this, and ceased
to commit them, thereby destroying his source of gain, he sent
agents into the bazaars to excite disorder, and by that means
,secured a supply of slaves for his market The slightest altercation or a loud word amongst a harmless group of citizens, and
his satellites were always at hand to pounce upon these unfortunate
beings; even those who were attracted to the spot by curiosity
only were taken, and a couple of hours afterwards sold or exchanged
by their relentless vizier for a camel, or a mule, or anything else
that might better suit him. Twenty young men was the price that
he usually gave for a Turltoman horse, a hundred tomauns i r ~value.
This trade continued for some considerable time, but the English
a t last succeeded in putting a stop to it, the inducement being a
.subsidy which they paid to the court of I-Ierat.
Western Afghanistan had scarcely escaped the Persian yoke, a t
the cost of all these fearful calamities against which it had still to
struggle, when the English, to repay Russia and the Shah for all
their provocations, prepared a forn~idable expedition to *invade
-Kandahar and Kabul. This important act was preceded by
.negotiations sufficiently singular, of which I will endeavour to give
a rough sketch.
W e have stated that Runjeet Sing, the ambitious Maharadjah of
the Punjab, after having wrested from the Afghans their finest
s 2

his conquests still further into their
provinces, prepared to
territory, when his intention was seen through by Dost Mohamed,
who, a s the English said (but the fact has not been ~roved),sought
the alliance of the Icing of Persia, and proposed to assist him in his
expeciition against Herat, ,provided that the Shah would on the
other hand protect him against the Sikhs, who were supported by
the East India Company. The English also reproached the D O S ~
with having written to the Emperor of Russia requesting his
alliance. This letter was, it is said, sent to St. Petersburg by an
Afghan envoy, properly accredited ; but the assertion is denied by
M. de Nesselrode, who declared in one of his despatches, beaing
date October 20th, 1838, that this envoy was simply a commercial
agent, having no instructions or authority to meddle with politics.
T h e adversaries of the Emir vent so far as to give a copy of his
letter, but Dost Mohamecl declared that it was a lying invention of
the enemy ; and to those who are acquainted with the extent to which
false doct~mentsare made use of in Asia, and the advanbges which
the English have themselves derived from them in subduing the
princes and rajahs of India, one doul~tsthe propriety of giving an
opinion on the validity of the one which the Emir is reproached with
having written. This doubt is d l the more admissible, inasmuch as
a t the epoch at which this document was said to have been prepared he was the warmest partisan of the English in Afghanistan,
and remained so after they had driven him from that country.,
T h e following is the letter referred to, written in the early part of
the year 1836 :" There have been great differences and quarrels between myself
and the royal house of the Suddozyes. The English Government
is inclined to support Shoojah-001-Moolk. The whole of India is
governed by them, and they are on friendly terms with Runjeet
Sing, the lord of the Punjab, which lies in their neighbourhood.
T h e British Government exhibit no favourable opinions towards
me. I (literally the creature of God), with all my power, have been
always fighting with the Sikhs; your Imperial Government has
made friendship with the Persians ; and if your Majesty will graciously be pleased to arrange matters in 'the Afghan country, and
assist this nation (which amounts to twenty lacs of families), you
will place me under obligations.
"I. hope your Imperial Majesty will do me the favour by allowing me to be received, lilre the Persians, under the protection
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of the government of Russia. Under your royal favour I can
perform, along with my Afghans, various praiseworthy services. I t
would be highly proper, whatever your Imperial Majesty may be
pleased to do."
Supposing that Dost Mohamed did write this letter, where was
the criine in his doing so ? Had lie not a right to look for alliances
against his enemies? Was there more justice therefore in the
English supporting Runjeet Sing in his spoliation of the Afghans?
But who was this Runjeet-who were the Sikhs? h nation of
yesterday ; always in subjection, without ancestors ,or traditions,
and governed for the first time by a chief of their own nation: and
this chief, 'this Runjeet, who it cannot be denied possesses some
very great qualities, how was he brought u p ? From whom did he
hold his power? Was it not from a n Afghan sovereign, the Shah
Zeman, who made him governor of the Punjab? Has lie not
thrown off his allegiance to that monarch's successors, and proclaimed himself sovereign of that country ? Is then the origin of
his power more legitimate than that of Dost Mohamed, who a t least
has in his favour the old traditions of his family to prove that his
ancestors always had in his country a power almost equal to that of
the Afghan sovereigns ?
The English had, probably, thought of this more than once ; but
reason is a poor argument in the eyes of those who for twenty years
had been wishing to have in Kabul a sovereign who would be a
docile and submissive instrument of theirs. They also sanctioned
the spoliations committed upon the finest Afghan provinces. by
Runjeet. H e had seized Mooltan in 1810, Cashmeer in 1819,
Peshawur in 1823, and that Runjeet affirmed, with the entire
consent of Shah Shooja-001-Moolk, the dethroned Icing, who had
placed himself under his protection, and was considered by him and
the English as the legitimate sovereign of Afghanistan, qualified
by that title to make whatever concessions of territory he pleased.
But why should Shooja be the legitimate sovereign of Afghanistan
more than any other of his twenty brothers?-than Zeman or Mahmood, for instance, who had been kings before him, and had done
nothing to disinherit their children or deprive them of their rights to
the throne ? Shah Kamran and Shah Eyoob had always protested
against the pretensions of Shooja to the throne. Why, then, should
the English he so regardless of their remonstrances and opposition,
and the opinions of the generality of the Afghans? This policy
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concealed a n ambitious project ; the Anglo-Indian Government
was possessed with a passion for territorial extension, and in no
way sensitive as to the justice of the cause of Dost Mohamed
from the moment they found that he would not bend to their wishes ;
and not being in a condition to depose him themselves, they
weakened his power as much as possible by means of their ally
Runjeet, who annually sent an army to ravage some part of the
Afghan kingdom.
Although the Government of Calcutta showed a marked predilection for that ruler, it did not fail still to maintain its relations
with and show some consideration for Dost Mollanled, who had on
his part been guilty of very great duplicity, if he had really written
to the Emperor Nicholas the letter which they accused him of
sending, for very nearly s t the same time, viz. on the 31st May,
1836, following, he addressed Lord Auckland, who had recently
arrived in India, in the most humble terms, as follows :'' It may be known to your Lordship that, relying on the principles of benevolence and philanthropy which distin,pish the British
Government, I look upon myself and country as bound to it ; and
the letters I have received from that quarter have all been replete
with friendly sentiments and attention, and to the efTect that, in the
time of need, the obligations of friendship should be fulfilled. T h e
late transactions in this quarter, the conduct of reckless and misguided Sikhs and their breach of treaty, are well known .to your
Lordship. Communicate to me whatever may now suggest ikelf
to your wisdom for the settlement of the affairs of this country, that
it may serve as a rule for my guidance.
" I hope your Lordship will consider me and my country as your
own, and favour me often by the receipt of your friendly letters.
Whatever directions your Lordship may be pleased to issue for the
administration of this country, I will-act accordingly."
Lord Aucltland replied to this communication on the 22nd of
August, 1836, with the greatest kindness, very highly praised his
discreet policy, and promised his impartial intervention to effect a
reconciliation between the Afghan prince and the Sikhs.
During the time that this correspondence was passing, the Persian expedition against.Herat was prepared and openly encourqed
by General Simonitch; but it was November, 1837, before the
army of Mohamed Shah arrived under the wdls of that city.
Early in the same year, however, Dost Mohamed, gown weary of
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the provocations of the Sikhs, and finding that he derived no
benefit, but rather the contrary, from the intervention of Lord
Auckland, determined upon avenging his own cause, and seized
upon the opportunity offered him in the month of May by the indiscretion of the Maharadjah (who recalled his troops from the Afghan
frontier in order to celebrate, with the greater pomp, the marriage
of his grandson Nahal Sing), to march 15,000 men into the province
of Peshamur. They were commanded by the Dost's two sons,
Mohamed Efzel Khan and Mohamed Alcbar Khan, who attacked
the Sikhs a t Djamrood on the 1st of May, 1837. The combat was
obstinate and the carnage dreadful, but victory crowned the banner
of the brothers a t the heavy cost of 7000 men.
T h e Government of Calcutta, already sufficiently daFmed by the
Persian expedition against Herat, became still more so on hearing
of the defeat of their faithful ally Runjeet, and despatched with all
speed Sir A. Burnes to Kabul, to encleavour to arrest the progress
of the victorious Afghans.
T h e British Envoy arrived in that city in September, and was
received with great honours by Dost Mohamed, who greatly
esteemed him. The instructions of Lord Auckland were, that he
was simply to enter into commercial relations and pacific intervention between the Emir and the Maharadjah ; he added also that he
wasauthorized to do this in the interest of the Afgizan chief and
to avert his ruin. It was sufficiently surprising that his Lordship
should use such language respecting a prince who had hitherto
so well known how to defend himself, who had set forth no
demands but what were perfectly reasonable, and in accordance
with which he would, if admitted, have laid down his arms. T h e
task of Burnes was difficult ; but he was fortunate enough to obtain
from the Emir a temporary suspension of hostilities, and it was
while he was occupied in this negotiation that Captain Vikovitch
arrived a t Kabul, namely, in December, 1837. The English have
asserted that he brought the reply of the Emperor Nicholas to the
letter the Emir had written his Imperial Majesty in the commencement of 1836.
Whatever might have been the real object of his presence there,
Vikovitcli met with a cold reception, and Dost Mohamed made
his arrival the pretext for paying a visit to Sir A. Burnes, and
requesting his advice as to what he ought to do under the circumstances. The Emir declared from the first that he had determined
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not to adopt a n alliance or ~oliticalrelations with any other
foreign power than England, that he would receive no foreign
agent so long a s he had the hope of conciliating the sympathy of
the Anglo-Indian Government, and that for all he cared he .was
willing to dismiss the Russian officer, or arrest him on his journey ;
indeed, to treat him as Burnes might wish. It must be admitted
that this was very extraordinary language for a man to use who
had been recently accused of having written to the Emperor of
Russia in the most respectful and submissive terms. Nevertheless
Vikovitch was allowed to enter Kabul, but only at the request of
Burnes, who took copies of all the letters brought by the latter to
the Emir, and the conduct of Dost Mohamed was in every way
calculated to inspire the English Government with confidence.
T h e following letter from the Envoy to Lord Aucltland proves this
to have been the case :" January 15,1838.-Since
I have been here I have learnt that
a Persian agent, bearing presents for Dost Mohamed, has penetrated the country as far as I<andahar,* and he has announced
hinlself a s the bearer of most seductive promises; but he was
nevertheless obliged to leave Afghanistan almost immediately,
because no one invited him to come on to Kabul. After him a
Russian agent came, by name Vilrovitch ; he brought flattering
compliments and offers of lasting engagements, but he was received
with only the respect due to any stranger and the regular forms of
hospitality. T h e Emir has said that his interest was in the English
alliance, and that he would not abandon that while he had a hope
of obtaining it."
T h e reasons which Burnes gave to his Government seemed to
him so conclusive, that he did not for a moment think that the
authorities at CaIcutts would reject the alliance of a chief so devoted to the English as Dost Mohamed; and to smooth every
species of difficulty, he exerted himself to establish 4 friendly understanding between the Dost and the Sikhs. The Emir, a witness
of his efforts, testified his gratitude for them ; but his confidence in
the equity of the Directors of the East India Company towards
him was not so great as that of the English officer.
Knowing how strong was their predilection for Runjeet Sing, and
* This agent arrived with Vikovitch in October, 1837, cud remained there
when the latter went on to Kabul.-Fm'm.
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having a vague suspicion that the Court would come to a partial
determination, the Dzst neglected no means of persuading them of
his entire devotion. " I n return," said the Emir to Burnes, " I ask
but little, but that little is just and reasonable. I ask the English
to protect me from the spoliat.ions of the Sikhs and the resentment of the Persians, who will never forgive me for having made
common cause with your countrymen; they must deo force the
former to give me back Peshawur, which is the only point that
protects my frontiel. on this side of the Indus, and oppose any
attempt of the latter to reduce Herat and Kandahar to a state of
vassalage : then I am theirs, body and soul. I shall never have
recoulse to others till I have lost all hope in you, and even in acting
thus it would be with regret to save only Afghanistan and my own
honour, not from ill-will towards England. On the contrary; I
should be happy to be advised and protected by her, and in return
should make every effort to second her views, political and commercial."
This frank and explicit declaration of the Dost's could not
leave Lord Auckland in any doubt of h i loyalty or sincerity. It
was quite sufficient to induce him to fall back upon the natural
course of British policy in India, and to maintain the Afghan independence against every other state, instead of joining with the
Sikhs to attack it on the one hand, while the Russians, in alliance with the Persians and the Serdars of Kandahar, ruined it on
the other.
T h e arrival of Viltovitch a t Kabul, and the copies of the letters
presented by him to the Emir, produced a lively sensation a t
Calcutta, and formed the subject of a note sent by Lord Clanricarde to the cabinet of St. Petersburg, which plainly allowed the
determination of the British Government to act vigorously to be
perceived. The following is an extract from that document :" The undersigned is further instructed to state that t,he British
Government possess a copy of a Treaty which has been concluded
between Persia and the Afghan ruler of Kanclahar, the execution
of which has been guaranteed by Count Sirnonich, and has given
to this Treaty, which tends to afford Russia, if she adopts the
guarantee, a pretence to compel the Shah of Persia not only
to make himself master of Herat, but to deliver over that city
afterxards to the rulers pf Icandahar, to be held by them, together with their other possessions, in the capacity, which those
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rulers engage by the Treaty to aclmomledge, of tributaries to
Persia.
" T h e guarantee, moreover, contains a promise to compel Persia
to defend the rulers of Kmdahar against attack from any quarter
whatever. I t is true that in this stipulation no specific allusion is
made to England ; but the intention of the parties may be inferred
from the original draft of this treaty, of which also Her Majesty's
Government have a copy, and which was less cautiously worded,
and in which specific allusion was made to England as one of the
powers against whom assistance was to be given by Russia to the .
rulers of Kandahar.
" 'rhe undersigned is further instructed to state that a Russian
agent of the name of Vicovitch, but sometimes calling himself
Omar Beg, and said to be attached to the staff of the general
commanding a t Orenburg, was the bearer of letters from the
Emperor and Count Simonich to the ruler of Kabul, copies of
which are in the possession of the British Government, and that
Count Simonich observed the most'*perfect silence 'towards the
British minister a t Teheran with respect to the mission of this
agent ; a reserve which might seem unnecessary if this agent was
merely to deliver the letters of which he was the bearer, and if his
mission was to have no tendency prejudicial to the British interests.
'' But the British Governnient have learned that Count Simonich
announced to the Shah of Persia that this Russian agent would
counsel the ruler of Kabul to seek assistance of the Persian
Government to support him in his hostilities with the ruler of the
Punjab ; and the further reports which the British Government'
have received of the language held by this Russian agent a t
Kandahar and at Kabul can lead to no other conclusion than
that h e strenuously exerted himself to detach the rulers of those
Afghan states from all connexion with England, and to iiiduce
them to place their reliance upon Persia in the first instance, and
ultimately upon Russia.
" I f the British Government could ent,ertain a doubt of the
correctness of the foregoing information, that doubt would, in a
great measure, be removed by the unfriendly language with respect
to t.he British Government which Count Simonich held some time
ago to the agent of Kabul a t the court of Persia, and of which the
British Government possess proof in the report made by that agent
to the ruler of Kabul."
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Lord Clanricarde concludes hy declaring " that Russia is free
to pursue with respect to the matters in question whatever course
may appear to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg most conducive to the
interests of Russia. But the British Government considers itself
entitled to ask of the Cabinet of S t Petersburg whether the
intentions and the policy of Russia towards Persia and Great
Britain are to be deduced from the declarations of Count Nesselrode and Mr. Rodofiniltin to the Earl of Durham, or from the
acts of Count Simonich and M. Vikovitch in Asia.!'
The Russian Government was not much disturbed by this note,
nevertheless it did vouchsafe to give a few explanations, but in a
most ironical manner. I t denied facts as clear as- the sun, with an
audacity so sustained and so calm that any minister less experienced than Lord Palmerston would have allowed himself to be
,deceived by the language of Count Nesselrode. The following
are some extracts from the despatch which that diplomatist
addressed to Count Pozzo di Borgo, to be communicated to the
Foreign Office, October 2Oth, 1838 :" You state that on this .occasion H e r Eritannic Majesty's
Principal Secretary-of-State for Foreign AEairs did not conceal
from, you, Monsieur Ye Comte, that public opinion in England
ascribes to Russian influence a decisive part in the events now
passing in Persia, and attributes to our Cabinet' intentions, dangerous to the security of the British possessions in Asia.
" This consideration is so serious, it is ,calculated to have so
pernicious an influence on all our relations with Great Britain, that
we do not hesitate a single instant to meet the English Cabinet
with a frank and spontaneous explanation. The policy, M.
lYAmbassadeur, which the Emperor pursues in that quarter is
guided by the same principles which direct i t in Europe. Far
from any idea of encroachment, that policy has only for its object
the maintenance of the rights of Russia, and respect for those
legitimately acquired by all other powers.
The idea of assailing the security and tranquillity of the possessions of Great Britain in India has consequently never presented. itself, and will never present itself, to the mind of our
august master. H e desires only what is just and what is possible.
6 G If the British Government places in those principles the confidence which they are calculated to inspire, i t will be easy for
you, M. YAmbassadeur, to clear up the doubts which it has .con-
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ceived as to the conduct which we have adopted in the midst of the
recent events in Persia, and specifically with regard to the .espedit*ion of Mohanled Shah against Herat.
If we adduce these facts, if w;! point out the restless activity
of certain unaccredited and unrecognised individuals, it is certainly not our wish to impute to the Government to which they
belong the blame of which they are deserving. On the contrary,
we consider the British Cabinet to be altogether a stranger to the
tendency which we have just alluded to. Eut in like manner as
we place a just reliance on the rectitude of the intentions of the
English Government, so also are we entitled to expect that it
will not raise a doubt as to our own.
" These remarks, M. le Comte, which the Emperor commands
you to communicate with the most perfed frankness to the English
Ministry, will serve, I hope, to satisfy it, above all, as to the intentions of our Cabinet, and to place in its true light the conservative
and disinterested policy of our august master. Our attitude,
M. le Comte, will necessarily be regulated according to the
definitive determination which the British Government shall think
fit to adopt."
After this display of principle M. de Nesselrode gives his
explanations. H e declares that the siege of Herat appears to him
a thing just in itself, but defends himself from the charge of
having instigated the Shah to undertake it. Nevertheless, he
adds, that if Herat were joined to Icandahar all contests would
cease, and that country would then become accessible to every
nation interested in the commerce of Central Asia.
T h e Emperor could not have any reason to injure England, and
the natural obstacles which separate the two empires render a
collision between them impossible. M. Thomas continues his
narrative, and states that '' According to Count Nesselrode it was
England who had made the first attack, and he finished by no
longer concealing that Russia well h e w , when necessary, how to
manoeuvre up to the Indus. I t was therefore fur England to
refrain and be careful; as to the Russians, they had nothing to
reproach themselves with ; they denied the existence of any
grievances that could be brought against them ; they had wished
to prevent the attack upon Herat ; Simonitch and Vikovitch were
pacificators ; the latter had been charged simply to fix the extent
of security that Afghanistan would grant to Russian merchants,
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and not to establish a treaty, or any other political combination, Russia having no other object than to secure a market for
her manufactures in Central Asia. If by accident the agents had
slightly deviated from their instructions, England could not complain. Where is the government that is always served as it wishes
to be ? H a d England herself the power to control those turbulent
travellers who continually excited disturbances in Asia?
Further, Count Nesselrode announced the recall of General
Simonitch, and that Colonel Duhamel, who was appointed to
succeed him, was on his way to Teheran-terminating his despatch
as follows :" ' If we recall these facts-if
we, notice the activity of certain
individuals who put themselves forward without having been
accredited, or even recognised, by their government-it
is not
because we wish to impute to the British Government itself the'
blame which belongs to them; on the contrary, we consider the
British Cabinet'as being entirely above such actions as we poiut
out ; ,but as we.place confidence in the rectitude of her intentions,
we consider that we have a right to expect she should not throw
any doubt over ours.
'f -'These remarlrs, which the Emperor commands your Excellency to communicate in full to the British Ckbinet, will, I hope,
s&ve to satisfy it, and place in its proper light the conservative
and disinterested policy of our august master. Our attitude must
necessarily be regulated by the definitive determination that the
British Government will think fit to adopt.' "
But Lord Palmerston, who, to the last, strove to preserve the
illusion that the Cabinet of St: Petersburg was sincere, wrote to
Count Pozzo di Borgo in the following terms on December 20,
1888 :" I can assure your Excellency that her Majesty's Government
have given to this important communication all the attention which
it so justly demands ; and I have great pleasure in being able to
state to your Excellency that this communication has in its general
result been highly satisfactory to her Majesty's Government. The
leading principle which invariably directs the British Government
in the management of its relations with foreign powers is a n
anxious desire to preserve for the Briti~hnation the blessings of
peace. But as regards Russia this wish is peculiarly strong ;
because an alliarice of long standing between Grest Britain an
I'
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Russia, commercial intercourse valuable to both countries, and
common interests of the highest order, must necessarily lead her
Majesty's Government to deprecate as a great misfortune any
event which might tend to interrupt the good understanding
which so happily subsists between the Cabinets of Petersburg and
London."
Couut Nesselrode, delighted to have succeeded in calming Lord
Palmerston's fears, wished probably to make him feel that from
the explanations he had given it did not follow that the Russian
Cabinet was determined henceforth to concede to him on all points,
for after having received his reply he addressed the following dry
answer to his Lordship on January 29, 1839, a reply which reads
far more like a threat than an approach towards the good understanding upon which the Noble Lord seemed so self-satisfied :" Those explanations," remarks Count Nesselrode, " have
afforded to the two Cabinets the opportunity of receiving and of
offering on either side assurances which bear the character of just
reciprocity, and which are inseparable from one another. Our
Cabinet, in taking note of that assurance, expects to receive the
proof of its entire fulfilment."
I s it possible to show more ability, more subtlety, more acuteness,
than Russia did in these negotiations, or rather deceptions, of four
years' duration ? Noth$g in her conduct can seriously give offence
to the English. They reproach her with treaties made by her
agents ; she disavows them. They are offended a t the siege of
IIerat, which they attribute to her ; she immediately abandons the
Shah to his own resources and withdraws from him the Russian
deserters. She has extended her influence to the frontier of the
British empire in India, without its costing her the smallest sacrifice ; she fails, it is true, but she retires mitho-ut shame and without
loss, and in her retreat she shot a Parthian arrow at her rival, who
. .only triumphed for the moment, subsequently to .meet with the
most dreadful catastrophe.
Though Russia and. Persia had appeared to give way on all
points, and Lord Palmerston h a d shown himself satisfied with
the explanations of M, de Nesselrode, the British nevertheless
continued their preparations in India for the purpose of driving
the Emir Dost Mohamed and Kohendil Khan from the princ,ipalities of Kabul and Kandahar. Five of the Company'i;
ships of war also entered the Persian Gulf in the spring of 1838,
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and the troops they had on board took possession of the island of
Karrack, where they waited for flat-bottomed steamers to convey
them into the heart of Persia by the river Karoon. When the siege
of Herat was raised, this expedition was given up ; but the one to
Afghanistan was carried on with vigour to depose a prince who
had wished, a t all risks, to become the ally of England, and whose
and concessions she, in her blind policy, constantly
rejected.
Dost Mohamed was thought to possess considerable administrative ability, and a courage not common even amonpt the Afghans. These qualities did not constitute any recommendation in
the eyes of the Directors of the East India Company; but the
Emir, who by inclination and conviction felt that the power of
retaining his position could only be derived from them, and that
nothing but their concurrence could enable him to found and
maintain a monarchy, allowed himself to be persuaded by Alexander 13urries to male one last attempt to secure the friendship of England, by intrusting him with a letter to Lord Auckland :" Let his Lordship," said he, "give me but two words of encouragement; let him recognise me as Emir of Kabul, and I will
forget the mortal feud between me and the Shah I<amran, m y
enemy by blood, and I will rush to his support with my best troops
to defend him from the Shah of Persia, on the simple condition of
receiving a subsidy for the troops,that I shall employ in the service
of the Company." E-Ie even added, " that for the present he would
not say another word about the restitution of Peshawur."
There was st) much disinterestedness and so much good intention
in these propositions, that Sir A. Burnes conceived himself justified
in promising the Dost that he could induce his Government to
accept them ; but what did that avail against a prior decision ? I t
was in vain that he wrote to Calcutta, "There is but one way of
making Afghanistan a barrier against the Russians, and that is to
form a strict alliance with Dost Mohamed, to strengthen his authority, which has been compromised by family quarrels, and let eveiry
one be thoroughly convinced that the government of India will
never allow any attempts to be made to injure or subvert it."
But the Cuurt of l h e c t o r s was far from entertaining the same
opinion, and in its insatiable avidity had long meditated the reestablishment of Shah Shooja in the government of Afghanistan, in
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order to have the finances of that country elltirely at its own disposal. Lord Auckland laid the conflicting opinions of Eurnes and of
the Court of Directors before the English Cabinet, who decided
in favour of that of the British officer, as being the only rational
and practicable one; but the contrary opinion, supported by Sir
JTT. M'Naghten, Sir Claude Wade, and Sir John &!'Neil, which.
favoured the secret views of the Directors, prevailed. Sir Claude
Wade, the resident a t Loodiana, who was the warmest partisan of Shah Shooja, encouraged the warlike propensities of the
East India Company by leading them into the error in which he had
himself been held many years by his protdge', namely, that the
Barukzye tribe did not contain 60,000 families, as Burnes had stated,
and that their numbers did not amount to more than 6000; also
that their chiefs were generally hatcd by the serdars of the other
Afghan tribes. Opinions so different held by two officers, both of
whom enjoyed in a high degree the confidence of their Government,
arose from. one common source, ignorance : like the greater part
of those authors who have hitherto written on Afghanistan, they
confused the tribes with their srtbdivisior~sor branches. Thus :Ahmed Shah and his descendants (Shah Shooja, &c.) were of the
tribe of Popolzye, and the branch or family of the Suddozyes.
Hadji Djemal Khan and his posterity (Dost Mohamed, kc.) were
of the tribe of Barukzye, and the branch or family of the Mohameclzyes; and it is probably of this latter-branch, which does consist
of four or five thousand families, that Sir C. Wade intended to
speak ; for in Afghanistan, when a descendant of Hailji Djemal is
spoken of, he is not called a " Barukzye chief," but a " Mohamedzye chief." I n the same manner Ahmed Shah is not called Ahmed
Shah Popolzye, but Ahmed Shah Suddozye.
T h e advice of Burnes was rejected and his acts completely disavowed. Lord Auckland also toolr upon himself to offer to the
Emir of Kabul the most merciless ultimatum, first demanding, but
in the most polite manner possible, that he should immediately
dismiss Captain Vikovitch; and next, that he should renounce all
his rights to the Afghan provinces conquered by the Sikhs, because
the noble Lord had determined not to interfere in his favour, from
a fear of displeasing his faithful ally, the Maharadjah of the Punjab.
Burnes exerted all his powers of persuasion and argument, which
marked the intense interest he toolr in the cause of the Emir, to
induce him to accept these hard conditions. T h e Dost, though
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indignant a t this unworthy treatment, had not actually given his
definitive reply, affirmative or negative, when he received informa-'
tion from his agents in India, which left him no doubt of the fact
of the concentration of a British army at Ferozepore with the welldetermined purpose of replacing Shah Shooja on the throne of
Kabul. Simultaneously with this information the Dost received
letters from Captain Vikovitch, written from Kandahar, in which
the fairest promises were made to him. These letters decided him
in his course of action, and he broke off his negotiations with
Burnes, who, having failed in his mission, retired, leaving Dost
Mohamed in a state of great consternation.
Mons. Thomas then proceeds with his remarks :-"The
Dost
could not, he said, hold out a month against Englaud, and t.he
thoughts of displeasing her filled him with terror. H e was not
ignorant that Runjeet was the friend of the English, and that it
would not be wise to attack him. They could a t any moment
support Peshawur, if not with troops at least with simple remonstrances, which would have restrained the Maharadjah of Lahore ;
but, on the contrary, they were now more than ever Runjeet's
declared friends, and preferred him to the Afghans, who were
ready to place themselves a t their disposal. Certainly that was
not'the. provocation of a very determined enemy. Burnes himself,
when he left, did not think that the Afghans would ever throw
themselves into the arms of the Rnssians, and unite with the Persians. T h e fatal policy of England, however, constrained the Dost
to do so, and left him no alternative but ruin or war.
" After haviug been four years a t peace-after having forced
the Shah of Persia to retire from Herat-after having ascertained
with certainty the devotion of Dost Mohamed-what could excite
the Government of India to such a,violent determination ? ' Why
make war on the Afghans ? I-Iad all Asia risen in arms ? H a d
.the Persians taken Herat and Kandahar, the Russians Bokhara
and Khiva? No ; but, as Burnes said, it was only because a
Cossack captain, without state or suite, had galloped up to I<abul.
Lord Palmerston, who had hesitated so long before he interfered
officially in Persia, adopted in less tlian six months a vigorous
intervention in Afghanistan. H e required a war with Icabul,
because he had not known how to ask in proper time for explanations a t St. Petersburg, which would certainly have been given him
if he had procrastinated, temporised, and tergiversated less. Afraid
T
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of losing the alliance of Russia in Europe, because he had the
misfortune to place faith in it, and the still greater one of preserving
i t as a balance of power-necessitated to defer to her, though the
Foreign Office had been obliged during four years to pass over in
silence the Muscovite intrigues, he had not warned the princes
of the East that England considered herself affronted, but endeavoured to detach them from these intrigues out of regard for their
interests. H e never spoke in the name of his Government, and
they had therefore never listened to him ; however, seeing India
seriously threatened, he a t length took a side, but which? Lord
Falmerston let loose the demon of war all over the East; he
created perils without end for the British empire ; he raised up
against i t resentment and vengeance ; he mixed England up more
and more with the internal quarrels of a country in which her dominion could only be maintained by neutrality; he hurried her
purposely into the path of conquest, and struck wherever the
Russian had set a foot or intended to set one, hoping these grand
strokes of his genius would astonish and lead to reflection, without
remembering that such flagrant injustice is never pardoned."
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-

Lord Auckland sends Sir W. M'Naghten to Lahore-Treaty with the Sikhs
Manifesto of the Governor-General from Simla in justification of his policy Reflections on this document^ -The possession of Scinde adjourned -The
Emirs are opporied to the advance of the British 2,rrny through their territory
-&fir Roustem of K6yi.poor-A~erse to lending the fortress of Bukkur to the
English, but at length accedes to their request -The result of this to himself
and his family -Conduct of the British authorities in Scinde - Strength of
the army when concentrated at Shikapoor - Extract from Mr. Sumner's work
Seizure of Rui~achee-English appliances to success in the invaaion of
Afghanistan - Proceedings of Shah Shooja.

-

AS soon as war had been determined upon, Lord Auckland sent
the Secretary of the Government of India, Sir William MLNaghten,
to negotiate a treaty with Runjeet Sing and Shah Shooja-001-Moolk,
which he concluded without difficultyi the Shah agreeing to
cede to the Maharadjah all the Afghan provinces he had conquered, including even Peshawur, which Dost Mohamed had
refused to. give up. This point settled, Lord Auckland published
the following manifesto, in which he set forth his reasons for
making war upon the Afghans :" Simla, October lst, 1838.
"The Right Honourable the Governor-General of India having,
with the concurrence of the Supreme Gouncil, directed the assemblage of a British force for service across the Indus, his Lordship
deems it proper to publish the following exposition of the reasons
which have led to this important measure.
"It is a matter of notoriety that the treaties entered into by the
British Government in the year 1832, with the Ameers of Sinde,
the Nawab of Bahawulpore, and the Maharajah Runjeet Sing, had
for their object, by opening the navigation of the Indus, to facilitate the ext,ension of commerce, and fo gain for the British nation
in Central Asia that legitimat,e influence which an interchange of
benefits would naturally produce. With a view to invite the aid
of the de fncto rulers of Afghanistan to the measures necessary for
giving full effect to t.hose treaties, Captain Burlies was deputed,
towards the close of the year 1836, on a mission to n o s t Mohamed
Khan, the chief of Kabul. T h e original objects of that officer's
T 2.
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mission were purely of a commercial nature. Whilst Captain
Burnes, however, was on his journey to Kabul, information was
received by the Governor-General that the troops of Dost Mohamed
Khan had made a sudden and unprovoked attack 011 those of our
ancient ally, the Maharajah Runjeet Sing." I t was naturally to be.
apprehended that his Highness the Maharajah would not be slow
to avenge this aggression, and it was to be feared that, the flames
of mar being once kindled in the very regions into which we were
endeavouring to extend our commerce, the peaceful and beneficial
purposes of the British Government mould be altogether frustrated.
I n order to avert a result so calamitous, the Govei-nor-General
resolved on authorizing Captain Burnes to intimate to Dost Mohamed Khan that, if he should evince a disposition to come to just
and reasonable terms with the Maharajah, his Lordship would
exert his good offices with his Highness, for the Maharajah, with
the c1laracterist.i~confidence which he has uniformly placed in the
faith and friendship of the British nation, a t once assented to the
proposition of the Governor-General, to the effect that in the mean
time hostilities on his part should be suspended.t
" I t subsequently came to the Icnowledge of the GovernorGeneral that a Persian army was besieging Herat ; that intrigues
were actively prosecuted throughout Afghanistan for the purpose of
extencling Persian influence and authority to the banks of, and
even beyond, the Indus ; and that the Court of Persia had not
only commenced a course of injury and insult to the officers of her
Majesty's mission in the Persian territory, but had afforded evidence
of being engaged in designs wholly a t variance with the principles
and objects of its alliance with Great Britain.$
" After much time spent by Captain Burnes in fruitless negotiation a t Kabul, it appeared that Dost Mohamed Khan, chiefly in
consequence of his reliance upon Persian encouragement and assistance, persisted, as respected his misunderstanding with the Sikhs,
in urging the most unreasonable pretensions, 5 such as the GovernorGeneral could not, consistently with justice and his regard for the

* What then of the spoliation of the
A f g h provinces by Runjeet.-Fernier.
f I have no doubt t h a t the English,
foreseeing that the Punjnb would ere
long be theirs, supported Runjeet in his
apo1iations.-Feeni6t*.
1. An alliance which wns obligato]-y

on both prrties, and which Englnnd
had been the first to break by refusing
t o pay the subsidy she had promised
t o Persia.-Fewim.
5 The restitution of Peshawur, t h e
bulwark of his country, extorted b y
Runjeet.-Fewier,
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friendship of the Maharajah Runjeet Sing, be the channel of submitting to the consideration of his Highness ; that he avowed
schemes of aggrandizement and ambition injurious to the security
and peace of the frontiers of India ; and that he openly threatened,
in furtherance of those schemes, to call in every foreign aid which
he could command. Ultimately he gave his undisguised support
to the Persian designs in Afghanistan, of the unfriendly and injurious character of which, as concerned the British power in India,
he was well apprized, and, by his utter disregard of the views and
interests of the British Government, compelled Captain Burnes to
leave Kabul without having effected any of the objects of his mission. I t was now evident that no further interference could be
exercised by the British Government to bring about a good understanding between the Sihk ruler and Dost Moharned Khan ; and
the hostile policy of the latter chief showed too plainly that, so
long as Kabul remained under his government, we could never
hope that the tranquillity of our neighbourhood would be secured,
or that the interests of our Indian empire would be preserved
inviolate.
" T h e Goaernor-General deems it in this place necessary to
revert to the siege of Herat, and the conduct of the Persian nation.
The siege of that city has now been carried on by the Persian
army for many months.* T h e attack upon it was a most unjustifiable and cruel aggression, perpetrated and continued, notwithstanding the solemn and repeated remonstrances of the British
envoy at the court of Persia, and after every just and becoming
offer of accommodation had been made and rejected. The besieged.
have behaved with a gallantry and fortitude worthy of the justice
of their cause ; and the Governor-General would yet indulge the
hope that their heroism may enable them to maintain a successful
defence until succours shall reach them from British India. In the
mean time the ulterior designs of Persia, affecting the interests of
the British Government, have been, by a succession of events, more
and more openly manifested. The Governor-General has recently
ascertained, by an official despatch from Mr. M'Neil, her Majesty's
envoy, that his Excellency has been compelled, by a refusal of his
just demands, and by a systematic course of disrespect adopted
towards him by the Persian Government, to q ~ ~the
i t court of the
* At the date of this manifesto the Shah had abandonedthe siege and retired,Ferrier.

.
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Shah, and to make a public declaration of a cessation of all intercourse between the two governments. The necessity under which
Great Britain is placed of regarding the present advance of the
Persian arms into Afghanistan as an act of hostility towards herself, has also been officially communicated to the Shah under the
expres order of her Majesty's Government.
"The chiefs of Kandahar (brothers of Dost Mohamed Khan
of Kabul) have avowed their adherence to the Persian policy, with
the same full knowledge of its opposition to the rights and interests
of the British nation in India, and have been openly assisting in
the operations against Herat. In the crisis of the affairs consequent
upon the retirement of our envoy from Kabul, the Governor-General felt the importance of taking immediate measures for arresting
the rapid progress of foreign intrigue and aggression towards our
own territories. His attention was naturally drawn a t this conjuncture to the position and claims of Shah Shooja-001-Moollr, a monarch'
who, when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of united
'esistance to external enmity which were at that time judged
necessary by the British Government, and who, on his empire being
usurped by its present rulers, had found an honourable asylum in
the British do~ninions.
" I t had been clearly ascertained, from th,e informalion hrnished
by the various officers who have visited Afghanistan, that the
Barukzye chiefs, from their disunion and unpopularity, were ill
fitted, under any circumstances, to be useful allies to the British
Government, and to aid us in our just and necessary measures of
national defence. Yet so long as they refrained from proceedings
injurious to our interests and security, the British Government
acknowledged and respected their authority ;but a different policy
appeared to be now more than justified by the conduct of those
chiefs, and t o be indispensable to our o m safety. The welfare
of our possessions in the East requires that we should have on our
western frontier an ally who is interested in resisting aggressions
and establishing tranquillity, in the pla.ce of chiefs ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile power, and seeking to promote
schemes of conquest and aggrandizement. After serious and
mature deliberation the Governor-General was satisfied that a
pressing necessity, as well as every consideration of policy and
justice, warranted us in espousing the cause of Shah Shooja-oolMoolk, whose popularity throughout Afghanistan had been proved
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to his Lordship by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best
authorities. Having arrived a t this determination, the GovernorGeneral was further of opinion that it was just and proper, no less
from the position of Maharajah Runjeet Sing, than from his
undeviating friendship towards the British Government, that his
Highness should have the offer of becoming a party to the contemplated operations.
" Mr. M'Naghten was accordingly deputed in June last to the
court of his Highness, and the result of his mission has been the
conclusion of a tripartite treaty by the British. Government, the
Maharajah, ancl Shah Shooja-001-Moolk, whereby his ~ i ~ h n eiss s
guaranteed in his present possessions, and has bound himself to
co-operate for the restoration of the Shah to the throne of his
ancestors. T h e friends and enemies of any one of the contracting
parties have been declared to be the friends and enemies of d l .
" Farious points have been adjusted which had been the subjects
of discussiod between the British Government and his Highness
the Maharaja, the identity of whose interests with those of the
Honourable Company has now been made apparent to all the
surrounding states. A guaranteed independence will, upon favourable conditions, be tendered to the Emirs of Scinde; and the
integrity of Herat, in the possession of its present ruler, will be
fully respected ; while by the measures completed, or in progress,
it may reasonably be hoped that the general freedom and security
of commerce will be promoted, the name and just influence of the
British Government will gain their proper footing aniong the
nations of Central Asia, that tranquillity will be established upon
the most important frontier of India, and that a lasting barrier
will be raised against hostile intrigue and encroachment.
" His Majesty Shah Shooja-001-Moolk will enter Afghanistan
surrounded by his own troops, and will be supported against .
foreign interference ancl factious opposition by a British army.
T h e Governor-General confidently hopes that the Shah mill be
replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents; and
when once-he shall be secured in power, and the independence and
integrity of Afghanistan established, the British army will be
withdrawn. The Governor-General has been led to these measures
by the duty which is imposed upon him of providing for the
security of the possessions of the British crown ; but he rejoices
that, in the discharge of his duty, he will be enabled to assist in
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restoring the union and ~rosperityof the Afghan people. Throughout the approaching operations British influence will be sedulously
employed to further every measure of general benefit, to reconcile
differences, to secure oblivion for injuries, and to put an end to
the distractions by which, for so many years, the welfare and
happiness of the Afghans have been impaired. Even to the chiefs
whose hostile proceedings have given just cause of offence to the
British Government, it will seek to secure liberal and honourable
treatment on their tendering early submission, and ceasing from
opposition to that course of measures which may be judged the
most suitable to the general advantage of their country."
Thc explanations that have preceded this manifesto do justice to
its inaccuracies, its reserve and want of frankness. I shall not
therefore comment upon it, but have reproduced it here to give
an idea of the manner in which the Anglo-Indian government proceeds in Asia.
T h e invasion of Afghanistan mas only a prelude to that of
Scinde, but there existed friendly treaties with the Talpoora Emirs,
sovereigns of that country, and the Indian Government could not
then attempt to seize their territory without creating for themselves
too much enlbarrassment at once ; the taking definitive possession
of it was therefore postponed, but forcing the Emirs to consent to
the passage of the British troops through their country was a
pelude thereto. A t one moment war was on the point of breaking out between the East India Company and the Emirs of lhat
part of Scinde which is watered by the Lower Indus, for they
energetically opposed the passage of an English ariny ; but Mir
Roustem of Khyrpoor, their aged chief, prevented them from
going to that extremity, arid succeeded in conciliating all parties.
When the British forces entered Scinde this venerable chieftain
acceded to d l the sacrifices imposed upon him. V h e n asked by the
English to Zed them during their ope~ationsin &hnnistan the fortress of Guldcar, situated on an island at the mouth of the Indus, the
demand appeared to him too humiliating. '' It is," he said, " at
once the bulwark and the heart of my country, and my honour
forbids that I should trust that in the hands of strangers." Nevertheless he allowed himself to be persuaded. His whole family
threw themselves on their knees before him to induce him not to
grant this extraordinary request, but he preferred exposing himself
to their lively and incessant reproaches, to displeasing his friends
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the English, in whose word he believed. H e lent them the fort.ress
of Bukkar-it has never been out of their hands since, and to recompense his generous conduct towards them they despoiled him five
years afterwards of the rest of his territory, and possessed themselves
also of that of his brothers and nephews. The officers of Genera1
Napier invaded even the harems of these unfortunate princes, and
carried off the treasures, jewels, and even the clothes of their women.
The Government of lndia had ordered that the Expeditionary
Army of Afghanistan should consist of 27,000 men, who were to
be ready to take the field in the month of November, 1538. But
when it was known at Calcutta that the Persians had raised the
siege of Herat it was reduced to an effective force of 21,500, and
this force was assembled on the eastern bank of the Indus, January
16, 1839, under the compand of Lieut.-Gkneral Sir John Keane.
Here Shah Shooja hastened to join him, and a week afterwards
the Emir Roustem placed the troops in possession of the island
fortress of Bulrkar ; they subsequently crossed the river on a pontoon bridge, and were concentrated at Shikapoor in the earliest
days of March.
" This concentration," says Sumner, " was preceded by one of
those acts of violence too often found in the pages of British
history, and which tarnish the glory of the brilliant actions
recorded in it.
" Near the town of Kurrachee, which is situated about fifty miles
north-east of the second mouth of the Indus, on the Scindian side,
is a small fortress belonging to a state with which England was at
peace, and which was attached to her by treaties of friendship aud
commerce. I t was thought that it would be useful to hold this
place ; and a British vessel of war and steamboats having arrived
before the fort, February 2, 1839, with two sepoy regiments and
a detachment of European artillery, a messenger was sent on shore
to inform the officer in command that its position rendered the
po8session of it indispensable to insure the safety of the vessels of
the Company intrusted with the transport of the munitions of war
and rnate5ieZ of their army. The message required the officer to
deliver up the place in a quarter of an hour, if he did not wish
rigorous measures to be taken against him.
The Scindian officer having refused to yield to the summons,
the troops disembarked, and under cover of the fire of the ships,
moored broadside to the shore, tool. possession of the fort and
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town of Kurrachee, and it now forms part of the British dominions
in the East Indies."
The English had neglected nothing that could tend to secure a
successful issue to this undertaking ; they had exerted all their arts
of seduction and corruption to induce the serdars of Afghanistan
to attach themselves to their party, and a few of the most influential had responded to their appeal. Amongst these were
Iskander Khan, Popolzye ; Mohamed Attah Khan, Popolzye ; and
Walee Mohamed Khan, Isakzye ; who left their tribes on the first
rumour of the mar, and joined Shah Shooja a t Loodiana, where,
with their concurrence, he formed the nucleus of a government.
A S soon as that was constituted, they sent numerous emissaries to
their own country, with a view of parading to the Afghans the
power and generosity of the English, and to persuade them that
not only would all resistance be useless, but that it would be more
beneficial to themselves to receive them, as they would effect the
restoration of their own royal family. A crowd of serdars, who
were jealous of those of the Barukzye tribe, whom the Mohamedzye
chiefs greatly favoured, allowed themselves to be easily persuaded
by these emissaries, and joined without delay the British camp.
A small number only, having no greater sympakh'y with the &lohamedzyes, nevertheless feared the consequences of a return of
fortune in favour of that branch, and retired to their homes to wait
till the course of events should be more decided before they took
a n open part.
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AT the conclusion of General Ferrier's manuscript are some pages
devoted to a description of the Afghan nation, their habits, customs,
education, laws, and religion, and much other general information
respecting Afghanistan, its productions, climate, &c. The author
left it to the translator to decide in which of the two volumes this
information could be placed to the best advantage, namely, ' Caravan Journeys,' or the present work. The translator has, therefore,
though it certainly does interrupt the continuous character of the
history, introduced a portion of that Addendum here ; for the reader
will thus have an insight into the character of the Afghan people
before he enters upon that period of their history which is so closely
interwoven with our own, and -be, therefore, better able to form an
opinion of it and that sad military catastrophe which is still and
must ever remain so deeply interesting to every Englishman.
T h e Afghans are tall, robust, active, and well formed; their
olive and sometimes sallow complexions and strongly-marked hard
features give their countenances a savage expression ; the lids of
their black eyes, which are full of fire, are tinged with antimony,
for this, in their opinion, gives force and adds beauty and a dazzling
brilliancy to them ; their black beard is worn'short, and their hair,
of the same colour, is shaved off from the front to the top of the
head, the remainder at the sides being allowed to fdl in large curls
over the shoulders. Their step is full of resolution, their bearing
proud, but rough.
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They are brave even to rashness, excited by the smallest trifle,
enterprising without the least regard to prudence, energctic and
born for war. They possess all the qualities essential to carry it
on successfully, but are utterly ignorant how to take advantage of
and turn them to account ; their courage is impulsive, and displays
itself most readily in the attack ; if that fails they are easily disheartened, and show no perseverance, for, as they are soon elated,
so are they as easily discouraged. They are sober, abstemious,
and apparently of an open disposition-great gossips, and curious
to excess. Their anger is not betrayed by any sudden burst of
passion ; on the contrary, all that is brutal and savage in their
nature is manifested with the most perfect callmess, but it is the
volcano slumbering beneath the ashes.
Courage is with them the first of virtues, and usurps the place
of a11 the others ; they are cruel, perfidious, coarse,, without pity,
badly brought up, exceedingly inclined to theft and pillage. In the
latter they differ from their neighbours the Persians, who are,, however, as great scoundrels as themselves, for they endeavour by every.
means in their power to conceal their knavery under the appearance of law or rhetoric, while the Afghans do the very reversethey a t once place the knife on your throat, and say, " Give, or I
take." Force is their only argument, and it justifies everything ;
an individual who is merely plundered considers himself extremely
fortunate, as, generally speaking, they act inversely to the cntthroats of Europe, who demand "your purse or your life ;" the
Afghans take life first and then the purse. In religion they are
more tolerant and well disposed towards those who profess a different faith than any other sect of Mussulmans. Like the people of
most Eastern nations, they are also addicted to a crime which it is
not necessary to name ; but this remark applies rather to the rich
than to the people in general. An injury is never forgotten, a'nd
vengeance is a passion which they love ; even at the cost of their
lives they will satisfy i t should an opportunity present itself, and
this in the most cruel manner.
There is no nation in the world more turbulent and less under
subjection ; the difficulties in rendering them submissive to a code
of just laws would be almost insurmountable. T o make them
observe the rules of good breeding, or even common civility, would
perhaps be still more difficult ; the people are as gross and coarse
as savages. The chiefs and upper classes are more civilized; but

,
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their politeness is ,always tinctured by a rudeness of manner very
offensive to Europeans. No matter what the condition or rank
of an Afghan may be, he considers that he has a right to seat
himself in the presence of his superiors ; to this privilege he attaches
the greatest importance, and enters into conversstion with them
perfectly a t hi ease and without the least hesitation, giving his
opinion on every subject; in short, forcing himself and his views
upon them as he thinks fit, eating with them uninvited, and all
this as if they were upon a footing of the most perfect equality.
These habits do not wound the pride of the rich and powerful
Afghans ; on the contrary, they encourage this independent spirit,
and admit their right to make their requests and volunteer their
opinions in this way. These are prerogatives which in their eyes
constitute liberty.
The Afghans do not attach the same importance to some words
as Europeans do ; " country " and '' honour " are to them as
empty sounds, and they sell them to the highest bidder without
scruple. This is so true, that they will almost always submit to and
obey a conqueror ; and if they have been pretty nearly independent
since the time of Ahmed Shah, Suddozye, it has been owing quite
as much to the weakness of the neighbouriig states as because there
was no one who thought it worth his while to purchase them. I t
cannot be denied that the conquest of Persia, under Mir Mahmood
in 1721, is a very remarkable page in their history ; but if we take
into consideration the feeble state in which that unfortunate country
was at the time, we shall be the less astonished ; a similar invasion,
and composed of the same elements, would now have every chance
of success, though the means of defence on the part of Persia are
much more considerable than they were then. After all, the Afghans were not long in losing their conquest and their liberty, and
being in their turn subdued by those whom they had vanquished
and humiliated.
I n mentioning this circumstance, Heaven forbid it should be supposed that I desire to undervalue the courage of a people who
have given so many proofs of i t ; but I wish to establish the fact
that the Afghans are as incapable of a continuous course of action
as of ideas ; they do everything on the spur of the moment, from a
love of disorder, or for no reason at all: it matters little to them
who gives them laws ; they obey the first comer directly they find it
is to their advantage to do so, and allow him to play the tyrant and

,
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govern them if he pays them well and does not interfere with their
passion for rapine and devastation. Pillage, fibhting, and dis9
turbances are at times necessary to their very existence, and are
followed by long days of repose and idleness, during which they
live on the fruits of their depredations.
Their cupidity and avarice are extreme; there is no tie they
.
would not break, no duty they would not desert, to gratify their
avidity for wealth. This surpasses all that can be imagined; it is
insatiable, and to satisfy it they are capable of committing the
.
greatest crimes. For it they will sacrifice all-their native and
independent pride; even prostitute the honour of their wives and
daughters, whom they frequently put to death after they have 1
received the price of their dishonour. Gold in Afghanistan is,
more than anywhere else, the god of the human race ; it stifles the
still small cry of every man's conscience;if, indeed, it can be admitted that an Afghan has a conscience a t all: i t ia impossible to
rely on their promises, their friendship, or their fidelity.
They enter into engagements, and bind themselves by the most
solemn oaths to respect them, and, in order to give then1 a sacred
character, transcribe them on a Koran, to which they affix their
seal, but nevertheless perjure themselves with an impudence
perfectly inconceivable. Towns and villages by hundreds have
surrendered on the faith of such obligations, stipulating that the
lives of the inhabitants should be spared, and get the examples are
rare, that, once in the victors' power, they have not been exterminated. It is extraordinary that, knowing their own bad faith,
they allow themselves to fall into these snares. The majority of
the wars which they wage against one another generally terminate
by one or more of these massacres. Murder is a game, and they
evince a feeling of vanity when they commit one, and glory in the
perfidy and cruelty which they show in their acts of devastation ;
when they can cite an example of a town which they have depopulated and razed to the ground, they imagine they have given
the grandest idea of their power and valour : they are, in short,
real Huns, and Attilas are never wanting amongst them.
They submit to .the laws only after they have tried'every means
to evade them ; they consider it perfectly lawful in those who are
stronger or more powerful than themselves to plunder them, and
consequently they have no scruple in despoiling those who are .
weaker. Accustomed from their childhood to see human blood
'
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spilt, to hear murder not only excused but gloried in, they are
soon familiar with the ?dea of death, which they confront with the
greatest coolness. It is rare to see them make war for the simple
purpose of defending their nationality, for this sentiment does not
exist, and can be considered applicable only to the tribe, its
district, or encampment. Their ideas are of a totally different
character ; the hope of enriching himself by booty, of bathing himself in blood-these are what from his earliest youth a n Afghan
proposes to indulge in, and these are the principles in which he is
brought up. They hate all governments which introduce law and
order into a country, or enter into treaties of peace with their
neighbours ; to do so is in their eyes an attack upon their rights,
which deprives them of pillage, and consequently the best part of
their revenues.
If an Afghan is put tb death by his sovereign for marauding, his
countrymen look upon him as a victim ; but they establish between
him who exposes his life in combat and the obscure domestic thief
who does not an immense difference ; the first is in their estimation a brave man, whereas the other is treated with contempt,
banished from the tribe, and sometimes put to death. At first
sight an Afghan pleases, and this in spite of his rough and savage
physiognomy and exterior : the fact is, that, when he has a n object
in view, and he has something to gain, he knows how to play, and
with great suppleness, the part which policy dictates ; but if he loses
the hope of obtaining anything out of you, it is easy to see-into
the details of his character, and he will stand without scruple
unmasked, and in all the aridity of his evil nature.
Excitement, the clash of arms, and the tumult of the combat are
to him life ; repose is for an Afghan only a; transitory state of
being, during which he leads a monotonous existence ; the sweets
of domestic life, mental quietude, the endearments of his family,
have no charms for him, and a life without commotion and agitation loses all its poetry. H e is only really a man when he is
fighting and plundering; then his eye is full of fire, his hand
grasps convulsively the hilt of his sabre, and he presses his sinewy
legs against his horse's sides until the animal can scarcely draw
his breath : man and horse are one, each understands the ardour
of the other, and it is difficult to distinguish which of the two is
then the most vicious. As there is nothing in the world of which
a n -4fghan makes so light as life, he hastens to live, but in his own
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way, a slave to his passions, for who Icnows whether he will not fall
to-morrow by his neighbour's sword, as others have fallen to-day
by his ?
Thcre is no shade of difference betreen the character of the
citizen or the nomade; a town life does not soften their habits;
they live there as they live in a tent, always armed to the teeth,
and ready for the onslaught, devoid of a right-minded feeling, and
always animated by the most ferocious instincts. Though they
are full of duplicity, one is nevertheless frequently liable to be
taken in by their apparent frankness ; but a traveller is not long
the victim of their clumsy cheating, which can succeed only amongst
themselves, for their minds are ratber'heavy than acute. Strangers,,
and particularly Europeans, easily see through them ; their kind
attentions, or an appearance of politeness to an individual, are
rarely the' result of a natural and sincere feeling on their part,
for they are sure to have an interested object in view ; and if
they are so liberal as to present you with an egg, it is because
they expect to have an ox in return : if they are of any service to
you, and they ask for nothing in exchange, you will find that the
gift, or whatever the service may be, has cost them nothing,
whether trouble or money. They are hospitable to travellers, but
only because this is an ancient custom, which has the force of law,
and is nut a virtue which springs from the heart; those who are
not in good circumstances consider it a burden which they would
willingly cast aside, were it not that they fear public opinion ; in all
cases they take every means in their power to evade it ; the rich
practise it only from ostentation, and always parsimoniously.
Idleness being the dominant vice of this people, they rarely
ever work ; and when the amount of plunder is insufficient for
their requirements, they are always thinking of some expedient by
which they can procure money; their greatest anxiety, however,
is to ascertain how they can get their daily bread without having
to pay for it. This is their one only thought all their lives ; after
having provided for their wives and children the barest pittance,
they will go from door to door in the hope of getting a dihner :
hangers-on are indeed so numerous that the chiefs, and even the
sovereign himself, are obliged to enter into the most minute
details of their houselceeping, and give instructions to their servants
as to the character and quantity of the food they are to place
before their voracious visitors. If with some bread they give a
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little soup, they have the reputation of being exceedingly hospitable ; but if to these they add a ration of rice or meat, no praise,
however expressed, would be sufficiently strong to marlt the estimation in which their generosity is held. The common people are
not alone in this love of putting their hands into other people's
plates, the highest personages do not object to refresh themselves
at their neighbour's expense ; and I have more than once seen
the Vizier Yar Mohamed Khan, and other chiefs, after having
finished their own repast, present the remains to some of their
guests, many of them generals, governors of towns, &c., who
pounced upon and cleared them off in the twinkling of an eye,
seizing the bones with as much dacrity as would have done
the most famished poodle. I t is rare indeed that an Afghan's
appetite fails him, at any rate it is a fact that never came within
my knowledge; and when they have the good fortune to meet with
a table well furnished, and an easy host, they put all reserve aside,
and, as they themselves express i t (ltharabi singuin), make a n
enormous feed.
This habit of living at the espense of other people forces the
Afghans to practise sobriety and frugality. They live on fruit
nearly half the year, rice forming the best and most appetising part
of their food ; but notwithstanding the low price a t which i t is sold,
it is only persons in easy circumstances who can afford to cat it
every day. They season it in their pilaus, like the Turks and Persians ; like them idso they take their meals sitting on the ground,
with their heels tucked under them, and convey their food to their
mouths with their fingers. Meat is not much lilted unless it is
swimming in grease ; then it is delicious. They throw away the
lean, as they say it produces diarrhcea. The principal food of
the villagers and nomades is Aooroot, a kind of pudding made of
boiled Indian corn, bruised between two stones, or simply bread,
on which they pour rancid grease, mixed with a substance which
in the East is known under the name of kechk." The flesh of the
sheep or goat is what the Afghans prefer ; but, as with the rice,
the rich only can afford to purchase it: the ox, the camel, and
the horse, that age or infirmities have rendered unfit for further
service, is the animal food of the people.
They will not eat meat unless it is hula1 (lawful), that is, the
-
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animal must have its face turned towards Mecca, and its throat cut
in a particular part of the neck, the following sacrificial words being
pronounced during the operation, in accordance with their law and
n the name of the most
rule of faith-Bismillizh dt.nzan ~ u l ~ i r(In
merciful God). In eating, they mix one dish with another, knead
then] together with their fingers, and then stuff it into their mouths.
The highest personages not only permit the lowest to eat with
them out of the same plate, but the dirtiest and the most disgusting :
it is sufficient that they are Mussulnians for them not to feel the
least annoyance, and yet they will be scr~~pulously
careful not to eat
with a person who is not of their religion, no matter how clean he
may be. They make two meals, one at noon, the other a t nine
o'clock at night ; they frequently smoke the tcldim, a kind of
water-pipe, but very inferior to the niiryhile of the Turks, or the
Kulioon of the Persians.
It would be difficult to conceive the ignorance of the Afghans,
which does not, however, prevent them from being excessively presumptuous ; they are brutes, not, .however, unintelligent, but they
like to be within a circle of ideas of the narrowest kind. They
have neither the genius of creation nor the faculty of imitation, and
are satisfied with the bigoted and confined views which have been
handed down to them by their ancestors. They refuse to take the
least trouble to learn anything which would open their minds and
add to their well-being, convinced that science is a useless burden,
which only fatigues and enervates those who pursue it, without
making them a t all happier. "Are not these Europeans fools,"
say they, "to give themselves so much concern in acquiring all
these things here below, while they arc preparing for themselves
the most dreadful punishments which they must sufTer for ever in
another world, for refusing to believe the unity of God' and the
power of our revered prophet Nahomet, on whom be praise ? "
Their wise men are the mollahs and astronomers ; the last,
especially, are in great reputation amongst them, for they cannot,
will not, undertake anything without consulting the stars and the
auguries. They believe also in magic, and hang a number of
amulets about themselves and their horses.
The Persian language is met with all over Afghanistan ; the
great families speak it, and their correspoildence is carried on in
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that tongue : the people are acquainted with it, but they prefer
the Pushtoo, the 'language of their nation, which is
a mixture of ancient Persian, Arabic, and Eindostanee. They
have a few works in this language, but they read Persian authors
by preference, and have through them formed imperfect ideas of
geography, astronomy, medicine, and history ; but these works,
full of fictions and deficiencies, have not materially assisted in
developing their faculties.
The Afghanswear their clothes long. They consist of two large
robes, very ample, and are either of cotton or a cloth made of
camel's hair, called burelt: this is the dress of the people. T h e
only difference in the garments of the rich is in the material, which
is silk, cloth, or cachemire. I n summer they are made without any
lining, but in the winter they are wadded with cotton or lined with
fir. The under garment is confined by a piece of muslin, or long
cloth, which is wound round the body ; the outside one and sometimes a third robe is used as a cloalc, and a person would be considered wanting in politeness if in visiting a superior he did not
put it on. The shirt is very full, and the sleeves, which reach below
the hands, particularly so. The former is open at the side from the
neck to the waist, and falls over the trowsers : these, which are
excesswely large, open at the foot, and are drawn in a t the waist
with a string. The head is covered by an enormous blue or white
turban, and the feet with slippers without quarters. T h e upper
classes are, for the most part, simply dreesed, and consider luxury in
this respect as enervating ; but some young chiefs have their robes
ornamented with gold lace or embroidered with gold thread. This is
done in the harems by the women, who excel in this kind of work,
particularly in Kandahar. T h e Afghans are not careful of their
clothes, and soil them the very first day they are put on, for they
squat on the ground without talcing the least thought whether the
spot on which they sit is clean or clirty. They never cha.nge their
garments, not even the shirt, until they are completely worn out;
and as they very rarely wash themselves, they are constantly covered
with vermin, great and small.
T h e Afghans are Muss~~ln~ans
of the sect of Soonee, with the
exception of the tribe of Beritchees, who belong to that of Shiah.
T h e Parsivans and Eirnaks, who are subject to the Afghans, equally
profess the faith of Islam, but besides the two sects just mentioned
some of them are of a third, called Ali-illahee, who worship Ali as
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God. The Afghans did not embrace Islamism till very late, and
after their conquerors the Moguls : this assertion is in contradiction
to their own, but is nevertheless true. They are religious more
from habit than conviction, though they are not on that account
guilty of hypocrisy. While the English occupied their country
they relaxed considerably the practice of their worship, and the
influence of the mollahs was much reduced ; but when the AngloIndians withdrew from Afghanistan, they recovered it with a
powerful hand, and from that moment have endeavoured to excite
a spirit of fanaticism in the people, and inspire them with a
hatred of Europeans.
I t is probable that the Afghans are not more persuaded than
formerly of the infallibility of Islam, but, as the mollahs are supported by -their chiefs, they have resumed their previous habits:
They make the live prayers every day, observe the fast of Ramazan,
and everything is comprised in the most rigorous observance of
external forms. Let the English -return, and they would again
relapse inbo indifference on this subject.
Just.ice is administered amongst the Afghans according to the
commands of the Eoran, though in some cases they use their
traditional lams, which have, they say, descended to them from the
remotest antiquity. The K a i i is the head of the religious tribunal ;
the sovereign, and, under him, the Ealehbeghi and the Daroga,
administer the ordinary law. The Afghans of Herat and Kabul
may congratulate themselves on the equity and justice with which
they are governed, but it is not the same in Eandahar, where the
laws are construed to the benefit of the judges in an unjust and
violent manner : they are always anxious to find the accused guilty,
and, as the sovereign inflicts heavy fines, this system much augmerits
h IS
'
revenues.
The 1e2 tnlionis is rigorously observed amongst the Afghans, and
the murderer is put to death by the nearest relation of his victim.
I t sometimes happens that the person on whom t.his duty devolves
is a child, when the punishment remains in abeyance till he is
strong enough to hold the dagger which is placed in his hands, and
with which he performs the office of executioner. H e possesses the
right to grant the murderer his life, but there is no instance of this
ever having been exercised, excepting for a compensation, which
the criminal is obliged to xnalce in a, sum of money or in land ;
sometimes he gives one of his daughters in marriage to the son or
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the brother of the murdered man, without the father being obliged
to give her any dower.
Thieves are treated with great leniency : for the first theft the
offender is obliged to restore the stolen property to its owner, and
receives from him a paternal admonition ; the second is txeated in
a similar manner, but with the addition of a fine ; the third is
followed by the bastinado; and a further repetition of the offence by
torture 01. death. I n a country where the population is so fond of
laying hands upon other people's property, i t is not surprising to find
the judges exercise so much forbearance, for the generality of them
might with more propriety be placed a t the bar than on the seat of
justice. I t must be added that torture, or any other punishment,
may be remitted, with the consent of the injured party ; and as
he has ever before him the probability that he will one day need
pardon himself, it is seldom that he is too severe.
The punishments inflicted for political crimes, and others which
in France would be brought before our courts of assize, are fine,
bastinado, cutting off the nose, ears, or hand ; opening the body of
the criminal, and then h a ~ g i n ghim up till death releases him fi-om
his suff'erings; cutting the throat, stabbing, impaling, strangling,
skinning alive, scalping, quartering, hanging (generally with the
head downwards), crucifying, stoning, boiling in ,z caldron, and a
thousand other barbarities of the kind. No extenuating circumstances are admitted ; no difference is made between a crime which
is the result of passion and premeditated guilt, between manslaughter and murder: from a. sentence there is no appeal, and the
punisliment is pitiless.
T h e Afghans are afflicted with dreadful diseases, which, from
their ignorance of medicine, they cannot ,mitigate ; these maladies
are owing to their bilious habit, the badness of their food, their
extreme dirt, and the little care they talie to prevent their development. The nomacles are generally of a siclrly complexion; this
is to be attributed to the pernicious quality of the water, which is
almost. a11 allraline. The diseases to which they are most subject
are fevers, cutaneous and nervous disorders, and especially blindness. The last they attrib;te to the waters of the rice-fields, which
they drink ; but if this has any effect upon the eye, it is no doubt
less injurious to that organ than the incredible treatment it often
receives at the hands of t.heir empirics: in fact, there is no country
in the world in which diseases of the eye and loss of sight are more.
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frequent than in Afghanistan. When the Afghans are bled they
generally avoid drinking for twenty - four hours after ; but if
they do not do so, they keep the arm elevated as much as
possible during absorption, in order that, as they say, the water
may not fill up and mix with the remainder of the blood in the
vein. They pretend also that, according to the quarter in which
the wind sets, or this or that conjunction of the stars, they ought
not to be bled in the same vein. They are very careful not to eat
sweet food after sour, dressed after raw, or vice versci. Rancid
grease three or four years old is in their eyes more easy of digestion and more beneficial than fresh ; the latter, which they obtain
from the enormous tails of their sheep, they use only as aperient
medicine, and, when melted, swallow four or six pounds of it a t a
time.
For the cure of wounds and abscesses they have but one receipt,
but that they say is infallible-it is, to apply a piece of an old
watersl~in, resoftened by soaking, which they place on the part
.affected, either to heal or to draw it. There is, however, a schism
amongst their doctors as to the treatment of wounds, some of them
affirming that i t is dangerous to wash them, and that the blood, or
the matter, ought to be left to coagulate on the surface to reform
the flesh.
T h e dressing of a broken bone they rernove every three or four
days; it consists of flour heaten up with the yolks of eggs, which
they consider a specific for setting a dislocated or fractured limb.
For fever they recommend cold baths, and, if possible, of iced
water; they administer mercury internally, but in such quantities as generally to bring the most serious consequences upon
the patient.
Every European is a doctor in the eyes of the Afghans, and
they have a blind confidence in them : even when in perfect health
they will ask for a medicine of some kind, and, be it what it may,
will swallow it on the spot. " I am not ill," an Afghan will say,
"but I may become so." They have no idea that there is any
difference between one medicine and another ; in their opinion they
all ought to produce the same results.
T o carry a Koran in procession, or to place it under their heads
when they go to sleep ; to repeat one thousand times the name of
God or the Prophet Mahornet, are infallible means of curing any
malady whatever. As they have a great dread of the Evil Eye,

'

,

PUBLIC BUILDLXGS-ROADS.
they cover themselves and their domestic animals with amulets.
Some of the charlatans whom they look upon as doctors procure
different European medicines from India, of the properties of
which they are utterly ignorant, and give them without discrimination as to their nature or dose, whatever may be the disease
they are prescribing for ; in this manner they will kill fifty pat.ients
before they cure. one. They win the confidence of these unfortunates by assuring them they have seen their disease in a dream,
and that they are thoroughly acquainted with it and the remedy
that will cure them. The wretched patients trust these liars
implicitly ; and instead of depending on the efforts of nature, which
in many cases would triumph over the malady, they allow themselves to be lrilled with a resignation worthy of a better fate.
The munificence of the Persian, Tartar, and Indian monarchs
has enriched Afghanistan with many fine buildings and worlrs of
public utility-mosques, caravanserais, reservoirs of water, &,c.,
but they have long since been in ruins. The Afghans know not
how to build, and destroy everything ; one may travel whole
months in their country without finding any other shelter than the.
tent of the nomade. At every step may be seen traces of edifices
that must have been magnificent, but none have ever been
repaired. Here or there the ground is strewed with rubbish;
farther in the distance an aqueduct has fallen down, or a river,
owing to the dilapidation of the dykes, has overflowed, and
the waters, which, well-directed, would have been of immense
advantage to the agl-iculturist, remain perfectly useless; but the
people whose interests are most concerned are quite indifferent to
the subject.
T h e roads, if the name can be given to paths made only by the
continual passage of carrLvans, are traced a t random over the
country, and frequently turn miles out of the way to avoid some
slight obstacle that might have been removed a t very little cost of
money or time ; and often, simply owing to the want of a bridge,
or even a ferry-boat, all trafic is interrupted for weeks.
The first families who establish themselves in a fertile spot for
the purpose of cultiva.ting it find their way to it by taking as
direct a course as they can, but entirely by conjecture ; their
footsteps guide the next traveller, and the next, and there is soon
a path. Wlien the snow begins to melt, thirty or forty camels
tied one after the other are led over it to trample it well, and the
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traces of their large feet never disappear. Such is the organisation of the ponts et chaussbes, or roadmaking, in central Asia.
The same system seems to have been followed for ages in the
construction of their houses ; sun-dried bricks are the material
ordinarily used, the rich have them burnt ; up to the present.
period but little use has been made of hewn stone. The great
scarcity of wood in this country has obliged the Afghans to build'
vaulted roofs, and, like the Persians, they excel in this art ;
nothing can be bolder or more graceful than the form of some of
their cupolas.
They roughcast the wall with mud and chopped straw mixed ;
as there is little rain, this suffices to consolidate them, and, being
neatly snloothed mith a trowel, the effect is not unpleasant to
the eje. T h e rich use plaster ; and the Kandaharians especially
decorate their rooms with great taste and talent. Their houses
are generally low, rarely consisting of more than one floor, but
they occupy a great space of ground; tbe inside is concealed
from the gaze of.the passer by, by a high wall which encircles
the whole, and in which there is very rarely more than one
entrance. A11 Afghan house is usually divided into several parts,
each having its own rooms, kitchen, court, reservoir, garden, &c.
They perfectly understand the distribution of the apartments,
with regard to preserving them from the intense heat of the
sun ; but they are quite ignorant of .any precautions against
the cold, which is, however, never severe at E-Ierat or Kandahar.
Even a royal residence in these countries looks mean externally
compared with an European house, and one is surprised to find
in the interior every Asiatic comfort combined with much that is
luxurious.
911 over the East they make an exceedingly hard cement,
which they use as mortar, and to form the lining of baths and
reservoirs : it is made by some persons with equal parts of woodashes, thoroughly sifted, and powdered lime ; and by some -with
two parts of lime to one of ashes ;but in either case these materials
are me11 mixed. Water is then poured upon them and they are
well kneaded, after which the mass is beaten for six days by bwo men
with large sticks, and uninterruptedly, except at night: when it
becomes a little solid on one side, it is turned over and beaten on
the other, care being taken to moisten it occasiontllly lest it should
become too dry. When thus well mixed, it is folded and turned
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and beaten again and again till the sixth day, when it is ready for
use. In building, this cement is laid between the bricks, which
are tightly pressed upon each other ; for lining it is laid upon the
surface that is to be covered, and spread with a flat and polished
flint, for it must not be touched with the hand, as it would burn.
Three layers are put on successively, and the third is washed over
with oil, but of what kind is inimaterial ; when it is dry nothing
can equal the beauty and solidity of this cement, which is called
saroodj. There is another description called sa~oocljmaglu-eli, but
it is not so much used : this is composed of one third of hot lime,
one of sifted sand, and one of pounded brick.
The domestic animals of Afghanistan are the camel, the oxwith-a-hump, the hoke, the ass, and a few fine mules, goats
and sheep, pigeons and fowls. T h e camels are of two sorts ;
those from Turltestau and the country of the Hazarahs are exceedingly large and strong, but not very active. Those from the
Seistan are slenderly formed and wiry, but, though small, are
as hardy an animal as can be found, and iucredibly swift; they
will travel five-and-twenty leagues in a day without feeling fatigue,
and are never affected by the great heat of the sun; these are
generally used for riding, and those of Turkestan as beasts of
burden.
The ox is used in the plough, in the transport of goods, and, as
a last resource, for food. T h e horses of Iiandahas and Kabul are
not particularly good, but at Herat, and amongst the Hazarahs,
there are splendid animals, probably the finest and most capable of
enduring fatigue in Central Asia. The Afghans take many of
them to Shilrapoor, where they are bought by the English for
remounts for their cavalry, and particularly for the artillery.
Amongst the wild animals of Afghanistan are the royal tiger,
the panther, bear, hyena, wolf, wild boar, jackal, fox, polecat, and
various kinds of rats ; myriads of scorpions and reptiles swarm in
the plains and mountains. Deer, the wild goat, and wild ass are
seen in numbers of which it is difficult to form an idea; the
gazelle is found only on the south bank of the Helmund. Hares,
partridges, pheasants, bustards, indeed every variety of game
and waterfowl are in abundance.
The soil of Afghanistan resembles that of the rest of the great
table-land of Central Asia. Within the principality of Kabul and
the northern part of that of Herat w e high mountains covered with
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forests, having between them vast argillaceous plains well supplied'
with water, covered with fields, and susceptible of every species of
cultivation; the portion south of Herat and Kandahar also consists of .
immense plains, but generally arid, running from East to West, and
bordered by a chain of sterile mountains. T h e soil of these plains
is sandy, and absorbs so much water as to create a great scarcity :
of that necessary of life within their limits, and t,he inhabitants are '
obliged to obtain by long and toilsome labour that which nature
has denied them a t the surface. They dig a deep hole at the foot
of a mountain where they expect to find water, and, having succeeded, lead it to their villages by a subterranean canal connecting
a series of wells. Experience is generally their only guide in
performing these works, for very few of them understand anything
of the art of taking levels; nevertheless, they rarely make a
mistake.
Before a population resolve to undertake such a work, they
must have found it impossible to select a spot near a natural .
stream which they could turn to purposes of cultivation. I t
r e q ~ ~ i r emuch
s
time and trouble to make these wells, or kariz,
as they are called; and if the country nnhappily becomes the
theatre of war, the first operation of the invading army is to
destroy them, and deprive the people they come to attack of their
supply of water. I t is to this unhappy mania of dest,ructiveness,
especially in this particular form, that the depopulation of Afghanistan is principally to be ascribed : immense tracts of country have
in consequence been abandoned and become arid ; they belong to
no one-the land is valueless and cannot be sold ; water only has
a value, whether in a well or from a river led by conduits to the
spot that it is required to fertilize. I t is always part of a bargzin
that, whenever land can be irrigated by this water, the water shall
belong to the purchaser.
Notwithstanding the bad quality of the soil in Kandahar,
vegetable productions are extremely good and cheap. T h e
Afghan plough is simply a piece of wood sharpened and hardened
in the fire. T h e Afghans cultivate wheat, barley, maize, tobacco,
cotton, and rice, sesamum, and palma-christi. T h e rice from
Jellalabad is esteemed the best; and from the sesamum and
palma-christi oil is expressed. Asafetida is exported, but of the
other crops they raise only enough for their consumption. They
rear also a few silkworms.
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All the fruits of Europe, excepting the gooseberry and strawberry, are found in Afghanistan, but the absence of these is amply
by the water-melon and the pomegranate. I n Kandah.har the latter are superior to those grown in any other part of
Asia.
In the mountains of Afghanistan are found vast quantities of
iron, lead, and sulphur ; quicksilver abounds; also asbestos, which
is called singui pemhe. Gold and silver are washed down in many
of the little streams; the mountains, therefore, contain much of
the precious metals-but all this mineral wealth is useless, for
the Afghans wilzl not take the trouble to turn it to account.
Afghanistan lies between 32" and 36" of north latitude, and 60'
and 680 of east longitude, and within this confined space the
climate varies amazingly according to the locality-the heat or
the cold is felt in different spots in the same latitude with very
different degrees of intensity, according to the configuration of the
country. By the side of plains, on which the sun darts his burning
rays, are table-lands at a very high elevation, and gigantic mountains where summer and winter seem to stand side by side. A t
Herat, in the July of 1845, the Centigrade thermometer never
stood higher than 37" in the shade, and that rarely; it more frequently ranged between 3%"and 34". From the commencement
of May to the middle of September the wind blows constantly from
t.he N.W. over this province, and often with such violence as to
prostrate houses, uproot trees, and cause much devastation. T h e
winter is tolerably mild; on the plain the snow melts as it falls,
and does not lie long even on the summits of the mountains.
Three years out of four it does not freeze hard enough for the
inhabitants to store up any ice for the summer; in general the
temperature is moderate, and the climate one of the most agreeable
in Asia.
The province of Ihndahar is everywhere subject to intense heat.
I n the fortress of Girishk, on the banks of the Helmund, in the
month of August, the Centigrade thermometer stood at 48' or 4 9 O
in the shade. This principality is bounded on the S. by the deserts
of moving sand of the Seistan, and is on this side open to violent
winds, surcharged with exceedingly fine sand, which is very injurious to animal life.
For nine months the sun shines with the greatest possible splendour on Afghanistan, and the nights are even more beautiful than
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the days; travellers can journey in perfect safety by the brilliant
starlight only. T h e atmosphere is, during the night, much charged'
with electricity, and the least friction will draw sparks from almost
any object whatever, mith a slight noise like the breaking of an
osier twig.
T h e N.W. wind of the spriig and summer is as violent in Ran- '
dahar as in Herat., but the minter is still milder; the mountains
which bound it on the north attract much rain, but snow is rarely
seen there, and then only in small quantities.
I n Kabul the climate is very temperate in the summer, and it
is delightful to reside there in tllat season ; but during half the
autumn, the winter, and half the spring, the ground is covered
with snow three feet deep. The frost is constant and intense, and
the roads are impassable f o ~
five months in the year.
T h a t which has contributed more than the turbulence of the
serdars and the rivalry of the tribes to break up the Afghan king- -dom, and lieep the three principalities separate, is the difficulty .
that has been always experienced by the Suddozye monarchs of
marching from Kabul with sufficient promptitude upon any part
that might be in a state of revolt. The extent of the Paropamisus, which is occupied by indepeildent tribes, and is at any time .
difficult to pass through, always obliged them to make a long
circuit with their armies to reach Herat,. This occasioned a loss
of time which the insurgents turned to their advantage by. strengthening their position. It is difficult to determine the boundasies of
the three Afghan principalities from. each other in those parts
where there is neither river nor mountain to fix them definitely :
in such case the frontier of each is defined by an imaginary line
which shall just include the ground on which a tribe subject to its
power has planted its tents.
T h e population of Afghanistan is not in proportion to the
extent of its territory, and the conditions which govern this
question contribute powerfully to arrest its development, and even
cause a sensible diminution of its numbers. The inhabitants
withdraw more and more from the agitation and instabi1it.y that
reign there ; a fourth part of its fighting men have either been
killed or taken service in Persia or in India in consequence of
the intestine or foreign wars with which Afghanistau has been
afflicted.
There are two causes which make it very difficult to estimate'
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the population of Afghanistan : first, the itinerant character of the
nomadic portion of it, for the passion for change of place is
pushed to the greatest extreme-a remark which sometimes applies
even to the inhabitants of towns; secondly, the mountanious
country of the Paropainisus is very iniperfectly known, and this
is specially inhabited by nomade tribes, of which it is impossible,
even approximately, to ascertain the number.
The population of Afghanistan is divided into two very distinct
parts : first, the Afghans, properly so called ; secondly, the Tajilcs,
the descendants of the ancient conquerors of the country, and who
may be s~~bdivided
into two classes-the Parsivans," or inhabitants
of the towns, and the Ei~naksor nomades. T h e Afghans are a t
the present time the dominant race, and. the Tajiks are subject to
them both in Hemt and Kandahar; nevertheless Yar Moharned
Khan has in the former city shown them great consideration, and
permitted them to obtain an influence which may a t some future
time become fatal to the Afghans. A t Kabul their superior
numbers, their warlike instincts, and the fortified position which
they occupy in that city, have obtained for them the same p i vileges as the Afghans ; they share with them the appointments
of the public service, and in the political troubles which often arise
the party to which they give their support is very frequently triumphant.
T h e ICuzzilbashes or Persians established in Kabul by Nadir
Shah, and numbering 12,000 families, hold to the Tajiks, to whom
they assindate in religion, both races being of the same sect, that
is to say, Shiahs.
The following may be considered, but approximately only, as
the amount of the population in Afghanistan.
I n the province ofllerat 300,000 Afghans, and 600,000 Parsivans or Eimaks.
Belooches.
,,
ICanclahar 600,000
,,
300,000
,,
800,000
,, and Kuzzilbashes.
,, Kabul 1,600,000
,,

--

Totd

2,500,000

General Total,

--

1,700,000

4,200,000 inhabitants.

The meaning of which is, "speaking Persian."-Fe~rier.
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CHAPTER XXII.
Government of the Afghan provinces -Power of the Emirs - Influence of t h e
priests - Turbulence of the serdars - Ideas of government - Conduct of
public affairs - Stability of power unlikely to last - Mode of obtaining it
- Character of the serdars - The producing classes - They cannot leave
Kandahar - Clannish feelings - Mercenary qualities of the serdars - Fidelity
of t h e troops never certain - The result of their numerous wars - The
sovereign and the serdars - Superiority of the Moharuedzyes -The power of
the Barulzzyes-Probabilities
of their retaining it- English marriages i n
Afghanistan -The Afghan army -Manner in which it is composed - T h e
contmgents easily assembled -Ignorant of military discipline, and insensible
to its advantages -War a necessity - Cavalry numerous - Mode of fighting
of
-Rights of individuals unknown - Construction of their towns-Tribes
the south-Strength of the Afghan army in each priucipnlity -Par Mohamed's
troops- Money -Prices of provisions - Wine-Weights and measures -The
Parsivans - Mechmical arts - Eurupean manufactures -Taxation.
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THEgovernment of the Afghan provinces has somewhat of a
monarchical character about it, nevertheless it is rather a military,
aristocratic, and despotic republic, the dictator of which is established for life. The sovereign is absolute, and makes any and
every change which may appear to him necessary or proper in the
government or the administration ; he can dispose of the lives and
property of his subjects, and is kept within certain limits in
these respects only by the calculstions which prudence dictates.
Religion is the counterpoise to his authority ; this gives the clergy
great influence, one that he might try in vain to subject to his will
and pleasure ; and vainer still would be the attempt to infringc
and invade the rights and privileges of the serdars or chiefs of
tribes, who would never consent to resign a certain influence in
the affairs of government. I t may be said that in Afghanistan
there are as many sovereigns as serdars, for each of them governs
after his own fashion ; they are jealous, turbulent, and anlbitious, and the sovereign can restrain and keep them in some
order only by taking advantage of their rivalry and feuds and
opposing one to the other. There is no unity, nothing is
permanent, everything depends on the pleasure or caprice of a
number of despots, always at variance with each other, making
their tribes espouse their personal quarrels ; a constant feeling of
irascibility is the result, which finally leads to sanguinary civil
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yarn, and throws the country into a state of anarchy and perpetual
confusion.
I n Europe civilization has regulated everything ; the majority
of her citizens are devoted to ~cience,the arts, industry, and
commerce, which enrich and conduce to the well-being of the
and ameliorate the habits and conditiou of the people :
when war bursts forth only a very small portion of the population
arm for the defence of the country, and this supplies all the wants
of the army, which ' i s a n element of order and security-the
government, in short, is the guardian and watches over the
interest,^ of the nation for the general good. But in Afghanistan
the ideas and object of the government and the governed are
wholly different ; there each man thinks only of destruction and
disorganization ; it is who shall labour least, or who shall enrich
himself the most, and by the most culpable means. T h e depositaries of power, instead of leacling those under them in the right
path, instead of giving them, by their own conduct, a good
example, and ameliorating the condition of the people, load
them with exactions and enrich themselves a t their cost.
This system of spoliation and embezzlement is practised by
functionaries of every class, and has a sad effect upon the minds
of the masses, who follow the example of their superiors : seeing
that the great., instead of occupying themselves with their welfare,
only think of enjoying themselves at their espense, they become
egotistical and avaricious in their turn, and prefer idleness to
an industry, which serves only to benefit their oppressors, and
draws upon themselves additional persecution. T o seize without
ceremony upon the property of other people is an example which
the Afghans receive daily from their chiefs, and it appears to
them a practice both convenient and just ; the effect of this is
a permanent state of disquietude and trouble. They are, as I
have already remarked, the moat turbulent nation in Asia, and
the most difficult to govern : they always welcome, and with
enthusiasm, the arrival of a new sovereign, but a reign too long,
or a peace too prolonged with their neighbours, is to them insupportable ; and when no opportunity presents itself of getting rid
of their over-excitement on their foes without, they make war
upon one another.
If courage is to them the first of Firtues, it may be said also
that agitation is for them a first necessity; thus scenes of
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violence arise which produce a change of government, and with it
a change of sovereigns, with incorlceivable rapidity. H e who
possesses a little money and can scatter it amongst the crowd will
soon have a sufficient number of partizans to assist in raising him
to power; and though this power is hereditary in Afghanistan,
the regular succession to the throne is by no means liked and
is the most uncertain thing possible. The legitimate heir is
always obliged to submit the question of sovereignty to an election
and the chances of war ; the result is rarely doubtfill, and has
always favoured the candidate who paid the soldiers best that
adhered to his fortunes ; hence it is that one sees so many obscure
adventurers, enriched by mzzias, suddenly elevated to the supreme
authority. These have, for the most part, been little better than
avaricious and sanguinary tyrants, who are overthrown almost as
soon as they are set up. In Afghanistan everything that succeeds
is legitimate, and in this way success favours the greatest rascal ;
his crimes or his virtues are of little importance to the people ; if
he pays well h e is'their idol ; but let his purse get empty, let a
reverse of fortune overtake him, he a t once becomes an object of
contempt and aversion, and is obliged either to expatriate
himself or retire into a greater obscurity than that from which
he sprung.
Afghanistan is of all countries in the world that in which a
man's position is the most uncertain ; a serdar to-day wealthy and
powerful will to-morrow be despoiled of everything he is possessed
of, and be reduced to serve, and in a subordinate rank, those who,
till then, had obeyed his smallest wish. T h e members of his
family will be dispersed and reduced to the greatest privations, and
hence it. is that in this country are Eeen so many nobles in rags.
There are hundreds of khans who take service as private soldiers,
and even servants of the lowest grade ; but no matter what may
be the misery, degradation, or adversity to which they are reduced,
they are always wonderfully vain of their birth, and their aristocratic pride is sure to pierce through their plebeian garb.
T h e sovereigns of Afghanistan bestow every kind of title with a
prodigal hand, and that of khan so much so, and upon such
perfect nobodies, that it has completely lost the consideration
properly due to it. The chance which every energetic man
has of rising to power, even the highest, and the faci1it.y with
which he attains it, has established between the people, the
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serdars, and the sovereign, a species of familiarity which is seen
in no other country. Jndividuals of the lowest birth and class,
clad in rags and covered with vermin, take whatever complaints,
they may have in person to the king ; they approach and seat
themselves before him without ceremony, enter at once and without preamble into .their story, and with that easy nonchalant
air which is so characteristic of Afghan human nature. T h e
sovereign sees, receives, and discusses every petition even on
the most insignificant subjects, and his minister, when he has
one, generally speaking, merely gives effect to the decisions of his
master.
As the Afghan chiefs are never sure of holding for a lengthened period any great appointment in the state, their first thought
is always how they can fill their own coffers and r u i i ~the country;
however great and politic, and of future advantage, any measure
may appear, they will always sacrifice it to the most trifling
present benefit, no matter how small. Another mode of enriching
themselves is putting up the public offices for sale to the highest
bidder, and the purchasers then consider that they are justified
in committing every kind of fraud to reimburse themselves the
sums they have paid. Individual liberty exists nowhere in the
East so perfect as in Afghanistan ; every Afghan can go where
he thinks fit; he can leave the kingdom with his family if he
wishes, neither authority nor passport is required to enable him
to do so, no one has a right to interfere with or restrain him ;
the sovereign certainly would not, for an Afghan is a very unproductive article, which consumes much and produces nothing: but
this is not the case either with the Paraivam or the Hindoos,
settled in the country, who form the industrial and producing class.
They, especially those in Iiandahar, are retained in the principality
against their wishes, and are severely punished when they attempt
to leave it. I t cannot be said that there is, as we understand i t
in Enrope, ally national spirit amongst the Afghans ; they fight
much more for their own interests than for their independence;
there is, nevertheless, something which resembles it, though not
commonly felt: this is a sentiment of affection for, or a jealous
pride in, his own tribe, which makes a man detest the neighbouring
one, though of the same race : it may be affirmed, therefore, tha.t
every tribe of Afghans has its own clannish feeling, and it is that
which protects the nation ; interest alone effects a passing unity
X

.'

306

-

THE SERDAXS-THE

TROOPS.

(:HAP.

XSII.

of purpose, and when that is satisfied the rivalries of different
castes and clans re-assume their sway.
T h e serdars are a t one and the same time the strength and the
cune of the monarch ; prompt to take arms and defend him when
a good understal?ding exists between them, they are a s ready
to revolt against him when they find, or think, they have the
smallest interest in doing so ; in anything, however, to which they
are disinclined, they mould not obey even the sovereign of their
choice but with reluctance ; moreover, they are always impatient
to see him replaced by another, from whom they hope to obtain
p e a t e r advantages. Each subdivision of a tribe is, according to
its numerical force and extent of territory, commanded by one or
more serdars.. These chiefs, though of a different countrx and
religion, may be compared to the dukes and barons of the middle
ages in France-the more powerful to the knighk bannerets, and
those having authority over only a few families to the esquires-who
in time of war enrol themselves and their men under the orders
of the chief that inspires them with the greatest confidence, and
can pay them the best. They have also the characteristic which
mas common to the old Italian condottieri, namely, that they will
sell their services to the highest bidder. I n war, as in peace, they
are ready to pass from the ranks of the Emir of ICabul into the
service of the Vizier of Eerat, the chief of Kandahar, the English,
the Persians, Sikhs, Tartars, or Belooches, and vice vers$, without
the slightest scruple ; it is indifferent to them whether their friend . ,
of to-day is their enemy to-morrow, or whether they have even to
take arms against their relations or not ; the love of money enables
them to overlook a11 these considerations. T h e soldiers imitate
on a small scale that which their chiefs do on a large one, that is
to say, they will desert one party and attach tliemselres to another,
without feeling any compunction or incurring the least disgrace ;
the question is simply one of speculation, an admitted custom,
and there is no shame in conforming t o it.
T h e consequence of this is that a sovereign is never sure of his
troops, and, if any one else will give them higher pay or treat
them better than he can, they will pass over to his camp. The
authority of the chiefs of tribes is much more effectual over their
subordinates, whom they sometimes rule with a rod of iron ; these
consider the chief as their father, and are accustomed to obey and
respect him from their infancy ; he is of the same clan as them-
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selves, he has received his power and authority through a long line
of ancestors; but these reasons nevertheless cannot always save
him from ruin ; it requires very little to excite discontent ; then he
is attacked, followed, and driven forth, aud his right to govern,
such as it is, passes to a brother, an uncle, or some collateral
branch, to any one, in short, so that the feudal rights remain in
the family.
The wars that have reddened the soil of Afghanistan for the last
seventy years have so completely decimated the old families that
many of them have become extinct, and several tribes have remained without a head. On some occasions, when the sovereign
has tried to give them a chief of his choice, instead of one of their
own, some dreadful and bloody conflict has ensued, which has
always ended in the triumph of the chief elected by the tribe.
This resistance is natural enough. To accept a leader who was
imposed upon them would be to abdicate their rights, to deliver
themselves up to the tender mercies of the prince ; whereas, he
who holds the command by right of election defends his position
and privileges with greater tenacity, no matter who may be the
individual who attacks him.
The visits of the serdars a t the court of the sovereign are rare,
for they are generally apprehensive of falling into some trap
which is often laid for them, and they dislike the prolonged stay
they are obliged to make when once they are there. They prefer
residing amongst their tribe, in their fortified villages, generally
occupying some eminence, where in case of attack they can the
more readily and continuously resist the efforts of their enemies.
The most powerful amongst them are caressed by the sovereign,
who attaches them to his interests much more by the concessions
he makes than by the fear which he inspires ; ordinarily, and with
a view to preserve a nominal authority over them, he remits the
whole of the taxes, and imposes in their stead the obligation to
furnish a contingent of troops in the event, of war being declared
against him by his neighbours. This wretched system gives too much power to the serdars; the sovereign is a t their mercy, and
it is the ambition of these men that gives birth to the numerous
civil wars in Afghanistan, for they are constantly ill revolt.
I t has been shown in the course of their history to what an
extent they carried their excesses under the dynasty of the Suddozyes ; if they have o t as often deposed and recalled the
x 2

hIohnnledzyes, it is because that family is as it were an exception
to the Afghans in general, and those who compose it are men of
superior intelligence and energy of character. They have also an
ascendancy over the other chiefs, and know how to control them
by the divisions which they so adroitly excite and maintain amongst
them, and by settling or encamping the tribe of the Bnrulizyes,
to which the Mohamedzyes belong, in the plains and valleys that,
lying south of Kandahar, reach as far as Ghumee. This central
position enables them to move their forces rapidly to any particular
spot, and suppress all revolts with alacrity and vigour, and being
numerically stronger they control the other tribes. Many of theie
they have broken up into sections or dispersed, in order to make it
almost impossible that they should render mutual assistance to
each other, and they thus hold them in check with greater facility.
T h e clan of which the sovereign is a member always enjoys the
greatest privileges and advantages over the rest, and this is one of
the reasons why each tribe is continually agitating and endeavouring to raise its chief to power.
T h e princcs actually reigning in Afghanistan have up to this
time repressed with as much good fortune as severity the revolts
that have taken place in their states ; but thougli this has enabled
them to hold the reins of government for many years, we must
not imagine that the Mohamedzyes have stifled the spirit ,of
rebellion, which is as much a necessity in the Afghan character as
the effect of a vicious social organization ; the Barulrzyes may be
overthrown to-morrow, they live on from day to day in a precarious
position, and their fate is dependent on the caprices of fortune and
the yood pleasure of their enemies. Burnes has affirmed that Dost
Mohamed is held in veneration by the Afghans, and that he is the
first sovereign who made them understand the sweets of peace,
and introduced abundance and security amongst them ; but how
did they treat him when the hour arrived for them to show their
gratitude? this chief was abandoned for Shah Shooja, for whom
they had still less consideration. T h e English took possession of
Kabul without meeting with any serious resistance on their march ;
and in ,spite of what has been said, and what might still be said,
I affirm and assert that they were then received with acclamations
and protestations of friendship and devotion without the least
solicitation on their part, and this from chiefs who subsequently
declared them to be their enemies. Then, as now, the serdurs
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were men of bad faith : they expected and hoped for gold ; as long
as they were given any they accepted it and said nothing ; t,heir
consciences were dead within them, even the bigoted feeling of
fanaticism was hushed in their breasts ; the husband sold the
honour of his wife, the father that of hi daughter, the brother that
of his sister, and one saw a circumstance till then unheard of, a
number of Englishmen, Christians, become the legitimate husbands
of Afghan women who profeszed the faith of Islam. Money had
made these Savage Afghans as tame and submissive as sheep, but
directly the order .was given by the East India Company to reduce
the subsidies which had been paid to them, turbulence and
fanaticism returned a t once ; the salaries and donations which they
received after this reduction were even then much higher than
those they obtained from their own sovereigns, but in this, as in all
other circumstances, their avarice, their unstable, restless, and
ficlrle character, brought about the insurrection which re-established
the power of the Emir Dost Mohamed in Kabul and that of
Rohendil Khan in Kandahar. Their return was celebrated with
every circumstance of pomp by their subjects, and yet how often
since that period have they not revolted against these chiefs ! They
will, as they have already done before, turn their backs on them
on the first occasion ; and if these princes have the good fortune
to terminate their troubled lives in power, it'is d l that in common
reason they can expect. It will be impossible either for them,
or Yar Mohamed Khan of Herat to establish a dynasty, the
foundations of which shall be sufficiently solid to enable them
to transmit it with any degree of certainty to their legitimate
heirs ; t.he sovereignty in this country exists only on considerations
purelyindividua1,-it is frequently brought to a close with the life
of the possessor, and becomes afterwards the appanage of some
bold adventurer or soldier of fortune.
T h e Afghan army might in case of necesssity consist of the
whole male population, for every .man is born a soldier, and
attaches himself to some chief as soon as he can hold a musket.
As the troops have no regular pay, and during their period of
service generally speaking live on plunder, it is difficult to say
which is the most disastrous to the people, its own army or that of
a foreign enemy, for both one and the other abandon themselves
to all kinds of excesses, devastate the country, and leave behind
'the most fearful traces of their pawage ; ordinarily speaking,

.
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the strength of the army of each ~ r i n c i p a l i tis~ dependent on the
probabilities that exist of maintaining it in the district to which
it is going.
A t the first news of war the s e r d m hasten with their several
contingents to the camp of the sovereign, each bringing with him
the number of men in proportion to the nature and importance of
his command. These contingents united form the army, properly
so called ; but in addition to it is another class of combatants,
which, though not the best, are often the most numerous ;such, for
instance, as the inhabitants of towns, who are not attached to any
chief, individuals who make war on their own account and at their
own expense, solely for the pleasure of making it, and in the hope
of obtaining large booty. I t sometimes happens that these
irregulars unite in parties, or d l together, and elect a chief, or
c.l~iefs, under whose command they place themselves; but more
often they are broken up into small detachments of Friends or
acquaintances coming from the same locality, associated together,
and iutending to share in the profits of the enterprise ; they march
after their own fashion, and without order, regulating their proceedings according to the movements of the army, or leaving it
when it suits their views and convenience. These elements united,
or sometimes disunited, form an Afghan army, if one can give
such a name to a collection of men, animals, and followers
marching pell-mell, and in the greatest confusion. I t requires
only a few days for the serdars to assemble their contingents, for
every man of the tribe is always ready to mount his horse, and
each of them carries his provisions with him in a kind of havresnc,
which is slung behind the saddle. The Afghans, such parasites
and sponges when at home, are exceedingly frugal and temperate
when they are on a journey ; their powers of abstinence and endurance are great, and they can live almost upon anything and
for a long time ; the chiefs, and those whose means enable them
to do so, are accompanied by so many servants for their personal
requirements, or to look after the baggage, that during the whole
of the operations they generally exceed in number those of the
fighting men. All these form a mixed and noisy rabble, undisciplined and impracticable, badly equipped, aud taking no precautions necessary to their own security, whether on the march or
in camp, even when in presence of the enemy. Nevertheless,
though in this miserable and confused state, the army moves with
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great rapidity and over immense distances : the inhabitants of the .
villages 07 at their approach, for they destroy and pillage everything that lies on their road. Sometimes a dearth of provisions
is felt in the camp, when the majority of the volunteers quit the
srmy and return to their homes ; the aerdars, who carry with them
only food enough for their personal wants, are also obliged to
disband successive portions of their contingents to obtain supplies, so that it often happens that only a fourth, and even a
less number, are all that remain with their colours. When
war takes place between the Afghans themselves, it generally
ends in a combat in which a very small force is engaged on either
side.
I n the field, the Afghans never think of ascertaining what
is going on in their front on the line of march ; they form neither
advanced nor rear guards, but move straight on without the
least uneasiness or apprehension until they meet the enemy ; it
matters little to them whether o i not their communications are
left open ; the spot on which they find their subsistence is for them
the line of operations ; they pitch their camp by hap-hazard, without system or order, a t the first place they come to, but Ijy preference near villages, which they can plunder, and where they are
also sure to find water. As this is in some parts very scarce, and
to be found only at certain points well known to all, it often
occurs that the vtrious contingents marching in several columns,
finding the springs or wells near which they intended to encamp
exhausted, retire upon the adjoiuing ones, but the ground is often
occupied, and a bloody conflict is the result, when the strongest
party remains in possession of the springs, and the other has to
continue its search elsewhere. I n thg camp each contingent forms
an irregular circle, the baggage and the chief's tent being in the
centre. The mass of the Afghan army is corrlposed of cavalry,
and the national character, and the nature of the climate and
soil, are the principal reasons that lead them to prefer this arm
to infantry, which, excepting in the mountains north of Kabul,
is held in little estimation amongst them : there the country is
difficult and the climate temperate, but in the other parts of
Afghanistan the people do not fancy traversing on foot miles and
miles of desert plains, under a burning sun, and where water is
scarce. With a little forethought and arrangement these obstacles
would readily and promptly be overcome, but this is not the
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country in which people care to overcome difficulties : anything
that is easy of execution and can be effected in a brief space of
time is much more to their taste.
The love of war iu felt much more amongst Afghans than all
other Eastern nations; nevertheless, in no one instance has so
little desire been shown to augment the means of resistance and
aggression. W a r to them is a trade, for it would be impossible
to give the name of science to the thousand absurd proceedings
which they employ, and which prove that their chiefs are completely
ignorant of the first elements of the art. The reason of their success
against the other Asiatic hordes up to this day has been their d u n
in the attack, their courage, but not any clever dispositions or
a knowledge of milibry operations ; t.heir neighbours the Sikhs,
previously subject to them, defeated the Afghans and seized some
o f ' the most valuable provinces in their territory, directly they
had obtained even a partial Itnowledge of European tactics. I t
cannot be denied that the Afghans are excellent skirmishers and
experienced foragers, for they possess the necessary qualifications
in a much greater degree than Europeans. They are perfectly
independent in their manmuvres, each detachment fighting after
its own devices, unrestrained by any subordination and discipline,
those who comrnand them not being any wiser than themselves.
Their instinct tells them what movement will ensure their safety
under defeat, or will tend to their advantage invictory. European
soldiers wou~ld certainly effect as much as they could under the
same circumstances ; but then they are subject to regular discipline,
directed by one impulse, the majority of them confiding in the
talents of their chiefs, so that their courage is limited within
proper bounds, out of which they cannot step without compromising their discipline, or sometimes endangering the lives of their
comrades.
For the theatre' of combat between their armies the Afghans
always select large plains, in order that their numerous cavalry,
on which they place a blind reliance, may be able to deploy
freely; if they could charge regularly and in line it would be
perhaps the finest cavalry in the world. The sword is their
favourite arm, and when they say of any one "chemchiri adam
est!' (that man is a swordsman) they have paid him the most
flattering compliment. They have no idea of the advantages of
position, or estimating in a military sense the features of the
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ground ; in their eyes the shortest road is the best ; they never
seek to turn a position or to make a diversion ; they always attack
in line parallel to tl~atof the enemy and on all points at once,
taking, in the words of the proverb, '' the bull by the horns."
Before they encounter their adversary, however, they endeavour
to weaken him by ruining the country in his front, so that he
cannot maintain himself; they burn the villages, expel the inhabitants, destroy the aqueducts ; and after he has wandered for days
in the desert they have made, panting with thirst and extenuated
by hunger, they pounce upon their enemy like a tiger and make a
horrible massacre. Strategy and tactics are unknown to them,
and not even by compulsion could they be initiated in these powerful agents in obtaining victory. They will have independence of
action, opportunities of displaying their address and their physical
strength ; t,hey place the triumph of individual courage far above
that of science, and reject every idea of combination and unity in
their movements. But this impulsive ardour, this daring bravery,
of which they were so proud, slackened when they had to meet the
British, whose artillery cleverly served, and infantry squares solid
as walls, made fearful hwoc in their squadrons. T h e artillery
especially, that terrible a m in the hands of Europeans, inspires
them with no less. aversion than it did formerly Montluc or the
Chevalier Bayard, the first of whom looked upon it as an invention
of the devil, and the second said it was a shame that a brave man
'
should be exposed to die by such a miserable device.
Against cannon the Afghans feel that they'.cannot trust to the
prowess which they value so highly. Their valour is incontestable,
but t,heir presumptiou is greater ; they never cease to boas4 and
are constantly repeating that, if other nations were, like themselves, armed only with the sword, they could give laws to the
world. When they attack they utter loud cries, and the most
courageous place themselves in front ; the rest form a second or
third line, more or less distant from the first, according to the
degree of ardour they may possess. These are ready to rush
forward and plunder if their comrades in advance are victorious,
or to run away if they are beaten. The chiefs are far more
intent upon signalizing their personal courage than upon directing
their troops, who are not under any control when they have
been a short time in action. The Afghans never disband until
they have failed in three charges successively, but after that it
becomes impossible to rally them, because they believe that talleh,
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fate, is q a i n s t them, and that they would offend God by longer
opposing his decrees.
But if they gain the day, woe indeed to the conquered! for an
Afghan ceases not from slaughter till his arm is wearied with
striking; till then there is no quarter from him, and a hundred
times better is it to die on the Eeld than survive to be his slave,
certain of the hardest possible toil and the most inhuman treatment : a large ransom is the only chance of liberty. I n time of
war the Afghans carry on their communications by signal fires on
the mountains, the information they are to afford being intimated
by their numbers and position, and the length of time they burn.
They have no idea of the rights of individuals, uor any regard
for public opinion, or fear of reprisals. T o express any humane
or generous sentiments after a victory is in their eyes the greatest
weakness ; and if they have lost the ideas they first formed of the
power of the British, it is not because they evacuated the country,
but because they did not, before they left it, convert it into a vast
desert, deluged with the blood of the inhabitants.
I n the Afghans enthusiasm and impulse are not the result of
noble sentiments, and but rarely of fanaticism ; they are excited
by the hope of pillage, or even, like the tiger, for the plain and
simple purpose of satisfying their ferocious instincts. Nothing is
morgnatural, in their eyes, than to seize upon a neighbouring state,
even upon that of an ally, without having received the slightest
provocation; force, the last argument of a nation who respects
itself, is with them the first and only one, and justifies all their
actions.
Though they are eutirely ignorant of the art of attack and defence of towns and fortresses, the Afghans are remarltable for the
obstinacy of their resistance and the correctness of their aim when
they are behind walls. When they are the assailants they always
attack, suddenly, by escalade, surprise, or stratagem, but very
seldom succeed. It is by long blockade or treachery, or more
often by lying and false oaths, that they possess themselves of a
fortified place.
T h e majority of their towns are square, but more or less perfect
in their form, enclosed by one very thick and high wall of earth,
embattled and loopholed, and having a banquette within, on which
two men, a t most, can walk side by side : a t intervals are placed
small hollow towers ; those a t the angles being larger, solid, a d
constructed for artillery. The ditch which surrounds the enceinte

is flooded in time of war whenever water can be obtained. The
gates are strengthened with large nails and bands of iron, and to
give them greater security there is a portcullis with loopholes
above it to defend the approach. A great proportion of the
villages in Kandahar and Herat are, like the towns, enclosed with
mud walls of about 1 2 or 15 feet in height, and 4 in thickness
at the base, but narrower a t the top; they are seldom protected by
a ditch, and in some'instsnces there are no turrets except a t the
angles. These defences would be inefficient against artillery well
served, but they are all that is required to sustain the mode of
attack customary in the country ; however, the climate being so
very hot and rain so very infrequent, the walls are of considerable
solidity, and are difficult to destroy with artillery only,-the mine
is indispensable for effecting a practicable breach.
These remarks apply to the towns and villages situated in the
plains of Kabul, but not to those in the mountains, which are constructed in positions defended by nature.
The inaptitude of this nation for discipline and military organisation arises from their spirit of impatience under the slightest
idea of restraint; and to this feeling their religion contributes, for
they are taught to believe that, having proclaimed Djehad, Holy
War, the numerous battalions of the Infidels are powerless against
a handful of the Ghazees, or soldiers of the Faith. The climate
and nature of the soil have also a great i~lfluenceon the warlike
habits of the Afghans. The tribes of the south are l e ~ quarrels
some and less able to support the fatigues of warfare than those
of the north ; and those who inhabit the southern bank. of the
I-Ielmund are considered by all the others as an effeminate race.
There is more than one instance of this pernicious influence of
climate upon the human character, and not t h e least remarkable
one is, that the Roman . legions gradually lost their manly
courage as they carried their conquests eastward.
The arms of the Afghans are the firelock, the carbine, the
swivel-gun, or a pair of bad pistols ; sometimes a bow, or a lance
with a bamboo handle. The fire-arms are coarse and heavy, the
hammers of the locks being very defective; most of the barrels
are Turkish, and rifled. They also carry a shield, a foot and a
half in diameter, covered with copper, or the hide of either the
elephant or the horse, which is very hard.
The whole Afghan army consists of the three division's of
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Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat ; of these, the troops called Defteris,*
present the following effective force :KAEUL 15,000 Afghan Horse.
6,000 Prrrsivan or I<nxzilbash Eorse.
6,000 Afghan Xountilineers, 1nTanh.y.
4,000 l'arsivr~ns, Haznmhs, or Usheks, l n f a n t ~ g .

-

Total 31,000

Mohamed Akbar Khan, son of the .Emir, Dost Mohamed, perceived the great advantages which order and discipline gave to
the British army, and, a s soon as he had in some degree established
his power, he attempted to train the Afghan cavalry to move in
squadrons-but all his efforts failed against the power of habit.
H e mas more successful with two battalions of Parsivans, who were
not so intractable as the Afghans uncler the discipline that he
introduced. These battalions, as it is said, manceuvred badly
enough; they were drilled by an Englishman of the name of
Kervel, who, having been wounded and made prisoner at the time
of the disasters i n Kabul in 1841, became a Mussulman, and
entered the service of Dost Blohamed.
In RANDAHAR there me 13,000 Afghan Horse.
3,000 Afghan Inrantry.
3,000 Belooch Infantry.

-

Total 18,000

I n 1833 Iiohendil Khan, sovereign of this principality, obtained
the assistance of a few Europeans to instruct and organize his
army, and after five years of continued exertion they succeeded
in bringing into some slight degree of discipline, such as it was,
about 2000 Afghan infantry. I n 1838, when Mohamed Sedik
Khan advanced to Subzawar with the intention of taking Herat,
these battalions met the enemy for the first time, but after one
volley was given their natural instinct of self-dependence was at
once in the ascendant ; every man left the ranks, forgetting all
he had learnt, and fought independently, the orders of the officers
being drowned in tumult and confusion.
Kabul and Kandahar have also a few pieces of artillery, served
by Afghans, who learned, to a certain extent, how to serve them
during the occupation of Afghanistan by the British.
*

*

Which receive pay.-Ferrier.

CUP. SXIT.

P A R MOHABIED'S TROOPS.

317

In I-IERAT the army consists of 8,000 Af~lianEorse.
4,000 Hazarah EIorse.
10,000 Parsivan Infantry,.

-

Total 22,000

Of the three Afghan princes the Vizier Yar Mohamed Khan
is the one who has placed the most confidence in his infantry, and
he persists in keeping up this arm; notwithstanding the little favour
with which it is viewed by the people, he has succeeded in forming
eight battalions of 1000 men each. H e accomplished this with the
assistance of a Hindoo Mussulman, who had been a sergeant in the
East India Company's service ; this man arrived at Herat in 1829,
and was killed in the last campaign which the Vizier undertook
against the Hazarahs in 1847. In the organization and drill
of these battalions there was much room for improvement, but
they have done pretty good service. The Vizier, finding the
Afghans ill adapted for making disciplined soldiers, recruited
these corps from the Parsivans exclusively, and this released him
from the esactions of the serdars of his principality, whom he
managed with so much tact that he made it impossible for them
to injure or even to disobey him. But if this plan had its advantages it had also its evils, for by i t Yar Mohamed com~nittedthe
same fault that Marius did when he received slaves and freedmen
into the Roman army, and he prepared the way for much future
embarrassment in Herat. The Parsivans are the conquered race,
and their number is double that of the Afghans ; by putting arms
in their hands, which they know how to use, Yar Mohamed Khan
has restored to them their prestige and power. Any other chief
but him would have already paid dearly for this imprudence, but
his policy has been so clever that he attached to himself by the
ties of gratitude a race that till then had never borne, but with
impatience, the yoke of their cruel oppressors. I t is probable that
so long as he lives these battalions of Parsivan infantry will always
be faithful to him, and give him their staunch support; but his
vigilance is unequalled, and he always foresees, and with rare
talent provides against, eventualities that might be fatal to him.
The ordnance of the Vizier is conlposed of sixteen pieces of
artillery, 6, 8, and 12-pounders, which are served by the infantry,
who make but poor artillerymen.
I n the three Afghan principalities the chiefs are too numerous
in proportion to the number of the troops they command, and that
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is particularly the case in Herat. T h e Vizier is aware of this, but
could not avoid recompensing the brave soldiers who SO valiantly
fought the army of Mohamed Shah, and afterwards supported him
against Shah Kamran. Hence the superabundance of office*, even
then but poorly rewarded, and having no permanent command.
The pay of the contingents is given to the serdars by the sovereign and is never fixed: it varies according to the influence these
chiefs possess, and the number of men they can bring into the
field. The tau due to the state is deducted from the pay when
the serdar receives it, but it is rarely they distribute the whole to
their soldiers-more than half remains. in their own hands, and
they indemnify the men by small grants of land, right of pasturage,
to work at a trade, et cetem, and no notice is taken.
Each Afghan is obliged to furnish his arms and horse at his own
expense, for which reason they always take great. care of them. .
T h e princes of Afghanistan have not coined gold pieces ; those
which are current in that co~mtryare t.he ducat of Russia and the
tellah of Bokhara. The gold tomaun and the silver Icran of
Persia are also in circulation, but a t a depreciation of a tenth of
their value, whereas that of the ducat and tellah is augmented in
the same proportion. Small silver coins called djindelc are
struck a t Herat, in value about fourpence; and a t Kandahar
rupees, also of silver, and. of the value of a shilling. A t Kabul the
rupee is worth two shillings.
There a r e two fictitious light coins current in the three principal
cities, called chahee and abbases; two chahees make one abbasee, and
two abbasees a djindek or fourpence ; there are three Herat djindelts
in the ICandahar rupee, and two rupees of Randahar to one of
Kabul. Fractions of the chahee and abbssee are represented b y a
copper coin called pod or paiseh : its value is never fixed, and
varies according to the abundance or scarcity that exists in the
market a t the time. This value is determined every three months
by the sovereign .on the report made to him by the chief a.gent of
police and the five principal merchants, who previous to the audience consult their fellow merchants of the locality on the subject.
There are from three to five pouls in a chahee according to circumstances, but this copper coin has no currency except in the towns,
where it is compulsory to receive it. T h e country-people will not
take it, or sell their provisions to the caravans and travellers, unless
they obtain in exchange a piece of coarse cotton cloth manufactured
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in the country, called kerbas, with which they make their clothes.
They will not even receive silver money ; and if the purchaser
has no cloth he must present them with some article that will be
useful to them ; in the way of food there are only two things which
they inquire for, viz. tea and sugar.
In a country where the inhabitants are so idle and poor, every
article naturally sells at a very low price ; a man may live for two
pence a day. T h e following is the current value of the undermentioned articles of first necessity in Afghanistan in the year 1845.
Bread .. the mcn oi Herat *
Mutton
8,
Butter and fat
I>
Milk of various kinds ,,
Fruit
II
Rice
11

,'

I

s. d .

Salt
..
Tobacco
Wheat
Barley
Indian corn
0 26 Wine ..

0 1$
0 4d;
I 1
0 1
0 1

8,

..

the men

.. ..

200 lbs.
>I

..

* ,,
a battemen

d.

0 O&
1 0
2 1
1 8
1 0
0 5

I t is strictly forbidden to make or drink wine a t Kabul and
Kandahar ; at Ilerat the contrary is the case, where Yar Mohamed
has monopolized the right to make it, and this has brought him in
a considerable profit by farming that right a t a very high price to
others. As to the consumption of it, he is one of the greatest winebibbers in that city or the principality.
Everything, whether solid or liquid, is sold by weight in
Afghanistan; the one which is generally used is the men or
.batternen of Herat, which, as 1have just stated, is of the weight of
seven pounds. This is divided into 40 sirs, the sir into 20 miscabs, and the miscale into 24 nookoods.
Cloth and manufactured articles are measured by the guez,
which is 3 ft. 35 in. I t is divided into 16 g u i ~ e hor knots, and
one of these is subdivided into 4 nokteh or points. Though
this is the only measure sanctioned by the government, it is
rare that an Afghan will purchase cloth in the bazaar unless i t
is measnred from the hand to the elbow, and more especially by
his own, that is to say, from the elbow to the very extremity of the
middle finger.
T h e Afghans who take any part in commercial affairs are very
few in number ; they are principally the Babees, who live to the
south of Kandahar ; the rest nev,er occupy themselves in this way

* The ?nenof Herat is soven pounds of 'Afghanistan ;b u t the sir is! less, aud
Enghh-that of Persia is only six, and meighs only sixteen nookoods.-Ferrier.
divided in the same manner as the nlrn
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or in any branch of industry ; they have in fact the greatest
repugnance to every kind of occupation, and are only qualified
either to make war or to plunder.
Those who inhabit the towns are habitually in the employ of
their wealthy countrymen, a n d . the nomades or country people
who have pasture or arable land never farm this themselves.
Directly an Afghan receives a concession of land from his chief,
he places it and a few oxen in the charge of a Parsivan, who
tills, sows, and reaps it for him, and when the crops are housed
he has a third of the produce for his trouble ; if they have flocks,
the Parsivan is in like manner the shepherd ; and if the Afghan
is overtaken by poverty, he procures as best he can a horse and
arms, and sets to: to plunder his neighbours. T h e Parsivans in .
the towns as well as in the villages are, as we have already stated,
the industrial class ; all commercial affairs are in their hands, a11
manufactures ; in a word, it is their activity and intelligence that
support the country and those who govern it. The Afghans are
incapable of imitating them ; they know only how to fight, and live from hand to mouth, rarely making a competency when they .
have no public appointment ; but once invested wit,h the least
power, they enrich themselves by every species of exaction.
T o the Parsivans must be added some few Hindoos, as forming
part of the commercial and industrious class, who are a t h c t e d to
the Afghan towns by the hope of gain ; they are here what the
Jews are elsewhere, always ready to enter into commercial transactions, and evincing like the Israelites the same intelligence and
activity in all their operations, displaying the same poverty-stricken
appearance, and affecting great simplicity in their dress. Everything about them denotes the greatest humility, which does not
however protect them from the contempt of the Afghans. Nevertheless, that does not give them much concern, and they console
themselves if i t does by filling their strong box with Russian ducats
or Bolrhara tellahs, and some of them are immensely rich. They
are considered extremely honest in all business transactions, exact
in fulfilling their engagements, and devoted to those to whom they
have once attached tfiemselves. The very few Afghan merchants
that are met with are, generally speaking, Sycds or descendants
of the Prophet, who will not profane their holy origin by serving
any master. These are especially employed in the somewhat
unsaintly occupation of horse-dealing with t,he I-Iazarahs and
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~urkomans. They take these horses to Shilrapoor, and return
from that town with English goods to Afghanistan. Their title of
Syud smooths all the difficulties of their journeys, for they are
venerated by the tribes, even those most addicted to pillage. It
would be hazardous for Parsivans and Hindoos to undertake similar
expedtiions and embark in an import and export trade, for they
would be stripped before they had traversed half the road between
Randahar and ,the Indus, they employ therefore these Syuds as
.
their agents.
The mechanical arts of indispensable utility are but imperfectly
known in Afghanistan : they manufacture inferior sabres, glass,
delf, coarse cloths of goats' hair, called kourh, and others of camels'
hair, called barek, of which they make their robes and cloc&a, and
esport a pretty large quantity to Turkestan and Persia The
kerbas, or coarse cotton 'cloth, is their principal article of manufacture, and with it they make their shirk and trousers. At
Herat, and there only, they raise and weave a little silk of a light
texture, and dye it of a red colour : the women's chemises are made
of this. A thick cloth, manufactured from the long coarse hair of
the, camel and goat, is used by the nomades for their tents.
Masonry, and carpenters' or joiners' work are pretty generally
understood in this country; they also work tolerably well in
leather ; and sheep-skins, with the wool on, are beautifully dressed
a t Kabul. This is done with considerable art, and the cloaks
made with these skins, which are very handsome, have a great
reputation all over Central Asia. I t appears that their superior
quality is to be attributed to the fact of their being prepared with
t,he rind of the pomegranate, a fruit which grows with peculiar
luxuriance near that city : workmen, who have established themselves at Kandahar, and a t Herat, have not been able to obtain
the same results with the pomegranates grown in those provinces
as they did with the fruit of their native city.
The Afghans purchase in Persia, Turkestan, and more especially
in India, a number of articles of European manufacture, which
they cannot do without, and which are not produced even in small
quantities in their own country. Amongst these the following may
be mentioned-metals, silk goods, cloth, muslins, woollen and
cotton goods, particularly the latter, which they purchase in very
large quantities, the lower and middle classes wearing scarcely
anything else. Fowling-pieces and watches would find a ready
Y

'
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sale in Afghanistan ; t.hose that I saw there were generally speaking
of French manufacture,,anrl more in demand than the same articles
of English makc. Delf, cutlery, spectacles, rich and heavy silk
goods, woollen or cotton, for turbans and sashes for the waist,
paper, and sugar might be imported with advantage.
Afghanistan, Turkestan, and Persia are excellent markets for
England and Russia, who have nearly monopolized the trade
of those countries ; if France had a commercial treaty with
Persia, she might hope to introduce several millions of francs of
merchandize into Central Asia annually. T h e Emir Dost Mohamed and Y a r Mohamed have endeavoured by every means in
their power to encourage their subjects in manufacturing some of
the articles which they require from European countries, and thus
avoid the high prices a t which they are obliged to purchase them,
but on such subjects to speak to an Afghan or a deaf man is absolutely the same thing; the Parsivans responded more readily to this
appeal, but they were very soon disgusted with the knowledge they
acquired, for it. was only a source of misery to them : under one
pretence or another the mealthy and powerful classes made them
work for their benefit and without sufficient remunerstion. The
best gunmalzer in Kandahar was incarcerat,ed in the fortress of
Girishk by the Serdar Mohamed Sedilr Ehan, on the absurd
pretext that he was born at a village within his jurisdiction ; the
khan gave this unfortunate artizan scarcely bread enough to eat,
and the man eventually expired under the harsh treatment he
received for llaving attempted to make a visit to his wife and
children, who were living only ten hours' journey from Girishk.
Foreign merchanclize arrives in Afghanistan by five different
routes: the first is that from the west, which tmverses Persia by
Teheran, and Meshed to I-lerat; the second is from Turkestan
on the north, by Bolthara, Mei-v; Moorghab to Herat ; the third,
also from Turkestan, by Bolihara, Iiarcliy, Ballth, and Khuln~,to
Kabul ; the fourth is the eastern one, from the Punjab by Lahore
and Peshawur to Kabul ; and the fifth is that of the south from
India by the Indus, Shikapoor, and Bolan, to I<andahar.
T h e revenue in Afghanistan varies according to the abundance
of water which irrigates a locality, or the race of persons by whom
i t is inhabited. An Afghan, who thinks that any debt he owes
his country is repaid by the fact of his arm being at her service,
always finds some way of avoiding the payment of a portion of the
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tax he owes his sovereign : but the Eimaks and Parsivans, \yho
are regarded a.s a conquered people, think themselves fortunate if
the collector takes only double of what they should legally pay ;
altliough Mtissulmans (the greater part it is true are of the sect of
Shiahs) they are obliged to pay the Icharadj, or capitation tax,
called also ser khani.h, or house tax, from which- the Afghans
are exempt.
The following is a statement of the tax, not as it is collected,
hut as it is fixed in the principalities of Herat and Kandahar.
Though the Afghans are exempt from the humiliating tribute
of the ser lrhankh, they pay under another name a contribution of
two shillings for each tent or house.
The Eimalts, or the nomade Beloochees, pay the contribution of
the ser khan'eh, which amounts to forty-four djindeks, or fourteen
shillings and eightpence for each family : orphans and widows are
free of this impost.
T h e ser khansh is not paid under this name by the Par-'bwans
and Hindoos living in towns, who are exempt by placing themselves under the protection of some Afghan chief; but the sovereign repays himself by the tax levied on their shops.
A t Herat Afghans and Parsivans, &c., pay an annual tax for
the horses or other animals which they keep. For a camel and a
mare, sixteen djindeks (five shillings and fourpence) ; for a cow,
three djindeks and a half (one shilling) ; for an ewe or a she-goat,
twenty abassees (or two pence) ;a he-goat or a sheep is free of tax.
For all animals without distinction, whether male or female, a tenth
of their value is paid when they are sold in the public market.
In Icandahar the tax upon animals is only paid upon sheep a t
sixpence a head ; the tax of n~eiclaw* is levied on all the other
aliimals at the rate of five per cent.
I n Kandahitr and in Herat it is only on cultivated land that
taxes are levied; the sovereign takes as much of the crop as
there was seed sown, and also eight djindeks (two shillings and
eight pencej on the produce of ten battemens of' seed sown.
Fruit gardens are taxed by the ten$, or cord, a t ten shillings
; this measure comprises a space sixty paces long on
every side. Kitchen ga,rdens pay twelve shillings and sixpence
per cord, When an Afghan proprietor or farmer lets his land to
-
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The duty upon sales.-Ferrier.
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a Parsivan, and furnishes seed, and oxen to work it, the former .
claims four-fifths of the produce, and leaves one-fifth for his tenant.
But when the Parsivan takes the land only, hc takes three-fifths,
and gives two-fifths to the landlord.
Having merely passed through the principality of Kabul, it was
impossible for me to know positively how the taxes are levied there,
but the information I obtained by careful inquiry justifies me in
supposing that it is nearly in the same manner as i n Kandahar.
I n the eyes of an European these taxes appear trifling, but it
must be remembered that the smallest payment seems onerous to
an Afghan; they work so little, and are therefore so poor, that
they feel the want of the least thing that is taken from them, and
every time they pay a tax they exclaim against what they call
violence and tyranny. They might perhaps become reconciled to
the impost if, after they had paid it, they were left in peace and
idleness to enjoy the fruits of their speculations or their rniscleeds,
but they are subject to the exactions of subordinate agents, and
that provokes them, though they pay less than the Parsivans and
others. T h e inhabitants of the country pay also another indirect
tax, which, in proportion to their resources, is rather heavy, but i t
does not seem oppressive to them, because it is engrafted on the
manners of the nation: it is the hospitality they are bound to
exercise towards travellers, of whom a great number are servants
of the government.
When the travellers are men of rank they have a long train
of attendants, all of whonl the villages are obliged to feed, and
also their horses; i t is true they sometimes avoid extortion by
concealing themselves if they have timely notice, but. they cannot
often elude the vigilance of the head of the village, who almost
always extracts something from them; this is violence and not
hospitality a s they like to practise it.
A sa general rule, if an Afghan is obliged to work one month
in twelve h e considers himself most unfortunate. T h e repression of crime and levying a tax he designates as ztrlm,
tyranny. T o live in perfect licence and never to be asked for
anything is what he would call the proofs of a paternal government. Nevertheless, the heaviest demands are not made upon
him ; the Parsivans, who are attached to the soil, obtain for their
labour in cultivating it, only just so much as is necessary for the
maintenance of themselves and their families. There is no
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security for them unless they put themselves under the protection
of an Afghan, and this protection costs them dear. Those who
live in the towns are less oppressed than those in the countiy, but
as they are the working part of the population, they are subject to
a host of taxes direct and indirect which they have mucb difficulty
in meeting the payment of, even when they are always in work.
Tradesmen pay five pounds twelve shillings per annum, for
pel;mission to open their shops. Those who expose their goods in
front of their houses, such as attar, bakal, halva-j%rouchlmpay
upon each shelf a sum fixed by the tax-gatherer, which varies
according to the presumed profits of the merchant. Artificers
like Aiefch-dooz, zine-dooz, zerguer, or Rliayat,t are obliged when
they sell an article, and before they deliver it to the purchaser, to
submit it to one of the inspectors, who perambulate the bazars, to
receive the mark of the dagh,$ for which they pay a duty equal to
one third of the value of the article sold. Workmen, that is,
benna, nahal-bed, or nadjar§ are obliged to give to the government
gratis, two days' work out of seven. I n fact, every profession,
every species of trade or commerce, is subject to taxation. A t
Herat in particular, the meat-markets, soap-manufact,ories, copperware, and ironmongery trade, carpentry, the repairing of old fumiture and even shoes, and the carriage of water, are all monopolies.
A t Kabul, previously to 1839, the Parsivans were much better
treated ; they did not pay more than two per cent. on their floc%s,
and four per cent. on the harvest, like the Afghans ; but since the
power of the Emir, Dost Mohamed Khan, has been hampered by
the conduct of his sons, avaricious demands have greatly increased
in that principality.
In Kandahar extortion is yet more ra~npant than in Kabul. or
Herat. T h e people live in utter misery, and within the last ten years
more than 100,000 of Kohendil Khan's subjects have emigrated.
All merchandise entering Afghanistan pays duty as under :At Hernt 5 per cent., but with other exactions it may be calculated at 9 per ceut
At Kmdahar 2f ,,
II
1,
,>
10
,,
AtKabul
24,,
PI
)I
4
,,
>)

Goods are exported from the three principalities fiee of
customs duties, but they are subject, to the ba4,II viz. :-

*

Druggist. Grocer. Spice shop.
Shoemaker. Saddler. Goldsmith.
Tailor.

t

I
5
1)

Stamp.
A mason. Blacksmith. Carpenter.
Tar on transport.-Terrier.

r. d. .
.. 12 2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10
A horse o r mrde load
. . . . . <..
An ms load . . . . . .
..
.."i

A camel load, whether entering or leaving the country, p , 2 ~ . s . .

Every horse scnt to India for sale pays I I. 4s. 4d. to the chief of
1Candaha.r when he leaves his territory.
T h e revenues of Afghanistan are :In Herat
XL'jd.000 and
E24,000 in corn.
I n Xaudahr 15,000
,,
Y?,000
,,
In Kabul
140,000
,,
60,000
,,
Whoever looks only at the amount of this revenue will never
be able to form a correct opinion of its importance ; he must also
understand the price of labour, of materials, of cereal and other
products, of the requirements of the people, et cetera, he will then
have an idea of the real value of' sums which appear so small.
Under the system fdlowecl by the Afghan chiefs, these revennes
covered all their expenses, and left them a very pretty profit.
T h e English, instead of following the same system, paying the
officials regularly and on the same footing, and thus have
satisfied every one, thought it necessary to increase the expenses
which such a revenue was not able to meet; tllis was one of
the principal reasons, that led to their disasters in that country,
because every one had enjoyed the augmentation, and revolted
when the time came for retrenchment.
W e have said that the minerals in the mountainous parts of
Kabul and Kandahar are not worked. Yar Mohamed, of Herat,
saw better than either of his neighbours, the advantages which he
possessed in this source of wealth, and has for some years past
worked a n iron and a lead mine near his capital. The results,
however, have been but moderate as to profit, owing to the
ignorancc of the workmen, who are unacquainted with metallurgical operations ;the silver is not properly extracted from the lead ;
the iron can .be broken, and is as brittle as glass even when hot.
T h e Vizier is most anxious to increase his revenue by these mines ;
he would like to establish cotton and woollen factories, also
spinning machinery for cotton, silli, and wool ; to erect cannon
foundries and small-arm manufactories, but in the Afghan style.
Yar Mohamed would like to have all this without spending any
money, and with the assistance of one man, who must be acquainted with every department, and who would find by enchantment, in a country devoid of everything, all the machinery and
tools requisite to carry out such projects.
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CHAPTER YXIII.
English army leaves Shikapoor - March through t h e Bolan pass -Kohendil
Khan advances to meet i t - Defection of the Afghan chiefs - Kohendil
retires into Persio- Kandahur cnpitulntes Assault and fall of Ghuznee Dost Mohamed endeavours to negotiate, but without success -The Emir 1ea1.e~
Kabul -The English enter the city - Restorat.ion of Shah Shooja-First
disagreement .between him and the British - The latter interfere in t h e
administration of the kingdom - Results of this-The priests are hostile t o
t h e invaders - Avaricious views of the English disappoiuted -Revenues of
Afghanistan moderate in amount - Means employed to raise them - Shah
Shooja demands the fulfilruent of the treaty Refusal of the English - Hatred
against them augmented -Religious proselytism -English connesio~lswith
Afghan women -Revolts in the kingdom - The Dost at Bokhara-. Perseoutions to which he is subject -Combat a t IEarchy - Mohamed Shah threatens
t h e Usbek Emir- The Dost is released -His perilous position near the Oxus
-He tiles to Cher Sebz and Khulm- Returns to the province of Kabul - Conflicts between the Dost and t h e English-Deserted
by his conutrymen Surrenders to the English-He is sent to India.

-

-
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WE must now return to the EIistory which was interrupted at the
close of the 20th chapter, the last incident mentioned being
the concentration of a British force at Shilrapoor. This army
left that place early in March, and after passing Dadur, entered
the mountains though which the road winds as far as Bolan,
s distance of fifty-two miles, and thence leads to the great tableland of Central Asia, more than 5000 feet above the level of the
sea. Notwithstanding the advantages which this defile afforded
the Afgllans scarcely defended it. The English advanced without
serious opposition, though two hundred men well posted might have
annihilated them, distressed as they were by a painful march
amidst the natural obstacles with which the pass is thickly beset at
every step. A t Dadur, oil this side the mountains, the thermometer
stood a t 102' of Fahrenheit, while violent snowstorms fell heavily
on the way-worn soldiers as they advanced dong the Bolan Pass.
On the 24th of March, after eight days of a most harassing march
from Shikapoor, the army having cleared the mountains, moved on
towards Iimdahar. Kohendil Khan had ceased to intrigue against
Dost Mohamed, and became on friendly terms with him, as he
always did when threatened by serious danger. H e had determined upon shutting himself up in his capital till his brother of

325

NXRCH THROUGH THE BOLAS PASS. CHAP.XXLII.

Iiabul should arrive with reinforcenlents to his assistance, but the '
llost having been detained by a movement which the Sikhs had
made in favour of the English on this side of Peshawur, Kohendil
Iihan decided upon assembling all his contingents and marching to
meet the enemy. However, he had scarcely reached the valley of
Pisheen when the ranks of his army were thinned by numerous
desertions. The Serdar I-Iadji Khan, Raukeree, was the first to
pass over to Shah Shooja with five hundred picked horsemen ; this
was the signal for the disorganisation of the Iiandaharian army, and
Kohendil Iihan, and his brothers, despairing of then defending
themselves and their families with success, determined upon flight.
'J.'hey gained the Helmund, followed its course to lake Roustem, and
entered Persia, where the Shah received them most kindly ; he
bestowed upon them as a fief the little town of Sher-babek, situated
between the provinces of Fan and Kerman, and gave them the revenues of the whole of that, district, amounting to 12,000 tomauns
annually. The flight of the Prince of Kandahar was followed by
the immediate subniission of the Serdars ZIadji Dost Mohamed
Iihan, Isalrzye, Habib Ullah Khan, Surkanee, Perstalab Khan,
Noorzye, Ramazan Khan, Ghildjzye, Akhter Khan Alizye, Ser
Firaz Khan Isakzye, &c. k c . , who brought with them a detachment of horse to Shah Shooja, and his cause might from that hour
be looked upon a s triumphant in Afghanistan.
The British Army thus took possession of Kandahar without
opposition, and the King and General Sir John Keane made
their public entry into that city on the 20th of April. ShahShooja,
a s if conscious that his claim to the throne was not very legitimate,
was crowned in the mosque of Ahmed Shah on the 8th of May,
1839, hoping by that ceremony to render his claim more important
i n the eyes of the Afgl:ans. After naming his son Timoor nlirza
governor of the city, the King and the Army marched on the 27th
of,June, in the direction of Ghuznee.
"This town," says Mr. Sumner, " is about one hundred and sixty
miles from ICandahar, and sixty-eight from Kabul : although ten
days ought to have Been sufficient to reach Ghuznee it was not till
the 2 1st of July that Sir John Keane arrived before that fortress.
T h e march of the troops had been much impeded by the difficulties
of the road, the great number of camels, and the crowd of camp
followers, more numerous even than the soldiers, but no resistance
wort,hy of remark opposed the progress of the army.
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" I t had been supposed that the town of Ghuznee was not fortified,
it is, however, surrounded by a wall and a ditch. T o attack it with
the few light field-guns that the Anglo-Indian army had with it was
impossible, but one of the gates was destroyed with gunpowder in
the course of the second night, and on the 23rd of July a fierce
combat took place i11 the streets of the town, in which the English lost
two hundred-men. The Afghan garrison, numbering 2500, fought
with unexpected energy,-it
is stated that almost all the dead
were pierced by the bayonet, and very few received gun-shot
wounds. Nevertheless, the Afghans were vanquished, and Gholam
Haidar Khan, one of the sons of Dost Mohamed, who commanded,
was taken prisoner; Shnh Shooja wished to put him to death, and
the English had the greatest difficulty in making him renounce his
inten tion."
Notwithstanding the defection which had so seriously ~ e a k e n e d
the army of Kabul, Dost Mohamed would not abandon his kingdom
without trying the fortune of war, and he marched a t the head of
the few followers who remained faithful to him, about 6000 men,
with his artillery, to meet the British Army ; but having at the
second halt heard of the fall of Ghumee, he sent his brother the
Nawab Djnbbnr Khan, as ambassador to Sir William McNaghten,
the British Commissioner, to negotiate with Shah Shooja. T h e
Afghans reproached the Nawab with being too warm a partizan of
the English, with whom he had for some time kept up a continuous
intercourse ; but as he was of a conciliatory disposition and generally
appealed to as peace-maker in the quarrels between his brotl~ers,as
well as those between the serdars of the different tribes, this partiality
was overlooked. The Dost could not have made a better choice of a
negotiator with his adversaries, to whom he proposed that he should
accept a post under Shah Shooja, analogous to that which his brother
Fethi Khan had held under the Shnh Mahmood, that is to say
Prime Minister. He also demanded the restoration of his third son
Haidar Khan and his wives, who had been made prisoners a t Ghuznee, and consented to submit on these two conditions ; but they
were rejected. The Nawab met with an icy reception in the
English camp, almost insulting, and returned full of hatred for
those who, but a few days before, held the first place in his esteem.
The Emir retraced his steps when he heard the result of his last
conciliatory offer, and gave up the idea of making head against
the invading army with so small a force as his own, the greater
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part of which were demoralized,-moreover, he could only expect
fresh defections. H e macle, therefore, but a short stay in Kabrrl,
and abandoning that city retired beyond the Hindoo Koosh
into the dominions of the Emir of Bolchnra, accompanied by his
family and three lmidred and fifty devoted adherents. ,4s soon
a s he mas gone, Abdullah Khan, Etcheltzye, Aziz Khan, Ghildjzye,
Emin Ullah Khan, Logheree, and Khan Shireen Khan, Kuzzilbash, who might still have created fresh difficulties for the English,
and caused them coasiderable loss in their attack upon Kabul, now
openly espoused the party of the invaders and made their submission.
T h e Anglo-Indian army entered that city without opposition on
the 7th of August, 1839, and proclaimed the definitive re-establishment in power of Shah Shooja-001-Moollr. T h e General-in-Chief
had hoped to take Dost Mohamed prisoner, but finding that
he had escaped he sent Colonel Outram nith one hundred and
fifty British cavalry, and seven hundred Afghan horse, commanded
by Hadji Khan, Raukeree, in pursuit. On the 21st of August
they had nearly attained their object, for they were but fourteen
miles from the fugitive Emir, but having received secret intelligence
of this by a messenger from FIadji Khan, he made a forced march,
and escaped the danger that threatened him. Before he could re&
IShulm he had to repulse several attacks of the I-Iazarah Deh
Zinguis, who had already felt the power of English influence, and
his lit& escort was reduced to half its number by the time he
arrived a t Ballth. His first intention had been to gain Persia, but
the Emir Nasser Ullah Khan Bahadoor having despatched a messenger to offer him shelter in his domiuions, he delayed his journey
to Teheran, and went direct to the court of the Usbek Emir.
Shah Shooja, replaced on the throne of his fathers, was soon
surrounded by the greater part of the Afghan serdars, and with the
exception of some partial outbreaks of little importance, haxl reason
to consider himself firmly seated on the musnud. This result was
due to the conciliatory conduct that he a t first manifested, and
his good understanding with the English; but he only acted
thus from an apprehension that Dost Mohamed might be near
at hand, for as soon as he knew that that chief had arrived at
Bolthara, he wished to exercise the sovereign authority to the
exclusion of his protectors. They, on the contrary, had determined
to leave him nothing but the semblance of it-and
Sir T;V.
McXaghten directed everything. H e gave all his orders through
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the Shah, who every morning repeated, a t his durbar, the lesson he
had received 011 the previous evening from the British Commissioner.
The serdars were too clear-sighted not to perceive this, and they
expressed their disgust in strong terms at all times, and in all
places. The English, though affronted at this freedom of speech,
dared not openly repress it, lest their own interference in the
Government should become too manifest, but they revenged themstlves by noting the chiefs that were rebellious in their eyes, and in
this way created a great deal of discontent.
Notwithstanding the smothered displeasure that prevailed, the
English fancied themselves firmly established in the country, and
sent back part of their army to India. They determined also at
once, and without the least consideration for the Afghans, to
introduce those administrative reforms which they had established
in their Indian possessions, where all had been done progressively and without wounding the prejudices of a population, far
more timid and more easy to manage than the Afghans. I t is true
that in Afghanistan they put native officers at the head of the
different departments, but they were there like puppets, having no
liberty of action and only following blindly the directions of a
British officer, who was associated with them. I n doing this, Sir W.
M'Naghten appeared to be guided by the remernbmnce of what
Mir Mahlnood the Ghilcljzye had done when he established his
government in Persia ; but Sii. William forgot, or overlooked, the
point that the
in placing with his ofiicials others more enlightened
than themselves, selected the former from among the Persians, a
servile people alvays accustomed to bend to a conqueror, while the
English officers on the contrary thrust their own will upon the Afghan
functionaries, which was a very different condition of aflairs. The
plan failed and brought into general contempt with their countrymen those natives who accepted office under such circumstances.
This system gradually disturbed the good understanding existing
between Shah Shooja and the English ; they wishcd to be masters,
but wanted the courage to act openly, and yet they would not
leave the Icing to his own ideas of Government : they were
apparently neutral, and still had the presumption to m u themselves
up in everything. This bastard system alienated from them both
the people and the court ; the Shah testified his great displeasure at
it, and a t last connteracted evcry measure that originated with the
English. For example, Sir Alexander Burnes, who had bcen
of Kabul, had establishec!
appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the

,

a new and reduced tariff for the lnerchandize imported into Afghanistan, but Shah Shooja seeing that this was done simply with a view
of encouraging the interests of British commerce, secretly authorised
his agents to levy higher duties than those which had becn determined on. T h e injured merchants complained to the English, by
whom they were referred to the Minister of the Shah, and this officer
gave them the bastinado for appealing for justice to strangers before
they had applied to the Royal Government. At length an almost
open rupture took place between Mollah Chekkar, the Shah's Prime
Minister, and Sir W. MLNaghten. A party had bcen formed by
the Vizier with the hope of withdrawing the Shah fi-om the influence
of the British, and this party cared not ill the least to conceal or
dissimulate its intentions. Sir W. M'Naghten and Sir A. Burnes
were made aware of its existence, but they despised the information
they received on all sides, and when their partisans endeavoured to
make them see the extremities to which impunity would encourage
the Afghans, they answered in the famous words of the Duc de
Guise, "they dare not." The result proved that these gentlemen
were no nearer right than was the Duc de Guise.
T h e Afghans, little initiated in the intricacies of politics, and not
as yet completely experienced in the duplicity of the government of
Calcutta, remembered the article in the treaty that Lord Auckland
had concluded with their king, which stipulated that as soon as
Shah Shooja was$rmly established on his throne, the Anglo-Indian
army should repass the Indus. This word " j r m l y " gave him, it is
true, a great latitude, but it was not thus that the Afghans had
interpreted it ; and they were impatient for the hour that should rid
them of their protectors.
The uneasiness at length became general, and confidence existed
amongst the English only. The Afghans anticipated a catastrophe,
and the agitation, at first confined to the towns, soon spread into the
country. T h e Mollahs would no longer recite the " Khoutbe" (or
prayer for the King) in the Mosques, alleging that they could only
do so for an independent sovereign, and that Shah Shooja was not
independent. On the other hand, the maintenance of the British .
army had nearly exhausted the provinces, all the necessaries of life
had quadrupled in price, and a cry of distress was raised everywhere. I n vain did the Vizier publish an order placing the sale of
provisions on the old footing and forbid monopoly ; no one paid any
attention to his injunctions. The Shah therefore found himself
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obliged to arrest the monopolists, whose corn was re-sold a t the
tariff price, and by public auction. The English were ill-judged
enough to interfere in their favor, which increased the irritation
amongst the people, and they were accused of wishing to create a
famine. I t was in vain that they distributed food gratis to the
necessitous, the populace valued not this concession as proceeding
from charity ; that virtue is practised in a different manner by the
Afghans, and the English lost more than they gained by granting
benefits 'to one class only, and with an appearance of such
method and calculation so totally foreign to Afghan habits. T h e
deplorable. mania which the English have for scatterin0 gold by
?
handfuls in Asiatic countries, without any reason for doip~gso other
than to gratify an useless pride, and for valuing things only because
they are expensive, created for them in this instance one of the
most formidable difficulties they have ever had to encounter. T h e
officers were prodigal in their personal expenditure, and that depreciated the value of money ; the British Commissjoner had obliged
the King to give his officers, civil and ~nilitary,as much pay for
a month as they had hitherto received for a year ; and that without
having previously ascertained that the revenues of the country
would admit of his so doing. I t is true the English had calculated
on an excess of receipts consequent upon the regularity of their
administration, and an amount of revenue founded upon the information given by Shah Shooja when he was a t Loocliana. But in that
a s on many other occasions they were wrong in not remembering
the maxim of Machiavelli, " that it is dangerous and i~nprudent
to undertake an expedition upon the representations and hopes
of exiles." The English also paid for every species of labour,
tenfold what the Afghans had ever received before, so that all the
workmen were glad to be employed on the fortifications, or otherwise occupied by the English, and hands were therefore soon
wanting to till the ground. Shah Shooja, even, could not obtain
the men that he required, because he could not pay them on this
footing, and he was therefore obliged to overwork the labourers
who were engaged in the repairs of his own palac,e, and to pay ,
them the ordinary wages of the country. But here the English
meddled again, and signified to the Vizier, that if those who cornplained were not satisfied, and paid according to the English tariff,
they should pay them themselves, and place-the sum to the Shah's
account. This new and insulting injunction irritated the Shah to
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the last degree, and from that momcnt he seemed to be indifferent
whether or not he mas on good terms with his protectors ; he even
earnestly required of them the promised evacuation of his dominions. But Sir W. M6Naghten ref~lsed to comply with this
demand, objecting, that he could not be" firmly " seated on his
throne while Dost Mohamed remained a t liberty, and ,that the
English could not leave him without support as long as there was
n chance of the return of that chief. Shah Shooja, forced rather
than convinced, resigned himself to their tutelage ; but his reiterated complaints created in his subjects the most hostile feelings
against the English, and their exasperation broke through all
bounds when the people saw that the invaders considered the'
Afghans incapable of serving them, and found themselves superseded by Hazarahs and Yarsivans who 11p to that time had
been looked upon as a conquered people. Perhaps the English
were not wrong in having a better opinion of these descendants
of the Persian colonists, but such a step shodd only have been
taken with the greatest prudence, gradually, and after they had
become perfectly established in the country. Another el-ror
was their constant habit of threatening to send some of the
restless chiefs to India, and not carrying out the menace. This
might possibly have prevented the development of the revolt in
which they were overwhelmed at a later period. The Afghans
have little or none of that fceling which we understand by the
word patriotism, for they are quite indifferent as to which or how
many of their tribes may be subdued, provided their own is in the
enjoyment of personal freedom ; but this indifference as to who
governs them, is accompanied in each indiviclual by a deep
attachment to his own tribe. T h e repeated threats, therefore, of
separation from them created serious alarm, and these fears heing
worked upon by the partisans of Dost Mohamed, inspired a still
greater distrust and hatred of the English : who never looked with
the least anxiety a t these various indications of approaching
trouble, but slept on in perfect tranquillity.
While they were reforming the administration, their missionaries
attempted to meddle in religion also, and distributed everywhere
the Bible translated into Persiau-a
proselytism that uras more
injurious than profitable to them. Previously to the time a t which
the English entered Afghanistan, the inhabitants might have been
considered as the least fanatical of any people professing Jslamism

.

--but as a set-off, they are the most covetous upon earth, and the
result was that the women soon gave themselves up to the English
for money, even with tbe knowledge of their husbands ; fathers
and brothers sold their daughters and sisters, and it was a novel
spectacle to see Christians become the legitimate husbands of Mahomedan wives, for many officers were legally married to Afghaa
women. The Mollahs did not omit to rouse the anger of the
faithful, against this tendency to encroach upon their religion, and
they excited on all sides a fanaticism which manifested itself in the
provinces by assassination and partial revolt. Colonel Herring was
murdered a t Ghuznee, and it was only with great difficulty that
Colonel Orchard and Major Mac Gregor quelled a seditious movement excited by a certain Syud Kassem. The Ibrtress of Kelat-iGliildjzye also rose against the authority of Shah Shooja, or ratlier
the English, and the circumstance that led to this was one of'
the unnecessary acts of rigour, of which they are so often guilty
in Asia.
Lieutenant Lynch, one of the political agents in Afghanistan,
made a military reconnaissauce on the side of Icelat-i-Ghildjzye
and summoned the inhabitants to open the gates of their fort to him.
The commandant was one of those men who were tired of the ascendancy so arrogantly maintained over their sovereign by hie foreign
dly, and replied that he should do as Lieutenant Lynch demancled
as soon as he showed him an order from Shah Shooja, or his son
Timoor Mirza, and that in the mean time he would visit him the
nest morning as a friend. Lieutenant Lynch was not satisfied with
this answer, and without further negotiation demolished his fortress
with his artillery, and the chief and many of the garrison lost their
lives. T h e survivors, who were of the Ghildjzye tribe, bent for a
time to the storm, but as soon as the opportunity presented itself,
they took their revenge by massacring all the English that fell
into their hands. A detachment under Major Clibborne was cut up
in the south, and that officer lost his life. The Serdar Alcter Khan,
Alizye, who had raised a small body of troops of 1& tribe in the
district of Zemindavar, held the English in check in that quarter,
and Yar Moha~nedKhan secretly sent him reinforcements, for
though the English paid him large sums of money the discontented
Afghans always found help and shelter in his dominions.
I n the midst of these serious difficulties the British mere surprised
by fresh troubles, the Emir Dost Mohamed re-appeared in arms
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on the northern fi-ontier, and there was not a moment to be lost in
preparing to meet the storm.
The Emir of Bokhara had received the fugitive Prince and his
family in a suitable manner when he arrived in his capital, and
allotted a daily sum for their maintenance, but from that conduct
five or sis days after, it became evident that his offer of an asylum
mas intended to dram them into a snare, for their allowance was
stopped and the Dost was left to his own resources. This indifference to misfortune, so foreign to the Mussulman ideas of hospitality,
was followed by aggravated insults.
T h e greater number of Dost Mohamed's sons accompanied him to Bolrhara, and the youngest, Sultan Djan, who was remarkable
for his personal beauty and graceful and distinguished manners,
attracted the attention of the Emir Nasser Ullah. This monster
was addicted to the most horrible of Eastern propensities, and one
day sent a n officer to the Dost's house to bring Sultan Djan to t,he
palace. His father, however, well acquainted with the Uzbek
Emir's character, refused to let him go, and immediately ordered the
lad, accompanied by his second son Alrbar Khan and one.hundred
Afghan horse, to leave Bokhara. They did so, but were soon pursued, and after a desperate encounter near Larchy, in which the
Afghans lost two-thirds of their party, the remainder were obliged
to lay down their arms. The two brothers were then brought back
prisoners to Bokhara, and it is unnecessary to say what was the
fate of the youngest a t the hands of Nasser Ullah.
T h e position of the Emir Dost Mohamed had now become most
distressing ; he had every day to repulse some new demand from
his tyrant ; his life even was in danger, for Nasser Ullah Khan,
besides his hereditary hatred to the Afghans, wished to make
himself popular in the eyes of the English by showing hostility
to the Emir of Kabul, as they might some day enter his own
dominions. H i s messengers were frequently crossing those of
Shah Shooja, and the two monarchs had concerted together one
of those vile plots by mecans of which Asiatics so frequently
endeavour to effect their objects, when the Shah of Persia wrote to
Nasser Ullah Khan and informed him that he should hold him
responsible for any evil that might befall the Dost, whom he declared
he had taken under his own special protection. The Shah also
enjoined him to set that chief and his family at liberty, in order
that he might make tt pilgrimage to Mecca, as he had expressed his
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intention of doing, and conchded by signifying to the Emir of
Bokhara his royal determination of making war upon him if he
did not coinply with his injunctions.
Nasser Ullah, afraid openly to manifest his indignation against
the Shah of Persia, allowed the Dost to leave Bokhara; but
he was even then actually planning the death of this unfortunate
chief, and taking measures to make it appear the result of accident. Before the. departure of the Dost he sent a man to the
banks of the Oxus who, in concert with the ferryman, was ordered
to upset the boat, and take care that the Emir should never
reach the.shore alive.
Happily, an indiscreet remark of the wretch intrusted with this
detestable commission made the Dost, when he reached the banks
of the river, suspicious of some lurking danger; and a caravan
fi-om the south travelling to Samarcand coming up at the time, he
succeeded in escaping with it, disguised and in a litter, and thus
eluded the vigilance of the authorities of Bokhara. His wives
had left that city after him, and, having sent a messenger to
desire them to alter their route, they rejoined him seven miles from
. . Samarcand, which place he did not think it prudent to enter. Here,
however, he took off the female attire in which he had escaped,
mounted a horse, and proceeded to ask hospitality of the Khan of
Cher Sebz, who generously granted it, but for a brief space only, for,
though this Khan detested the Emir of Bokhara, he h e a d e d his
power. Alarmed therefore a t his threats, and command to put
Dost Mohamed and his sons to death, on pain of being deprived
of his Khanat, he secretly sent away his guest, furnishing him
with the means of reaching Khulm. Mir Walee, the chief of this
province, was by no means easy at the approach of the English, who
had already reached Bamian, and he had made warlike preparations
to receive them. The moment of the Dost's arrival could not
have been more propitious, for the partisans of the Emir had succeeded in agitating Kohistan, of which the population refused to
obey the orders, emanating in appearance from Shah Shooja, but
really from the English. Discontent was general in the other
Afghan provinces, and if the orders of the latter were still acted
upon it was feebly and with repugnance on the part of the officials, though they were active enough when they saw a chance of
committing some extortion that might prove a benefit to themselves.
Sir W. McNaghtenknew not what to do, nor whom to trust-for
z
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those Afghans who did not betray him were indifferent to the
disaffection that existed and the progress of revolt: he gave
ordew, and revoked them almost as soon as given; and a t last
determined on rigorous measures, hoping thereby to eradicate the
evil. I n doing this he made several arrests of very doubtful
legality, and missed the real culprits, who were most of them
about the person of Shah Shooja
Hadji Khan, Kaukeree, the first of the Afghan chiefs who
joined the ~ n i l i s h was
, arrested and sent to India, for showing too
much independence, and being suspected of having pursued the
Dost too leisurely in order to give him time to escape. Two other
Ghiidjzye serdars, Abcl el Rahman Khan and Mahme, who had taken refuge with the Sikhs, were, contrary to all the laws of
hospitality, given up to the English, and also sent to India. I n
Kandahar severity was pushed to its utmost limits ; Akrem Khan;
Noorzye, convicted of having taken up arms against the invade~s
of his country, was arrested, and blown from a gun. I-Iadji Dost
Mohamed Khan, Izakzye, died almost at the same time in the
prison of ICaudahar, and the people, ever suspicious, believed, though
i t was never proved, that he had been poisoned. Such was the
position of affairs when the Walee of Khulm and Dost Mohamed
took the field. On the 30th of August, Mir Efzel Khan, eldest
son of the Emir and commander of the advanced guard of Usbek
Afghans, attacked the British post at Badjguiah, but did not
succeed, and he fell back upon the main body of the =my. Dost
Mohamed waited a few days'longer, and on the 18th of September
accepted the offer of battle given him by Colonel Denny, and he
likewise was unsuccessful; after which the Usbeks retired altogether. This check, however, did not daunt the Emir, who withdrew
into Kohistan, where the majority of the chiefs declared for him, and
their men, added to those who joined him a t IChulm, still presented
a n effective force of 6000 troops ; other reinforcements from various
districts also came and ranged themselves under his standard, but
Sir W. M'Naghten cooled their ardour for the cause of their ancient
chief by lavishly distributing gold amongst the hostile tribes. 'The
Dost and his companions, who well knew the power of this touchstone of honesty over the mind of an Afghan, were alarmed a t the
result of such prodigality, and it was almost with hesitation that on November 2nd, ld39, he engaged General Sale and
Prince Fethi Djing, second son of Shah Shooja, at Fervaneh Derreh,
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The Dost's soldiers performed prodigies of vdour, and the 2nd
Regiment of Bengal Regular Cavalry wavered and fled before
a charge of eighty Afghans, led by the Emir himself, who broke
them at the onset, and then engaged the infantry, upon whom he
inflicted considerable loss, especially in officers. The advantage
of the day remained with the Dost, and the Anglo-Indian army
would have been completely beaten had they renewed the combat
on the morrow, but success being doubtful they determined to
conquer with gold ; their agents entered the camp of the Emir,
and manceuvred so well and so quickly, that he only escaped death at
the hands of his own mutinous troops by a rapid flight, in which he
was accompanied by a few brave men who remained faithful to him.
Dost Mohamed now retired to the mountains, and wandered
amongst them for some time ; his partisans, who were gradually
detached from his falling fortunes by English bribes, and being
also little inclined to face the hard winter in the hills, returned to
their homes. Their noble chief was a t length utterly abandoned,
and had much to suffer from privation and the rigour of the season ;
but this was not all,-he
found himself hunted by parties of
Afghans, who hoped to receive a large recompence for betraying
him to his enemies, and this led to the resolution which he finally
took of placing himself in their hands.
On the 4th of November, 1840, he went almost done under the
walls of Kabul, and, taking advantage of an accidental meeting
with Sir W. M'Naghten to make his submission, he gave up his
sword to the envoy, declaring at the same time who he was.
T h e E ~ ~ g l i sdiplomatist
h
immediately returned it, which mark of
respect gratified the Emir exceedingly, and they rode into Kabul
together. Dost Mohamed was honourably treated while he remained
in his own capital, and was afterwards sent to India with his
wives, where he was pensioned, and carefully guarded by the
political agents of the East India Company; his sons, whom he
had left in Afqhanistan, soon joined him in his exile, with the
exception of Akbar Khan.
T;Ve have seen that this chief was taken prisoner by the Bokha+ns after having sustained a bloody combat with them at Karchy.
On his return to Bokhara he was imprisoned by order of Nasser
U]l& Khan, and was consequently prevented from leaving it
with his father. But a short time after the flight of the latter
the surveillance to which he was subjected was relaxed, and
z 2
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having succeeded in making his escape he reached Cher Sebz : but
the Khan of that place, a h i d to grant him an asylum for the same
reasons that prevented him from sheltering his father, gave him
an escort of two horsemen as far as Khulm, where the Walee
received the fugitive, and set-era1 of his dependents who joined
him there.
Notwithstanding the strict match that was kept over him, Dost
Mohamed was treated vith great consideration and respect by
Lord Aucltland, who, wishing to give him a clear idea of the
British power in India, took him over all the arsenals, magazines,
dockyards, &c., at Calcutta. The Emir was completely amazed
at a 1 he saw, and expressed the conviction that afterwards he
often repeated to his sons when they wished him to make mar
with the English, that they were " invincible, and would some
day be the masters of the world." After several months' residence
at Calcutta the Dost fell ill from the effects of the climate of
Bengal, when he sought and obtained permission to join his family
a t Loodiana.--Subsequently he was allowed to settle in the mountains, the air of which was more favourable to his health.
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AFTER the submission of the Emir, Shah Shooja, thinking the
English had no further plausible motive for refusing to evacuate
Afghanistan, inasmuch as the tranquillity of the country could not
be disturbed by any pretender to the throne, demanded for the
second time the fulfilment of the treaty; but, on various pretences, they again rejected this demand, and continued t,o carry
out those injudicious reforms which had already alienated so many
from their party. I t might have been supposed that they were
striving to destroy their own influence by adopting measures so
false and ill adapted to the objects they had in view; every day
tliey in some manner wounded the self-love and disappointed the
avarice of the Afghans, and expected them to change abruptly the
habits, customs, and ideas that had existed amongst them for' ages
past-indeed, they endeavoured to make them do so.
I n a country so recently conquered, and on which a new
sovereign had been forced, the opposition must, of necessity, be.
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obstinate ; the wisest policy would, therefore, have been to attach
the people to them by kindness, to throw, if possible, a veil over
the past, and, above all, to be indulgent to minor oBences. The
British did just the reverse in Afghanistan.
After his flight to Bokhara, Dost Mohamed continued to correspond with the Afghan serdars that surrounded Shah Shooja, and
he kept all their letters ; these were found in a little bag on t.he
field f t e r the battle' of Pervaneh and given to the English, who
talked of this discovery, and threatened to make use of them against
the chiefs whom they compromised and who were far from docile
under their rule. But this indiscreet conduct brought about a result
very different from what they intended, for the serdars who were
hostile to them, and who were afraid of being sent to join Hadji
Khan, Kaukeree, in India, held aloof, and, to prevent any surprise
on the part of their conquerors, surrounded themselves with their
follotveis, always appearing in public attended by an escort ready to
fight ; this warlike attitude was almost a challenge to their adversaries, who scarcely dared to accept it. T h e English, moreover,
drew upon themselves the resentment of those who up to that
time had been devoted to their cause, by recompensing the individuals that delivered this packet of pretended letters, the contents of which were, in truth, the fabrications of some artful and
avaricious intriguers-a fact that was proved in the sequel.
Shah Shooja profited by the errors of the English to alienate the
minds of the Afghans from them, and to strengthen his own party ;
his vizier, Mollah Chekker, was the soul of all his intrigues, and
cared so little to spare the protectors of his sovereign, that in
several instances they were able to prove his hostile intentions, and
eventually demanded his dismissal.
T h e king resisted to the utmost of his power, but was at last
obliged to accept a vizier of their choice ; and the Nizam ed Dooulet,
the new minister, who consulted his master simply as a matter of
form, entirely followed the instructions h e received from the
English. This miserable wretch, finding himself supported by them,
committed spoliations and exactions of every kind, and was guilty
of many acts of tyranny; those whom he plundered sometimes
found the means of bringing their complaints before the king ; but
Shah Shooja informed them that he could do nothing, being himself a slave. Sir W. MLNaghtenwas far from approving of the
vizier's conduct; but having himself made him minister, he could
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not immediately degrade him. T o these causes of discontent and
anxiety was soon added a still greater one.
The Directors of the East India Company, who have a habit of
judging of the value of a conquest only by the revenue it produces,
were more disappointed than can be described a't the deficit which
the expedition of Afghanistan had occasioned in their treasury.
They, therefore, ordered a rigid economy to be practised in the
Shah's army, and these instructions were carried out by the British
officers with more or less intelligence. Chiefs, whom it mould
have bee11 wise in the government to conciliate, found themselves
deprived of their subsidies ; those of others were considerably
reduced, and, at t h e same time that the pecuniary interests of the
Afghans were attacked, several Hazarah and I<uzzilbash chiefs
received fresh proofs of favour, which irritated the Afghans to the
highest degree.
Towards the end of September 'the serdars met in Kabul and
laid their grievances before Shah Shooja, who could only reply that
his power as a king was a fiction, that it was impossible for him to
do them justice, and added-" I t is your own fault that I have
fallen thus low; you have abandoned me to the good pleasure
of the English ; had there been one man of spirit amongst you, he
woulcl soon have delivered me from this shameful state of dependence." These words were not uttered in vain. Amongst the
serdars present at the durbar was Abdullah Khan, Etchekzye
(branch of the Barulrzyes), a chief of energy and resolution, who
stood forward and offered to be that man. I n the afternoon
of the same day he met the Shah in secret conference in the
garden of his palace, and there a revolt, which was to be postponed till a favourable ~pportunit~y
should render success certain,
was planned. However, it was resolved that the death of Sir
A. Burnes should take place immediately ; for the king, who well
knew the infinite trouble that officer had taken to support Dost
Mohamed, detested him, and was very anxious to prevent his
being made the Resident at his court, if Sir W. BPNaghten,
whose departure had been talked of for some time, should be
removed.
On leaving the Shah, Abdullall Khan called together a t his own
house the serdars Mohamed Attah Khan, Sikander Khan, Mir
Efzel Khan, Abdul Samut Ehan, and Abdul Selarn Khan, all of
the royal tribe of Popolzye ; also Seidal Khan, Aliltioozye, Emin
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Ullah Khan, Logheree, and Mohamed Hoosein B a n , Erz Beghi,*
and communicated to them the intentions of Shah Shooja : to which
they agreed to conform in every particular, and swore to overthrow the British power in Afghanistan. This oath was written
on the leaves of a.Koran, and the seal of each of the serdars present was affixed to it. The secret was ill kept, and soon came to the
knowledge of Sir TJT.MLNaghten,who was not in the least alarmed
by it, being fully impressed with the idea that it was impossible
the chiefs should undertake any serious measures. H e would not
even allow the Koran to be seized for the purpose of learning the
names of the conspirators, lest that act should be construed into
evidence of timidity on his part: an appearance of perfect iudifference was, in his opinion, the best mode of proving to the discontented that the British were not afraid of them ; but Burnes took
quite a n opposite view of the case. Thus the two officers, invested
with special power, were never agreed upon the most judicious
plan to be adopted for the general interests, and this want of good
understanding between the Resident and the political Envoy was,
perhaps, of all the causes that contributed to the British fall in
Afghanistan, the one that hastened it the most. It is impossible
to doubt that, if three or four of the conspirators had been arrested
and sent to India, it would have been sufficient to put a stop to
these intrigues ; but instead of adopting this vigorous course, Sir
TV. M'Naghten gave them ample time to bring them to maturity,
a n d exasperated the serdars by the most ill-timed measures of
economy. Though he did not see that the storm was so close
a t hand, he was fully aware of the difficulties that were to be
surmounted, and modified in a degree the reduction in the
pay of the Afghan soldiers ordered by Lord Auckland ; but from
the moment he received notice of his nomination to the post
of Governor of Bombay, he made no further objection to the
instructions that the Directors had given, and unhesitatingly
reduced all the subsidies which had been pointed out as superfluous.
The Ghildjzye serdars, who occupied the defiles of the Khyber

* Thisserdar was the brother of that
wife of Dost Yohirued who had been
previously married to Mohamed h i m
Khan. By this ~narriageshc hail a son
called Sultan Djnn Khan, who to thia

day has influence in Afghanistau. The
chiefs of Kabul and Kaudahar are both
equally anxious to attach him to their
cause.-Pen-icr,
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mountains between Kabul and Jellalabad, and held them open or
shut at their pleasure, were informed at the commencement of
October, 1541, that they must submit to a reduction of 40,000
rupees = 40001., when they at once hastened to Kabul to ascertain the motive for this alteration. They made their representations in the first instance to Sir W. MLNaghten,and he referred
them to Shah Shooja, by whom they were haughtily dismissed,
which greatly wounded their self-love and disappointed their cupidity ; but a few amongst them he secretly received, initiated them
into the conspiracy against his protectors, and assured them that
for the future their interests would be cared for.
Sir Alexander Burnes, without actually foreseeing the consequences that would result from these retrenchments, nevertheless
opposed them with all his power, though he did not succeed in preventing them; the consequence was, that when the Ghildjzye
serdars returned to their homes, they raised their countrymen and
cut off the communications in the mountains.
On the other hand, the conspirators a t Kabul had sent emissaries to all the Afghan provinces to prepare the tribes for revolt ;
already discontented, they alarmed them still more by persuading
them that their chiefs were to be banished to India, that Shah
Shooja was a mere puppet who would soon be upset, and that the
British yoke, so heavy only in a protective character, would be far
more so when it became absolute. The nomades responded immediately to this appeal, rushed to arms, and the communications
between Kabul and Kandahar were closed without delay, as those
had already been between Kabul and Jellalabad. General Sale
was sent with a brigade to reopen the latter and force the passage
of the Hindoo Koosh ;this small force quitted Kabul on the 11th of
October, entered the mountains the same day, and was very far from
expecting to meet with the terrible resistance it found there. Once
in this infernal region, however, the Indo-British troops could not
retrace their steps, and during eighteen days they were, if the
expression may be used, choked in these defiles, where every step of
their way was disputed foot by foot. On the first day General Sale
was wounded and obliged to abandon his command, and a fourth
part of his brigade was exterminated. From the 12th of October the
troops could advance only three miles and a half a-day, and arrived
exhausted on the 2nd November at Gundamuck, on the other side
of the gorge of the Khoord Kabul ; here they rested a few days,
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and then left for Jellalabad, still harassed by the tribes in revolt,
and after having reached that town took refuge within its walls
with only three days' provisions. Never were troops in such a
precarious position ;but a most happy incident came to their assistance, for caravans brought them supplies for three months from
Peshawur, which enabled them resolutely to oppose an energetic
resistance to the insurrection in which the rest of the army perished.
The news of these conflicts of the mountaineers with General
Sale's brigade arrived at Kabul on the 1st of November, and was
the signal for a serious disturbance which broke out in that city.
The unconquered tribes of Afghanistan waited only for the signal
to be given them by the Khyberees to rise simultaneously and
commence a war for their faith-a religious war, the most bloody
of all wars. They watched attentively the Indo-British troops,
who were imprudently dispersed in the several garrisons of Kabul,
Ghuznee, Kelat-i-Ghildjzye, Charikar, Kandahar, Jellalabad, and
other places ; they knew that these detachments could easily be
cut off, and also that it was impossible that reinforcements should
reach them from India until the month of April, the mountain
passes being obstructed by the snow. Of the thirty-two political
agents scattered over the country, not one perceived the least
symptom of the excited state of the public mind ; the unfortunate
Burnes himself, blinded by his excessive confidence in the natives,
was the first to report to the Indian Government that the Afghan
chiefs were sincerely attached to Shah Shooja, and that the British
army might be withdrawn from their garrisons. Sir W. M'Naghten
wrote more confidently in the same strain : all had fallen into a
fatal slumber, from which they were aroused only by surrounding
massacre. The British Commissioner had, in the first instance,
attempted to parley with the Ghildjzyes and induce them to return
to their duty, offering as one of the most persuasive arguments
100,000 rupees = 10,0001. ; but they rejected every species of
temptation, and continued to make war upon the invaders, their
attacks being generally made at night.
As soon as the signal of revolt had been given in the country,
Abdullah Khan, the head of the conspiracy in Kibul, took no
further trouble to conceal his intentions, and said openly that he
would kill Burnes before eight days were over. This officer,
though warned, paid no attention to these threats, considering
them as simple boasting, but, seeing that the serdar's insolence
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increased daily, he at last became very uneasy, and obtained
information which left no doubt as to the serious position
they were i n ; moreover, he saw that the conduct of Abdullah
- Khan was connected with the revolt in the hills. This enlightened
him as to the snare which had been woven round them, and he
exclaimed, "There is nothing for it now but to quit this country."
The next day, November 2, 1841, early in the morning, he sent
one of his servants t6 the house of Abdullah Khan to request that
chief to come to him, but the serdar, suspecting that Burnes
intended to seize him and send him to India, conceived that the
moment had arrived to execute the project of open revolt, for which
he was so well prepared ;his first act was therefore to kill Burnes's
messenger,. and, without loss of time, he proceeded to his residence,
accompanied by Seidal Khan, Sikander Khan, Mohamed Attah
Khan, Abdul Selam Khan, Emin Ullah Khan, &c. &c., and their
followers and servants, in all nearly one hundred and thirty persons,
the nucleus of the insurrection.
On the way there they killed the British officers and soldiers
whom they met in. the streets ; the delay this occasioned enabled
Bumes, who had been informed of these massacres, to barricade
the large outer gate of 'his house, and the insurgents were
therefore a long time before they could force a passage. H e
had thought of retiring to the cantonments situated three miles
from the city, but while putting on an Afghan dress to effect
his retreat undiscovered, he changed his mind, and said, "No,
I cannot play the coward, and, for the life of one man, compromise the honour of the British name. Were I to escape thus,
the Afghans would believe that I was frightened ; no, a hundred
times worse than death, the prestige of my authority would be
lost." With these words he put on his uniform again and remained
a t his post, but sent messenger after messenger to Sir W.
M6Naghten, requesting that a battalion of infantry and two pieces
of artillery might be sent to him without delay, for with these he
considered he should be able to put down the insurgents. And he
was right, for had the British troops appeared in the streets of Kabul
10,000 Euzzilbashes, ~ ~ z a r a hand
s , Parsivans, would have rallied
round Burnes and supported him ; but seeing that the English
did not take the initiative, they feared to commit themselves
in the eyes of the Afghans, who might have made them pay
dearly for their interference, and thus remained passive spectators of
the struggle. T o crown his misfortune, the artillery sent for by the
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beleaguered officer never arrived, and the mob, emboldened
by the simply defensive attitude assumed by his countrymen,
hesitated no longer; the inhabitants rose in all parts of the
city, and to them were soon joined the suburban population.
From that moment the impulse given to the revolt \\-as implacable and irresistible, and the nation rose as oue man against
their foreign invaders. But to continue my narrative ; the
shopkeepers and workmen, as well as the dregs of the people,
now surrounded the residence of Burnes, to take it by assault, and
showed themselves exceedingly vindictive in this conflict, a circumstance which might have arisen from his having been governor
of the city, and frequently obliged to punish them with severity.
The mob showed great perseverance in their endeavours to break
their way into the house, but the besieged, twenty-three in number, consisting of a few officers and servants, and ten sepoys, by
applying their ears to the ground, learnt from the hollow sound of
the blows that were struck against the walls, on which side to
expect the attack, and when a hole was made, they shot the first man
who presented himself at the opening ; this damped the courage of
the others, who retired to recornmewe operations a t some other
spot. The defence was thus prolonged from eight in the morning
till two in the afternoon, and the Afghans having lost many men
in their attempts to force an entrance, at last had recourse to other
means ; combustibles were piled against the great gate, and when
it was entirely consumed they rushed in a mass through the passage
and gained the interior of the house. T h e inmates had by this
time exhausted d l their ammunition, and Burnes received a point
blank shot from a pistol ; the ball struck him in the right eye, and
he died instantly: his body was then hacked to pieces with
repeated sabre cuts, and, horribly mutilated, thrown into the iarden
of his own house.
Three-and-twenty persons perished with Burnes, amongst whom
were his brother Lieut. Charles Burnes and Lieut. Broadfoot;
Captain Johnson, in charge of the Treasury, escaped by a miracle.
Captain Trevor, with his family, and a few other officers, were also
fortunate enough to reach the cantonments. His house and that
of Burnes were burned to the ground, and the military chest,
magazines, and commissariat stores of provisions pillaged.*

* These details of the death of
Burnes weye given me by hfohamed
Hoosein Khan, Kachee, ~ h was
o the

sole survivor of the magsacre in ~nrnes's
house. He received six-and-twenty
wounds.-Pcrricr.
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On hearing of the outbreak Sir W. McNaghten detached t ~ v o
regiments under Brigadier Shelton, and some irregulars under
Captain Nicholl, to occupy the citadel -of the Bala Hissar, in
which was the residence of Shah Shooja. This movement was the
only measure the envoy adopted, totally regardless of the state of
the city and the earnest demands of Burnes, whose repeated messages announced his critical position. I t was the weater error,
b
because provisions were short in barracks, and the principal magazine was in Kabul; the Resident considered the small party in
charge of it as sufficient for its defence, but the indecision of the
officer in command led to its evacuation. Another depct, gallantly
defended, was carried by assault, and it was with great difficulty
and'loss of life that they subsequently retook two small redoubts
tolerably well provisioned, which enabled them to subsist some
time longer.
These disasters, the result of want of foresight, were the cause
of all the calamit,ies which overtook the British army. Greater
success would, without doubt, have followed if bolder measures had
been adopted, .but General Elphinstone, borne down by age and
infirmity, had long lost the qualifications necessary for so responsible
a command; he appeared to have fallen into a state of lethargy,
and remained complacently satisfied with his defensive attitude,
while it was absolutely necessary to proceed by the most opposite
means. The staff of the General-in-Chief did not prove itself more
competent than their commander, and Sir W. M'Naghten, taking
hjmself to task rather late for the numerous faults he had committed, and which had placed some thousands of his countrymen in
peril, strbve to repair his error by the energy and vigour with which
he conducted the defence. But his efforts were vain, all seemed
pardysed around him; his orders, like his requests, were eluded, or
timidly and inefficiently executed, and this occasioned fresh disasters,
instead of procuring the slightest amelioration of their position.
On the 4th of November Zeman Khan, Mohamedzye," who
possessed immense wealth and had attached the people to his
party by his largesses, succeeded, with the help of his uncle Nawab
Djabbar Khan, and his cousin Chems Eddin I<han,t both influential personages, in inducing the Afghans to proclaim him king,

* Son of Nawab Assad Ullah Rhan,
one of the'deceasecl brothem of Dost
Mohuned.-Frrier.

t Son of Emiu Rhan, half-broth&
of Dost Mohamed Khan.-Terrier.
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and h e surrounded himself with all the pomp of royalty. This
chief, at the head of his partizans, daily exchanged a few shots
with the English, who mere shut up in their cantonments; but
though he captured and murdered a few officers and soldiers who
imprudently risked their lives outside the camp, the Mohamedzye
chief experienced only reverses in his repeated attaclrs. I n one
of these Abdullah Khan, Etchekzye, the originator and promoter
of the conspiracy, received a ball in the forehead and died within
two days.
After each defeat Zeman Khan retired into the city without
being disturbed, for the English never followed him, which they,
could have done without difficulty ; and as they had committed the
serious fault of establishing their magazines of provisions a t a
considerable distance from the cantonments, they should at the
outset have displayed a little more energy in endeavouring to dislodge the Afghans from the houses in which they. were regaling
themselves upon them. At the sight of one battalion and two
or three pieces of cannon, they would have fled: they admit it
now, and it was the step they most dreaded the enemy would take.
Many times did the officers suggest it, but General Elphinstone
would not give his consent, and the army saw itself reduced to
procure provisions with gold and presents from the insurgents
-the conduct of the general was indeed incomprehensible. After
Shah Shoojs had concerted with Abdullah Khan the revolt
against the English, he fell into a far more dependent con'dition than that from which the latter had intended to withdraw
him. T h e Etchekzye serdar and other conspirators had shown
themselves exceedingly overbearing towards him, sharp discussions took place, and there was very nearly a rupture; nevertheless Shah Shooja was not sufliciently clearsighted to discover
that they only looked upon him as a tool to be set aside as soon as
the annihilation of his protectors was accomplished, and the rising
of the Khyberees induced the king to throw himself into the arms
of the national party, and conspire actively himself. H e first
-permitted the unhappy Burnes to 'be murdered, though he could
have saved him with the greatest ease, for he occupied the citadel
with a devoted garrison of a thousand men ; but it seems that he
lost confidence in his accomplices while that act was being perpetrated, the cause of which was probably secret information that
he received from the Serdar &lohnmed Attah Khan. He then
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thought it prudent to close the gates of the B d a Hissar before the
mob could reach it, and, in his blindness, believed that when
order mas restored the Afghans would ,hail him again as their
king without the concurrence of the British being necessary ; he
therefore abstained from helping them, hoping by this means to
secure the support of his own subjects. H e even thought it very
wrong when some of the English troops, shut up in the fortress with
him, fired upon the townspeople, and turned their artillery upon the
city ;but it was quite a different matter when the insurgents cut down
the trees in his garden under the guns of t.he place, or when the
partizans of Zeman Khan came within range: then the Shah
entreated that the sharpest and best sustained fire possible might
be 'kept up. Several British officers, to whom the treachery of
Shah Shooja was now evident, proposed that the army should occupy
the citadel in which he still reslded, as they woilld then have the
town in their power, and could, by threatening its destruction,
obtain supplies and provisions. This plan was warmly supported
by Sir ?V. M'Naghten, but rejected by General Elphinstone,
who gave as his reason that the discouragement amongst the troops
rendered the execution of it impossible ; indeed he acte? in direct
opposition to this sound advice by ordering a regiment, that had
been sent to the Bala Hissar when the rebellion broke out, to return
to camp. After this, though thus reinforced, the General lost all
confidence in himself for any useful purpose ; he had despaired of
success from the commencement, and waited to the last with the
inertness and cold apathy that are the result of a fixed opinion, the
annihilation of the doomed army under his command : the troops
themselves, cast down by the.example of their chief, lost all energy.
T h e British soldier has proved in all times that in bravery he is
second to none in Europe ; but this is under certain conditions:
he must have full rations, his arrack, his beer, and a thousand
other stimulants, the privation of which induces discouragement
and indecision.
There is no doubt such was the condition of the force a t Kabul,
and to this must be attributed the feeble and pusillanimous conduct
of H.M.'s 44th and the 37th N.I. when attacked by the insurgents
in a small ,entrenched camp on an eminence which protected the
citadel ;they scarcely made any resistance, the efforts of Brigadier
Shelton to animate them were useless, and cavalry and infantry gave
way and fled in great disorder to the cantonments, hotly pursued

by the Afghans, who would perhaps have forced their enemy's
position that day, but for the intervention of the insurgent Serdar
Osman Khan, Isakzye, who made a special treaty with Sir TV.
MLNaghten, in virtue of which a few days of compi~rativetranquillity were secured to the Anglo-Indian troops. After this check
the 54th regiment of N. I., which occupied the Bala Hissar, was
withdram, and Shah Shooja abandoned to his own resources.
I t has been mentioned that Mohamed Akbar Khan, a son of
Dost Mohamed, had retired to Khulm after his flight from Boltham. Not having been able to procure from Blir TValee the
assistance he required to maintain the old soldiers of his father who
had joined him in his exile, he resolved to go to Persia, where his
uncles, the serdars of Kandahar, had been well received by Mohamed Shah, hoping that that monarch would not do less for him than
for them ; indeed he was on his road there, and near Balkh, when,
hearing of the insui~ectionin Kabul, he changed his course, and
arrived on the 25th of November in that city,* where he found everything in the greatest confusion, and his cousin Zeman Khan declared
king. Though smarting under this vexation, Akhar was obliged to
recognise the election, but only with the secret determination to
reverse it on the first opportunity, and such was the diversity of
opinions and interests a t this time amongst the Afghans, that he
had little difficulty in creating for himself, and in a few days,
a powerful party, which soon overcame that of all the other
chiefs.
Many British officers, alive to the mournful turn that the military
operations had taken, and foreseeing the result which the weakness
and incapacity of General Elphinstone must produce, were of opinion
that negotiations, based upon the evacuation of the country, ought
to be opened with all the influential chiefs in Kabul, without regard
to the superiority that some chose to arrogate to themselves over the
rest. For several clays Sir TV. M'Naghten repelled this advice,
which he received from all sides; but the disastrous intelligence
that was brought in from outlying garrisons inclined him to enter-

* The newspapers nnd some other
publications that have touched upon
this revolt hnve stated, on what authority I know not, that Akbar Khan
returned to Rabul accompanied by one
thousand Tartar horsemen who had
been sent to him b y the Russian Go-

vernment, but the assertion is utterly
incorrect.
He arrived with twelve
badly equipped Afghan cav,alry, and
never received assistance from the
Russian~,who carefully abstained from
any materid intervention i n favour of
the conq11cred.-Fernier,
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tain pacific measures more favourably, for the English had losses
to deplore in every direction. T h e troops at Ghuznee, commanded by Colonel Palmer, had been ordered to Kabul, but
could not leave, and, subsequently, being obliged to abandon the
town, they retired into the citadel : however, they were pretty well
provisioned. The brigade of Lieutenant-Colonel WLaren, which
Sir FV. M'Naghten recalled from Kandahar to the assistance of the
division in Kabul, had been arrested in its march by the great depth
of snow which had fallen and the insurrection that developed itself
everywhere with a ferocity and excitement difficult to imagine.
This column had pushed forward as far as Ghuznee ; but there it
was forced to return, and after having thrown a garrison into Kelat-CGhildjzye, with a year's provisions, it made its way back to
Kandahar. On the other hand Captain Woodburn, who left
Ghuznee with one hundred and thirty men, was .harassed on the
road by the insurgents, and took refuge in some ruins, surrounded
by a broken wall. Here, besieged by four or five thousand Afghans,
he made a sortie in two divisions, one led by himself the other
by a native officer, and, throwing himself into the rnelde, he fell
gallantly with all his men ; the second division endeavoured to return,
but only five Sepoys escaped to tell the tale. Another Engljsh
officer, Captain Ferris, was besieged with two hundred and fifty
men in a miserable fort, which he defended many days against
three or four thousand Afghans, and having only twenty-five cart
ridges a manleft, also resolved to try and cut his way through the
enemy. This was no easy matter, for he had with him his wife and
her sister, but the ladies were tied behind two native horsemen and
placed in the centre of the square, and after a frightful conflict
the little party reached another fort, whence, with the help of
guides, they made their way to Peshawur.
The first idea of Sir W. MbNaghten, on hearing of these disasters, was to force his way through the Khyber Pass and join
General Sale in Jellalabad, which he had fortified ; but wiser
counsels prevailed, and this impracticable project was given' up.
It was impracticable quite as much from the nature of the ground
as from the ill feeling of the tribes, who were in arms all along
the pass, and the deep snow presented aggravated difficulties of
every kind, which Sale's brigade, if it had been ordered to meet
them, must have encountered also. The plans for the retreat
thei.efore were for the moment abandoned by Sir Wm. MGNaghten,
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and uot without regret. Subsequently, and in conformity with the.
almost universal opinion, he sent Captains Lawrence and Trevor,
and 3, few other officers, to make overtures of peace to the Afghans,
by whom the propositions were favourably received ; this induced
Sir W. M'Naghten to place himself in direct communication with
the chiefs, particularly with Mohamed Akbar Khan, with whom
the English Commissioner proposed to conclude a treaty, consisting
of twenty articles. These were all accepted by him and them, and
in several conferences that followed, many of the serdars, who were
desirous that tranquillity should be reestablished in the country,
insisted that the terms of the evacuation should be definitively and
promptly decreed. Sir W. M'Naghten, seeing that Mohamed
Akbar Khan appeared the most powerFul amongst them, and the
most inclined to negotiate, referred treating with him, although
he well knew that this chief every day joined the insurgents who.
fired on the soldiers in the cantonment. But Akbar, having
assured him that he acted thus only to pacify the other serdars
his rivals, who sought to degrade him in the eyes of his countrgmen by representing him as a traitor to the national cause, he
succeeded in gaining the confidence of the Commissioner, and
a n almost friendly understanding was established between them.
W a s Mohamed Akbar in good faith when he promised entire
devotion to the English, and when he promised even to deliver up t.he murderers of Burnes ? This is doubtful, for it is
very improbable, he should have forgotten that the ruin of
his house had been brought about by those to whom he had
offered to devote himself. And then .his father, the head of his
family, the. Emir Dost Mohamed, was he not still a prisoner in
India? I t is impossible to deny that the position of Akbar Khan
was most embarrassing, for, obliged to conciliate the invaders
of his country to preserve a hope of delivering his father, he could
only do so a t the risk of exciting the suspicions of his countrymen,
who were but too well 'inclined to mistrust him. Zeman Khan, his
cousin, knew that the return of Dost Mohamed would bring down
the crazy scaifolding on which his own dawning royalty fdepended,
and therefore he neglected no means of alienating the Afghans horn
Mohamed Akbar Khan ; he would, perhaps, have completely succeeded if the latter had not, to save his life, adopted an energetic
line of conduct, the loyalty of which has been diversely appreciated
by those who have considered the subject. Many chiefs had openly
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quarrelled with the son of the Emir, and on the 22nd of December
they reproached him with having treated with the English unknowri
to them, and sacrificed' them to his own ambition: H e defended
himself with energy from these accusations, but he could not convince his antagonists, and they would certainly have cut him to
pieces on the .spot if he had not sworn upon the Koran that on
the morrow he would bring the British Commissioner into Kabul
either as a hostage or a corpse.
The Afghans who took part in the melancholy episodes which
concluded the British occupation of Kabul, are generally,convinced
that in one of his interviews with Mohamed Akbar ~ h & ,Sir W.
N'Naghten had solemnly promised to restore his father to him
within the space of a month ; but the period had nearly expired, and
the Emir was still a prisoner in India. This fact greatly exasperated
Akbar Khan, and made him more exacting in the terms of the evacuation ; several conferences had ended without a successful result,
and the negotiations had already become embittered, when on the
night of the 23rdto 24th of December, Captain Skinner who wasin
the Afghan camp, arrived in that of the English, the bearer of fresh
conditions from Akbar Khan, who demanded another interview with
Sir W. MGNaghten,for the purpose of concluding a definitive treaty.
This was acceded to, and the envoy arrived at the appointed rendezvous on Christmas:Day, 1841, accompanied by Captains Lawrence,
Trevor, and M'Kenzie ; the meeting took place near a bridge, in
the neighbourhood of which sixteen Afghan horsemen had been previously posted in ambush. Akbar Khan received the Commissioner
with violent reproaches a t his having so long delayed setting his
father at liberty and evacuating Kabul ; he also declared that the
arms, ammunition, and hostages had never been given up to him,
while on his side he held in readiness and at Sir W. M'Naghtenys
disposal the cattle necessary to transport the baggage of the army.
" I n exchange for my promptitude," he said, I find only delay
and duplicity; General Sale, instead of evacuating Jellahbad
as agreed between us, has provisioned and fortified himself
with more energy than ever." T h e British Commissioner in
vain protested his good and loyal intentions ; Mohamed Akhar
would listen to nothi~ig: Sir W. M'Naghten had, he said, delayed
up to that day. to fulfil his promises, and he should therefore consider him and his suite aa prisoners, till all the conditions previously determined upon were executed. H e then seized Sir William
2 A 2
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by the arm to take him into Kabul, but the envoy resisted and exclaimed, "Better die than follow you." Alrbar Khan instantly put
his pistol to his breast and fired,-it flashed in the pan ; the second
laid the Resident dead at his feet. T h e pistols which the chief
used had been presented to him only a few days before by Sir W.
McNaghten himself. Captain Trevor, who was at a little distance,
having seen the first hostile movement of the assassin, instantly dismounted to go to the assistance of his chief, but was killed on the
spot by an Afghan bullet. As to Captains Lawrence and McKenzie
they were seized, stripped, and tied on horseback behind two
chiefs, who had infinite difficulty in saving them from- their infuriated followers; they were subsequently imprisoned in a fort,
but after some days recovered their liberty. T h e head of Sir W.
iMLNaghtenwas carried through the bazaars on the point of a
spear, with the green spectacles on that he was in the habit of
wearing ; it was subsequeutly fixed on the roof of the Round Point
of the bazaar, called the Tchar-sook, as well as his corpse, and that
of Captain Trevor: the bodies were left there three days, and
afterwards thrown into a dry well.
After the death of Sir W. McNaghten, the direction of affairs
was placed in the hands of Major Pottinger, who had defended
Herat the preceding year. On leaving that city he came to Kabul
and was appointed governor of Charikar and Istalif, two small towns
situated in the mountains, one-and-twenty miles north of Kabul,
and about three from each other. The garrisons which held them
were after a gallant defence overpowered about the same time that
the revolt broke out in the capital, but Major Pottinger, though
wounded by a ball in the thigh, was enabled, almost by a miracle, to escape and reach the house of Burnes, which had been
sacked and pillaged shortly before. .Of this event he was i p o rant, but on his arrival there the traces of the disaster were
still fresh ; he found himself alone in the smoking ruins and in
the midst of the insurgents, from whom his lucky star and excellent horse saved him once more, and he arrived, completely
exhausted, in the British cantonment. Major Pottinger had but
very imperfectly recovered from his wound, when the heavy
task of directing the political affairs of Kabul fell upon his
shoulders. Sad as had been the result of the confidence which Sir
William M'Naghten placed in Mohamed Akbar, such was the
desperate position of things, that Major Pottinger could see no
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better course than to renew the negotiations with that serdar ;
but the other Afghan chiefs who wished to prevent the concentration of authority i n , the hands of the son of the Emir,
insisted on taking part in the treaty, that was to drive the
English out of their country. They all ratified it, and the articles
were nearly a repetition of those which had been imposed on Sir
W. MLNaghten,namely, the evacuation of Jellalabad by Sale's
brigade, and the liberation of Dost Mohalned ; but this time it
was agreed that the Epglish should keep their arms, and be accompanied across the Khyber by an Afghan escort, commanded by
Akbar Khan himself, who was to protect them as far as Peshawur.
Wounded, however, as had been his self-love, and foiled in his
ambitious views in not having been permitted to treat singly with
the invaders, he did not care to assemble the escort immediately.
The Indo-British had lost up to this period twenty-eight ofiicers killed
in action or assassinated ; 10,000 bodies of men and animalsinfected
the air and aggravated the sufferings of the 5000 unhappy survivors, that now formed the army, and who were worn out by the
resistance they had maintained for two months against 40,000
insurgents. The cold had become intensely severe ;fuel, provisions,
and ammunition failed, and the troops being completely discouraged
Major Pottinger did not think it advisable to wait any longer for
the promised escort, and decided upon making a desperate rush
through the midst of the enemy; accordingly, on the 5th of
January, 1842, he gave the order for departure.
On Thu$sday the 6th, after having sust.ained a siege of sixtyseven days, and endured the most cruel privations, General
Elphinstone and the army he commanded quitted, under a humiliating capitulation, the intrenched camp of Kabul, and moved
off on a road a foot deep in snow. The force had, however,
scarcely cleared the cantonment, when the rear guard was attacked
by the Afghans ; an officer of the 5th regiment of native cavalry
named Hardyman, and some of his men, were killed in this
affair, and the army marched only five miles that day. T h e sky
was clear, but the cold intense, and when they arrived on the encamping ground the soldiers had to clear away the snow, before
they could rest their weary limbs on the frozen earth; to this
was added the want of provisiona, and before morning dawned
several hundred men and women had died from cold and hunger.
On the 7th the division marched upon Barikhar, and the
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Afshan escort which Akbar Khan had promised should protect the
retreat appeared i n larger numbers and hostile ; the rear guard
was harassed that day by several bloody engagements, and the
enemy carried off three mountain guns. From this moment
the English, who had indeed placed but little confidence in the
promises of t.he Afghans, felt convinced they should never reach
Jellalabad but by fighting every inch of the way, and, encamping
at the entrance of the defile, they there passed a more terrible
night than the first. Those who survived till day-break, found
the ground covered with corpses ; the bewildered Sepoys burnt
their clothes to warm themselves, and the British soldiers sinking
under cold and hunger had scarcely stresgth to carry their arms :
the most frightful disorder reigned throughout the frozen and
famished multitude, and those who had saved anything valuable
were here obliged to abandon it.
O n the morning of the 8th, the division could not advance one
single step. The heights around swarmed with their enemies,
who having suspended their fire during the night, recommenced
their deadly work a t sunrise. I n this extremity the.English were
obliged to enter into a psrley with Mohamed Akbar Khan, who
was seen encamped on an eminence near, and who, while affectilig
a great sympathy for them, was not so ignorant of the misfortunes that befell them as he wished to make them believe. H e
blamed Major Pottinger for his precipitation in quitting Kabul,
without waiting for the escort which was to protect the army,
adding that he alone amongst the Afghan .chiefs had the power
to prevent the attacks made upon it, and he offered to control
the insurgents, provided the English consented to give hostages
that they would not go beyond Tezeen, until Sale's brigade
had evacuated Jellalabad. I t is evident that the serdar feared
the junction of the two divisions in a place that was fortified and provisioned, and in which they could pass the winter
in safety, and wait for the spring to resume the offensive. T o
assure himself therefore that the engagement would be faithfully kept, he demanded a t first six hostages, but was subsequently
satisfied with Major Pottinger, and Captains Lawrence and
McKenzie. A s soon as they were placed in his hands, the troops
moved forward towards the famous defile of Khoord Kabul, but
attacked on all sides, notwithstanding the treaty just concluded,
this day brought with it the climax of their misfortunes; scenes
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of carnage and pitiless cruelty were renewed a t every step, and
the column, crushed by the rolling fire of its invisible foes, a t
length abandoned the guns to the Afghans. Reduced to twenty
cartridges per man, they were obliged to charge with the bayonet
enemies sheltered by rocks and well provided with ammunition,
while women and children pierced with cold were seen wandering distracted and at random through the fire, amongst the
disorganised troops. Mohamed Akbar Khan had no command
over his men, for they had proclaimed the Djehad or Holy W a r ,
had become Ghazees or soldiers of the Faith, and their fanaticism
knew no bounds ; the feeling of revenge, that of doing a good
work in the eyes of God, and above all the hope of booty, rendered
them utterly deaf to entreaty or command ; destitute of pity, and
reckless of order or discipline, they gorged themselves with blood
and plunder.
On the 9th Akbar Khan acknowledged that he was perfectly
powerless to restrain these Ghazees, who renewed the scenes of the
previous day with increased fury, and the storm which had raged
over the wretched troops for three consecutive days ended in one of
the most terrible military catastrophes on record. The remnant of
the Indo-British army, exhausted by forced marches, by cold, by
want of food and fuel, and agonizing sufferings of every description,
had no longer the strength t o defend itself, and was massacredannihilated, by overwhelming numbers of merciless enemies. Three
natives only and one single European, Dr. Brydon, reached Jellalabad out of a body of five thousand men and a much greater number
of camp-followers, who lost their lives in this butchery. Akbar Khan
seemed to deplore the conduct of his soldiers and his own want of
command over them, and in the height of this bloody tragedy
offered shelter to the English ladies, promising to protect them a t
the peril of his own life ; the offer was accepted by several,
amongst whom were Lady Sale, Lady N'Naghten, RIrs. Anderson,
Mrs. Reid, and Mrs. Mainwaring, and they were perfectly well
treated by him.
Akbar Khan having in his camp the hostages that were delivered to him, also General Elphinstone, Brigadier Shelton, Captain
Johnson, and a few other officers, remained two days on this fatal
ground, waiting for the evacuation of Jellalabad by General Sale,
to whom he had sent a copy of the treaty concluded between
himself and Major Eldred Pottinger. But that General formally
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refused to abandon the place without an order from the GovernorGeneral of India in Council ; and fortunate was it for him that he
came to this determination, for the Afghans had laid a plan for
exterminating his corps to the very last man.
After the disaster in the Khoord Kabul, Mohamed Akbar ,
Khan marched his prisoners to Tezeen and Jugdulluk, and then
to Thigri, a fortified town situated in the rich valley of Lug-.
man, where, after much hesitation, he determined not to forward
them to Jellalabad, but sent them to Buddiabad, a large fortress
recently built a t the upper end of the valley. On the 11th they
were moved to Zindeh and placed in charge of the chief, Mohamed
Shah Khan. T h e death of General Elphinstone from natural
causes occurred on the 23rd of April following, and Akbar Khan
sent the corpse under escort to Jellalabad ; but the Ghazees met
it on the road, attacked and dispersed the guard, tore the body from
the coffin, and stripped and stoned it.
The massacres in the Khoord Kabul greatly increased the power
and influence of Mohamed Akbar and his party became daily more
numerous ; the Ghazees on all sides responded to his appeal, and
the irregular cavalry of the country in the service of the English
deserted to join his standard. His army then amounted to seven
or eight thousand men, and with these he laid siege to Jellalabad,
being fully convinced that General Sale would never evacuate it in
virtue of the treaty. This brave officer had entrenched himself in
the place with the two battalions under his command, and for more
than two months had been living on half rations, determined to
hold out to the last man. Jellalabad (Glory inhabited) is situated
west of Feshawur, a t the opening of the Kliyber Pass. In the
summer it contains but 2000 inhabitants, but in the winter nearly
20,000, for the severity of that season in these mountains obliges.
the inhabitants to take refuge in the t o m s ; General Sale arrived
a t the period of this au,mentation, and was necessitated, for the
security of his brigade, to take steps to prevent this increase in
the population. All Akbar Khan's efforts to dislodge the gallant
General proved ineffectual, and instead of succeeding, as he hoped,
he was very nearly losing his life here either by mischance or
treachery. T h e rifle of the Isakzye chief, Mohamed Osman Khan,
the first of the insurgent serdars who made a treaty with Sir Wm.
M'Naghten, went off accidentally-such, a t least, was the statement
of that chief-and the ball lodged in Akbar Khan's arm, who pre-
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tended that the injury was premeditated, and that Osman Khan
had been bribed by the English to assassinate him : he, therefore,
put him to death.
While Akbar Khan was thus harassing General Sale a t Jellalabad, Zeman Khan, the newly elected king of the Afghans, occupied the town of Kabul and besieged Shah Shooja, who from the
citadel kept up a cannonade upon the city ; several thousand lives
were sacrificed in this struggle, for each day brought with it its own
combat. T h e cause of Zeman Khan, however, prospered n o t ; he
became anxious and disappointed a t this useless waste of his fortune,
on which he depended for success, and by which alone he had
secured partisans; he, therefore, deemed it prudent to accept the
propositions made to him by the Shah, laid down the royalty with
which the nation had invested him, and consented to become the
prime minister of the Suddozye prince. I n acting thus he thought
he should be able to prevent the re-establishment of Dost Mohamed
if he should return, and also to reduce Akbar Khan to ohedience, being well determined, however, to take the first favourable
opportunity of overthrowing Shah Shooja and seizing the crown
once more ; but the events which followed completely neutralized
his deep-laid schemes. T h e Shah, on the other hand, was not
more sincere than his vizier, and promised him what' he never
intended to perform ; he made these concessions to his adversaries for no other purpose than to extricate himself from his
present embarrassing position, intending to get rid of them all if
ever he should find himself firmly established in power. T o
complete this apparent reconciliation, he named Akbar Khan,
Serdm serdarbne,* and sent his a.ppointment to him at Jellalabad ;
but that chief would not accept it or sanction the treaty concluded with his cousin, unless Shah Shooja agreed to support him
in besieging that town. I t was hardly possible that any proposal
should have better coincided with the Shah's own views, for he
ardently longed for some opportunity of leaving Kabul till he could
return in force, supported by the English, whose assistance he saw,
when too late, was indispensable to him. The conditions offered by
Akbar Khan were by no means favourable to the intrigues of Zeman
Khan, and the vizier, therefore, advised the king not to accept them,
or at any rate if he did to leave him, during his absence, in com-
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rnand at Kabul ; but the king, who perceived the drift of his advice,'
simply sent him orders to accompany him to Jellalabad, and to
prove that he was in earnest in this decision, he appointed the
son of the Serdar Emin Ullah Khan governor of Kabul while he
was away. Zeman Khan, uneasy at the Shah's persisting in his
determination, resolved to ascertain the cause, and found that
he had been deceived by his sovereign, whom he had himself
intended to betray : he, therefore, to nip the evil in the bud,
determined upon his destruction.
Shah Shooja, in pursuance of his intentions, left the citadel to
join his small army, encamped.about a mile and a half from the
Bala Hissar, with the declared object of leading it against the
English, but in reality to use it as an escort on his way to place
himself under their protection; he had, however, scarcely started
when the Serdar Shooja ed Dooulet, a son of Zeman Khan, accompanied by four servants, overtook him, and fired point blank into
his palanquin. T h e unfortunate monarch was wounded by several
balls, and still breathed when the assassins took him out of the
litter .and threw his body into a stream that mas near the road,
finishing their atrocious crime with their swords. This event took
place in February, 1842.
The character of Shah Shooja has generally been too severely
criticized. Even his adversaries, the Mohamedzyes, who now govern
Afghanistan, admit that he was a very remarkable man, and the
only one of Shah Timoor's sons who was capable of reigning. H e
had both ability and courage, and redeemed .more than one vice
by the qualities which the Afghans delight to see in their princes.
H e was after the manner of that country a good administrator, and
understood how to conduct a war as well as an Afghan can ; he only
wanted a little better luck ; such is the opinion of all Afghans.
Several times beaten and driven out of the country, he never considered himself vanquished, and took the field twelve times in his
endeavours to regain the crown. It is impossible to look upon
this perseverance as mere obstinacy ; it denotes great energy of
character, and if he always failed it was because he never would
permit the smallest entrenchment upon his absolute rights. When
we Europeans form an opinion of the acts of the barbarous nations
of Asia we always do so according to our own standard of morals,
and political passions, without making the least allowance for the
difference that exists between our habits and feelings, and theirs.
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There is no question that Shall Shooja, like every other Afghan,
was cruel and also despotic, but let us review the position in which
he was placed, and it will appear that having to govern a race
for whom force is the only law, it would have been difficult
for him to act othemise than as he did. The Moharnedzyes,
whose influence in the government was so great, were always
conspiring against him during his first reign. After the death of
Ahmed Shah, the descendants of that great prince had always been
subject to the caprices engendered by the ambition of the serdars
who left them only the shadow of regal power. Shah Shooja
resisted their intrigues with greater tenacity than his predecessors
had done, and was therefore more especially the object of their
machinations ; he would have been foolish indeed to allow himself t@
be beaten without making an effort to foil them, and coercion was the
only means by which he could succeed in concentrating the power
in his own hands: he believed he should secure this object if he
did so, and therein was his error. H a d he reflected that the
tribes, attached to their chiefs by so many ties, would give him but
a feeble and uncertain support, he would certainly have abstained
from using force for the purpose of attaining it ; but weakness on
his part, would have been worse; for then he must have succumbed
at once. His conduct during his second reign is a proof of that
independence of character which was ever his nlisfortune : indignant under the yoke imposed upon him by the English, all
the vices of his Afghan nature broke forth; he betrayed his
benefactors, resisted his liberators, and died by the hands of
assassins-for an Afghan he could have no more glorious close to
such a career.
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SHAESHOOJA
left several sons,. of whom four took part in the
political events that occurred in Afghanistam during the English
occupation ; these were Timoor Mirza, Fethi Djing Mirza, Seif der
Djing Mirza, and Shapoor Mirza.
Although the Shah had appointed a Governor of Kabul previously to his violent death, he had also for further security placed
his second son Fethi Djing in the Bala Hissar. When this prince
heard of his father's a ~ m i n a t i o nhe shut himself up in the citadel
wiLh one thousand men of Arab origin who were devoted to him,
and sent money to his partizan Emin Ullah Khan, Logheree,
who occupied the suburbs with three thousand men, to distribute
among the people in his name, and induce them to rise against
Zekan Khan : this he did, and a bloody combat was maintained
for two days and two nights, after which Emin UlIah Khan was
obliged to retire to the Bala Hissar.
Mohanled Akbar had scarcely recovered from his wound when he
heard of these events, which determined him immediately to retire
from the siege of Jellalabad (an undertaking that had hitherto
proved to him only a source of disappointment), and return in haste
to Kabul, which he reached twenty days after the death of Shah
Shooja. Whether i t was because he did not consider himself in
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su5cient force, or that he thought the moment unpropitious, the
serdar did not assume the sovereign power, but resolved in the
first instance to beguile his enemies into destroying each other, and
for that purpose allied himself with Zeman, Khan, and prevailed
on him to assist in seizing the person of the Prince Fethi Djing.
With their united forces they made four unsuccessful attacks upon
the Bala Hissar, but at last succeeded in blowing up one of the
towers of the enceinte, when they rushed in and either killed or
made prisoners all who were within its walls.
Zeman Khan wished to put' Fethi Djing to death, but to this
proposal Mohamed Akbar refused to consent, and not only took
that prince under his special protection, but made the liveliest
protestations of devotion to his cause, declaring that he would
never recognize any other Afghan as his sovereign. T h e object
of this apparent generosity was simply to crush more decidedly
the power of Zeman Khan, who, divining his intention, fortified himself in the suburbs of the town, but in vain, for Mohamed Akbar attacked and drove him back at every point,
and he owed his safety to his formal renunciation of his claims
to royalty and the post of vizier. After this success Akbar
Khan marcied the daughter of the Serdar Ernin Ullah Khan, a n
alliance which greatly strengthened his party; he was also appointed vizier by Fethi Djing, and maintained in the general
command of the army. But these concessions did not affect his
original project, and he prepared to bring about the downfall
of this prince, who, warned of his danger, once more retired to
the citadel, from which, however, he was forced to retire after a
siege of forty-eight hours. Akbar immediately seized the treasuxe
that Shah Shooja had left his son, but suspecting that Fethi Djing
had secreted a part of it, he ordered his guards not to lose sight of
him for a moment, nor to allow him to sleep until he had given
up all the diamonds which he acknowledged were in his possess'ion.
For three days and nights had the unhappy Fethi Djing Mirza
been thus tormented, when Khan Shireen Khan, a Kuzzilbash
serdar, who was secretly of his party, and supported the English,
found an opportunity of conveying to him two hundred ducats
with which he bribed his janitors to facilitate his escape. His
prison was one of the large towers in an angle of the citadel, and
happily for him a window in it overlooked the town ; from this
he was lowered by a rope a t night, and took refuge in the quarter
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inhabited by the Kuzzilbashes of Djevanchir, a gun-shot from
the place, where-Khan Shireen Khan secreted him in his own
house.
When his escape became known, Akbar Khan sent in pursuit of him in all directions; the strictest search was instituted
for. about twelve days, but without success, and when all hope of
discovering him was lost, and the search given up, Fethi Djing
left his retreat, and under the escort of one hundred Kuzzilbash
horsemen, reached Jellalabad. It was not known till some time
after that Khan Shireen Khan had assisted the prince in his
escape, and though Mohamed Akbar's resentment was great, he
concealed it, as it was necessary for him t.o keep on terms with this
serdar. Are not all these intrigues and counter-intrigues the best
evidence of the instability,of the Afghan character, and of the
turbulence, constant craving for change, and uncontrollable love
of bloodshed innate in it ?
T h e flight of Fethi Djing Mirzs was the last episode connected
with the occupation of Kabul by the British. More fortunate
or better prepared a t Kandahar, they succeeded in holding that
city ; a result which was due to the firmness of General Nott,
and, aboZe all, to the indefatigable activity of Major Rawlinson, who administered the affairs of that Residency with great
ability."
T h e war in this province was the more difficult to conduct because the.principality had never been entirely subdued. The Serdar
Akter Khan, Alizye, who had retired to the district of Zemindavar,
kept up a n unceasing conflict against the English, and though constantly beaten, he, in the most undaunted manner, as constantly

* Major Rawlinson is one of those
rare characters who are equally capable
of everything -honournble, firm, enlightened, and conciliatory-he is miversally beloved. The remembrance
of his government, which even in 1845
the author found fresh in the memory
of the Kandaharians, and could well
appreciate, tells fnr more in favour of
the learned and celebrated decipherer
of the Cuneiform inscriptions than anything that can be said in commendation
of that officer's talents. The manner
in which he defended Kandahar against
the insurgents will give t h e reader only
a poor idea of the merit and courage of

this brilliant officer. He may justly be
classed amongst the great men that
have been distinguished in the service
of the East India Company, and it ia
impossible not to feel astonishment,
that after such a splendid defence of
the post entrlisted to his care, his
talents and fidelity should remain so
ill-remunerated by his government.
But, however that may be, such men
are always elevated above their fellow
men, and whether they are or are not
the objects of Government patronage,
the esteem and admiration of the world
are theira. - Ferrier.
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returned to the charge. When the insurrection broke out i n
Kabul the number of his adherents was considerably augmented,
and the serdars Seidal Khan, Mohamed Attah Khan, Saloo Khan,
Mir Efzel Khan, and others, with large contingents, then joined
him.
Seif der -Djing, the third son of Shah Shooja, who lived a t Kandahar, fled from the city to join the insurgents; both father and
son thus repaying their benefactors the English, to whom they
owed everything, with the blackest ingratitude.
Immediately the news of the rising a t Kabul reached Major
Rawlinson, he. secretly despatched messengers in every direction
to call in the scattered troops under the guns of the place.
H e likewise ordered the removal of all the provisions from the
different magazines to the citadel, in which he resided, and
these wise dispositions were completed before the report of the
revolt was known in the city. There were at this time in ICandahar and the suburbs, 4000 Afghan horse, in the pay of the state ;
these troops were the cause of the greatest uneasiness to Major
Raalinson, and, in consequence, he sent for Mirza Mohamed
Khan, Popolzye, the Vizier of Timoor Mirza,* and desired him
to say whether he was or was not true to the British cause? T o
this question he. replied in the affirmative, when hlajor Rawlinson desired him to give instant proof of his devotion by leaving
Eandahar with his cavalry, and attacking the Serdar Mohamed
Attah Khan, who was advancing on the city from Kabul a t the
head of the greater part of the insurgent horse. Mirza Mohamed,
having first received a large sum of money, a t once set out
with his division, but, instead of fighting, joined his force to that
of the rebel chief. On hearing of this piece of treachery, the
Resident adopted a measure most imperatively necessary to preserve the corps under General Nott from certain destruction, and
ordered the greater part of the inhabitants who were of Afghan
origin to leave the city in the shortest possible space of time,
permitting only a few to remain besides the Parsees and Hindoos.
A t Eandahar the English had nine incomplete battalions, two
batteries of artillery, and 9 few hundred Indian cavalry, but the
atter were outside the town and held the country under the com-

* The eldeet son of Shah Shooja and
Governor of Kandahar; but only nomi-

nally so, for the English had more
power here than at Kabul.-Ferrisr.

mand of Mr. Pattinson. During my residence a t Kandahar, 1
read a Persian account of the mournful event which led t,o the
death of that officer and one of his comrades named Golding.
T h e simplicity of the document tempted me to translate it in the
most literal manner, and I give the Persian text in order that
those readers who are able may judge of the correctness of my
translation.
Dou fooudj Djanbaz ez merdum
Afghan-farsi-Kabonli der Kandshar
boudend. Douta saheb meuseb inglich serkerde emin dou fooudj
djanbaz boud. Yeki ismech, Golding
boud yeki Wilson. Pattinson saheb
serlcerdi Kull, der tchader Goldiug
saheb boud. Biroun dervaze Herat
t c h d e r zede boudend. Emon cheb
k6 mi khastend s u b p i a h beurevend
der Guirichlc, fooudj Golding saheb
ril&t.end bala tchader. Er dou saheb
Khabidk. Boudend der tchader. Dest
bi: chemchir bala inha rilrhtend,
Golding saheb kachtend, Pattinson
saheb ez tchader biroun amed. Yozdeh
zakhrn chemchir dncht. Pelt noouker
ouchisr dacht ; asp hazer mi kouned,
ve khodech poucht saheb savar
micheved. Emon cheb onra avonrd
dsr Kandahar. B8 o n snheb d i v e r ,
Ire' TVilson saheb bached, khaberclar
micheved ; Khodechra be' tchader
saheb misresoned-mi
bined lshoun
busior r i b t e s t ve' saheban em nistend-mustereb biroun mi ayed ; mi
bined yek fooudj djanbaz &mmh
reftend. Mi ayed miyan fooudj khodech, migonyet : her guia'n chouma
em hemek beharam estid, mera beu
kuched, v B Irhod-tu beorevid ouha
der djavab mi gouyend : Ehouda nb
ltouned ! m a nemek b e haram nistim
- migouyed herguiah nemek b6
haram nistid ba men bi ayid, E.6
beurevim Choun be'raderan mara
higuirim. I n savar ez emin fooudj
aspha lrhodra zin mikouned, b8 kadr
sed savar emera on mi revend, dou
sed pindja savar ez rassal8h. Hindi,
alidja mejor Rawlinson, be Homalr
ou mi furusted, ve gafeul mi rizend
bala emon fooudj gurikht8. Fursed
tutyeng indsktk n$ boud, dest bB
chemchir gnti mi cheved, aliclja Wil-

Two squadrons of Afghan horse,
Djanbaz, composed of Yarsivans of
Kabul, were a t Kandahar with two
English officers, Messrs. Golding and
Wilson. Mr. Pattinson, who had
the chief command, was in the
tent of Mr. Golding, and the
squadrons mere encamped outside the
Herat gate. On the night preceding
the day on which they were to march
to Girishk the troopers of Mr. Golding's squadron ru~ihedinto the tent
in which these officers were asleep,
fell upon them sword in hand and
killed Mr. Golding. Mr. Pattinson,
who was mounded in eleven places,
having subsequently left the tent,
found his servant an intelligent, and
faithful man, with his horse ready ;
this man assisted him to mount, and
getting up behind him, he brought him
in to Kandahar the same night. Tho
news r e d i n g Mr. Wilson he immediately rode to the tent of these gentlemen, but found only the proof of the
marderons onslaught in their blood
on the ground. He withdrew from
the tent deeply moved, and finding
that their squadron of djnnbaz had deserted, he at once returned to his own
men and said, "If you are traitors
kill me and be off ;" but the troopers
replied, " God preserve us from being
any such thing." " Well then," said
their officer, " if you are not traitors
follow me and let us take'revenge for
the blood of our comrades which has
,heen shed." The men, about one
hundred in number, immediately
saddled their horses, and I~eforeleaving the ground two hundred and
fifty Indian cavalry, which had
been sent to his assistance hy Major
Rawlinson, joined Mr. Wilson, when
they a t once set off in pursuit of the
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son saheb chir del ewe1 savar bond,
mi ressed. Seta ez serkerdbh-buzurk-ra ba chemchir mi zened, kuchtb
chudk ez asp mi indazed eulm mi
dbd, ser .yelu-ra mi hourend :Kalender Khan ismech boud emin
fessad-ra ou Kerdeboud Bagui savar,
chikest khourdk, rouh b'e guriz mi
guzarend, aigaih ichan mi revend ta
busior ez ichan Kaltl ICerde vb euldjb
busior mi averend, bermigerdend ser
bourid k Kalender Khan-ra avourdend der Kandahar ; eukm Kerdend
IrB sB oh rouz der bazar avizou Ker?
dend. Djartchi Djar k6chid der bazarha ke' sezye k6si Ire' nemek be
barami mi kounend.
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deserters. I t was no affair for firearms, they came upon the rebels sword
in hand ; the very exalted Nr. Wilson,
the lion-hearted, was the first to close
with them, and killed three of the
principal chiefs with his own hand,
striking them off their horses. He
then ordered the head of one of them,
Kalender Khan, who had excited the
men to mutiny, to be cut off, and followed the rebel squadron, which had
fled in disorder. Be pursued them
until a great number were killed, and
they retumed to Kandabar laden with
their spoils, bringing back with them
the head of Kalender Khan ; this n7as
by order placed on a hook in the
bazaar to remain there three days,
and a crier stood near, who continmlly
announced to the passers by, " This
is the punishment of traitors."

Treachery was indeed the order of the day with the Afghans ;
and fanaticism, till then almost unknown to that people, was added
to it. Aroused by the mollahs, it excited every mind, for these
sanguinary ministers of Allah unceasingly repeated to the people
in their sermons and on all other occasions, the verse of the
Koran which says that to kill an infidel is an act pleasing to God,
and that every Ghazee .will, after his death, go to the Garden of
Paradise, and live in the midst of houris always young and
beautiful. I s it astonishing that such teaching should instigate
this barbarous people to indulge in the most deplorable excesses?
One example, from amongst a.thousand, will give an idea of the
state of public feeling at this time. An officer of the English
commissariat was making some purchases in the bazaar, when one
of these fanatics came up to him, and stabbed him in the abdomen
with his knife. H e was immediately arrested, bound, and brought
before Major Rawlinson, who asked him why he had committed
so vile an act ? " H e is mad," exclaimed a certain Mirzs Jan,
a servant of the English, who wished to save his life. "No,
no," replied the Afghan, eagerly, " I have all my senses about
me;" and, having heaped upon the Resident every opprobrious
epithet he could think of, added, " far from repenting of what
I have done, if I had my knife now, and my hands were freo,
I would do as much for you." The villain was subsequently
blown from a gun.
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But to return to my narrative. The Prince Seif der Djing,
Akter Khan, Mohamed Attah Khan, and other insurgent chiefs,
after having united their forces, advanced to within a short distance
of Kandahar on the 9th of January, 1842, just in time to give a
small body of six hundred men, commanded by General Nott, the
opportunity of beating them. They, however, were not demoralized
by this check, and persevered in trying to carry out their design of
taking the city ; but wisely judging that their numbers were
quite unequal to accomplish this object by force, they had recourse
to an artifice in which they very nearly succeeded. A body of
from eighteen to twenty thousand Ghazees attempted to ravage the
environs of Kandahar, when General Nott immediately took the
field to drive them back. H e had only eight incomplete battalions
with him, and a few horsemen; amongst these were a hundred
Beloochees, commanded by the same Aga Khan whom the English
sent into the south of Persia in 1841, and who, having failed in his
enterprise, undertaken for the purpose of raising an insurrection
there, joined them again. The Ghazees retired slowly on the
approach of General Nott, skirmishing all the way, to the mountainous district of Zemindavar, three days' journey from Kandahar,
whither the British troops had the imprudence to follow them.
When the insurgent commanders saw that they had succeeded in
dra&ng the enemy thus far from the city, they left a few cavally
in his front to occupy their attention, and rapidly returned with the
bulk of their troops to Kandahar, the garrison of which then consisted of only seven hundred sepoys and one hundred English
soldiers, with a single officer. On this occasion Major Rawlinson
showed as much intelligence as coolness and decision. H e placed
his men most judiciously, the Hid_oos on the walls, the few British
a t the gates; and with these dispositions once made waited the
arrival of the enemy in stern tranquillity.
Towards evening some Afghans appeared a t the Herat gate
mith mules laden mith firewood, brought, they asserted, for the
use of the town, and declaring themselves friends of the English. T h e sepoy sentry on the rampart, foolishly believing their
story, gave them permission to lie down within cannon-shot of
the place, which most imprudent conduct, as will be seen, nearly
led to the capture of the city. At two o'clock in the dark winter
morning, the faggots, which they had secretly piled against
the gates, were fired, and a detachment of the insurgent army
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rushed forward at a concerted signal and threw themselves into
the opening made by. the flames. They were received with a
sharp volley, which did not, however, prevent a few from penetrating to the centre of the city, where they were soon disposed of.
The combat, nevertheless, still raged with fury round the gate ; the
British artillery, ably served, mowed down whole ranks of Ghazees :
and so many Afghans fell there that, entirely obstructing the
entrance, the bodies formed a rampart for the besieged. Several
attacks which they made at other points were perfectly unsuccessful; and after six hours' hard fighting they retired, leaving
more than twelve hundred dead under the ramparts. Intelligence
of what was taking place was immediately sent to General Nott,
the rapidity of whose movements soon brought him back to Kandahar, near which the Afghans dared no longer remain, and
therefore turned their efforts against the little fortress of Girishk.
This had been confided to the charge of Mohamed Kooli Khan, a
son of the famous Vizier Fethi Khan, Mohamedzye, who had
attached himself to the British cause ;the young serdar was not to
be intimidated either by the threats or by the greatly superior force
which held him in a state of siege for many months, during which
lie made a heroic resistance, and a t the close remained master of
the place.
That the English maintained themselves in Kandahar through
the whole period of the troubles in Kabul was due, as I have already
remarked, to the talent and courage of Major Rawlinson, whose
measures enabled him to surmount the most serious difficulties; and
wait till the relieving army from India arrived to re-establish the
prestige of the Indo-British arms in that principality. This expedition obtained permission to pass through the dominions of the
Maharadjah of the Punjab, and crossed the Indus about the middle
of the summer of 1842. A s soon as information of this fact arrived
a t Kandahar, four battalions of the garrison and the Beloocli
cavalry, commanded by the brother of Aga Khan, escorted the
heavy baggage and guns to Shilrapoor, whence they proceeded to
India. The five remaining battalions of General Nott's division also
quitted the city on the 8th of August, 1842, but marched towards
Kabul, where they effected their junction with the corps d'arme'e
which had advanced from Peshawur at the. end of the same
month.
The Afghans, corhmanded by Mohamed Akbar Khan, left the
2 n 2
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capital to meet the English, and fell in with them at the village of
Bootkak, a distance of fourteen miles from Kabul. Khan Shireen
Khan, the Huzzilbash Serdar, had joined him, but after the exchange of a few shots he passed over to the English with the five
thousand horsemen who were under his orders.*
T h e battle of Bootkak, the brunt of which fell entirely upon the
light troops, lasted nearly five hours, when Mohamed Akbar Khan,
completely beaten, retired to the mountains and thence to Khulm.
H e had with him at this time a British officer, whom he had taken
prisoner in the beginning of the year, and he at &st thought of
putting him t o death, but the fear of reprisals which might be
taken on his family, still in India and in the power of the English,
suggested to him a nobler line of concluct, and after his flight to
Khulm he sent this officer to the British camp, escorted by two
Afghan horsemen; those who had been made prisoners on the
same occasion, both men, women, and children, having already
arrived there. Mohamed Akbar had removed them from Zindeh
on the 28th of May, in order that they mizht be the more closely
watched, for two chiefs had, it was said, offered the English to
raise two thousand men and deliver the prisoners. They were,
therefore, dispersed in various fortresses at about an hour's distance
from Kabul, near the river Logur, and at this time they were
better lodged and better fed. But when the British force approached, Akbar Khan, dreading that they might be carried off,
and that he should then lose the best ground for any stipulation
he could hope to make for his exiled family, sent them away on
the 29th of August towards Bamian, where they arrived on the
3rd of September, and met with far worse treatment than they had
.ever experienced.
After the battle of Bootkak, however, Khan Shireen Khan caused
search to be made for them by the I<uzzilbashes, who brought them
safely into camp at Kabul on the 21st September. H e had procured their liberty by his interposition with Mohamed Shah Khan,
to whom 20,000 rupees in cash and an annual pension of 2000
more were promised, but never paid.

* Khan Shireen Khan, the Serdar
Serdnrane of the Kuzzilbashes, has four
thonsand families under his command,
and is much looked up to and feared by
the Afghans. Six thousand more fami-

lies of this tribe are distributed amongst
different serdars, of whom Gholam
Hoosein Khau, Atchnr, renowned for
his courage, is one, and has authority
over one thousand families.-Perrier.
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The Indo-British army remained some days under the walls of
I h b u l before they entered the city, and it was not till the 9th
October that Sir R. Shakespear received orders to take in a company of sappers, five companies of Her Majesty's 26th and 33rd,
and five companies of the 31st, the Bengal light cavalry and the
3rd Irre,dar cavalry. As the inhabitants had fled at the approach
of the British troops, there was no one to fight: but this o5cer's
instructions were to destroy several parts of this fine city. On the
11th the destruction of the magnificent and glorious edifice of Ali
Murdane Khan, the great emporium of this part of Central Asia,
was effected, and soon after that of a mosque near the bazaars;
the bazaars themselves. and every quarter of the city, with the exception of the Bala EIissar and the houses of the Kuzzilbashes,
were treated in the same manner, and nothing was left but a mass
of ruins. After having destroyed the city, the army retired upon
Gundamuck, where they arrived almost without resistance on the
18th, having desolated the country, burnt the residences of the
native chiefs and the villages on their line of march. On the 21st
the 1st division, under General Pollock, arrived a t Jellalabad, and
was followed by that of General Nott, which reached it on the
24th. On the 25th October the engineers blew up the bastions
of Jellalabad, and all the houses were reduced to ashes-this was
the concluding operation of the retributary expedition, and the
force commenced its return to India inlmediately after.
I shall close this episode of the war in Kabul by a quotation
from the work of Lady gale, who was herself one of the prisoners,
and who thus speaks of their captivity while sojourning in the
mountain f~stnessesof the Khyber :-" A woman's vengeance is
said to be fearful; but nothing can satisfy mine a.gainst Akbar,
Sultan Jan, and Mohamed Shah Khan. Still I say that Akhar,
having for his own political purposes done as he said he would do
-that is, destroyed our army-letting only one man escape to tell
the tale, as Dr. Brydon did, and having got the families into his
possession-I say, having done this, he has ever .since we have
been in his hands treated us well-that is, honour has been
respected. I t is true that we have not common comforts ; but
what we denominate such are u~~knonrn
to Afghan females-they
always sleep on the floor, sit on the floor, &c. The wuzeer gives
us rations of meat, rice, ottah, ghee, and oil, and lately fruit.
A t first our food was dressed for us, but it was so greasy, and
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disgusting, that we asked leave to cook for ourselves. It is
true we have been taken about the country, exposed to heat,
cold, rain, kc. ; but so were their own women. He has given us
common coarse chintz and coarse long cloth, too, wherewith to
clothe ourselves ; but I do not hesitate to repeat that we have
always been as well treated as captives could have bcen in such a
country. But while rendering to Akbar Khan the justice that is
due to him, I shall never forget the injury he has done to England.
H a d our army been cut to pieces by an avowed enemy, whether in the
field or the passes, let them have used what stratagems they pleased,
all had been fair. Akbar had shone as another William Tell : he had
been the deliverer of his country from a hateful yoke imposed upon
them by Kaffirs; but here he stands by his own avowal, freely
made, the assassin of the envoy, not by proxy, but by his own hand.
H e treated with his enemies and betrayed them; he massacred
under his own eyes thousands of men and women dying of cold and
hunger, whom he had promised to feed and to defend; therefore
his name will be devoted to eternal opprobrium."
I have examined most of the journals and reviews of the time,
in which the British occupation of Afghanistan was discussed,
and found that all loudly declaimed against the second expedition
to Kabul-those of London as well as Paris, and especially the
English opposition press. But why so much heat ? so much party
spirit ? mhy distort facts or exaggerate them ? It is certain that
faults were committed, and that bloody catastrophes, even excesses
according to our ideas, were the consequtnces of that expedition ;
but such invectives will not repair them. Let us state them with
the calmness and dignity of civilized people, instead of becoming
barbarous ourselves in defending barbarians. I n the course of this
narrative blame has been awarded wherever it was justly due, and
impartiality renders it equally a duty to correct the overcharged
statements of the events and circumstances that are said to have
occurred in the second invasion of Kabul. The article in the
Journal des D&bds of January 8, 1848, though written with a
certain degree of asperity, is on the whole the most moderate that
up to that time had appeared on the subject in France, and this
induces me to insert it here, adding a few remarks of my own :" The principal fact that we find in the Monthly &'ail from India,
which brings us intelligence from Bombay up to the 1st December,
1842, is the final evacuation of Afghanistan.
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" Early in November the Indo-British army of the Indus was concentrated at Peshawur, in the kingdom of Lahore, prepared to return
within the boundaries of British India, where it was expected the
last brigade would arrive between the 20th and 25th December.
"The events by which this evacuation will ever be remembered
are deplorable. In truth, if we wished to take our revenge for the
declamations of Lord Palmerston-if we wished to fling back upon
England all the accusations unceasingly made by her press against
our generals and the system of warfare which they have been forced
to adopt in Algiers-the task would be easy, indeed more than
easy. The retreat of General Pollock's force was marked by barbarities as odious as useless : every man who fell into the hands of
the troops was put to death; and it was not the Afghans who set
the example of this cruelty, for they had returned safe and sound
the prisoners of 1841.*
"Three towns, one of which contains, or did contain, 60,000 inhabitants, have been reduced to shes, and why? for what end ?
For the fruitless pleasure of satisfying the least honourable passion
of our nature, the passion of revenge.
'' I t was not thus that our soldiers and generds behaved in
Mica. If the barbarism of our enemies, who knew not, like the
Afghans, what it is to make prisoners-if the hard necessities of
war forced our generals to adopt measures of extreme severitythey are, a t least, in pursuit of a definitive object-positive, honourable, glorious. In those severities the ministers of France may, at
least, find consolation in the hopes of a brighter future ; they have
the right to believe that they will some day rescue that colony from
its barbarous condition. The ever increasing sacrifices made by
France stand as proofs to the world that it is a real and serious
undertaking, in which the country looks for better things than the
gratification of brutal passions ; but in ordering these burnings and
massacres, what object could that general possibly have who was
immediately to evacuate Afghanistan for ever?
" ' Istalif,' says the letter of an English officer, 'is a pretty little
* But were they not the same Afgham who, in defiance of a capitulation, agreed t o by themselves and their
chiefs, to allow the British army to
make good its retreat, masacred that
army t o the very last man? The Eng-

lish prisoners were returned, it is true;
but would that have been the case if
Dost Xohamed had not been the prisoner of Lhe East India Company 2Fet-riw.
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town of 15,000 * inhabitants, against whom we had nothing to say
unless that their town stood half way between Kabul and Charikar, where one of our Goorkha regiments (irregular cavalry) t was
destroyed the year before by the Afghans.' As, then, they were
pressed for time and could not push on to Charikar, Istalif was
punished. A brigade, under the orders of General MM'Caskill,
entered it early in September, after a trifling engagement, and
proceeded to put to the sword every one who had not succeeded in
making his escape. I t appears that even the dead and wounded were
not respected. The sepoy soldiers, in the excess of their unmitigable cruelty, set fire to the cotton clothing of their victims, and
thus burned the dead and dying, which would, according to their .
superstitious notions, call down a curse on the descendants of those
whose remains were thus disposed of without the honours of sepulture. After the slaughter six hundred women remained in the
hands of the victors, who set them a t liberty. Were they respected,
as had been the European ladies who fell into the power of the
Afghans after the disasters at Kabul the winter before 'l' I t does
not seem that the soldiers saw their prisoners taken from them
with much satisfaction.
"Two soldiers of the 9th infantry of the Royal army had at the
same moment seized a pretty girl of fourteen years of age, and, not
wishing to fight for the possession of the prize, they agreed to decide it with the dice,-with this condition, that the winner should
make her an honest woman and marry her the first time he should
meet with a priest to bless their union. The dice thrown, the successful player was walking off with the bride elect on his arm, when
he received an order to set her at liberty. I n vain he entreated
and asserted his good intentions; he was obliged to give her up,
and it was not without regret.
" A captain of the 26th, having selected one from amongst a
group of distracted beauties, ~ u r c h a e dfor his sultana a magnificent trousseau of the embroidered vests and trousers worn by
Afghan women of rank, which after the sack of the town were sold
for next to nothing ; but scarcely had he time to present them to
the lady, when the order arrived to set her free : she did not require
to be told twice, but fled as fast as her legs would carry her.

*
t

At the outside 4000.-Pem'er.
Infantry -admirable
troops, re-

cruited in the hill country at the base
of the Himalaya.-Translator.
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' Ah,' said the captain, as she disappeared ; ' if I had known all
the ingratitude of the female heart, they would never have caught
me buying these garments.'
" ARer being regularly pillaged, Istalif was given up to the
flames, and the brigade of General M'Caskill returned to Kabul,
where another tragedy was to be performed.
"The work of destruction there was accomplished with a refinement of systematic barbarity and cunning which it is difficult
to believe. Arriving under the walls of the capital on the 15th of
September, the English found it deserted ; for the examples they
had already made put the whole population to flight. Occupied
entirely with the recovery of the English prisoners, General
Pollock had never manifested any evil intention against the city ;
the army was encamped outside, guards were placed at the gates,
and the soldiers forbidden to pass them : it might have been supposed that it was a friendly army, .an army of pious devotees, for
the Rev. Mr. Allen took advantage of the inactivity of the troops
during these few days of rest to preach several sermons upon the
mercy of God, who had permitted the return of their captive
comrades. The event was celebrated by a solemn service, at which
all the troops attended, and men selected from the 13th light
infantry sang the Psalms. The strict discipline of the army, and
these religious exercises, restored in some degree the confidence of
the wretched inhabitants, and a great many ventured to return to
their houses. I t was then, that is to say on the 9th of October,
that General Pollock ordered Colonel Richmond Shakespear to
enter Kabul with his brigade, and, with the exception of the Bala
Hissar, and the quarter inhabited by the I<uzzilbashes,* who had
always been friendly to the English, to destroy the city and give it
up to the flames.
A t Jelldabad the same scenes were enacted, and it isperhaps
still more difficult to understand why that place was treated with
such severity. When, in the November of 1841, General Sale,
harassed by the Ghildjzyes, and almost overcome by numbers, presented himself at the gates, the inhabitants opened them to him
without resistance. He had brought with him only two days' provisions, but they supplied him as well as they were able-moreover,
* These Ruzdlbashes me the same
people that Lord Auckland accused of
being hostile to the British, and in

favouring whom he considered Dost
Mohamed guilty of a crime. See his
Lordship's Sinla, manifesto.-Eemkr.

on credit. When he afterwards saw that he could not be relieved
before the spring and must therefore pass the winter in the t o m ,
and found that, to avoid being destroyed with his small garrison
by famine, he was compelled to drive out the inhabitants, they left
their homes without a murmur, and their provisions in them. Why
then was this town so completely destroyed and burnt ?"
" Here then are 100,000 people whose houses have be'en burnt
just a t the commencement of winter, and in a country too where that
season is almost as severe as in Russia. Frightful as all this is, the
most odious feature in these cruel transactions is that, in conducting
the war as they have done upon the inhabitants of the towns only,
the English have punished the inoffensive part of the population,
and not the tribes who in 1841 destroyed the army of General
Elphinstone. I n Afghanistan, as in Algeria, the warlike tribes
wander about with their flocks ; the towns are inhabited only by
Jews, Armenians, Hindoos, Cashmeerians, Tajiks, slaves, merchants,
workpeople, handicraftsmen, that is to say, by strangers, who by
nature and interest are peaceable, and who have never been known
to have a musket in their hands.?
" I n all the w a s of which this unhappy country has been so long
the theatre, these are the people who have to bear the brunt of
British vengeance : it is unworthy of the nation. A s they had determined that revenge they would have, those who should have
been pursued were the Ghildjzyes, the Afreedees, the Chinnarees,
the Mohmunds, the Othman-Kails-all those, in fact, whom General
Pollock took care not to seek in their mountain fastnesses, and
instead wreaked his vengeance upon the citizens. In a word,
General Pollock has done that which a French General would
do, who, having to punish a revolt of the Flittas or Beni-amers, in
Algeria, should burn Mostaganem or Blascara ; he has committed
barbarities without excuse.$
" Nevertheless it should be said that public opinion in India has

* The necessities of war are inexorable ; m d withhis knowledge of the
Afghan character, General Sale only
did what the dictatetea of prudence cornmanded for the safety of the troops
undorhis orders. After all, it wu only
what Davoust clid in defending Hamburg, and what m y other general in
the same position would have done.Brricr.

t

Utterly erroneous: the inhabitants

of Kabul were as warlike as the nomades, and in the whole principality
there are not six Jews or Armenians.Fmier.
$ The case is quite otherwise, for
the townspeople in Afghanistan are, as
we have already said, quite as warlike
as those of the country, and are more
dangerous and ferocious in a revolt.Fmie~...
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already raised its voice against these ignoble and atrocious excesses,
neither do we doubt that in England indignation will be felt by
every generous heart. However, the Governor-General, Lord
Ellenborough, is preparing a magnificent reception at Ferozepore
for the victorious army of Afghanistan. Invitations have been sent
to all the native princes to attend the military f&tes, which will, it
is said, eclipse the splendour of the courts of the ancient Mogul
Emperors ; a magnificent triumphal arch is now in course of construction, through which the army of the Indus is to defile, followed
by, as trophies of its victories, the gates of the tomb of Mahmood
the ~haznevide,that were captured at Ghuznee, and the twentyfour pieces of cannon taken in 1839 from Dost Mohamed. This
last detail is not the least curious part of the ceremony, for it is
well known that the English army returned from Afghanistan
having lost its own artillery there ; the guns were either taken by
the Afghans or destroyed by order of the British Generals, who
had no means of transport for them."
" Dost Mohamed and his family, and all the Afghans now
prisoners in India, will be present a t these Gtes, after which the
Governor-General will allow them to return as they may think fit
to their own country.
"The government of British India will then believe itself free ,
of all obligation to Afghanistan : it introduced disorder and made
war there for three years, and left anarchy which may last for
ages."t
The Afghans, from whom I sought to procure evidence by
which to test the truth of all the facts that have been related
respecting the English occupation of Afghanistan, unfortunately
confirmed them, but with various modifications, which considerably
lessen the gravity of some of them. They affirm that, in spite of
the cruelties and excesses of which, in 1841, they were guilty to
the English, the latter showed themselves more humane than could
have been expected, and that it was just, because they knew they
deserved the utmost punishment that could be inflicted upon them ;

* All this display was indeed misplaced ; i t was sdiciently painful to
be reduced to the hard necessity of so
severely punishing the Afghans, without
adding the mockery of a triumph which
could not exist, as there had been
little or no fighting. But the procession was intended to make an impres-

sion on the Sikhs, the natives of India,
and doubtful alliea, and that must have
been quite as muchLord Ellenborough's
object as the gratiiication of a puerile

-Ferriev.
Terrier.

is is true, perfectly true. -
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that they abandoned the capital, where the houses were not burnt
any more than at Istalif, for the simple reason that, being built
of earth, they are not combustible. But it is true t,hat the bazaars
at Kabul, which were considered the finest in Afghanistan, were
mined and destroyed, as well as some of the adjacent houses. I t
is therefore untrue, as stated by the Journal des De'bats, that
100,000 persons were left without shelter.
I t is also untrue that the Afghan towns are inhabited by inoffensive people ; at Kabul the Jews are not tolerated, and at the outside
there are not more than two or three Armenian families there.
The mass of the population is of Afghan origin ; and whatever be
the occupation of an individual of that nation, he is above all
things warlike, turbulent, a lover of pillage, murder, and devastation. Proof of this might be found in a thousand instances, but
I name but one, the death of the unfortunate Burnes, who was
attacked in his house by these same shopkeepers who are depicted
as such peaceable people. As I have said before, it was these
shopkeeper or merchant soldiers" and other Ghazees, who especially
outraged the English, and who therefore, on their second arrival,
deserted their homes to take shelter in Istalif, a small fortress
which they thought was impregnable, but from which they were
driven after only six hours' fighting. The population of that town
is 3000 or 3500 souls; and if it held 15,000 when the English
attacked it, it is to the emigration from Kabul that the augmentation must be ascribed. The fugitives proceeded to this little town
with their families and baggage, believing they would be safe from
any hostile attempt; the English soon undeceived them, and many
suffered the fortune of war ; but the Afghans do not estimate
their loss, both at Istalif and Kabul, higher than four hundred and
fifty men.
As to the sack of Jellalabad, the history of that episode has also
been exaggerated. The fortifications that General Sale threw up
for his own defence were demolished in order that the Afghans might
not benefit by them, and the adjacent houses fell with them. But
the greatest misconception that exists on the subject is to attribute
generosity of feeling to Akbar Khan, because he took the English
ladies under his protection and preserved them from outrage.

* In Afghanistan the soldiers are not
formed into. regiments, they a e an
undisciplined militia; each man lives in

his family, and there are sometimes
several thousands of them in a town.Terrier.
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I t has been ascertained by the author, in a manner which admits
of no doubt, that, although they were respected, that fact in no way
redounds to the credit of Dost Mohamed's son, for he had more
than once in his own mind divided them amongst the harems of
some young serdars, his debauched companions. For himself he
had reserved the daughter of General Sale, and his confidential
conversations with others were frequently enlivened by the prospect
of this distribution. One night in particular, after a series of
orgies, these ladies were in the most imminent danger, and it was
averted only by a riot in Kabul which suddenly called Mohamed
Akbar to the scene of action. When, however, this chief was not
excited by wine, he allowed but little to be said on the subject,
because he remembered that his father was in the power of the
British, and he dreaded how far the Dost and the females of his
family wo~ddbe made to suffer if he carried out his brutal intentions. The English might have been reassured as to the fate of the
captives in Afghanistan, for the same reasons that caused Akbar
to respect them ; and when they undertook the second expedition
to that country, it was not because it was impossible to deliver
them otherwise, for they could have exchanged the Dost and his
wives and children for them, but they were determined to prove to
the Afghans that the disasters they had suffered in 1841 were not
of a nature to damage their power, and that they were perfectly
able to take and occupy their country whenever it might please
them to do so. So convinced of that fact were the Afghans themselves, that they laid down their arms immediately after the battle
of Bootkak, and the British might again have held Kabul by
adopting wiser and more politic measures than they did after the
first invasion.
But they did not hold it, and were certainly right; for if this
possession had not proved a dead weight upon their treasury, it
certainly would not have enriched it. I t could be of no use to
them, excepting as an advanced post against the ambitious schemes
of Russia ; but until the Caucasus is completely subjugated, it is
unlikely that power should undertake any enterprise in earnest in
Central Asia, and from this time till then Iiabul may be left to
itself.* After having sought, and with great care, every species of
information connectect with the second expedition to Kabul, I a m

* Since the English conquered the
upper part of the Indus they have
commanded nll the countries on the

right bank of that river east of Kabul,
and could take Afghanistan in leas than
:L month.-Arrier.
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convinced that I have obtained proof that the actions attributed to
the English, and which are to be regretted, took place, but have
been g~osslyexaggerated in their consequences. For the rest,
having stated the pro and con, each reader must form his own
judgment. I t will be most difficult to bring those who know the
character and policy of the Afghans to believe that an Indo-British
army could follow the one that had been exterminated in that
country, and be indifferent or forgetful of the cruelties that the
victims who preceded them had suffered. One would have a relation, another a friend, to avenge; and then the Indian soldiers,
with their religious ideas, view these things so differently from
Europeans, that I believe it would be impossible for their comm a ~ ~ d etor sstop the fearful deeds suggested by their love of revenge,
or rather that feeling which they believe to be their duty.
1am far from constituting myself the apologist of these severities ;
. but I have seen war in Asia and in Africa, and know, unhappily
by experience, that. it is impossible to conduct it as in Europe, where,
in the majority of states, the rights of individuals are respected.
I n vain may we declaim against bloodshed ; we shall never be able
to convert the battle-field into a drawing-room, where all parties
are bent upon the interchange of civilities. When I hear it said,
a how many thousands of Circassians the Russian soldiers have
slain," or " the French have bathed in the blood of the Arabs !" or
" the English have sacrificed myriads of Hindoos to their cupidity ;"
when I hear it said that the troops of these nations " are the scum
of the earth-wretches
who have outraged all laws, human and
divine," I cannot refrain from cursing the people who say somen, or rather not men, who possess the miserable courage to speak
in favour of barbarians, while they can find only an accusing voice
when they speak of the soldiers of their country. Unhappy madmen that ye are ! do ye not know that such enemies take your
clemency for weakness, your forbearance for fear ?-that they have
no gratitude but to the God of Islam, who withholds the infidel
arm that would have killed them-that their religion enjoins them
to massacre without pity or remorse?
T h e remedy lies precisely in that in which you see the evil. W a r
has its severities, and they are great, therefore it ought not to be
undertaken but for sound and legitimate reasons ; that is saying
enough, and I have not failed to admit that I never approved the
one undertaken by the English against the Afghans. But the acts
of a government are not to be confounded with those of its soldiers :

'
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to the former all reprobation-to the latter, for their many sufferings and hardships, a few encouraging words is no more than their
due. It is easy to forget them in the lazy tranquillity of the closet
-it is easy to judge of facts, and in a very humane point of view,
when sitting by the fire in a well-stuffed easy chair; but those who
endure the misery-who, as the reward of mercy shown in the heat
of battle, receive a sword-thrust or a bullet in the breast-who have
submitted to tortures worse a hundred times than death, and who
then see themselves calumniated and slandered by those who ought,
on the contrary, to have exalted their deeds-,&
them what they
think of your system ? Ask the many English, French, and
Russian generals, wearied to death with warring against Mussulmans, or consult the writings of others, and they will tell you what
is the fruit of your imprudent comments. You destroy the energy
of national spirit, and set bounds to nothing but the prosperity
of your country; had I any authority over you, you wretched
scribblers, I would order you no other punishment than to practise
the generosity that you preach with so much volubility. Go, bear
the musket for a couple of years only in Algeria, at Tiflis, or Calcutta, and when you return let us resume the conversation.
I n assigning to the English expedition of 1842 'the probable
object of re-establiihing the reputation of the Indo-British arms in
Afghanistan, I have not pretended to justify it ; but if the government of Calcutta had other and more positive reasons for launching
into such an increase of expenditure, the public had on its side a
right to be surprised at the precipitate return of that army without
having effected more than the death of a few hundred men, and the
destruction of a bazaar and a few houses. This leaves ground for
the supposition that they never knew too well why they went to
Kabul, or why they came lack, and induced one writer to say that
" the E n g l i i retired from Kabul with a precipitation resembling
the retreat of a beaten army as much as t-he march of a victorious
one." Neither can it be believed that t.hey went simply with the
intention of reestablishing the legitimate dynasty ; but, if such was
their intention, then it can only be said that they were not more
fortunate in the second expedition than in the first.
Before the English left Kabul they pressed Fethi Djing Mirza to
re-assume the regal authority, hoping that, with his own troops and
their moral support, he might maintain himself in power after their
return to India. But that prince was not dazzled by the splendid
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illusion ; he knew full well that, as soon as his nominal protectors
had departed, he should have Akbar Khan upon his hands, and,
being determined not to expose himself to the danger of a repetition of the treatment that he had received from that Serdar, he
declined the offer. I t was, however, accepted by his young brother,
Shapoor Mirza, who was very soon destined to see the entire
destruction of the ambitious hopes in which his inexperienced miud
had indulged. His elder brother's anticipations were realised ; for
scarcely was the last detachment of the British army out of sight
and across the Indus, when Mohamed Akbar reappeared a t Kabul,
attacked and beat the Mirza, carried off his riches, and obliged
him to take to flight. T o the English it was now indifferent
whether he held his ground or not; they had found out though
late that Burnes was right in rejecting the idea of restoring the
Suddozyes to the prejudice of the Mohamedzyes; and the proof
of this assertion is that Dost Mohamed arrived on the 19th
December a t Shikapoor, accompanied by Captain Nicholson, who
was attached to his escort, and was some days after forbally set a t
liberty. Free to go where he liked or to do what he pleased,
the Emir hesitated not a moment, but instantly took the road to
Afghanistan. On his arrival at Lahore he was received with great
state by Shere Sing, then Maharadjah of the Punjab, and the
English conjectured that these princes made a secret treaty;
but this was only one of the grievances of which they always
assume the existence when they wish to obtain possession of a
country. T h e fact was, the Directors were so astounded at the
deficit in their treasury caused by the Afghan war, that they did
not know what to be about, and were highly indignant at the
brilliant reception given to the Emir of Kabul by the sovereign of
the Sikhs.
During the time that the Dost was whiling away precious hours
in the enjoyment of the pleasures of the court of Lahore, his son
Mohamed Akbar Khan had infinite trouble in managing the
various parties that had been formed in Kabul, which, t,hough at
first subdued, were now becoming rampant.
Shooja ed Dooulet (the murderer of Shah Shooja), son of Zeman
Khan, and Chems Eddin his cousin, both nephews of Dost Mohamed, succeeded in reconstituting the party of Zeman Khan, and
forced Akbar Khan to retire into the citadel, where they besieged
him for seventy-three days. Intelligence of this fact and his cri-
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tical position reached the Dost at Lahore, who, being unable himself to go with sufficient rapidity to Kabul, sent his four sons,
Mohamed Efzel Khan, Mohamed Akrem' Khan, Mohamed Azim
Khan, and Goulam Haidar Khan, to the assistance of their beleaguered brother. Furnished with a firman from the Maharadjah,
and with one attendant only, the ssrdars s e t out inimediat.ely,
changed their horses a t every village, and, pursuing their anxious
journey night and day, scarce drew bridle till they reached
Kabul, accomplishing the distance in ten days from Lahore. T h e
great exertions of the princes were indeed all important to the
cause, for when they arrived Mohamed Akbar was at bay in the
citadel with only two days' provisions. These four young men had
been ,brought up in Kabul, and were beloved by the inhabitants,
who had had many opportunities. of witnessing their youthful
courage, and their appearance at once caused a diversion in
favour of their brother, who eventually triumphed over his enemies. The return of the Emir himself, which took place very
shortly after, put an end to all further contest; and on remounting the throne, from which he had been t.hree years
banished, he at once applied himself to the task of effacing the
sad traces of the anarchy brought into his dominions by the English invasion.
A t Kandahar, which was also abandoned, General Nott and
Major Rawlinson tried to induce Timoor Mirza, the eldest son of
Shah Shooja, to remain at the head of affairs in that principality.
But the prince coveted not the cares of a throne. Satisfied that the
royal honours of ~ f ~ h a n i s t awere
n lost for ever to the Suddozyee,
he thought that dynasty ought to give way to the Mohamedz'yes,
and refused the offer, preferring to return to India, where he hoped
to live a life of tranquillity, much more in accordance with his own
tastes. Upon his declining, the English proposed to his brother
Seif der Djing that he should assume the government. T h e
reader will remember that this prince had formerly betrayed
them, and made common cause with the insurgents, but his union
with the latter was not of 1ong.duration; the death of his father
completely destroyed it, and he made his submission to and rejoined
those whom he had. previously abandoned. The Serdar Mohamed
Kooli Khan, son of the vizier Fethi Khan, was given him for a
minister, and by thus dividing the power between a Mohamedzye
who had always been faithful, to them, and a Suddozye who had
2 c
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deserted them, though he became more firmly attached to them
afterwards-balancing
one against the other-the English hoped
to retain their influence in this important city. But the plan
proved only one more illusion to be added to those by which they
had been so often misled, for, about four months after they left
Seif der Djing to his own resources, Kohendil Khan returned
from Persia and manifested his intention of regaining if possible
his principality of Kandahar. For some little time he remained
on the banks of the Helmund, where he was joined by the Serdars
Akter Khan, Ser Firaz Khan, Shah Pecend Khan, and others ;
and, when he saw himself in sufficient force, he marched upon his old
capital to dispossess Seif der Djing. ,4s to Mohamed Kooli Khan,
he a t once abandoned the prince, and passed over to the camp of
his uncle. Nevertheless, Seif der Djing did not allow himself to
be discouraged by the defection of his minister, and gave battle to
Kohendil Khan at Haooz Singsar, twenty-eight miles west of the
city ; but a t the very first charge he saw one-half of his army run
away, and the other fraternise with his enemy. Kohendil Khan
took immediate possession of the capital, amid the acclamations of
the inhabitants, who had not, however, the happiest reminiscences
of his previous administration, and the serdar possibly mistook
the cause of these congratulations ; they were-not for him, but for
the success of the principle represented in his person-the choice
of the masses, to the exclusion of divine right-the one representing
Afghan liberty, the other English domination.
Seif der Djing after his discomfiture was unable to reach and
defend Kandahar, and obliged to turn off the road : it was not
without di5culty and danger that he gained Shikapoor. Thence
he went on to India, whither his brothers had preceded him.
T h e battle of Haooz Singsar was the last episode connected
with the British occupation of Afghanistan, whither the East India
Company had sent its army to die and its treasure to vanish !
'' Such was the conclusion," says an intelligent and clever author,
" of this war, and of the policy of Lord Palmerston, vacillating at
first, violent a t the close. Rather than keep the grand and
straightforward path in which states of the highest order should
proudly and gracefully tread, in which they can honourably meet
and encounter each other-rather
than meet the Russians face to
face-he preferred disputing with then1 on distant ground and by
paltry counter-manmuvres, a policy which could only engulf his
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fortunes, for that was really the finale of the negotiations
of which we have gven an epitome, and which terminated the sad
series of reserve, duplicity, shuffling, and circumspection towards
Russia. I n this it all ended. The first consequence of his Lordship's policy in Asia was the expedition of Lord Auckland, the
second the massacre of the British army by the Afghans, the third
reprisals upon the Afghans, and, lastly, the absurd triumph of
Lord Ellenborough at Ferozepore. God preserve England from
any more such ; God preserve her ! But it is not the less true
that, having exasperated the political animosities and roused the
religious fanaticism of Central Asia under the pretence of adding
to the terror of her name, she has reduced it everywhere-she
has extinguished the hatred of the Russian name that formerly
existed-she has destroyed the respect for her own strength, and
spread the fear of that power which she dared not to attack but
in an indirect manner-she has herself been- the pioneer of a
Muscovite invasion."
Without adopting the deductions of the writer I have just
quoted, it may be stated, and without fear of contradiction, that
previously to their ill-starred expedition to Kabul the English
never met with anything but sympathy in Afghanistan ; opinion is
now much divided about them, and the majority of the chiefs are
hostile to them. The feeling in favour of them is rather to be
found amongst the people, who, with due allowance for their
fanaticism, have not forgotten the equitable administration of the
invaders, and still regret that it was not continued by their own
Afghan rulers. In any c&e England must nob be convinced
of the soundness of the advice given by Sir Alexander Burnes.
His antagonists were Sir C. Wade, Sir W. M'Naghten, and Sir
J. M'Neil, and their policy was accepted by Lord Auckland.
IJpon these four individuals may England charge the responsibiIity
of her disasters ; and upon Burnes did their evil counsel bring the
penalty of death: unhappily the survivors cannot replace to their
country the loss it sustained in his death and in that of so many
other officers-men possessing scientific acquirement, indomitable
courage, aud a hopeful future.
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C H A P T E R XXVI.
State of. Kabul after the return of Dost Mohamed- Antagonistic feeling between
the Emir and his son Akbar Khan -Ambitious projects of the latter- War
between the Dost and the Walee of Khulm -Reasons for this rupture -Akbar
Khan wishes to dispossess Kohendil Khan of Kandahar -Also t o join the Sikhs
against the English-His rupture with the Dost - Marriage of Akbar with the
daughter of P a r Mohamed Khan-Intrigues of Kohendil Khan to prevent this
union -Demonstration of Akbar Khan against Kandahar - He requests the
assistance of the Shah of Persia - ~avourablereply of that aovereign-Akbar
obliges his father t o withdraw from the direction of aEairs- Death of' Akbar
Khan- Revolt of Nohamed Shah Khan -Dost Mohamed forces him to rehu-n
-to his duty -Alliance between Persia andKabul The English are alarmed Embarrassment of the Emir-Sultan Mohamed Khan returns to KabulReception by the Dost- The Emir appoints his sou Haidar Khan vizier- The
Dost joins the Sikhs against the English-Antipathy of the Afghans to the
Sikhs, and vice versd-Doat Mohamed takes Attock- His cavalry is defeated by
the English - Owes his escape to the fleetness of his horse.
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IF absolute calm was not the immediate consequence of the return
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of Dost Mohamed to his dominions, it a t least produced a suspension of hostilities amongst the various parties in the state. T h e
majority of his countrymeu rallied round him, but still it was found
impossible to re-establish the same governmental unity that had
existed before the English invasion ; the serdars, especially those
belonging to the Ghildjzye tribe, rendered an obedience far less
implicit than before, and, though always commanding the respect
of his people, the Dost found that he had lost much of that
veneration of which he had formerly been the object. This was
a consequence of his residence in India: in the eyes of the
Afghans he had contracted a kind of pollution from which he
could never purify himself ; they could not forgive him for
having appreciated British civilization, and looked upon his efforts
for their improvement alnlost in the light of a crime.
Akbar Khan, the heir-presumptive of his power, was far from
approving of the new policy. Strongly imbued with the same
prejudices as the mass of the Afghans, he detested the English,
',. though he was fully sensible of their superiority in the arts of war
and government. After he had entrapped a r ~ dmurdered Sir TV.
M'Naghten he felt persuaded that the blood he had shed must be
and that his enemies could not without disredeemed by his 06,

,

CHAP. S S V I .

AMBITIOUS PROJECTS OF AJKBAR KHAN.

389

honour abstain from taking revenge upon him for that detestable
crime ; thus circumstances quite as much as his own desire threw
him into a line of conduct different from that of his father, and he
persevered in his opposition the more tenaciously inasmuch as it
was in unison with the opinions of the greater number of his
countrymen, who lavished upon him much of the affection that had
hitherto been bestowed upon the Emir.
Mohamed Akbar vowed therefore an implacable hatred against
the English, and the tenacity of his opposition to them, in despite
of all his father's remonstrances, denoted his firm determination
not to rest until he had given them a check sufficiently important
to disgust them for ever with the idea of attempting further conquests in the north of Asia. H e commenced his preparations by
inflaming the minds of his soldiers with the wi!dest and most
seductive promises, while his father spared no pains in endeavouring to calm his imprudent ardour and that of his adherents, to
extinguish the feuds of the various parties in the principality, and
to re-establish security in the hope of giving a salutary impulse to
the interests of commerce and agriculture. But Mohamed Akbar,
who saw everything through the prism of his own fanatical feelings,
and was dazzled with the enthusiasm that his success and constant opposition to the English had excited in the minds of the
Afghans, ruined, by the support that he gave to his own turbulent
followers, the wise and ,beneficial measures concerted by his father
for the improvement, independence, and prosperity of his dominions.
The post of vizier which had been conferred upon Mohamed Akbar
by Fethi Djing, and in which his father so imprudently retained
him, g w e him great influence in the affairs of government, and he
used this in a manner very detrimental to their future prospects.
H e indulged in dreams of re-establishing the Afghan kingdom in
the plenitude of its ancient glory and power, and obtaining possession of the other Afghan principalities, the Usbek Khanats, the
Punjab, and Beloochistan ;even these would not satisfy his ambition,
and British India was in his eyes a prize on which he imagined
that he should be able some day to lay his hands. Little could
be urged against those day dreams if he had intended to carry
them out in the spirit of ameliorating the condition of the nations
whom he intended to subjugate ; but a s he would only have renewed
the bloody episodes that have rendered mournfully celebrated the
reigns of Ghengis Khan and Tamerlane, much cause is there fay
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rejoicing that the Emir opposed, with unshaken firmness and a
sincere desire for peace, these warlike and unreflecting manifestations of Akbar Khan.
The disorganization of the Sikhs and the inroads of the British
on their territory were the occasions of the first serious outbreak
between the father and son; for the latter, seeing that Dost Mohamed opposed his marching to the assistance of his neighbours,
and was unalterably determined not to take the initiative in any
act of aggression which could again bring the English upon him,
was a t one moment on the point of breaking with his father completely. H e was a t this time about to marry the daughter of Yar
Mohamed Khan, and endeavoured to interest the vizier in his
schemes, informing him that he had decided on withdrawing for a
time from Kabul, and requesting he would assign him a district in
his dominions where he could establish himself with those Afghans
who were attached to him and intended to follow hi's fortunes. But
Yar Nohamed saw many objections to complying with this demand
; he interfered only so far as to induce the Dost to endea\.
vour to calm the excitability of his son, and the difficul'ty was
overcome by a concession on the part of the Dost, who promised to send five hundred Afghan horse to his brother and'
former enemy, Sultan Mohamed Khan. This serdar was serving
with the Sikhs, for he had been invested with the government of
Rotas, after Runjeet Sing seized Peshawur ; and as Nawab Djabbar
Khan, also a brother of the Emir, was suspected of having preserved some sympathy for the English, Mohamed Akbar sought
to compromise him in their eyes by intrusting to his son, Abdul
Ghyaz Khan, the command of these five hundred cavalry. Rut
this demonstration against the Anglo-Indian government was not
su5cient to satisfy Akbar Khan ; he wanted his uncle Rohendil
Khan to join him, and on his refusal threatened to invade his
territory. H e would probably have carried this threat into execution,
but for an unforeseen event of which it is supposed the Dost was
not altogether ignorant; his son desired war a t all risks, and in
this wish he contrived to indulge him in the following manner :Dost Moharned had not forgotten the ill-treatment he and his
family had received from the Emir of Bokhara, and manifested a
desire of taking revenge by proclaiming war against him. He
also wished to occupy Balkh, then governed by Ichane Suddoor,
under the suzerainty of Nasser Ullah, but to reach that town it
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was necessary to traverse the territory of Khulm, and the Walee
of that principaliCy positively refused to allow the Afghans to
pass through it, well knowing what would be the result if he
consented. "If you have any complaint against the Emir of
Bokhara," he wrote to the Dost, " I will espouse your quarrel and
fight him myself, but if you violate my territory I will join him
against you."
T h e negotiations stood thus, and Dost Mohamed, who remembered the Walee's kindness to him, was on the eve of withdrawing his proposition, when Akbar Khan, who also ought to have
been grateful for the generous conduct of the Walee to himself,
complicated the whole affair by committing an abduction, which,
in the opinion of many Afghans, did him more honour than all his
triumphs over the English. On leaving Khulm,-Mohamed Akbar
brought with him from thence a youth belonging to the Khan of
that district for a purpose which shdl be nameless. This fact was
of sufficient importance to induce the Walee to declare war, and
Akbar sent his brother, Akrem Khan, at the head of ten thousand
horse against the Usbeks. Three battles were fought'in 1845 and
1846, but without deciding the quarrel, nevertheless the Khan of
Khulm became uneasy, for his rear was threatened by the Emir of
Bokhara ; he returned 'therefore to his capiial and Akrern Khan
to Kabul, where his brother continued to spend large sums of
money upon the creature who had been the cause of the war.
When Akbar Khan found that he had nothing to fear from the
exasperated Walee of Khulm, he clung with more obstinacy than
ever to his project of joining the Sikhs and once more fighting the
English. T h e five hundred cavalry he had sent towards the end of
1845 to assist the former under his cousin Abdul Ghyaz Khan had
not arrived in time to be present at the battle of Sobraon, which in
1846 determined the fate of the Punjab, and enabled the British
to enter Lahore as'conquerors ; but Akbar Khan believed that he
had only to present himself and his troops before that city to turn
them out, and the cession of Peshawur was promised him as the
price of his armed intervention. Dost Mohamed was not indifferent
to this arrangement, which afforded him the opportunity of including
in his dominions that frontier town, which he had always been so
unwilling to give up ; nevertheless he felt that it would compromise
him with the English if he received it from the Sikhs in return for
his co-operation, so he preferred seizing it himself a t a moment

*

392

MARRIAGE O F AKBAR.

CHAP. =TI.

when they were unable to defend it ; but Akbar persisted in his
wish to cross the Indus. I n this purpose he was foiled by the
Dost, who secretly retarded the recruiting of t l ~ earmy, and his
son was obliged to delay the execution of his projects. T o make
up for this disappointment, he determined upon marching against
Kandahar, alleging that his uncle had sought the alliance of the
British and fomented discontent in Kabul, which had brought about
changes most disadvantageous to the interests of Dost Mohamed.
Several serdars deserted the cause of the Emir on this occasion and
passed over to the service of his brother; but none of these defections was so grievous to him as that of his step-son, the Sultan
Djan Khan. This young serdar had proceeded to Kandahar with
five hundred horse, and been well received by Kohendil Khanin Akbar's eyes a sufficient cause for declaring war against his uncle,
and the Emir had infinite difficulty in preventing him from taking
this step. These different views on such serious subjects kept up
the irritation between the father and son, and ended in doing more
good to their enemies than to themselves. Akbar, who had not the
experience of the Emir and was of a restless domineering spirit,
never hesitated for considerations of any kind, and, being supported
in his violent opinions by chiefs as turbulent as himself, decided
on advancing upon Kandahar, in utter disregard of his father's
disapprobation ; not, however, to drive matters quite to extremity,
he thought he would strengthen his policy by the alliance of which
the Dost had himself laid the foundations in the preceding year.
Yar Mohamed, after having dethroned and strangled Shah
Kamran, had become all powerful at Herat, and it was important
that the Emir should secure him in his interest; negotiations
were, therefore, commenced between the two families ; Akbar married in 1846 Bobodjane, the eldest daughter of Yar Mohamed,
and the Vizier's son, the Serdar Syud Mohamed ,Khan, espoused
Goher, only daughter of Mohamed Khan, deceased, a half-brother
of the Emir Dost Mohamed.
Alrbar ~ h a n ' mother
s
went to Herat to bring her daughter-in-law
to Kabul ; but on her return she was detained a long time at Kandahar, in consequence of an insurrection that had broken out in the
district of Kelat-i-Ghildjzye, which prevented her from continuing
her journey. This insurrection w.as attributed to the intrigues of
Kohendil Khan, who dreaded the result of the alliances recently
concluded, for, as his dominions 1a.y between Kabul and Herat, he
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was henceforth placed between two fires. I-Ie complained loudly
to Yar Mohamed of his-having given his daughter to Akbar Khan,
and before the marriage took place demanded her for one of his
own sons, urging his position as a neighbour of the vizier's, which
he considered a just ground of preference. But his representations
produced no alteration in the arrangement, and the inhabitants of
Kelat-i-Ghikljzye having heard that the Emir had ordered two
thousand horsemen from Ghumee to march against them, the
matter ended by their opening the road for the affianced bride of
Mohamed Akbar Khan. A t this the indignation of the serdars of
Kandahar was great, and they revenged themselves by sending
several thousand cavalry to ravage the plain of Bakooa, belonging
toHerat (adding that they intended to seize the town itself),
when they were arrested in their project by a diversion made in
favour of Mohamed Akbar by his brother Haidar Khan, a t the
head of eight thousand horse, who advanced by forced marches
on Kandahar. The moment Dost Mohamed was infoilned that
the Kandaharians had retreated, he, to Akbar's infinite regret,
impkratively recalled him to Kabul. Seizing on this pretext to
free himself completely from the authority of his father, Akbar
signified to him in the haughtiest and most insolent manner that
henceforth he intended to do as he pleased in the principality, and
requested him for the future not to interfere in its affairs. Unfortunately Mohamed Altbar Khan was sufficiently powerful to hold this
language to his sovereign, and the Emir resigned himself to the
passive position in which his son's conduct placed him.
T o relate all the rash and foolish undertalzings projected by
Akbar Khan from this period would be impossible ; though he a t
the same time originated several able measures for the consolidation
of his power. I t was with this object in view that a t the close of
1846 he sent Akhood Zadeh Azim a s ambassador to the Shah of
Persia to conclude an alliance offensive and defensive with- that
mon2rch; his father-in-law, Yar Mohamed Khan, followed his
example, and also sent an agent to Teheran for. the same purpose.
These two chiefs wrote a joint letter to Mohamed Shah in the most
pressing termb, showing him how the English were carrying their
conquests along the whole course of the Indus, and were ready
to enter Afghanistan; the missive concluded in these words:
" I f your majesty hesitates to take part in the war with us
against the English, Allah will require you to account for the
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neglect with which you allow the faithful to be swept away by the
infidels."
The Shah of Persia, without granting the assistance demanded
of him, was nevertheless quite inclined to join the projected alliance.
The envoys of Herat and Kabul were well received, and richly
jewelled swords and decorations were sent to Dost Mohamed, Akbar
Khan, and such of their brothers, uncles, and other serdars in the
principality as were favourable to the cause.
As to Kohendil Khan, he became daily more discontented with
Yar Mohamed and Akbar Khan, and made fresh incursions upon
the territory of Herat, in the district of Gulistau, the result of
which was that the vizier advanced upon Wachir and Girishk,
and made fearful reprisals. Akbar Khan now became anxious
to support his father-in-law and march against Kohendil Khan,
but Dost Mohamed opposed this, and a sharp altercation took
place between the father aud son, during which the latter bitterly reproached the Emir with cowardice, and even threatened to imprison
him. This quarrel a t length opened the eyes of Dost Mohamed,
and proved to him what he had up to that time earnestly wished
to doubt, namely, the evil disposition of his son ; he withdrew
therefore from the citadel and took refuge in the kaleh of
Djevanchir, where Khan Shireen Khan, the Kuzzilbash chief,
received him with all the warmth and respect due to his rank
and great misfortunes. Mohamed Akbar threatened, but in vain ;
he could not induce the Ruzzilbash to give up his guest; and to
what extremities he might have proceded is unknown, for he was
carried oft'by a sudden and wholly unexpected death, caused, as it
is said, by taking two aphrodisiac pills, which were given him by
a Hindoo doctor. This man had them in a box with some others,
of which he took two himself in the presence of his victim, who
therefore swallowed those offered to him without suspicion, and
died three hours afterwards in horrible convulsions. The conduct
of Akbar Khan had scarcely left him the chance of dying a natural
death ; h e thought that in forming a powerful party which would
obey his warlike instincts he could oppose his father and the
English also, and disdained the prudent warnings often given
him to be careful for his personal safety.
Opinions are divided amongst the Afghans as to who was the
instigator of this deed. Some lay it to the charge of the English,
without being able to produce any proof thereof; others suppose
'-A
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it to have been committed a t the instigation of Dost Mohamed and
his sons, whom Akbar delivered 'from the tyranny of the English
only to make them feel his own more heavily. However this may be,
the Dost obtained some liberty of action after his decease, though
not so much as he expected to enjoy. Akbar Khan was dead,
but his .party was not; some serdars, finding their plans defeated, retired in disgust to their domains, and slighted the old
Emir; others revolted against his authority, amongst whom was
Mohamed Shah Khan, Ghildjzye, a chief enjoying great influence
with the mountain tribes. H e had followed the fortunes of Dost
Mohamed and his family when the English seized Kabul, and
when they returned to Khulm his assistance was most valuable
in organizing an attempt against Shah Shooja, as well as during
the insurrection of 1841. T o this serdar Mohamed Akbar had
bound himself by an oath of friendship and brotherhood sworn
upon the Koran and legally attested by a mollah ; the Mussulman law sanctions ties of this description, so that the two chiefk
justly considered each other as brothers During the lifetime
of Akbar, Mohamed Shah Khan received an important c o m n d
in the hill country to the north of Kabul, and such was the trust
reposed in him by his friend, and the difficulty of access to his
mountain-home, that he placed all his wealth in his h a n h as he
acquired it, intending thus to secure it from any covetous attack
on the part of his own brothers, or even from the English, should
they ever return to Kabul ; the good understanding between
these two chiefs continued uninterrupted till the death of Mohamed
Akbar Khan. After that event Dost Mohamed claimed the property that his son had confided to Mohamed Shah Khan, but the
latter obstinately refused to give it up, alleging that the oath
which boilnd him to Akbar constituted him the legitimate heir
to the deceased serdar, and that the Emir could not without injustice
refuse him the title of vizier which he had bestowed upon Akbar ;
likewise that it gave him the right to marry all his widows in preference to the Dost's sons-Mohamed Shah Khan set up, in fact; an
infinity of the most unreasonable pretensions, and supported them by
hostile demonstrations. T h e Ghildjzyes responded to his appeal
in crowds, and the Emir was obliged to send an army against
them, but it was numerically insufficient to repress the revolt, for
it had to operate in a county full of difficulties, with an enemy
always fighting under great advantages of ground, and the
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troops were therefore obliged to return and wait for reinforcements. Dost Nohamed, who mis quite alive to the serious character of the ~ircumstances,redoubled his efforts to collect a
sufticient force with the utmost rapidity, and in the month of
April, 1847, had under his standard 25,000 men-veteran warriors brought up in hatred of the Ghildjzye tribe. With 'this large
army he moved against a comparatively feeble enemy, who had
hitherto only been able to maintain themselves against their foes
by the mountainous character of their country, and the Emir now
determined to strike a decisive blow ; concentrating his troops,
therefore, he moved towards the point a t which Mohamed Shah
K h a n had encamped with the greater number of the insurgents, and
pressed him so vigorously and closely, that the latter was obliged
to surrender at discretion and give up the disputed treasure to the
lawful heirs of Mohamed Akbar. The Dost also obliged the Khan
to enter into and accept other conditions sufficiently humiliating ;
he seized his sons a s hostages, and left him only the government
of a small mountain district-measures which rendered another
revolt on his part almost impossible. The reduction to obedience
of this rebellious tribe gave peace to the principality of Kabul, and .
the compromised serdars, dreading the loss of their property, liberty,
or lives, hastened to join the camp of the Emir, who, after having
installed his son Goulam Haidar Khan at Jellalabad in the chief
command of the Ghildjzye territory, returned immediately to his
capital; there he applied himself earnestly to repair t,he injuries
that years of civil war had inflicted upon some of the finest provinces of Afghanistan, and which originated in the just, though
dangerous, antipathy to the British alliance that always existed in
the mind of his son Mohaked Akbar.
I t was a t this juncture that Alchood Zadeh Azim, who had been
on his embassy to Persia, returned to Kabul ; the Emir could
not possibly do otherwise than approve of the conduct of his late
son's envoy, and he accordingly ratified all the steps that Akhood
Zadeh Azim had taken to perfect. a strict alliance between the
Afghans and the Persians.
T h e Anglo-Indian Government watched with some uneasiness the increasing good feeling between these two nations. But
although the hostility of Akbar Khan had been anything but
encouraging to them, their anxiety was not extreme, for they
thought his eccentric schemes would probably commit him sooner
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or later in some manner very detrimental to his power and introduce
perpetual~discord'andconfusion into the Afghan states. Such a
man a t the head of affairs in Kabul was almost a piece of good
fortune for the Company, and it is doubtful whether his violent
death was in any way satisfactory to them-at the utmost it might
seem to avenge the murder of Sir W. M'Naghten, of which he
had been guilty. They might also hope that Dost Mohamed,
now emancipated from the thraldom of his overbearing son,
would preserve his neutrality towards them, at least for a time.
I n this, however, there lurked perhaps a greater danger, for,
under the able administration of the Emir, the power of the principality would be increased tenfold in a short time ; influenced by
him the chiefs would more, easily become united, while under Akbar
they had always been quarrelling : nevertheless, Dost lMohamed
might possibly be forced by them to accede to their demands,
which, as facts subsequently proved, was the case.
The English thoroughly understood that the tranquillity of Afghanistan was no advantage to their cause, and in place of Akbar
Khan provided another brand of discord.
I t has been shown in this history that before Dost Mohamed
attained the sovereignty he struggled through years of trouble
and wars, and fought many a battle, and, if he triumphed over every
difficulty, he was not beholden to his family for helping him to
obtain that result; nearly all his brothers were hostile to him,
and the one whose hatred was the most unremitting and implacable was Sultan Mohamed Khan, who contended with him to
the last for the sovereignty of Kabul. I t has been stated that this
serdar was obliged to be satisfied with Peshawur, and subsequently
constrained to cede that province to Runjeet Sing, who made
him governor of the fortress of Rotas in the Punjab. After the
death of the Maharadjah, and Shere Sing the last of his sons,
Sultan Mohamed Khan drew upon himself the enmity of the
Sikh vizier Djovaker Sing, and was in consequence taken to Lahore
and detained a prisoner there. But the English watched over him ;
for no one could better carry out their designs than Sultan Mohamed Khan, whose constant enmity and opposition to the Emir,
was well known to them, and this led them to hope that they might
be able to make use of him to counteract his plans. A t their
solicitation, therefore, the Afghan serdar was set at liberty, and it
was believed that he received from them the promise of a pen-,
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sion ; after this he returned to Afghanistan, and having lived
several months at Peshawur retired to Kohat, a small town situated to the south of the former city.
Dost Mohamed was not blind to all this, but testified no resentment-far from it. After Sultan Mohamed was deprived of the
government of Peshawur the Emir's heart was softened by his
misfortunes, and he endeavoured on various occasions to effect a
reconciliation with him ; but the intractable pride of his brother
was inaccessible to every attempt of the kind. When he saw him
return from Lahore he was not too proud to take the initiative
once more with the same object in view, and he sent his eldest son
&!ohamed Efzel Khan to .Kohat to give his uncle every possible
guarantee for his securit.y, and endeavour to induce him to return
to Kabul. This last step entirely succeeded : the old serdar a t
last promised to forget his ancient hatred, and go to the Dost. H e
kept this promise, and a short time after the same 'roof sheltered
these two chiefs of the family of the Mohamedzyes. In thisreconciliation the Emir was sincere. Can the same be said of his eldest
brother ? That is a problem which can be decided by time only.
T h e return of Sultan Mohamed Khan to Kabul took place a t
the period a t which a fresh revolt of the Ghildjzyes occurred,
and Mohamed Shah Khan placed himself once more a t their head.
Dost Mohamed now declared his military career was over, that
he should delegate his authority as a general to his tliird son
Goulam Haidar Khan, the defender of Ghuznee against the
English, and should reserve to himself the administration of civil
affairs only. T h e serdars received this semi-abdication with
favour ; Haidar was dear to them for the same reasons as Akbar,
and was besides the son of the same mother : their braverygas
equal, and their hatred of the English had been deep and constant.
On assuming the rank of vizier, Goulam Haidar Khan espoused
some of the wives of his deceased brother, and amongst them
Robodjane. T h e first act of his administration was to assemble
the chiefs of all the tribes, and make them swear fidelity to his
family and war to the unsubdued Ghildjzyes; he won the
affections of the army by increasing the pay of the troops, and
took advantage of the popular feeling expressed in his favour by
a t once pursuing Mohamed Shah Khan, whom he speedily reduced
to a condition that rendered it.hopeless for him ever again to raise
the standard of rebellion.
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The enthusiasm excited by this success, and the warlike tastes
of their iiew chief, led the Afghans to desire a fresh field for the
employment of their arms : they loudly called upon Goulam
Haidar Khan to lead them against the English ; and, such was
the unanimity of feeling, that it was impossible for the Emir to
elude or delay the execution of their demands. The Sikhs had
for many years offered to restore Peshawur to him in return for
the assistance he had formerly given them, and he now decided
to accept the proposition which he had till then steadily rejected ;
for, had he done otherwise, he would perhaps have alienated the
affections of his countrymen and lost the throne of Afghanistan
for his family for ever.
When the British generals who commanded in the Punjab
learnt that Dost Mohamed had descended into the plain of the
Indus with 15,000 men, they were anxious as to the course he
might take. Having at this time to keep in check Tchatter
Sing and his son Shere Sing, who had raised the Sikhs against
them on all sides, they were in no position to oppose the invasion
of the Afghans, who, having taken possession of the fertile plain
of Peshawur, subsequently marched against Attock, then commanded by Colonel Herbert. This officer, being absolutely without the means of defending the fortress, was obliged to surrender,
and the Afghans occupied it immediately. However, instead of
showing the slightest disposition in favour of the Sikhs, who were
their allies, and inhabited the town, they pillaged them, forced
their way into their harems, and violated their wives and daughters,
in revenge, as they said, for the unheard-of insult of which they
accused the army of Shere Sing, namely, of having killed pigs in
all the mosques on their route.
Dost Mohamed and hi son were utterly unable to restrain
their soldiers, and were obliged to excuse these excesses as well
as they could to the allies whose cause they had been brought
to defend. But the serious nature of the position in which they
found themselves led the Sikh chiefs to shut their eyes to these
enormities, and the English were thenceforth convinced that, in
consequence of their religious antipathies, no alliance could possibly
exist between the Sikhs and the Afghans ; they were therefore far
less concerned than they had been at the advance of Dost Mohamed.
Notwithstanding the prospect which now presented itself to the
Emir of.seizing Cashmeer, anciently a province of the Afghan
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kingdom, he appeared by no means anxious to proceed beyond the
limits of his re-conquered territory, and displayed no desire to support the insurrectionary movement of the Sikhs. The possession of
Attock, where he could concentrate a force sufficient to protect him
from a coup.de-main,satisfied his ambition, but this was not the
case vith his soldiers ;they had not followed him simply to encamp
on the banks of t.he Indus, and to pacify them he sent a contingent of cavalry to Shere Sing, who had just beaten the English at
Chillianwallah. T h e latter, however, soon took their revenge, and
crushed the Afghans and Sikhs together a t Goojerat, February 21,
1849. T h e vanquished were hotly pursued, but the Sikh commanders, Tchatter Sing and Shere Sing, kept the field for another
month; they then found they had lost all their positions and the
greater part of their artillery, and surrendered to Sir Walter
Gilbert, who disarmed the remainder of the Sikh army. This
event having set his division a t liberty, he received orders from
the General-in-Chief, Lord Gough, to march against, Attock
and Peshawur, and drive the Afghans beyond the passes of
Afghanistan.
If Dost Mohamed had cherished a hope that the English would
leave him in peaceable possession of the towns which he had just
taken, the idea was soon dispelled, for to attack and defeat him
was with them an operation equally prompt and easy. H e was
even driven to seek safety by a precipitous flight, and for two
hours the Indian cavalry sent in pursuit of him kept within gunshot
of the fugitive Emir ; but his gallant horse eventually distanced
them, and saved his liberty, perhaps his life.
'
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The English conquer the Punjab -Dost Mohamed loses Peshawur and AttockHe retires to Kabul -Policy of Kohendil Khan at Icandahar after hie return
from Persia -Retrospective view of affairs a t Herat-Par Mohamed Khan and
the English Major Pottinger and Colonel Stoddart -The latter leaves for
Bokhara -Inteniew betmen Major Pottinger a d Shere Dil Khan -Sarious
conaequences resulting from t h h - Conduct of Yar Mohamed Major Todd at
Herat -Treaty concluded with Shah Kamran -Par Mohamed all-powerful in
the principality
A scene at Yar Mohamed's dinner-table-Intrigues of that
chief His treatment of Shah Kamran- Misunderstanding between Major
Todd and the vizier -Dine Mohamed Khan Approbation of Major Todd's
conduct by the Directors of the Eaat India. Compmy - Official instructions to
that officer-Bad faith of Par Mohamed -Difficulties of Major Todd's position
-Treachery
of Yar Mohamed- Subsidy to Shah Kamran and his court
stopped- The vizier makea fresh demands upon Major Todd Counter proHe leaves Herat and is escorted out of the city.
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ONCEmore in possession of Peshawur and Attock, the English
installed themselves in a manner to prevent all chance of their'being
easily removed therefrom ; and Dost Mohamed reached Kabul,
where he is now less secure thau ever, and less satisfied as to the
ultimate views of his neighbours. If he has to regret that he could
not preserve his conquests, he has at.least the satisfaction of having proved to his subjects that he was right in his judgment, and
that it was imprudent in them to attack the English, who it was
now evident were more dangerous than ever. His defeat was
the justification of his past policy; and, having changed that, he
is in the worst possible position. T h e English detest him for
having borne arms against them in 1848 : to the Afghans he is an
object of suspicion, and they will ever suspect'that he is ready and
willing to treat with the East India Company. Indeed his prospects
011 all sides. are indifferent, and appear as if they were not likely to
brighten nor his troubles arrive at any satisfactory conclusion ; the
fate of the Emir and his kingdom is a problem which time only
can solve.
The position of Kohendil Khan a t Kandahas is far from being
so embarrassing as that of his elder brother. I t has been shown
how, after having beaten the Prince Seif der Djing, he resumed
possession of his principality. After this he found that, besides his
quarrels with Akbar Khan and Yar Mohamed, he had revolts to
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put down amongst the Hazarahs Poocht Kooh and the Beloochees
who were under his jurisdiction. But the serdars of his province
are not the same turbulent characters as those of Kabul, and
therefore he has a far less difficult task in carrying on his government than Dost Mohamed ; his political talents are not nearly so
good as those of the Emir, but they are sufficient for his position.
The Serdar Akter Khan was thg only one who could give him the
least annoyance, but, notwithstanding the services that he had
rendered to his prince' when he assisted him in re-consolidating
his power, and the family ties that existed between them, Kohendil
Khan determined to expel him from the district of Zemindavax ;
here he was established in the heart of his tribe, the Alizyes, and
towards the close of 1547 was attacked by him with a very superior
force, when he was obliged to fly, and escaped to Herat. This was
a most fortunate event for Yar Mohamed Khan, who was not ignorant of the influence which this. serdar exercised over the Afghan
tribes established in the south, and the extent to which he might
turn i t to his own account against his adversaries, the chiefs of
Kandahar. The vizier completely neutralised the precautionary
measures taken by Rohendil Khan by settling Akter Khan in the
district of Gour, situated on the frontier of Kandahar and near
that of Zemindavar, which the tribe of Alizye had quitted almost
entirely to join its chief in liis new abode. This fact was not calculated to re-establish the good feeling that had so long been
interrupted between Kohendil Khan and Yar Mohamed; and from
this time their intercourse was characterised by constantly increasing
asperity : but it is very difficult to foresee the results of this rivalry,
Afghanistan being pre-eminently the country in which nothing can
be foreseen.
A wish to avoid the necessity of returning to the history of
Kabul and Kandahar has induced the author to carry it on without
. interruption ; but, as there is nothing further to add to it, he now
proposes to return to Herat, and describe the events that took
place in that city after the siege was raised by Nohamed Shah, the
period at which the'English proclaimed the restoration of Shah
Shooja to the throne of ,t&e Suddozyes in Kabul, and the independence of Eierat under Shah Kamran.
Although the retreat of the Persians and the relief of Herat
ought to have satisfied British susceptibilities, Lord Aucliland did
not the less persist in a most unjust invasion of territory.
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I t has been related that Shah Shooja, escorted by an AngloIndian army, first possessed himself of Kandahar ; he had at that
time, and in concert with Sir W. M'Naghten, the British resident
a t his court, agreed that a few battalions, sufficient to seize Herat,
should be detached from the expeditionary army to occupy that
city. Several reasons apparently combined to induce him to give
up this project, the importance of which was thought secondary
after the departure of the Persian army ; besides Shah Shooja had
publicly expressed a hope that his nephew, Shah Kamran, would
feel grateful for the assistance that he had received from the
English. But these reasons were given only to dissimulate the
real state of things, and to anticipate the annoying and disadvantageous moral effect that the truth would produce upon the
Afghan allies, whose fidelity was very doubtful. The correspondence of Major Pottinger, who remained a t Herat after the siege
was raised, and that of Colonel Stoddart, who joined him there
after he had carried to the Persian monarch the ultimatum with
which he had been intrusted, contained assurances which alone
caused the delay of this measure. They informed Sir W.
M'Naghten that Yar Mohamed might be considered the real
sovereign of Herat, and, after having described him a s a man
equally energetic and opposed to their ambitious views, finished by
stating him to be the most accomplished villain in*Central Asia.
However they admitted the power of upsetting him simply with
the aid of Kamran and the Heratees, and that was the real motive
which led Sir W. M'Naghten to delay and amend the plan first
conceived of a military occupation of Herat. They therefore trusted
to diplomacy to upset the vizier ; but the council a t Calcutta had
reckoned too much upon the co-operation of fortune, which up
to that time had smiled on the execution of their projects in
Afghanistan, and the vigilance of the distrustful Yar Mohamed
Khan baffled all their calculations.
After the retreat of the Shah of Persia, in 1838, Major Pottinger
continued to pay the troops at Herat with money supplied by the
East India Company. His efforts, and those of Colonel Stoddart,
were mainly directed to saving the wretched I-Ieratees from famine,
and preventing Yar Mohamed from selling them to the Usbelrs ;
but as the revenues of the state were exhausted, and the vizier
had no means left of raising any funds except by a continuation
of this inhuman traffic, the English were under the necessity of
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granting a pension to Shah Kamran and the principal chiefs of
Herat, in order to put a stop to it. This measure, however,
did not attain the desired object, and the British officers soon
complained of the ill treatment they had to submit to from
Yar Mohamed ; the motive for which, in their opinion, was
the protection they gave the townspeople against their tyrant.
After having well investigated the matter and obtained information from the best sources, I have come to the conclusion that
they were in error; these gentlemen hoped that gratitude for
the support the government of Herat had received from that of
Calcutta, and also the fear of the British army in the neighbourhood of Kabul, must bring Yar Mohamed Khan to submit to their
wishes. Colonel Stoddart especially would assume to himself the
position of a Mentor who expected to be obeyed ;of a violent &sposition he frequently gave way to passion before the vizier, which
impeded rather than served his cause, and only rendered him
liable to insult. The consequence was, that an imperative order .
to leave Herat was given him by the king; moreover, his imprudent conduct placed his comrade Pottinger in a false position.
Stoddart, thus dismissed, went to Bokharn, where he had a missioi~
to fulfil, and it was only by great good management that Pottinger
could obtain leave to remain a t Herat, where he soon had serious
difficulties to contend with ; these had reference to some concessions that he demanded from the vizier in consideration of the pecuniary aid that he received from the East India Comp'any. T h e
concessions in .question were, the reform of the government at .
Herat, and confiding the administration of it to British agents ;
the occupation of the citadel with two regular battalions of
Heratees, well organized, and officered by Englishmen; and finally,
the recapture of the fortress of Gorian, which the Persians had
held ever since the close of 1837.
T h e vizier rejected each and all of these pi-opositions, and the
good understanding with him, already compromised by Stoddart,
thenceforth ceased entirely -with Major ,Pottinger. The latter,
finding that he had failed to obtain any one of his demands,
ceased to pay the subsidy hitherto furnished to the Afghan chiefs ;
but Yar Moharned, conceiving that the payments which had been
made gave him a n acquired right to their continuance in future,
looked upon this suppression as illegal and unjust. On the 30th
of January, 1839, therefore, he sent his brother Shere Mohamed
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Khan to'Major Pottinger to demand specific explanations of his
ulterior intentions. The Afghans are not conspicuous amongst
either European or Eastern nations for their politeness, and it is
said that the chief executed his mission with such brutal rudeness
that Major Pottinger ordered one of his servants, a Heratee, to
show him the door ; a scuffle ensued, and the servant,^ of Shere
Mohamed Khan, hearing his shouts, rushed to the assistance of
their master and rescued him from his undignified position : the
serdar returned furious into the presence of his brother, his
attendants dragging after them the luckless servant of the Major,
whose hand was immediately cut. off by order of the vizier for
having dared to place it upon an Afghan chief. H e then ordered
Sertip La1 Mohamed Khan, Kaleh Beghi, to surround the British
officer's house with a guard of two hundred men, and never to
lose sight of him, which order was acted upon forthwith.
Yar Mohamed Khan was most perfectly informed of all the
intrigues set on foot by the British envoy to deprive him of his
power, and he therefore was not sorry to have an opportunity of
making him feel that a s yet it had not suffered t.he slightest
diminution from his proceedings ; avarice being, however, a
dominant feature in his character, he contrived, while asserting
his independence and resisting the demands of the English, to bend
sufficiently to allow of a reconciliation after this rupture. I n adopting thisline of conduct he had no other end in view than to enrich
himself a t their expense, well resolved that he would have nothing
more to do with them from the day that they should cease to
supply his treasury. ('They wanted to despoil me, to ruin me,
perhaps worse," said Y ar Mohamed to the author ; I must have
been a great fool not to be beforehand with them."
Major 'Pottinger had a perfect knowledge of the character of the
Asiatic Mussulmans and the versatility and pliancy of the intellect
requisite in treating with them ; he was therefore soon relieved
from the supervision of his guards, and renewed his negotiations
a t the court of Shah IZamran, but ,it was o d y by continuing the
payment of the ~ubsidies,temporarily interrupted, that he obtained
his liberty. Although that prince, his court, and his ministers,
were absolutely maintained by the English, no one appeared to
appreciate that fact, or to esteem them for it, for they well
knew that their generosity was exercised much more in their
own interest than in that of .the Heratees. For his part, Yar
'(
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Mohamed was never their dupe, and from the month of March,
1839, he had been in coi~espondencewith the court of Persia
endeavouring to obbain support against them. I t was at this
time that he offered Mohamed Shah to unite his army with that
of the Prince of Kandahar and oppose the invasion of Shah
Shooja ; but the rapid march of the British on that town, and
the tardiness displayed by the Shah of Persia in producing the
subsidy required to carry on the war, induced the vizier again to
attach himself to the English alliance, which he found the most
profitable of the two. I-Iaving formed his plans upon the events
of the moment, he was one of the first to send his congratulations
to Shah Shooja upon his success. Major Pottinger knew not
which way to turn in the midst of all these fluctuations in the
policy of the vizier, and it was with a feeling of inexpressible
pleasure that he heard the East India Company were about to
release him from his fetters by sending him a successor.
Major d'Arcy Todd, of the artillery, assistant and military
secretary to Sir W. M6Naghten, was the officer charged by the
Governor-General to accompany Shah Shooja from Loodiana to
Shikapoor, .and h e afterwards went with the army to Kandahar,
where the embassy of congratulation sent to the Shah by Yar
Mohamed had already arrived. This officer possessed an intimate
knowledge of the Persian language, and the affairs of Central.
Asia, which he h a d acquired when in the service of the Shah of
Persia, and he was therefore selected as envoy to the court of
Herat, May 15, 1839. The following were the instructions he
received :1st. T o ascertain the intentions and sentiments of Shah Kamran
and his court towards the English. Government, and, if he found
that i11 spite of the benefits they had received from it they favoured
the Persian Government, to ascertain t.he cause of discontent, and
to do everything in his power to remove it.
2nd. To negotiate a treaty of alliance with Shah Kamran.
3rd. T o give Y a r Mohamed a written indemnity for his past
conduct, in order to obtain his confidence for the future, but without
securirzq to him and hisfamily the perpetualgovernment of the country.
4th. T o pay attention to the financial relations of the East India
Company with the court of Herat.
5th. T o take with him engineer and artillery officers to restore
and repair the fortifications of the town.

.
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6th. T o fix,if possible, the frontier which separates Persia from
the principality of Herat.
7th. T o make known the objects of the British policy to the chiefs
of Bokhara and Khiva ; and after having carried out these instructions, to return to Kabul, leaving Major Pottinger as the representative of England at Herat.
Such were the instructions that were transmitted to the British
Envoy; but it seems probable that there were secret ones also :
a t any rate, the last paragraph of the third article leaves room for
the supposition-however that might be, Major Todd reached
Herat in July, 1839. He exerted himself to the utmost to carry
out the mission confided to him, and to establish a cordial understanding between the Shah Ramran, his vizier, and himself ; and
his efforts were a t first crowned with success, for in August, 11339,
he concluded a treaty of alliance and friendship with the Suddozye
prince. The independence of the principality of Herat was
guaranteed by England, and the most substantial advantages stipulated in favour of its chiefs, on condition that the traffic in slaves
should be abolished and that all correspondence with other courts
should cease miless carried on with the consent of the British Envoy.
A monthly sum, equal to the revenues of the principality before the
siege, was granted for the maintenance of the government, for the
soil had remained without cultivation for eighteen months, and
labour of every kind had been interrupted from the commencement
of hostilities.
The East India Company also made considerable advances to the
agriculturiets, merchants, and shopkeepers to enable them to recommence business, and every description of tax was remitted till after
the harvest of 1840 ; large sums of money were likewise expended
in repairing the fortifications. The Anglo-Indian Government could
hardly have done more had. Herat been a British possession, and
there can be little doubt they hoped that it would soon become one
as they behaved with. so much liberality. However, the measures
they adopted produced the happiest results for the Afghans ; the
town was quickly re-peopled, the land covered with crops, commerce
resllmed its activity, caravans poured in rapidly, and security and
confidence were completely re-established. But the sacrifices made
by the Company were never compensated by any of the advantages
they had expected. Yar Mohamed made not a single concession,
and remained absolute master of the principality ; he tolerated
the English in it only because they satisfied his thirst for gold..
'
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I t is true they constantly endeavoured to induce Shah Ramran to
displace his despotic minister ; but that sovereign could see no other
way of disposing of his vizier than by putting him to death-a
measure which Major Todd, of course, would not sanction, and
the Shah would not commit himself to it unless the English COoperated with him, so that it was very difficult to come to an
understanding when the views of both were so conflicting. T h e
Serdar Shere Mohamed Khan, brother of the vizier, and the
Ichik Agassi Feiz Mohamed, Alikioozye, both of them warm partisans of the Persian alliance, were constantly originating reports
hostile to the English, rendering all hope of coming to a cordial
feeling utterly abortive. Herat, indeed, abounded in intrigues,
and, if blood was not shed, it was due only to the loyalty of Major
Todd, who, constantly pressed by his partisans to consent to the
assassination of the vizier, as constantly rejected the idea with
indignation ; could it have been possible for that of ice^ to wish
to terminate the question in this manner, nothing would have been
more easy, for, a t one of the dinners that he gave to Yar Mohamed
Khan, the vizier, being but a bad ~ u s s d m a n was
, so intoxicated
as to fall senseless under the table. Here was an opportunity :
many of the guests, and amongst them Prince Mohamed Yoossoof
(grandson of Hadji Firooz Eddin), the Serdar Dine Mohamed
Khan, and the Xazi of Hernt, were his declared enemies ; Hassan
Mohamed, another guest, suggested that the head of the unconscious
minister ought to be cut off at once, and the Major had the greatest
possible trouble to prevent the company from adopting his proposition, being obliged to sit up with him the whole night to save his
life. It was in'vain that he represented to these chiefs that such
actions were reprobated by Europeans, and contrary to their religion and the rights of men ; they looked upon his conduct as
simply pusillanimous, and for this reason only several serdars were
subsequently much less favourably disposed towards the English,
-that the death of the vizier in a chancemedley or an apoplectic
fit would not in any way have distressed Major Todd is highly
probable. The king was exceedingly ill-disposed towards Yar
Mohamed before the arrivd of the English envoy, and took no
pains to conceal his opinion ; he thought no more about the Persians
after they had retreated, and when he found the Feringhees paid
him his pension with such perfect punctuality and supplied him so
lavishly with wine and spirits, which constituted the charm of his
existence, he became their warmest partisan and granted them
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whatever they desired. But the English required also the ratification of his minister, and the minister would never ratify anything.
T h e government" of India considered it a cfime in Major Tpdd
that he did not give up the old king and try his powers of persuasion and argument upon the vizier ; but ihere is no proof that
the British envoy had any chance of success with him, for Y a r ,
Mohamed had already come to a determination respecting the power
that the English wanted to exert over him, and the substitution of
the vizier for his sovereign would have alienated from Major Todd
the party that supported Shah Kamran. Furthermore, it was to
the Shah that he was accredited by his Government; it was, therefore, his duty to carry on his negotiations in the regular course, and
if Shah Ihmran had retained any of the vigour of his youth he
would a t the very commencement have settled his differences with his
minister. Every morning the vizier had an audience, at which he
made a report to his sovereign on the position of affairs in general ;
his servants always remained a t the gate of the citadel, which was
also the residence of the king, and it would have been easy for the
Shah to have had Yar Mohamed arrested and strangled before the
least assistance could reach him : but instead of taking that step
he threatened him in the most violent and absurd manner, and
towards the close of 1839 proceeded to such lengths that the loss
of his own liberty, and afterwards of his life, were the consequence.
It happened thus :Shah Kamran, having been informed that the vizier had received
100,000 rupees, demanded that they should be delivered to him; but
the minister replied that they were in his charge not only t~ keep,
but to use for the expenses of his administration. In accordance
with Eastern custom, Yar Mohamed was at the time seated on
his knees and heels before his sovereign, who, being considerably
into~icat~ed,
seized his minister by the beard, dragged him forcibly
towards him with one hand, drew his dagger with the other, and
prepared to strike. However, before proceeding to extremity, he
endeavoured to make him restore the sum that he thought the vizier
had extorted ; but neither menaces nor promises had any effect upon
the prime minister, who maintained the most perfect coolness.
Strike," he said, " my fate is in your hands. I have spent the
money for the good of the state, and I have none of it to return
to you." Kamran, shaken by that extraordinary firmness of demeanour which had maintained so great an influence over him for
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ten years, replaced the dagger in his belt, and allowed Yar 810hamed to depart. After this the vizier kept a strict watch over
his sovereign, and never entered the presence alone to converse
upon matters of state policy.
This incident created a further estrangement between BIajor
Todd and Yar Mohamed, and was quickly followed by another .
event, of which the English were accused of being the instigators.
After the death of Attar Khan in 1830 his father, the Serdar Dine
Mohamed, soon repented that he had given up the ~owerfulposition
of vizier to his cousin ; his ambition had increased with age, and
he ranged himself amongst the adversaries of Yar Mohamed.
Notwithstanding this rivalry the two relatives had not ceased to
meet and maintain the appearance of friendly intercourse, and
the wily vizier neglected nothing that might attach Dine Mohamed to his cause, for none could promote his ambitious views
better than he. This serdar was the true type of an Asiatic warrior
-one of those intrepid and fiery chiefs whose sword leaps from the
scabbard ere the hand of its master reaches the hilt; his audacity
had no equal among the Afghans, and none knew better how
to infuse his own courage and enthusiasm into the breasts of
others. Yar Mohamed might perhaps have succeeded in securing
his assistance if the English had not attached him to their party,
but Dine Mohamed submitted to the influence of their persuasions ,
and their gold, and soon fell into their projects. Towards the
commencement of 1840 this 'serdar sent a messenger to the vizier
with an invitation to a feast at his house, which was accepted, and
arrangements were made by him to seize his cousin 01) his arrival ;
of this the minister received warning only a t the moment he was
passing the threshold of the door, when suddenly retracing his
steps he returned home, and despatched a body of five hundred
infantry to surround Dine Mohamed's residence, and take him
prisoner. Scenes of this description were constantly occurring,
and added greatly to the difficulties that the British envoy had
to contend with.
Much that I have stated relating to Major Todd was taken
from an article in the Bombay Times of November 14, 1847. By
incorporating that narrative with my own notes I have hoped to
make a simple and explicit statement in defence of that brave
officer, so unworthily treated by the ungrateful Government of
Calcutta.
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The Sicret Committee of the Council there had approved of
the treaty conkluded between their Envoy a t Herat and Shah
Kamran; they wrote to Major Todd- to compliment him on the
ability that he had displayed in these negotiations ; they also sanctioned all the expenses incurred and promised for fortifying the
town, for the nlaintenance of the Heratee troops, and other purposes, and added, " W e continue to attach the greatest importance
to the security of Herat, but the sacrifices that we make for Shah
Kamran will give you the right to a powerful influence over his
councils and conduct, and we hope that he will show bimself grateful for d l the British Government has done for him." The Council deceived themselves wonderfully in expecting '' powerful influence a t Herat ;" that of Major Todd was barely tolerated ; i t
was far from commanding. The treaty approved by the Council
was concluded in August 1839, and in the October following the
smifices to which they alluded in their letter to their envoy
amounted to six lacs of rupees, 60,000Z.
But Yar Mohamed appeared indifferent to the liberality of the
English Government, and a t the very moment they supposed they
had his boniijde support he made fresh propositions to the Persian
.court; the letters which he wrote to Assaf Dooulet, GovernorGeneral of Rhorassan, bore in every word the stamp of implacable
hatred to the British, and he offered to place himself and his
country under the protection of Mohamed Shah. When Major
Todd informed the English Resident a t Kabul of this fresh
treachery, he. stated his opinion that to maintain friendly relations
with the court of Shah Kamran was no longer possible, and that it
was indispensable to the security of the dominion of Shah Shooja
to annex the p~incipalityof Herat. H e showed also the precarious
and useless position of himself and his mission in that t o m in
comparison with and in despite of the enormous outlay that it
entailed, and specially insisted that the Company had no chance
of reaping the fruits of its expenditure nor of establishing a permanent and solid influence without the presence of an AngloInaian army to awe the vizier. He concluded by saying that if,
contrary to his advice, they persisted in maintaining the independence of Herat, the Company would prepaye d@cuZties for themselves which would attain a femful hhght.
Sir W. M'Naghten supported the opinion of Major Todd with
the Court of Directors, and added that he considered the annexation
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necessary tu the complete consolidation of the British dominion in
Afghanistan. But on so serious a subject the Directors thought
fit to take time for reflection, and after having lost some months in
deliberation determined upon placing the conduct of Yar Motlamed
before Lord Auckland, that his Lordship might determine what
was proper to be done under the circumstances.
While Major Todd awaited his reply the difficulties became
daily greater a t Herat. T h e vizier, knowing that his treachery
had been discovered, rendered Major Todd's residence there more
and more disagreeable by making fresh demands in a most imperious tone ; large sums alone would satisfy him, and Major
Todd was content to pay them to maintain his position.
I n January, 1840, the payments made to the Shah ICamran, his
avaricious minister, and his starving people, amounted to 100,0001.,
and yet before that month had expired Yar Mohamed addressed
another letter to the Shah of Persia, in which he called himself his
faithful servant, and declared that he permitted the British envoy
to remain at Herat from mere motives of courtesy. At the
same time he wrote a letter to the Russian minister at Teheran
asking him to send an agent of his nation to Herat; and so
great was his hatred of the English that he offered to give up the
city to the Persian garrison of Gorian. Major Todd, exasperated
on learning this fact, went instantly to the vizier to expostulate with
him, but he could not induce him to forego his intention until he
placed his pistol at his breast; this attempt was undoubtedly
imprudent, but the British envoy staked everything upon that last
throw. Y a r Mohamed, awed by his courage and inflexibility,
dared no longer resist, and he would probably have behaved with
a little more humility afterwards if Lord Auckland had better
appreciated the reports of Major Todd; but his Lordship's incredible weakness in his treatment of this barbarian encouraged
him to re-assume all his former arrogance. I n his 'reply to the
British egvoy the Governor-General said that he could only attribute
the t.reacllerg of Yar Mohamed to a vague idea of danger, and
recommended him by every means in his power to endeavour to
bring the minister to a cordial and friendly state of feeling with
the government of India, and make him clearly comprehend the
benefits of the British alliance, instead of 'proceeding with the
duplicity and suspicion which had hitherto marked his conduct
towards the Company. Lord Auckland added, that, in considera-
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tion of the vizier's former good services, and his resistance to
the Persians of several months' duration, he should extend his
pardon to every offence of which he might have been guilty before
that letter was received. But as this despatch only reached Herat
in February, 1840, and Yar Mohamed's last treacherous proceeding took place in January, 1840, it was considered as included in
this act of oblivion, and Major Todd was obliged to fulfil the
painful duty imposed upon him. , H e gave the vizier the most
positive and solemn assurances that every past infraction of the
treaty was forgotten, and Yar Mohamed seemed apparently sensible of Lord Auckland's kindness ; but unhappily he was secretly
convinced in his own mind that, whatever might be his future
conduct to the English, he had acquired impunity for his evil
deeds, and therefore proceeded on his old plan'of profiting by their
folly to fill his pockets with their rupees.
After his rupture with the court of Persia Sir John M'Neil
had returned to England, leaving his Secretary, Lieut.-Colonel
Sheil, as chargk d'affaires a t Erzeroum, who thence kept up an
active correspondence with the Persian minister, the good understanding between England and Persia remaining dependent upou
the evacuation of Gorian by the Persians and its restoration to
the Prince of Herat. Demands the most urgent on this subject
were sent to Teheran by Colonel Sheil, a t the same time that
Yar Mohamed's offer to give the place up to the Shah of Persia
arrived there, and with it his request to that sovereign to occupy
Herat. This coincidence had caused much, altercation between
Major Todd and the vizier; but when the latter received full
pardon for his delinquencies from Lord Auckland he professed
unbounded gratitude for such generosity, and swore to prove it
by some brilliant act of devotion; he therefore requested Major
Todd to advance him some money, promising that he would employ it in an expedition against the fortress of Gorian. The Major,
in his anxious position, trusted to his sincerity, and advanced two
lacs of rupees to equip the force, but the cash once safe in the
vizier's treasury the preparations, which necessitated only a trifling
expense, proceeded slowly, and in a short time he announced on the
most frivolous grounds that the undertaking was abandoned. I t
was afterwards proved in the clearest manner that Yar Mohamed
had written to the Persian Governor of Gorian to inform him that
he need not be alarmed at any news of a warlike character, for,
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though the English had obliged him to promise that he would
besiege the place, he might dismiss from his mind all fear and
uneasiness on the subject, for he did not intend to keep his word.
Major Todd, almost in despair at such utter faithlessness, wrote to
his Government that the expedition had been given up under cir.
cumstances of the most perfidious nature. This took place in July,
1840, by which time the sums spent in efforts to consolidate this
most unproductive alliance amounted to 190,000Z.
The British envoy, seeing the perfect inutility of this vast expenditure, took upon himself to reduce the monthly payment to the court
of Herat to 25002. ; and Yar Mohamed, wrathful at the reduction,
renewed in the following September his intrigues with the Persian
monarch. A t his request Mirza Massood, the foreign minister of
Mohamed Shah, who was a t Meshed at the time, came as far as .
Gorian to meet in pewon an agent from the vizier ; but Yar Mohamed had the address to turn even this perfidious action to his
own account, by relating it to Major Todd, and pretending that it .. '
had been done unknown to him by his brother, the Serdar Shere
Mohamed : he obtained fresh advances for this apparent frankness, but it must be added that he plucked them from the major's
hand rather than received them from him. Never was the position
of a British agent in the East so exasperating as that of this officer
a t I-Ierat. Exposed to the craft and cupidity of a man who saw
through the a.mbitious views of the Anglo-Indian Government upon
his country, the envoy was entirely a t his mercy, and the vizier purposely embittered every hour of every day that he remained a t Herat,
and, rendered endurance scarcely possible. The larger and more
liberal were the concessions of that Government, the less did Yar
Mohamed dissemble his hatred and hostility to his improvident
protectors ; and both these increased, while every check or reverse
experienced by the British troops in Afgha9;~tanwas exaggerated
by the vizier, and represented as a triumph of Islamism over the
Infidels: he went so far as to say publicly that he should seize
the-opportunity of the first great disaster of the British arms to join
their enemies, At this period cl6uds hung over the political horizon of ~ f ~ h a n i s t ;a nDost Mohamed had unsheathed his sword in
the north, and threatened Kabul : in the south the detachment of
Major Clibborne had been cut to pieces, and Kelat-i-Ghildjzye
taken from the invaders. The quarrel between the vizier and his
cousin caused the former, it is true, some uneasiness, and prevented
,
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him from h t once taking part against the English ; but he indemnified himself by attachi-ng to his party all the discontented spirits
of Kabul and Kandahar, with whose assistance. he could easily
disturb the tranquillity ,of those provinces and impede the establishment of the dominion of Shah Shooja. It was only by satisfying
the rapacious and exorbitant demands which Yar Mohamed daily,
nay, almost hourly, advanced on every possible pretence, that Major
Todd could retain his footing in Herat at this critical moment.
While thus continuing to draw upon the Company's exchequer,
Yar Mohamed actually discu&ed.in council a project for attacking
Kandahar, a scheme that he would assuredly have carried out it
Dost Mohamed had not been at hand. During all this period
scarcely a week passed that he did not speak of his alliance with
Persia and his intention of arresting the English officers ; in the
month of August their imprisonment was so generally expected, that
no one would go to their houses, not even persons under great obligations to them. Shah Icamran himself spoke of it, and publicly, but
idded, the legation had nothing to fear, that he was their friend,
and that not one of them would have been alive then but for his
interference in their favour. This deplorable condition of affairs
had reached such a point that a crisis became inevitable. The
money spent upon 'the chiefs and fortifications of Herat now
amounted to 300,0001., which, however, in no way prevented Yar
Mohamed from contiming his intercourse with the Persian court ;
and in January, 1841, he despatched a confidential agent with a
numerous suite to Assaf Dooulet, to ask for pecuniary assistance
and six guns from the Shah of Persia, to enable him to march
against Girishk, a small fortress in advance of Kandahar, as Gorian
is of Herat. When Major Todd was certain of the object of this
expedition, he represented to the vizier the danger to which he
exposed himself by this new infraction of the eighth article of the
treaty; and that so flagrant a violation of that solemn engagement
would be more than t.he long-suffering and patience of his Government could submit to ;he also declared that he should not consider
himself bound to continue the allowances he had paid up to that
time-that all the treasure of the Company could not suffice to
satisfy his requirements-and that the vizier must propidt: for the
expenses of his own government until such time as he should see
fit to act strictly up td the conditions and stipulations of friendship
existing between the two nations.
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Following up this declaration, Major Todd withheld the payment
of 25001. due on the 1st of February, 1841, to the court of Shah
Kamran. T h e vizier, case-hardened by impunity, looked upon this
suppression as merely temporary, expected he should be pardoned
his last breach of faith as he had been all former ones, and on the
8th of the same month addressed to Major Todd the following
fi-esh demands :1st. T h a t the British envoy should pardon all his past conduct,
and leave him under no apprehension for the future.
I2. T h a t he should receive immediately 30,0001. from the
East
India Company for the payment of his personal debts.
3. T h a t his monthly pension should be augmented and paid a
year in advance.
4. T h a t the British envoy should hand over a written agreement not to compromise Herat in any foreign war till after the
harvest in July.
5. T h a t the fortifications of the town should be enlarged and
finished a t the expense of the East India Cumpany, and that it
should provide the Government of Herat with the necessary
funds to enable it to reconquer several places which had thrown
off their obedience to it.
6. T h a t the Company should pay and maintain the Heratee
troops while in the field.
After his recent infraction of the existing treaty these terms
appeared so exorbitant, that Major Todd replied it was impossible
to suppose his Government would consent to make fresh sacrifices,
even in a modified form, unless it was for some corresponding
advantages, but he offered to grant several of Yar Mohamed's
demands if he made the following concessions :1. T h a t Yar Mohamed should never again deviate from the
spirit of the treaty between the two Governments.
2. T h a t the Serdar Syud Mohamed Khan, his eldest son, should
-take a contingent of troops to Kabul to serve in the British army.
3. T h a t a s soon as this serdar had arrived a t his destination
the envoy would pay half the vizier's debts and augment his
monthly allowance.
4. T h a t the citadel of Herat should receive a British garrison,
and that the royal residence of Rooz-bagh, seven miles south of the
city, with the land belonging to it, should be made over to the
English to build barracks upon for their own troops.
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5. That the Vizier should never again expect to receive, and
distribute himself, the funds appropriated to the maintenance of the
chiefs of .the.Court of %ah Kamran, and that the sums allotted for
that purpose should be paid to the individuals themselves by the
agents of the Company.
These propositions of Major Todd's were approved by Sir William M'Naghten, while the Governor-General of India looked
upon it as a matter of regret that &hey had been made. Yar
Mohamed appeared quite satisfied, provided the sums he had
demanded were paid in advance ; but Major Todd knew only too
well the character of the man he had to deal with to grant his
request, and the result was a most animated discussion.- T h e
Vizier pretended, certainly falsely, that Major Todd had in his
accounts charged the East India Company with much larger sums
than he had paid to him, and that he had used the difference in
largesses to the people in order to excite them to overturn the
Government of Herat, and substitute that of the Company.
Finally-and
this seems to be true-that the envoy constantly
plotted with Shah Kamran the fall of the Vizier from power,
-and the angry minister declared to Major Todd that his presence and that of his subordinates could no longer be tolerated
in Herat, and that he must depart with the least possible delay.
Thus ended the anxious and onerous intervention of the IndoBritish Government at Herat, and its conclusion was, as might be
expected, marked by several acts of rapacity on the part of Yar
Mohamed, who immediately made known his intention of marching
against Kandahar ; and in order to leave no doubt on this occasion
of his sincerity, he sent his own brother, the Serdar Shere Mohamed Khan, as ambassador to the court of Persia, with presents
for the Shah, and a request that a subsidy might be given him to
undertake the expedition he had projected. But it seems evident
that in making this demand the Vizier was really not more sincere
than he had been with the English ; his only object was to obtain
from both as much money as he possibly could for the purpose of
strengthening his position in his own country.
The British envoy being driven to the alternative of making fresh
sacrifices or taring his departure, decided upon the latter, and the
Vizier having provided him with the transport necessary for his
journey, sent with him the Serdar Fethi Khan, one of his cousins,
as his escort to the frontier. Major Todd had, with an object that
2 E
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is easy to understand, collected a considerable quantity of corn at
Herat; but the granaries were pillaged by the people even before
he had left the town, and a report having been spread that he had
carried away four boxes of treasure, the Heratees determined to
plunder him of it, and they would certainly have proceeded to do
so if the Vizier had not lined the streets and bazaars with troops.
His son, the Serdar Syud Mohamed Khan, also accompanied Major
Todd and his party to such a distance on their road as secured
them against any act of violence.
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AFTERthe departure of the British Envoy a grievous reaction took
place against all those who had participated in the liberality of the
English, or who, having served them, received pensions : they were
arrested, imprisoned, robbed of every thing, and reduced to the
deepest distress. There were but few merchants in Herat who
hadnot transacted business with Major Todd, some of whom had
made large fortunes ; these the vizier confiscated or grossly overtaxed to his own profit, and insults and oppression continued
during several months.
~naongstthe families who were the greatest sufferers was that
of the Kazi of Herat, I-Iassan Mohamed, ,and his son Akhood
Zadeh Saleh Mohamed ; they were stripped of a fortune amounting to 20,0001., and their wives, daughters, and slaves tortured
to make them disclose where the chief judge had secreted his
wealth. This venerable old man was actually condemned to
death, and his life was saved only by thg arrival of a ransom
of 14001. sent by Major Todd. to procure his release. T h e
villanous nature of Yar Mohamed resumed on this occasion all its
origind cruelty ; and it was in the midst of a sea of blood that he
seized the property of so many unhappy people-spoils that he considered legitimately to belong to him only because they had arisen
2 ~ 2
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out of, or were reputed to have done so, the corrupt generosity of
the English.
I t is worthy of remark that nine months before the departure of
the mission from Herat, Lord Auckland proposed to the Court
of Directors that Major Todd should be recalled, if the. measures
which the British Government wished to adopt in the principality should be received with suspicion by Yar. Mohamed Khan ;
and his Lordship observed that by such recall the vizier would be
made to feel his false position and to defend the independence of his
country. But on the arrival a t Calcutta of the news that the differences between Persia and England had been terminated by the
restitution of Gorian to Shah Kamran, this proposition was abandoned. D r . Riach, attach6 to the British embassy in Persia, who
had retired to Erzeroom, was despatched to Teheran in the month
of January, 1841, and travelled post to Khorassan, to be there a t
the surrender of the place; this had been stipulated for in a
treaty concluded between Great Britain and Persia, the latter
being compensated by the restitution of the island of Icarrack to
Mohamed Shah.
T h e Court of Directors hoped that this arrangement, and the
freedom i n which the new treaty with Persia would oblige the
Persian monarch to leave Yar Mohamed Khan, would put a stop
to the intrigues of the latter. But that was an erroneous anticipation ; and the departure of Major Todd from Herat a year afterwards, and just at the moment when Lord Auckland had succeeded
in obtaining an amelioration of his position, occasioned the East
India Company bitter disappointment-even resentment, and the
Secretary of Government received orders to write to Sir William
McNaghten, British Resident at Kabul, to whom Major Todd was
attached, that the late envoy at Herat .was considered as incapable
of yfilling a political appointment, and ought to rejoin his regiment
with dishonoz~r,
Here, then, was the recompense which this officer received
for so much labour and anxiety, so much devotion to his country,
so many dangers braved. Such are the Co~irtof Directors, men
who demand of a worthy man full of intelligence and capacity
a n impossible result-more than impossible ; and because he does
not obtain it - because he did not rid them of Yar Mohamed,
they cast upon him the imputation of dishonourable conduct, which
in fact they themselves deserve for the notorious folly and im-
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becility tbey displayed, not in the affairs of Herat only, but in
$11 the other provinces of Afghanistan in which they had a
policy to carry out. Was Major Todd, then, so guilty? Had
he not well estimated the circumstances when he advised they
should take everything out of the power of Yar Moharned and
occupy Herat with a British force ? Are not those Directors incapable whose avarice was in no degree less than that of Erar Nohamed, who knew not how to value their envoy's advice, and
allowed the vizier to believe that he might do as he pleased with
perfect impunity ? I t is disgraceful, scandalous, that writers s h ~ u l d
have been found in the British press sufficiently stupid and base t o
sanction the blame with which they sought to tarnish the name of
an intelligent and honourable man -blame which could never
conceal the black ingratitude of the Court of Directors.
Strong in the consciousness that his conduct at Herat had been
strictly irreproachable, the unfortunate Major D'Arcy Todd rejoined
in India the corps of artillery to which he belonged ; but, con.stantly oppressed by thoughts of the infamy with which they had
so unjustly sought to blast his good name, his laborious life rolled
on filled with bitterness, and i t was with real pleasure that he
received orders to take part in the war that broke out in 1845
between the English and the Sikhs. H e went into the field of
Feroseshah with the impressidn that he should there lay down his
life, and was conducting himself in the most gallant manner when
the iron messenger from one of the enemy's @ns realised in a moment his mournful presentiment. Before, however, he met a soldier's
death, Major Todd had long been reinstated in the esteem of his
countrymen, whose faith in him had for a moment been shaken,
and they now respect his memory and take a deep interest in the
events of his distinguished career-an interest which will be eternal.
I t will be remembered that when Major Todd went to I-Ierat his
instructions were also to make known the objects of the British policy
in Central Asia to the Khans of Bokhara and Khiva. The English suddenly passed from a state of the most confiding peacefulness to that of the most exaggerated fear, and were no longer
satisfied that the possession of Afghanistan efficiently secured their
Indian dominions. Turkestan was the barrier they now wished
to raise against Russia, by completely establishing their influence
in the Usbek Khanats. Moments even appeared precious, for, just
at the time when the Shah retired from before Herat, Count
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Simonitch boldly announced that a Russian corps d'arme'e was
leaving Orenburg and marching upon Khiva, to reduce the Khan
of that country, and the cabinet of St. Petersburg gave a very
reasonable motive for this new invasion of Tartary. A great
number of Russian subjects had been carried off by the Usbelrs
and sold as slaves in the markets of IChiva, and all negotiations
for their deliverance had hitherto .proved unsuccessful, for Allah
Kooli Khan had obstinately refused to give his consent to
their release. T h e Rusian Government at first sought a remedy
by making reprisals, and had detained at Astrakan ever since
the year 1833 a Khivan caravan, consisting of 200 men and
800 camels, laden with large quantities of merchandise of great
value ; but this, instead of rendering the Khan more reasonable,
only irritated him, and the Emperor therefore determined to employ
force to obtain his just demands.
I t was a t the commencement of the winter of 1840 that Genera.1
Peroffsky left Orenburg at the head of 6000 infantry, accompanied
by 10,000 camels and their army of drivers, to conquer the obstinate resistance of the Usbek sovereign. This season was chosen
for the expedition as being the one in which the troops would be
less distressed than at any other by the want of water in the arid
steppes across which they had to march; but, by one of those
strange chances which occur from time to time, this winter was
remarkable for its inclemency, and the difficultiesthat under ordinary circurnstances would have been by no means serious beca.me
terrible, even insurmountable, in consequence. The cold was
intense, and the mercury a t 40° below zero: snow covered the
earth to a considerable depth, and the vind swept with incredible
violence over the naked steppes. Several thousand soldiers were
frost-bitten and lost their legs and arms, and the greater.number,
both of men and animals, perished even before they reached Ak
Boolak (a station on the extreme frontier of Russia and Khiva), when
General Peroffsky wisely retreated, thus avoiding worse disasters.
Nothing could have served the purposes of the English better,
and their satisfaction was proportionably great when the discomfiture of the Russian army became known; but, remembering
that another expedition could be sent which might meet with
fewer obstacles, and achieve what this had just failed in doing,
they hastened t30 prevent, if possible, a fisesh advance of the Russians, by endeavouring to induce Allah Kooli Khan to give them
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the satisfiytion they demanded; and, in order to prevent the Shah
of Persia ftom_making a diversion in favour of the Tzar south of
Khiva, the British Government created much embarrassment for
him in his own kingdom.
I n speaking of the affairs of Kandahar, mention has been made
of an Ismaelian Syud " greatly renowned for his bravery, and much
venerated by the Beloochees, called Aga Khan. This chief, after
having escorted part of General Nott's baggage to Shikapoor in
1830, marched at the head of a body of cavalry into Kerman,
where he found no difficulty in establishing himself, for he had a
great many partisans in that province. His success was so rapid
and decided, that the Shah of Persia found himself compelled to
send a body of troops against him, and a year elapsed before he
could repress the insurrection and drive him from the country.
While Aga Khan was engaged in this irruption into the south of
Persia, Major Todd arrived a t Herat, and, in conformity with
the instructions he had received, sent Moharned I-Iassan on an
embassy to the Khan of Khiva. The Major could not possibly
have selected an envoy better qualified than the Kazi, for, in addition to the influence with Mussulmans which he possessed in virtue
of his ofice of kazi or chief judge, he had also that which arose from
his belonging to the Djagatais of Turkestan origin,t a tribe greatly
venerated in its own country. The kazi took with him letters from
Major Todd, Shah Kamran, and his vizier Yar Mohamed, to the
Khan of the Usbeks, and the Afghan prince requested him to conclude an alliance with the English ; but, notwithstanding these
recommendations, the mission was a dangerous and delicate one,
and it required real courage to accept it, .for it was generally
known a t the time that Yacooba Mehter, the vizier of Allah
Kooli Khan, had hitherto brought about the death of every one
who had supported the British policy. The brave and intelligent Kazi reached Khiva in safety, but met with an exceedingly
rude reception from Yacooba Mehter, which occasioned him
a momentary regret at having involved himself in this enterprise ;
he did not lose, however, either his coolness or his prudence.
Having been presented to the Khan on the day after his arrival,
* Thia chief is thus called on account
of his descent from Ismael, the old
Man of the Mountain.-Fernier.

7 t The descendsnta of Djiyatai, a aon
of Ghengis Khan.-Perriw.
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Mohamed Hassan left him to imagine in the first instance that he
was simply the bearer of a letter from Shah Kamran, which letter
he gave him. After the customary compliments, the Usbek prince
assumed an air of severity; and questioned him closely as to the
object of his journey ; and the following dialogue, which then took
place, I now relate as the Kazi himself related it to me :The -.Khan. Strengthen my belief in you, Oh Icazi, by assuring
me that you are still a Mussulman. Yet, if you were so, yon would
never have brought these Kiaffir Frenguis * into the country of
Islam.
E a z i . I t is not I who brought them, it is Allah who has
sent them to us.
The Ehnn. How darest thou thus profane the name of Allah,
by connecting it with such a bad action ?
53.e Ea.zi. I only tell the truth, and I can prove it to thee.
f l ~ eKhan. Prove it, then.
The Xazi. When the rafezist Kadjars $ laid siege to Herat, our
illustrious sovereign, who has no equal (bi nnzer), sent letters to
entreat you to come to our assistance-to us-Soonees like yourself, veritable pillars of Islam : Did you come ?
T ~ Ehan.
M
Never did Mussulman ask my help in vain! M y
victorious army marched immediately on my reception of the first
letter of Shah Kamran ;but, when I arrived a t Pindjdeh, Mohamed
Zeman Khan, Serdar of the Djemcheedis, assured me that my
troops were not required to save the place-that the Afghans were
all-sufficient, and I then returned to my own dominions.
The Kazi. And who, most mighty Khan, had need of your help,
Zeman Khan or Shah Kamran? Why attend to the words of the
former, when the fearful extremity to which the latter was reduced
was known to all Asia? Not only did you abandon our cause,
but you forbade your subjects to bring us provisions. This unhappy example was followed by the Bokharians and the Mohamedzyes, who, instead of coming to our aid, joined the rafezi
Kadjars. W h a t did the Frenguis then, whom you call Riaffirs ?
They came to aid the true children of Allah, they procured us the

*

Infidel Europeans,

f Heretics.

$ The Afghans, in speaking of a nation, frequently designate it by the
proper name of the tribe to which the

sovereign belongs: thua they call the
Persians, Kadjars; the Kandaharians,
Mohamedqes; thesindians, Talpoorae;
the Sikhs, Runcljeeta, &c.-Ferris.
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corn that you refused ; they brought us their gold, their blood, and
their intellect, to defend our ramparts that were crumbling under
the balls of Mohamed shah, and are now rising again under their
beneficent care. I t was they who lent the helping hand to the
unfortunate, who brought back to us abundance and tranquillity,
who distinguished themselves by their justice and equity, and protected the true Mussulman against the heretics. Which, then, are
the infidels,-the Persians, who inflicted upon us every kind of
misery, and whose part you take ; or those whom, deserted as we
were by our brethren, God sent to protect us, and whose help you
may want ere long to arrest the progress of the Russians ?
Th Ehan. I s it really true, Oh Kazi, that these Frenguis are
such as you describe them ? H a s Islam found support in them ?
A t this point the Kazi, seeing that the warnkh of his discourse
had made an impression upon Allah Rooli Ehan, drew from
his pocket the letter of Major Todd, and handed it to him,
saying, " Doubt it not for a moment, great prince ; receive this
letter that the most exalted elchee (ambassador) accredited to our
powerful sovereign addresses to thee ; its words axe so many pre'cious pearls that he has woven into the wreath of friendship, and
in connexion with which he offeis his prayers with thine to the
Almighty to grant thee a long and glorious reign."
The letter was enclosed in a silken bag embroidered with gold.
The Khan took it, broke the large seal of the British arms with
'animation, and, after having perused the missive, which contained
proposals of friendship and alliance, and also of active mediation
between him and the Russians, his contracted brow gradually expanded; and from that time he treated the Kazi with great respect.
Mohamed Hassan seized this favourable opportunity for complaining of the insolence of the vizier, which brought upon that
functionary a severe reprimand. T h e audience terminated in the
delivery of the presents sent by Major Todd to the Usbek prince
-optical instruments and splendid arms, at the sight of which
the whole court went into ecstasies; and the English cause was
further benefited by the disgrace of Yacooba Mehter, their most
dangerous enemy, who was kept a t a distance from the scene of
negotiations.
After having arranged the preliminaries of a treaty, the Kazi
'promptly set out on his return to Herat, to render to the British
envoy an account of the results of hi embassy: but when he
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reached Merv he fell into an ambush, which nearly proved fatal to
him. This had been prepared for him by the governor of the town,
Wiaz Mohamed Khan, uncle of Yacooba Mehter, the exasperated
minister. Fortunately some persons who were near, hearing the
Kazi's shouts, hastened to his assistance, and delivered him out
of the hands of his assassins, though with some severe contusions.
Niaz Mohamed, as if to testify his regret a t his misfortune, had
the hypocrisy to pay a visit to his victim, but no one was deceived
by that act of apparent courtesy ; the injuries received by the Kazi
were intended to impress upon his mind the disgrace he had
brought upon Yacooba Mehter, and for some time they certainly
answered their purpose.
A s soon as Major Todd was informed that the Kazi had succeeded in the object of his mission, he dispatched Captain Abbott
to I<hiva.* His instructions were, if possible, to induce Allah
Kooli Rhan to release the Russian prisoners ; and, as soon as he
had attained that object, to go to Astrakan and procure the liberation of the caravan, which had been detained there seven years
by the Russians. Captain Abbott commenced his journey very
early in 1340-and a t a most auspicious moment, for the army of
General Peroffsky had just been-decimated and obliged to retire,
and therefore a fair field lily open to him in which to bring his
negotiations to a favourable conclusion.
If the English were prodigal of their gold in facilitating the
conquest of Afghanistan, they certainly were not less so in their
endeavours to effect their object in Kurdistan ; and Captain Abbott
freely employed this means of persuasion. So lavish was he, that a t
Merv he was obliged to dispatch Akhood Zadeh Saleh Mohamed to
Hera t, to request Major Todd to send him a further supply of money
with the utmost dispatch : he did not, however, wait for this, but
continuing his journey to Khiva, was received there with distinction
by the Rhan, and this in spite of the intrigues of Yacooba Mehter,
who had been reinstated in the favour of his sovereign, and who,
justly or not, was considered a warm partisan of Russia. One
fact, however, appeared to indicate the contrary ; he exerted him-

* Captain Abbott published a narrative of his journey, but, being unacqudnted with the English language,
the anthor could not avail himself of
the adv.mtage of reading that interest-

ing work. His information relating to
the British negotiations in Khivais given
as he received it from the Kazi Hassan
Mohamed, and his son Akhood Zadeh
Saleh Mohnmed.-Perricr.
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self in evpry way to prevent the liberation of the Russian slaves,
which 'the English affirm he did only to give the Russians an
excuse for marching an a h y to Khiva. In defiance, however, of
the minister's opposition, the Khan made the concessions required
of him by Captain Abbott with a view of settling the differences
with Russia. Nevertheless, and although the definitive convention
was drawn up, the vizier did not consider himself vanquished;
the Kaxi of Herat had, it is true, escaped his toils, but such he
trusted would not be the case with Captain Abbott from those he
intended to spread for him.
Aftef having obtained a positive promise that the Russian slaves
should be restored, the British officer, anxious to terminate his important mission as quiclrly as possible, would not wait for the return
of Akhood Zadeh with the money from Herat ; but, procuring what
he required on the spot, he set out for Astrakan, accompanied by
seven servants, a mehmendar,* and a few horsemen furnished by
the Khan of Khiva,-the mehmendar being an officer of high rank,
named I-Iassai~Bahadoor. This official conducted Captain Abbott
in the first instance to the port of Guedik, and near it was encamped his own tribe, of which he was th; chief. Captain Abbott,
not -finding any vessel here, determined to proceed to Dach
Kaleh, four days' journey farther south, occupied by the Russians.
But I-Iassan Bahadoor refused to accompany him, alleging as a
reason that his orders from his sovereign were not to go beyond
Guedik ; and Captain Abbott was therefore obliged to continue
his journey without any escort : as to his servants they were like
himself, strangers in the country, and consequently ignorant of the
road.
The mehmendar was acting upon secret orders from the
treacherous vizier, who, foreseeing the difficulty in which Captain
Abbott would be placed if he could not find a ship, sent forward a messenger with an order that every vessel that might be
there should leave the port. The unsuspecting officer of course saw
no danger in going on, though it was on that part of his road that
those who had sworn his destruction were lying in wait for him ;and
he was not more than ten hours' march from Dach Kaleh when he
and his servants were assailed by a arty of Usbeks, against whom

* An officer whose duty it ia ,to pro- travelling in some parts of the Eat.cure food and lodging for amba~andors Forriot-.
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they a t first made a vigorous resistance; but, being in the end
overpowered by numbers, they were seized and stripped. Captain
Abbott lost two fingers in the meEe and received a gash on the head,
and in this miserable condition he was carried to a camp of nomades ten miles to the north, almost on the borders of the Caspian
Sea. His new hosts behaved to him with great cruelty ; his servants being all taken from him and dispersed in different camps,
were made the slaves of those whose hospitality they had claimed.
While Captain Abbott was thus treated a t the instigat.ion of the
villain Yacooba Mehter, Akhood Zadeh arrived a t Khiva, bringing
with h i m a thousand ducats from Major Todd, but his utmost
diligence had not enabled him to reach that town before Captain
Abbott's departure ; and when he proposed to follow him, he was
informed by Yacooba Mehter of the report of the unfortunate
officer's death : the vizier at the same time ordered all the letters
from Major Todd to Captain Abbott to be taken from Akhood
Zadeh, though being written in English he could not understand their contents. After Akhood Zadeh had been ten days a t
Khiva some information he received led him to suppose that Captain Abbott was still alive, and under the influence of this hope he
fonned the generous determination of going immediately in search
of him. Allah Kooli Khan a t first attempted to prevent him from
risking his life in so perilous an enterprise ; but, finding him resolute, h e sanctioned his departure, and ordered him a guard of eight
horsemen for his personal security. I t was a rough task that the
son of the Kazi of Herat undertook ; ignorant of the country
and the Tartar language, he was obliged to wander from tent to
tent over the arid steppes by tracks scarcely to be distinguished,
often led astray by false information, and having frequently to
contend with the ill-will of his escort. But he did not the less perseveringly continue t o scour the country in search of the British
o5cer. On the seventeenth day after he left Khiva, a t the encampment of Maukeglag, he first came upon traces by which he
trusted he should at last discover Captain Abbott, and he determined to press on without delay to the spot indicated as the place
of his detention, when the escort, acting upon secret orders from Yacooba Mehter, refused to accompany him, asserting that this part of
the country mas in such a state, that to go there was to expose themselves to certain death. I-Iowever, the noble Akhood Zadeh was
not daunted by any of the dangers that were pointed out to him ;
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he abandoned his camels and provisions to the nomades of Maukeglag, a i d departed alone on his uncertain way across the steppe.
His sufferings in consequence were terrible, Hourly in dread of being
robbed and murdered, destitute of water to quench the burning
thirst of either himself or his horse, or food to alleviate his hunger,
he felt himself, at the close of the fourth day, perishing from inanition, when a traveller on foot happily crossed his path, who gave
him a draught of water and a handful of maize. Thus slightly
supported, he continued his weary search ; for, such was his devotion, that he would have died rather than have failed in it. At length,
and on the fifth day, he reached the encampment in which C a p
tain Abbott was detained by the rascals who had plundered him.
The unfortunate officer was lying on a wretched carpet, suffering
much from his wounds, and expecting his death every moment, when
a Rossack entered the tent, and said, '' They come to deliver you ;"
and he had scarcel) uttered these words when Akhood Zadeh stood
before him. " Barik Allah," * exclaimed his friend, " my eyes are
gladdened, for I have found you, and my arrival is the end of your
misery." The effect of this most unhoped-for deliverance upon
Captain Abbott's feelings may be imagined. Akhood Zndeh then
placed in his hands the thousand ducats which he had concealed in
his belt during the two-and-twenty days that had elapsed after he
left Khiva, and which he all the time dreaded would be taken from
him. This act is the more striking, in the eyes of those who know
the Asiatic character, than.his devotion to the British cause and Captain Abbott, for he could so easily have said that he had been robbed,
and no one would for a moment have doubted his word. Few,
indeed, are the Afghans who would have acted as he did.t When
the first outpourings of the heart between Captain Abbott and his
gallant and self-denying deliverer had passed, the latter presented
to the chief of the horde the firman of which he was the bearer ;

*
t

Glory t o Cod.
His conduct benefited him but
little: others, whose services were not
to be comparedwith his, were rewarded
liberally, while he obtained scarcely so
much as he had a right to ex ect. This
ingratitude on the part of those he
served s o well changed his character,
and in 1847 he was guilty of an act
of bad faith that was punished by the
bastinado, under the orders of the
governor of Khorassan, Assaf Dooulet,

t o make him restore some thousands
of francs which hnd been given him
by the English for the purpose of
proceeding to Khulm to seek for some
English prisoners who were said to be
there. Akhood Zadeh received t h e
money, but remained at home, quietly
sending reports from time to' time t o
the British Legation, as if he had really
been occupied in the transaction he had
engaged to carry out.-Fowior.

43 0

THE PUSS BASHI.

CHAP. XSVIII.

in this Allah ICooli Khan enjoined his subjects to aid him in discovering Captain Abbott, who, as well as his servanta, were to be
delivered up to him if ever they were found within his dominions.
T h e nomades thus perceived, though rather late, that in obeying
their chief and attacking the British oficer, they had exposed themselves to the anger of their sovereip, for it was clear he had
been quite ignorant of this miserable business, and the responsibility therefore was likely to fall uFon themseives. Beseeching
Captain Abbott t o pardon them, they overwhelmed him with
attentions, and conducted him two days' journey on the road to
I\/Iaukeglag to another encampment; this was composed of two
portions of different tribes, one of which was commanded by a
chief named Yuss Bsshi, the other by a son of the villain Hassan
Bahadoor, and i t was in the tent of the former that the travellers
took up their temporary abode.
Yuss Bashi gave his guest the warmest reception, and the son
of Hassan Bahadoor soon paid him a visit; but when he found
the British officer intended to make his father responsible for
the treatment he had received, he hastened to inform him of
the fact, and also that their enemy Yuss Bashi was collecting
evidence against them to aggravate his crime. The messenger who carried this letter made such dispatch, that in the
short interval of four days I-Iassan Bahadoor arrived a t his son's
camp, at the head of 150 horsemen, for the purpose of preventing Captain Abbott from returning to Khiva escorted by Yuss
Bashi, who could do them the greatest possibli. injury in the
estimation of their sovereign. When he had pitched his tent he
pressed Captain Abbott to be his guest, on the ground that he
was his mehmendar, and that i t was his duty to watch over the
safety of his person. This officer, however, decidedly refused
to avail himself of his offer, and rejected the invitation, Yuss
Bashi supporting his refusal and sharply reproaching Hassan
Bahadoor with his prwious conduct. The discussion grew warm,
swords were drawn, and blood would have been shed, but for the
intervention of Akhood Zadeh, who a t last prevailed upon his
friend to inhabit the tent of Hassan a t night, remaining in the
daytime with Yuss Bashi. Captain Ahbott now wished to return
to Khiva, but Akhood Zadeh dissuaded him. " Allah Kooli,"
said he, " is not ignorant that the letters I brought for you were
taken from me by force ; and he will not fail to be influenced by
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the reports qf Hassan Bahadoor, who is so interested in exculpating
himself from his criminal proceedings against you. Yacooba
Mehter will help him, and possibly you may lose by their fresh
intrigues the fruits of your previous negotiations. Hold, then, to
what you settled with Allah Kooli Khan ; go on to Dach Raleh
and Astrakan, while I return to lQiva to watch over your interests,
and be prepared for whatever may occur."
This advice the English officer adopted, and by so doing eventually lost all benefit from his clever and courageous conduct on
this anxious and dangerous embassy. He reached the Russian
fortress, where his finger was amputated, and as soon as his wounds
were healed proceeded to Astralcan to confer with the Russian
authorities, while Akhood Zadeh returned to Khiva, with an escort
provided by Hassan Bahadoor.
The report to which Yacooba Mehter gave currency, that Captain Abbott had been killed, soon reached Herat; and Major
Todd, greatly distressed at the misfortune which deprived him of
the co-operation of so good an assistant and compromised the
negotiations entered into with the Khan of Khiva, immediately
dispatchd to his court Lieutenant Richmond Shakespear to complete them, and to ascertain what had really been the fate of their
lamented brother-officer. Lieutenant Shakespear, accompariied by
the Kazi Hassan Mohamed, arrived a t Khiva at the commence- .
ment of June, 1840, on the same day that Akhood Zadeh (who
the reader will remember was the son of the kazi) reached it from
Maukeglag, and from him they heard of the dangers that had
befallen Captain Abbott, and of his unlooked-for deliverance.
When Lieutenant Shakespear was thoroughly satisfied of his countryman's safety, he proceeded with the business that Captain Abbott
had so well commenced. Allah Kooli Khan, who was at heart
favourably inclined towards the English, soon gave up the prejudices
that his vizier had instilled into his mind against them, and he even
took pleasure in conversing with Lieutenant Shakespear on matters
connected with their policy. " How is it," he said to him one day,
6 L that your nation, whicll is so distant from mine, should wish so,
much for an alliance with me ? " " We possess India," replied that
officer; " a vast garden, and, for fear of a surprise, we wish to
surround it by walls,-those walls are Khiva, Bokhara, Herat, and
Kabul." The Khan, satisfied by this answer, which showed him
there was a possibility of obtaining .support against the Russians,
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remained from that moment perfectly willing to treat, whatever his
minister might do to induce him to adopt a contrary part. Yacooba
Mehter seeing all his plans defeated, sought in every way to multiply
difficulties and embarrass Lieutenant Shakespear) and, at the moment when the treaty was about to be concluded,rhe had the impertinence to say to him, " Thou who wishest to ally thyself to a
Mussulman nation, why dost thou not become a Mussulman ? T h y
dost thou remain an infidel ? " " Which of us is the infidel ? " said
the British officer,-" you who, driven by insatiable avarice, daily
put slaves to the torture, tear the daughter from her father, the
wife from her husband, and sell them to the highest bidder in your
bazaars ; or those who, like myself, seek the deliverance of SO many
unhappy being, and wish to send them back to their country
and their families?" Allah Kooli, ashamed of the humiliating
reproof that his vizier had drawn upon himself, with some apparent ill-humour, dismissed him with these words: " When tpill
you cease to expose our vices to strangers? this is one who .will
make them known to the whole world." Yacooba Mehter, after
.
the close of this conference, remained in disgrace for eight days.
U p to this time the Khivan prince had always insisted that the '
T z a r should return the caravan that had been detained a t Astrakan before he set the slaves at liberty; but Lieutenant Shakespear triumphed even over that resolution, by giving him, as a
guarantee, a bill of exchange for 44001., endorsed by the Eazi of
Herat, which was to be paid in case the caravan should not be
restored after the Russians were given up. This arrangement being,
satisfactorily concluded, the British envoy collected all the subjects
of the Tzar, amounting to four hundred and twenty-four, and .
having hired camels and men, left Khiva, but on arriving a t
old Urghendj, he learned that a Russian woman had: been
detained in the harem of the Usbek prince. Regardless of the
consequences that might result from the demand, he immediately sent an express to Allah Rooli Khan, and such wzls his
influence with him, that the woman was set a t liberty, in spite of
the remonstrances of Yacooba Mehter, and she had the happiness
of rejoining her countrymen. The restitution of the caravan took.
place immediately on Lieutenant Shakespear's arrival at dstrakan
with the rescued slaves; thence he went to Orenburg, and ,fi.om
thela .to St. Petersburg. A t the capital he was received in the most
courteous manner by the Emperor, and decorated with a Russian
~
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order ; by. his own Government he was knighted. Certainly, the
important results obtained by this officer justified the favour in which
he was'hela by the Tzar and his own Sovereign; but his good
fortune is one proof more to be added to the many existing in the
world that seven-eighths of aur success in this life are the result of
accident-Sir Richmond Shakespear did but gather the fruits of
the labours of the Kazi of Herat and Captain Abbott. T h e
recompense of the former was complete ruin, brought upon him by
Yar Mohamed, to punish him for being so useful to the English,
and he now vegetates in poverty and misery a t Meshed ; the reward
of the latter is the loss of two fingers, with other wounds-such
is the gratitude of governments. Sir Richmond Shakespear, on
the contrary, makes a journey to Khiva, the difficulties of which
have been removed; above all, he has the Kazi with him, which
is a guarantee for his success ; and then, because he succeeds,
without a thought being bestowed on the exertions of his predecessors, he becomes the centre of rewards, praises, and compliments, while the energetic and courageous pioneers, those who
prepared the way for him, fall into the most complete oblivion.
What a sad comedy is the world !
Was it persuasion only that induced the Khan of Khiva to give
up his captives? This is a point that we have nut been able to
verify ; but even if gold did assist the negotiations for the release
of the Russian prisoners, can we do otherwise than admire the nation
that obtained that result, and made such a judicious selection of its
agents to carry out so loyal and noble an enterprise ? England, by
liberating so many unhappy beings, and restoring them to Russia,
destroyed her principal reason for undertaking a second expedition
to Khiva. In re-establishing the good understanding between the
Tzar Nicholas and Allah Kooli Khan, the English expected to preserve a powerful influence over the latter; but that ex~ectation
was completely opposed to the one entertained by the court of
St. Petersburgh, which Lad a direct interest in subjugating, sooner
or later, the people of Turkestan, and, therefore, in habituating
them never to acknowledge any supremacy but that of Russia. By
underhand means, therefore, Allah Kooli was made to comprehend
that, if there was danger for him in offending Russia, there was
equal risk in seeking support at other hands than hers; and the
Usbek sovereign had scarcely settled his troubles with Russia,
when he saw his relations with Persia assume a most unfavourable
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aspect, for the Shah, in the most imperious manner, demanded of
him the restoration of 40,000 of his subjects held in slavery in
the Khivan dominions. I t is easy to see who instigated this
demand. Allah Kooli Khan replied that, however desirous he
might be to preserve a friendly intercourse with the Shah in Shah,*
it was impossible for him to comply with his demand. " T h e
greater part of the Persian slaves," he said, " have been legally
bought of the Turkomans settled on my frontier, who are not
subject to my laws, and from whom it would be impossible to
obtain the sums they have received for them. Many of these
slaves have redeemed themselves, married, and become established
in my dominions ; have raised up families and interests ; and to
authorize their return to Persia would create a disturbance amongst
my subjects that would end in a rebellion, in which I should be the
first victim. I t is not, therefore, in my power to grant the demand
of Mohamed Shah."
T h e English once more offered their intervention, in the hope
of accommodating this difference, and i t formed the object of
another embassy, which Sir W. iM6Naghten, the Resident at the ,
court of Shah Shooja, confided to Captain Conolly, an officer of
great ability, and who had already distinguished himself on several
occasions. t Moreover, to give him greater consideration and
authority, Sir William sent with him an Afghan ambassador,
Allah D a d Khan, Popolzye, who was the bearer of letters from his
sovereign, Shah Shooja, to the Khan of Khiva.
Escorted by the Hazarahs deh Zingui, Conolly skirted the
mountains inhabited by them, travelling direct from Kabul to
Meimana, and from that town he wrote to Major Todd, who was
then a t Herat, to forward him some money, of which he was in
need. T h e major a t once despatched Akhood Zadeh with two
hundred ducats; and as the latter was now so well known a t
Khiva, and could be of use to him there, Captain Conolly took
him on to the capital. Here the British officer was received with
-great honour by the Khan, who gave him many proofs of his
esteem for himself and his Government, but resisted all his arguments in favour of the manumission of the Persian slaves, and
positively refused to liberate them.
* King of Kinga, the title of the
Persian monarch.-Forrier.
t He travelled in Persia, Turkestan,

and Afghanistan in 1832. His volume
of travels was published in London,
Ferrier.

CEAP. XXVIII.

REQUIRENENTS OF THE KHAN.

435

Captain conilly had beep four months at Khiva when a letter
arrived from Yar Mohdmed, informing the Khan that he had
expelled Major Todd from ?&rat, and recommended him to imitate his example and turn Captain Conolly out of his capital. But
instead of adopting this advice, the Usbek sent him a robe of
honour, and with it the vizier's letter, assuring him that be spurned
such a proposal, and begged him to consider Khiva as his country,
and the royal palace as his own house. Captain Conolly failed
not to endeavour to turn this evidence of good feeling towards
himself to account by urging again the cause of the poor slaves ;
but his exertions were utterly thrown away. H e then took up the
idea of purchasing these unfortunate persons on account of the
Indian Government.
One of the principal causes of the dissatisfaction of Mohamed
Shah with the English was their refusal to pay a subsidy promised
to Persia by Mr. MacDonald Kinnear, then British ambassador a t
the court of Feth Ali Shah, to assist that sovereign in making
war against Russia. Captain Conolly thought that, if a sum of
money were applied in the interest of Persia as a ransom for the
slaves in question, both the Shah of Persia and the Khan of
Khiva would be equally well satisfied ; and he therefore sent
Akhood Zadeh to Kabul to induce Sir W. McNaghten to sanction
the plan, and forward it to Calcutta as the best suggestion he
could offer for adjusting the difference that had been created by
the demands of the court of Teheran. T h e departure of this
intelligent and faithful friend from Khiva was the signal for a
thousand intrigues, which put an end to the influence of England
a t the court of the Usbek. Sincerely devoted to those whom they
served, and united to the Turkomans by the ties of religion, none
could better forward British interests in that part of Turkestan
than the Kazi of Herat and his son ; when they left, Yacooba
Mehter regained the ascendant, and Russian interests again
prevailed. The Khan, though he conceded nothing to Captain
Conolly, became daily more exacting and difficult to please, and
finally insisted that he should apply to the Government a t Calcutta
for a subsidy for him, inasmuch as they paid one to the sovereign
of Herat : with this difference, however, that, instead of declining
the assistance of English officers, he wished for some to organise
his army and cast guns for him. The British agent endeavoured
to make him understand that a t that moment his request could
2 ~ 2
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not be granted, a s it would endanger the life of Colonel St.oddart,
tben a captive at Bokhara, because the Emir would not fail
to be offended if support were given to one of his neighbours
whose power he most dreaded. T h e Khan, however, could not or
would not be convinced by Conolly's reasoning, and became less
and less favourably disposed towards him : finally he made the
English officer comprehend that he was in his way, and that he
should not be sorry to see him leave his dominions.
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Captain Conolly leaves for Kokan -Liberality of that officer -War between
Bokhara and Kokan Colonel Stoddart requests Conolly t o come to Bokhasa
-The Khan of Kokan ie averse to hia going -Nasser Ullah sends a firman t o
Captain Conolly insuring his safety -Conolly leaves Kokan for the E d s
camp-Colonel Stoddart -~ a d a u s ~ i c under
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that officer when presented to Nasser Ullah - He treats him with insolence
Stoddart ia arrested - Barbarous treatment - The Mir Cheb -Stoddart is
confined in the Siah-tchah -He turns Mussulman -Russian intervention in his
favour - Stoical courage' of Stoddart -The Emir changes his conduct towar&
him - Vicissitudes to which he is subjected - The Sultan interferes in his
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AKHOOD
ZADEHhad left Khiva fourteen days when :Captain
Conolly determined to quit it also and go to Kokan. H e had
instructions to explore the road to that town, leaving Bokhara on
the right, and passing through Altoon Kaleb, Ak-Mesdjid, and
Achkiane ; a perfect knowledge of that route was of infinite
importance to England, as the Russians were daily drawing closer
to it, and it was evidently their object to occupy the points which
command it in order to be able to act more powerfully upon
the small Tartar states. T h e Cabinet of St. Petersburg had long
since signified to them its intention of constructing a fortress at Ak
Mesdjid, for at this spot the three roads diverge which lead from
the north to Khiva, Bokhara, and Kokan. A careful examination
convinced Captain Conolly of the danger that would ensue to the
independence of Turkestan if this encroachment on the -part of
Russia was permitted, and he advised the Usbek princes to resist
it to the utmost. T h e Emperor Nicholas, however, entirely disregarded their remonstlmces, and imperatively informed the Khans
that he allowed them three years to make up their minds to leave
Ak-Mesdjid and its neighbourhood. This delay expired in 1844;
and the following year, when I passed through Meshed, the Usbeks
from the north assured me that the Russian fortress was rising
fast. .
Captain Conolly was six weeks in going from Rhiva to Kokan,
the Emir of which, Mohamed Ali I.han, gave him a brilliant
reception, and he had no great difficulty in winning him over to
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the interests of his Government; but it should be stated that his
presents, amongst which were expensive fire-arms, inlaid and ornamented, and Cashmeer shawls, which he distributed profusely as
auxiliaries in his negotiations, contributed not a little to produce
this result. H e travelled with a train of eighty servants and an
immense quantity of baggage, and the principal inhabitasts of the
towns he pwsed through shared in his liberality, as well as the
Government officials, however low OF high might be their rank.
This mode of proceeding in a country in which the people are
characterised by extreme covetousness could not do less than create
an immense number of partisans; and during the three months
that Captain Conolly remained at Kokan the inhabitants of that
town were almost as much under his influence as that of Mohamed
Ali Khan.
The Emir of Bokhara presumes to impose his suzerainty over all
the Usbek Khanats which join his own ; but it often happens that
those which do not recognise his right to that supposititious
claim oblige him to place himself on the defensive. The Khan
of Kokan, now nearly fifteen years ago, showed the greatest
determination not to submit to his rule; but after having been
defeated in many engagements, he was obliged to bend to the
yoke of Nasser Ullah in 1839. I t would appear that the presence
of the English officer made Mohamed Ali rather audacious and
restive, for he suddenly refused to comply with the conditions of
the treaty which he had made with the Emir; and the latter,
seeing that negotiation was useless, marched against him at the
head of 12,000 men.
When this expedition was undertaken Captain Conolly was still
at Kokan, and received about this time a letter from Colonel
Charles Stoddart, then a prisoner at Bokhara, in which he pressed
him to go to the camp of Nasser Ullah, who had manifested the
greatest desire to treat with him for a definitive alliance with England. In this way the Emir hoped he should he able to get Captain
Conolly into his power, for, believing as he did that that officer was
the instigator of the war which he was now obliged to undertake
against the Khan of Kokan, he had a hostile feeling towards him.
Captain Conolly was by no means blind to the danger that
lurked under this request of Nasser Ullah's, and he hesitated a t
first what course he should take ; but the hope of attaching the
Emir to the British policy, the advantages to be derived therefrom
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by his Government, and the honour it would reflect upon himself,
made him think lightly of his personal safety, and he determined
to proceed to the Emir's camp, thoroughly persuaded that i t would
be easy to induce him to enter into the league which the other
Usbek princes had formed against Russia. Nevertheless, before he
set out he despatched amessenger to request him to send a firman
insuring his safety on his journey. Nasser Ullah, delighted a t
the facility with which he was drawing the British officer into the
snare prepared for him, immediately sent the document, and so
much importance did he attach to the fact of his receiving it quickly,
that he promised his liberty to the slave who was the bearer of it,
across a country covered with the enemy's troops and beset with
dangers, if he delivered it within a specified time.
The Khan of Kokan and all the nobles of his court besought
Captain Conollyoto give up this expedition, and entreated him not
to place any confidence in the word of Nasser Ullah: they even detained him a few days by force ; but seeing that he was obstinate
in his determination, they allowed him to depart, though not without reget, and made him promise to send them an account of his
journey, and also the Emir of Bokhara's plan of his intended
- campaign. It is also worthy of remark, that the Khan of Khiva
had advised the English officer on several ~.ccasionsnot to risk
his life and liberty on the territory of Bokhara, let the proposal
to go there come from whatever quarter it might, for that he
would there find nothing but danger and bad faith. I t was then
something more than imprudence that induced Captain Conolly to
throw himself into the lion's mouth ; and it is impossible not to
respect sincerely such exalted ideas of duty. Which, in truth, is
the most deserving of admiration, the men who push the abnegation of the principle of self-Preservation to such an extreme solely
in the interests of their country, or the country which gave them
birth and produces such glorious instances of patriotism ?-a
country prodigal of its wealth and the blood of its most intelligent
and bravest officers, for the merest shadow of an advantage that
may disappear in the chances and changes of the future. This is
not the optimism of the greater number of European states,; and
those amongst them who boast of their power and civilization,
who shine by their imagination and the wordy eloquence of their
Governments, who fence for ever in empty space, would do well to
take example from Great Britain.

T e n days after he left Kokan Captain Conolly reached the
camp of the Emir of Bokhara. T h e reception which he met with
from this prince at Djizak, though coId and haughty, inspired him
with some confidence, and this led him to attempt a reconciliation
between the Emir and his vassal. Having succeeded, he left the
two sovereigns to discuss the conditions of their treaty, and, under
an escort furnished by the Emir, went on to Bokhara, where he
took up his residence in the house of a Persian, Abdul Samut
Khan,* Naib T o p Khane,? whose abode was outside the walls.
Here for a time we must leave Captain Conolly to return to
Colonel Charles Stoddart. The reader will not have forgotten
that he was attached to the .British embassy at the court of
Teheran, and was the bearer of the ultimatum sent to the Shah
by Sir John MbNeil in July, 1838, in which the British Minister
declared war, in the event of the Shah refusing to raise the siege
of Herat. After the Persians retired, Colonel Stoddart rejoined
Major Pottinger a t Herat, whence he was soon obliged to depart
on account of the differences that arose between him and Yar
Mohamed. H e then went to Bokhara, charged by Sir .John
M'Neil with the difficult task of inducing the Emir to become the
chief of a league of the Tartar states against Russia.
'rhis officer had, and with great justice, the reputation of b e k g
an excellent soldier-loyal, firm, full of zeal, and of the highest
courage ; but with these fine qualities there was an impetuosity 'of
disposition and an imperious tone about him, based upon the conviction that he belonged to the first nation in the world, and that

* This wretch, who was of Persian
origin, commenced his military career
in the army of Abbas K r z a (when that
prince was viceroy of Azerbaidjan), and
obtained the rank of lieutenant, which
he subsequently lost in consequence
of some disgraceful conduct that a
French officer thought it his duty to
report. As t b waa not the first time
he had thus offended, Abbaa Mirza
ordered that one of his ears should be
cut off, and dismissed him from the
army. After this punishment he offered
hia services to t h e serdars of Afghanistan, and by them he wm well received,
but was in the end obliged t o leave that
country for various misdeeds. He afterwards retired to Peshawur, which then
belonged to the Mnharadjnh of the Pun-

jab, but there, as everywhere else, he
indulged his intriguing disposition, and
joined a conspiracy that had been set
on foot against the governor of the
town, General Avitabile, a Neapolitan
in the service of Runjeet Sing. Abdul
Samut and his accomplices were taken :
some were hanged, and some put to
death in other ways, but the greater
number were hamstrung. The rascally
Kh'm escaped with a severe application
of the bastinado, and orders to leave
Peshawur without loss of time.
I t was then that he went to Bokharn,
where to a certaiu extent he organized
an army for the Emir, of which he
received the command.-Fmisr.
t Commander-in.chief of theartillery.
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all the others ought to bend before him. Other points in his
character also rendered him but little suited to conduct an embassy
to the Emir of Bokhara. I t was an error of Sir John McNeil's
(who, to say the truth, resembled him in many respects) to select
such a man to manage negotiations which required the greatest
address and pliancy of disposition.
The following details concerning the captivity of Colonel Stoddart
were related to me by the Kazi of Herat, Akhood Zadeh, and
several Bokharian chiefs ; and I have seen similar inforination in
the account given by Dr. Wolf of the Bokhara victims, translated
by Philarste Charles, which I also make use of here, adding to it
whatever seems to me to have been overlooked. This courageous
traveller describes the Colonel as severe and proud, attached to the
habits and religion of his childhood and his country, and inflexible
to everything but military discipline. Stoddart, he says, found
himself in contact with beasts of prey, destitute alike of pity
and good faith, shamelessly perfidious, wedded to the minutis of
forms, believing themselves justified in doing anything after they
have said their prayers and performed their ablutions, and deceiving and killing with perfect tranquillity of conscience. I t has
,been already shown that, in wounding the pride of Yar Mohamed,
Stoddart had made him his enemy, and the vizier subsequently
wrote a letter to Nasser Ullah, in which he described the British
officer as a very dangerous spy, full of intrigue and pride, and
an obstinate man; adding that he must be defeated in his views
or exterminated. This epistle he sent by one of the colonel's
suite to the Emir.
Stoddart, who had no suspicion of the excellent letter of
recommendation of which one of his servants was t.he bearer, nor
the habits and customs that he had to encounter, ent.ered the
territory of Bokhara full of confidence, and arrived in the
capital of Nasser Ullah two days previously to the fast of
Ramazan, during which the fanaticism of Mahomedans is always
much greater than at any other time. A numerous escort of
cavalry, preceded by a mehmendar, received and accompanied him
to the residence which had been appointed him in the house
of the vizier, Mahzoom Berdi-Reiss, who affected great indignation that the letters with which Stoddart was furnished were
addressed to his predecessor instead of to him. But this was
only a pretext; for when the colonel left 'Persia the appoint-
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ment of the new vizier a t Bokhara was not known there ; however,
it mas in this way that the system of intimidation commenced,
and after the letter of Yar Mohamed was placed in the hands
of the Emir, the latter sought every opportunity of humiliating
the stranger who came, as he believed, to meddle in his affairs.
Stoddart received these affronts haughtily ; the minister did not
return his visit, and sent him word that he must come to him ;
the British agent, however, refused to go; and matters were in
this state when Mahzoom Berdi-Reiss entered the colonel's apartment one morning with the vehement apostrophe, " Do you know I
have destroyed all the Emir's enemies ?" '' I rejoice to hear,"
replied Stoddart, with misplaced irony, '' that the Emir has no
more enemies." After this unsatisfactory commencement they
went on in the same style on both sides.
On the first day of Ramazan the colonel received orders to go
on foot to the Registan, the great square in Bokhara, as the Emir
wanted to speak to him ; but Stoddart refused to walk there, and
replied that h e should go on horseback, that force only should
make him dismount, and that he should do a t Bokhara just the
same as he would do in London.
T o Nasser Ullah, who was already so ill-disposed against him,
this answer appeared most insulting ;neither a Christian nor a Jew
could show himself on horseback in Bokhara, nor any one but
the Emir himself on the Registan. However, word was sent to the
Englishman that he might do as he pleased ; and Stoddart, in full
Europeaxtn uniform, caracolled his horse on the forbidden ground, to
the great scandal and surprise of the populace. But they were
astounded when the sound of the trumpets announced the approach
of the E k i r ;and the stranger, instead of dismounting, settled himself in his stirrups, and received him simply with a military salute.
T h e Emir, seeing himself thus publicly defied, fixed one long
look upon him, and passed on in perfect silence. Some minutes
afterwards a maharam* was sent to Stoddart by Nasser Ullah to
ask why he had not dismounted in the presence of the sovereign?
" It is not the custom of my country," said the colonel. " Eut it is
of ours," replied the officer. " I cannot act otherwise," continued
Stoddart. " It is well ; the Emir is satisfied, and desires you to go
to his palace :" and the chamberlain withdrew.

*

Chamberlain.
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I t was not thus that the intelligent Alexander Burnes prepared
for his reception by the Emir of Bokhara. H e sent a letter,
in which h e requested "protection and shelter for the traveller from
that ' Magnificent Sovereign, the Citadel of true Believers, the
Tower of Islam, the Pearl of the Faith, the Star of Religion, the
Dispenser of Equity, and Pillar of the Faithful.' " How did
Burnes, without any official position, manage to make friends at
Bokhara, and to escape every danger? By respecting their
bigotry, by conforming to their extravagant etiquette, their
Chinese love of forms, and amazing hypocrisy. All obstacles gave
way before him. But Stoddart, on the contrary, appears to have
taken it into his head to trample under foot every Usbek custom,
and to exhibit a t the court of Bokhara.that unbending pride
which is so dear to the English traveller, and at which even
Europeans so often take offence.
Before receiving the British envoy, the Emir ordered some
Jews, who had traded in Europe, and knew, or were supposed
to know, what ceremonies were observed a t the courts of
Christian sovereigns when they gave audience to an ambassador,
to be brought into his presence ; and as they affirmed that the
salute which Stoddart had made was in conformity with the
usages of his country, the Emir was satisfied on the point, and
gave an order that he should be admitted a t the palace. On his
arrival there the colonel was led into a
that terminated
at the interior court of the building in which Nasser Ullah held his
durbar and received petitions. Here a chamberlain approached
him, and said that he was about to request on his (Stoddart's)
part the Emir's permission to introduce him and present his
I?TZ bend2guiani-"
the supplication of his slave." T h e colonel was
offended at this; he might as well have been offended a t the
words '' Your Majesty," which scarcely belong to any but to God,
or have objected to the ordinary phrase " your very humble
servant," which signifies nothing. But the stiff and precise i d e a
of Stoddart thought that such a form of expression was humiliating,
and he replied with vehemence, "I address my prayers to God
only ; I am not the slave of any one : tell your master that I will
communicate what I have to say when he bas received me, and not
before." The same inflexibility was manifested by several other
traits of a like nature. T h e presence of a sovereign in these
countries is presumed to have the effect of overwhelming a stranger
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who comes within reach of the effulgence of his rays ; and in consequence of this he is supported under the arms when he enters
the hall of audience in which the monaroh is seated. Stoddart,
who was compelled to submit to this ceremony, shook off with
violence the two assistants who introduced him ; and this conduct
excited the anger of the Bokharians. The master of the ceremonies then approached the colonel to touch his clothes, in order
to see that he had no arms secreted upon his person with which he
might attempt the Emir's life, and a vigorous blow from Stoddart's fist that laid him at his feet was ,the result of this unfortunate investigation. Nasser Ullah Khan heard from the inner apartment all that passed in the antechamber, and the proceedings of
the English envoy irritated him to the highest degree. A t the
door of the audience-chamber is placed a n officer, who, at the
mnment a stranger is admitted, repeats the words, " Pray ye all for
the sovereign," as if, amidst such a ferocious people, death and
danger were always present. Stoddart, who had never made
himself acquainted with any of these details, .instead of offering up
a silent invocation, began reciting in a loud voice a prayer to God
in Persian, upon which Nasser Ullah, seated on the royal dais,
stroked his beard, full of hatred for this arrogant stranger, and
disgusted by his coarse and domineering behaviour.
T h e Emir, having repeated the accustomed Allah 6 Akbar (God
is great), received from the colonel's hands the letter which he had
brought from Sir John MiNeil, read it, and informed Colonel
Stoddart that he could not take into consideration its contents,
because it would be derogatory in him to treat with a simple delegate of the British minister. Also, that, in order to continge the
negotiations, it would be necessary the colonel should deliver to him
credentials signed by the Queen of England herself. Stoddart
replied in a dry tone that Sir John MCNeilwas likewise the agent
and acted forthe East India Company, and that this Company had
made treaties with all the sovereigns of Asia ; that their power was
great, and that h e did not understand. the Emir's objections on
this head, inasmuch as there was both honour and profit for him in
becoming the ally of that powerful body. Nasser Ullah was far
from being satisfied with this reply : he stated that the Emperor
Nicholas, his neighbour, a monarch whose power a t least equalled
that of Queen Victoria, was not too proud to write to him with
his own hand, and that he knew of no reason which could prevent

.
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the sovereign of Colonel+3toddart from doing as much.
I can,"
said the Emir to the colonel, " treat only on the grounds of equality;
nevertheless, while waiting for the instructions which I recommend you to obtain from London, give me the letters which the
F e r m a n - F m a r * has confided to your care for me." The colonel
was then obliged to admit that he had no letter to give him but
the one that he had presented from Sir John M'Neil, that he
was acquainted with the views of the East India Company, and
had been instructed to state vivi voce to, his E-Iighness that the
Directors would pay a subsidy in money in consideration of a
promise to be made on the part of the Emir to resist the encroachments of Russia. Nasser Ullah fixed for a few instants an ironical
smile on Stoddart, and said, " Very good ; I see that it is your
is
intention to make me your slave : hhetmet Aha hem hey&-it
well, I will serve you. I n the mean time withdraw."
This d&ut did not augur a successful termination to the negotiations. Stoddart, who had done nothing to conciliate the esteem
and confidence of the Emir, arrived at Bokhara without presenk,
without escort, armed only by his intrepidity ; he presented himself as a conqueror rather than as an ally or a friend, and his
character as a political personage was equivocal-he neither represented England nor the East India Company. The Emir and his
vizier took advantage of these circumstances, and two days. after
this interview Stoddart received a n intimation to proceed irnmediately to the house of the latter. H e hastened, singularly enough
-for the hour was inappropriate-to obey the summons : moreover, the colonel had previously refused to attend to a similar
request
I t was evening, and Stoddart on entering the house of Mahzoom
Berdi confronted twelve armed men stationed in the antechamber
of the Reiss, who at once seized and threw him down, and, as
he lay on the ground, tied hand and foot, the vizier with a
drawn sword in his hand, rushed towards him. " May God
pardon your sins !" exclaimed the English officer, who thought that
his last hour was come, when Mahzoom Berdi, with sparkling
eyes and foaming a t the mouth, placed the point of his sword a t
Stoddart's breast, and loaded him with every kind of invective.
Miserable spy !" he said, " infidel dog I you come here, do

*

Governor-General of India.

446

ARREST OF STODDART.

CHAP.XXlX.

you, from your English employers to buy Bokhara as you have
bought Kabul ? You mill not succeed-I will kill you !" and he
pressed his sabre on the prostrate body of Stoddart ; but the
Englishman's eye remained firmly fixed on that of the furious
minister. This scene lasted a few minutes, and whether the
unmoved countenance of his victim arrested the arm of his executioner, or, what is more probable, that this display of force was a
concerted plan between the Emir and the vizier, the latter suddenly
turned to his servants, and said, " Take him away !" The rain fell
in torrents, but the men, some bearing torches, carried him off
like a corpse, still bound, and amidst profound silence, along the
deserted streets of the city. Sometimes they let him fall on the
ground, or drew tighter the cords that confined his bruised limbs ;
and sometimes they stopped and insulted him with savage gestures
and laughter. c G Put an end to me a t oncel" cried the unhappy
prisoner ; in pity, prolong not my sufferings !" On hearing this,
one of them stooped down, and, bringing his torch nearer to him
as he lay upon the ground, said, " Of a truth, you are either
a devil or a sorcerer ; you know beforehand that you are not going
to be killed; if you were only a man, you would certainly h&e
been afraid." I n this way they continued to drag him along the
streets, and at length threw him, bound as he was, into a dark
room, and barred the entrance. After the unfortunate Stoddart
had been two hours in this place, alone and stretched on the
damp floor, the door opened, lights appeared, and some servants
entered, preceded by a man enveloped from head to foot in woollen
drapery, which allowed only his eyes to be seen. This personage
seated himself on a divan a t the extremity of the apartment,
the lights being placed in front of him ; and Stoddart followed
with his eyes every movement of the new comer, who seemed to
be some great personage, for every one treated him with profound
respect. Raising himself from the floor as well as his bonds would
permit, and collecting all his strength, he said, in a firm voice,
c' I pray that the all-powerful God will pardon you I
You have
done ill to throw into prison an innocent .man, who is charged
with a mission from his Government to your sovereign. If you
were not disposed to receive me, you ought not to have alJ,owed
me to enter your city ;it was for the vizier to acquaint me with the
wishes of his master; if you desire that I should leave Bokhara, I
am ready to attend to those wishes." After having listened with
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great attention, the disguised person rose and said, " I will communicate what you have said to the Emir."
But this individual, who was the Mir Cheb,* or chief of the
police, left the prisqn to execute the Emir's orders; seized and
burned the envoy's papers, sold all his effects and horses by auction,
and subsequently transferred him to the Siah-tchah, or Black Well,
-a horrible abode. This dungeon, which is in the centre of the
town, is twenty-one feet in depth ; and here the greatest malefactors are generally confined. T h e descent into it is made by
means of a rope ; and when Stoddart w m let down he found there
two thieves and a murderer, the latter having been incarcerated
here for several years. With these criminals for his companions
the colonel remained two months in this loathsome and filthy hole,
covered with vermin and surrounded by reptiles, in killing which
they were constantly occupied. Their food, such as it was, was
lowered to them, by the rope with which they had themselves
descend-ed, and much of their time was passed in ~moking.
When the ferocious caprice of Nasser Ullah had been satisfied,
and he thought he had humbled the pride of the Englishman and
impressed him with the terror of his power, he gave an order to the
chief of the police to remove him from the Siah-tchah in which he
had been immured, and keep him a prisoner in his own house ; but
two days after this the public .executioner came to Stoddart with
an order to put him to death unless he consented to become a
f i s u l m a n . T o this alternative, borne down by the dreadful
sufferings he had endured, and the exhaustion of his mental and
bodily powers, he gave a reluctant consent, repeating the Mohamedan
confession of faith, after which he was taken to the public square
and circumcised in the presence of an immense crowd who had
been attracted there by the novelty of the event. Austere and
sensitive in his religious feelings, Colonel Stoddart never forgave
himself this act of wealmess, of which he bitterly repented during
the remainder of his wretched existence.
The news of the cruelties that had been perpetrated on the person
of the envoy were noised abroad, and General peroffsky, Governor
of Orenburg, instructed the Russian agent a t Bokhara to request
Nasser Ullah to liberate his prisoner. On receiving this communication the Emir sent for Stoddart, and said, " T h e R,ussians claim
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you : what will they do with you ? Will they treat you well, and
shall I place you in their hands ? " " I am sure," said his captive, " that the Russians will treat me well ; but if my Government
demands of your Highness what you have done with me, what
reply shall you make ? " Such was the answer of this heroic man,
after the unexampled tortures he had endured during his two
months' confinement in the Siah-tchah with death so near. The
Emir, struck by his dignified and bold reply, removed from
his own person the rich fur cloak that he wore, placed it on
Stoddart, and ordered that he should be led in triumph on horseback through the stLreetsof Bokhara. Restored to health, the first
act of the British officer was to proclaim everywhere that he was
a Christian, and had become a Nussulman only from the violence
offered to him. This conduct was so imprudent, and evinced a
strength of mind so rare, that Nasser Ullah, Mahzoom Berdi, the
Wr Cheb, and the inhabitants of Bokhara felt as if vanquished ;
he had been considered as a spy md dealt with as such, but he
mas again permitted to-'present himself at the Emir's palace when
he gave audience, and received from that barbarian marks of consideration.
Several motives must have led to this singular change in the
Emir's conduct to Stoddart. In the first place, the success of the
British arms in Afghanistan seemed threatening to Nasser Ullah ;
he mas now desirous of making it appear that the envoy was the
object of his munificence, though he had previously made him
suffer the weight of his tyranny. H e had conceived a hope that
he should be able to attach him to his interests, as Runjeet Sing
had other Europeans. " Those Feringhees," said the Emir, " so
powerful and clever in the arts and diplomacy, so talented in
organizing an army, bring everywhere success in their train."
But though lodged in the palace and feasted and overwhelmed with
attentions at Bokhara, Stoddart was a captive within its walls, and
subjected by turns to the surveillance of Samut Khan, a wretch
of avaricious disposition, and Abd ul Haleik, the steward of the
royal residence. A t this period the envoy was seized with typhus
fever, and the Emir ordered his own physician to attend him, who
saved his life ; and subsequently, when on the eve of sending an
embassy to the Tzar, Nasser Ullah offered the colonel the opportunity of accompanying it to St. Petersburg, and undertaking a
special mission for him at that court. Once a t Orenburg, or
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rather at the Russian frontier, he would have been out of the
clutches of the Emir, but Stoddart declined the proposition ; his
government had not, he said, as yet intimated to him their wish
that he should quit Rolrhara. Never was the feeling of devotion to
military or diplomatic duty carried to such a height ; and scruples
like these under such circumstances were perfectly astonishing.
Stoddart ought to have ltnown that the great distance from Calcutta, the war then going on, and the state of politics in Central
Asia, rendered communication with him almost: impossible; the
expected despatch might never arrive and this obstinacy renewed
the suspicions which had been curwnt as to his motive for coming to Bolchara. One day, when dark shadows came over the
mind of Nasser Ullah, Samut Khan received an order to poison
t,he Englishman, who succeeded in preserving his life only by
satisfying the cupidity of the Naib with t h e hope of obtaining
a large sum for his ransom ; and this the villain increased as muchas he could by exciting the suspicions of the Emir. At other
times Nasser Ullah felt better disposed towards his prisoner, and
sent him tobacco and other presents, requesting him in return to
replace the quicksilver on his mirrors, to make him a thermometer,
and candles which,would burn without smoke; Stoddart might
have turned all these matters to account if he had had as much
tact as he had courage and piety.
Nevertheles external events advanced towards their climax in the disasters of the British army in 1841-the defiles of Afghanistan
were covered with the dead bodies of the troops ;and these untoward
circumstances made the position of the English agent at Bokhara
more and more alarming: moreover war was declared between
Nasser Ullah and his neighbour Mohamed Ali, the Khan of Kokan,
and a t the instigation of the Anglo-Indian-government, a t least it
was thought so. The Sultan, acknowledged by the Soonees as
the spiritual head of all Islam, wrote to the 'Emir of Bokhara to
order him to release his prisoner ; the Tzar also, through the envoy
that was about to arrive at Bokhara, demanded in accordance with
the chivalrous customs of diplomatic opponents, the restoration of
Stoddart to his country, and when M. de Boutenieff saw him
there, he offered him his protection; the Khan of Ehivs like'wise interceded for him ; so that worried by these various applications, and knowing scarcely what to do, the despot became h i o u s .
T o the Sultan, Nasser Ullah replied that he would obey him pro2 G
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vided the Queen of England would remain his friend, and mould
do him no injury ; to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, that his
prisoner mas only a traveller, without any official status ; and to his
neighbour of Khiva in these whimsical words : "YOU have an
Englishman and so have I, why do you wish to take mine?"
After which the Emir left Bokhai-a to make war against the
Kokanees.
During this period several letters that Stoddart wrote to his
friends, which were entrusted to Khorassanee Kurds, Persians or
Jews, who sewed them in the hem of their robes, reached their
destination ; some of them have been printed, and one is surprised
to find in them the style of the Puritans of Cromwell's days. I n
these letters diplomatic interests, and the feelings of the soldier,
take their place far belom the religious sentiment which governed
the mind and destiny of Stoddart, whose character they invest with
~ e a grandeur.
l
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Character of Conolly He is full of hope as to the result of his negotiations
Naaser Ullah returns to Bokhara-His
interviews with the English officers
-They are both imprisoned-Allah Dad Khan, the Afghan envoy, returns
to Kabul- H e is brought back to Bokhara - His infamous intrigues -M. de
Boutenieff leaves the city - Alchood Zadeh, the son of the Razi of Herat, and
his brother Nohamed Davood -Dangers to which the latter is exposed
Akhood Zadeh is arreeted at the frontier of Bokhara-He is imprisoned
by the Emu. -Obstinate conduct of Stoddart -The servants of the English officers are released from prison-Akhood Zadeh and Allah Dad Khan
are conlined in the Siah-tchah -They are subsequently released- Joseph, a
Greek, is executed -Paper and pens are found on Stoddut -Hc receives the
baatinado -Execution of that officer and Conolly -A register of that event,
and other circumstances connected with those officers.
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now return to Captain Conolly, who had, as we have
already said, fulfilled at Kokan a mission analogous to that of
stodd&, and subsequently, on .the invitation of the latter, joined
him a t Bokhara to share his dangers. This officer united considerable learning to a splendid character-the q~dificationsof a
distinguished soldier and a clever diplomatist. Notwithstanding
the grievances that Nasser Ullah Khan fancied he had against him,
he &a pleased with him a t their first interview; and the successful manner in which Captain Conolly had terminated his dis;
him favourably
agreement with his neighbo;r of ~ o k a n disposed
towards that officer. \Then, therefore, he joined Stoddart at
Bokhara he was full of hope that he should be able to induce the
Emir to enter into the views of England; but it appears that after
he left the camp, Abdul Samut ~ h asucceeded
i
in &&king s change
in the capricious mind of Nasser Ullah, who wrote to Bokhara and
ordered that Captain Conolly should not be permitted to hold any
communication with Colonel Stoddart. The latter was at this time
living in the house of the Russian Ambassador, and the Emir had
'a suspicion that he might pe;sist in remaining there, and that M.
de Boutenieff would protect him. His order, therefore, to prevent Captain Conolly from seeing his countryman, was given with
no other object than that of inducing Colonel Stoddart to remove.
to the house of Abdut Samut Khan : this fatal step was taken ; and
Colonel Stoddart, naturally anxious to "live with his friend, left
2 a 2
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the residence of the Russian Ambassador on the 11th of November,
1840, to take up his abode in that of the Commander-in-Chief of
the h-tillery.
On the return of Nasser Ullah from Kokan, which took place
very soon after the arrival of Conolly in his capital, he found
himself master of two Englishmen ; and this was what he wished ;
for the war in Kabul continued, and the people of Central Asia
were animated with the deepest hatred of the power and influence that were brought to bear against them. The conduct
of the Emir towards Conolly became haughty and threatening,
and Abdul Samut feared, or rather pretended to fear, that the
prince's auger would fall upon himself; a house was therefore prepared for the officers in the interior of the city-that is to say, they
were treated as prisoners, but an allowance was made them of
three tellahs * per day. Conolly had, a month previously, asked
for a private audience of the Emir, but never obtained it ;however,
on the 31st of December, the officers were taken to the palace.
"Where are the letters from your government to m e ? ' s a i d
You are a spy ; but remember that
Nasser Ullah to Conolly.
Bokhara is not so easy to conquer as Afghanistan ; I shall send
you to prison, and your countrymen may come with an army if they
like and take you out." Conolly replied with as much firmness as
Stoddart, but with more prudence, and both were dismissed.
These interviews with the Emir were repeated fur three days in
succession : the last time they were taken to the citadel, as well
as seven of their servants (called in Persian ppich Rhetmet, upper
servants), and there passed a miserable night of suffering and
anxiety. Their house was ransacked and their servants; to
the number of forty-four, arrested and thrown into the Siahtchah (which did not exceed thirteen feet in diameter), for
every detail of the successful insurrection against the English
in Kabul was then known at Bokhara, and the Emir had ceased to
fear them ; the wretched captives were to expiate by the most
cruel treatment, and finally a barbarous death, the uneasiness
that the invasion of Afghanistan had created in the mind of the
Usbek tyrant.
I t has been said that when Captain Conolly left Kabul on his
mission to the Tartar princes, he was accompanied by Allah
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Dad Khan, the ambassador of Shah Shooja. This personage followed that officer to the Courts of Khiva, Kokan, and Bokhara;
but when he arrived in the latter city he quickly perceived the evil
intentions of the Emir towards his master, and endeavoured to
obtain permission to retire as soon as possible.
Nasser Ullah had indeed the most profound hatred for the
Afghans, and more particularly the Suddozyes, and he would not
have been sorry to chastise the ambassador of Shah Shooja; but
the fact of his being a Mahomeclan, as well as the interest taken in
him by the Mollahs of Bokhara who interfered in his favour,
induced him to allow Allah Dad Khan to return to Kabul, and
he had been gone only a week when the two unfortunate English
officers were cast into prison in the citadel. On his road the
Afghan was treated with every consideration due to his character
of Envoy, and had safely reached the frontier town of Karchy,
when he found that the Emir had given an order to the Governor
to arrest and send him back a prisoner to Bokhara- which
order was carried into effect; and when he returned to the capital
he was taken to a place called the Ab-Khaneh,* where the cold
was so severe that no person could be left in it two nights in
succession and live. FIappily for Allah Dad Khrtn he was, at the
expiration of twenty hours, taken out only half dead, and placed
in a dungeon adjacent to that to which the British officers had been
transferred on their removal from-the citadel. This prison w a ~
in the house of Mir Syud Sheriff, Kaleh-Beghi,t and from him
1 received these details. The removal of the Afghan ambassador
saved his life, which he so little deserved ; for whether he acted
by the secret instructions of Shah Shooja as he afterwards pretended, or upon the suggestions of his own mind, it is averred
that this wretch instead of assisting Captain Conolly never ceased
to embarrass his negotiations at Khiva and at Kokan, by his
intrigues and underhand practices.
Monsieur de Boutenieff had not been indifferent to the misfortunes of the British officers, and had energetically protested against.
the treatment to which they were subjected ; but after the disasters
of the English army in Kabul the Emir, who now believed himself
perfectly secure in his Kha~iat,considered the intervention of the
Russian diplomatist extremely uncallcd for, and behaved to him. i,n
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so violent a manner as to make Monsieur de Boutenieff think he
might be treated as the Englishmen had been : he therefore determined to quit Bokhara towards the end of March, 1842.
I n the mean time Akhood Zadeh, who was sent to Kabul
by Captain Conolly before he left IChiva, had returned to the
latter town, accompa~liedby his brother Mohamed Davood, and
brought instructions which it was hoped would induce Allah Kooli
Khan to liberate the Persian prisoners. Instead, however, of
finding Captain Conolly as he had expected, he rcceived a letter,
that the former had written to him from Bokhara, requesting
him to join him there. Akhood Zadeh immediately prepared to
follow him, but considered it expedient before he set out to send
his brother back to Kabul to inform Sir TY. M'Naghten of what
was passing at Rhiva. Fate now pressed heavily and cruelly on
the family of the Kazi of Herat, despoiled and exiled by Yar
Mahorned, the venerable chief owed his life only to the generosity of
Major Todd, who redeemed it from the sordid Vizier at the price of
14001.,and from that moment every member of the family devoted
himself body and soul to their deliverers. Mohamed Davood
travelled safely as far as Khulm ;but at Bamian, four days' journey
sout,h of it, he found the whole country in insurrection and, EUSpected of being a partisan of the English, was stopped and stripped
by the Afghans ; with a sword-cut on his head and a wound from
a ball in his thigh, it mas the merest chance that he escaped death
and succeeded in gaining Kabul. Arrived there he directed his
steps t o the entrenched camp, a mile from the city, in which the
British army was then blockaded by the insurgents, and delivered his despatch to Sir W. M'Naghten, who, anxious to take
advantage of such rare devotion in a native, allowed him only
two days' rest, and with wounds yet unhealed, sent him on with
letters to General Nott, a t Kandahar. A t Ghuznee he was seized
by the Ghazees, thrown into prison, and searched with great care ;
but he had concealed Sir W. M'Naghten's despatch in the tuft of
hair which Mahomedans allow to grow a t the back of the head,
and although it escaped their vigilant search, and nothing was found
upon him which could establish his guilt, he was tied to the
mouth of a gun with the certainty of being blown from it, when
h e cried out "Allah forgive the murderers of the son of the Razi
Hassan Mohamed." A t the sound of that name, so venerated by
a11 Afghans, the 1\1ollahs commanded that he should be set at
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liberty ; and after passing through so many dangers he arrived at
Kandahar in safety with his despatches.
Less fortunate than his brother, Akhood Zadeh took the road to
Bokhara : he reached Eljik-otoo, a village situated on the right bank
of the Oxus, without having heard of the detention of Captain
Conolly ; and supposing him to be receiving honourable treatment
at the Court of the Emir, he did not hesitate in stating openly, when
interrogated by the guard at the frontier, that he was in the service
of the English and on his way to join one of the officers then at
the capital. This was quite a sufficient reason for arresting aud
sending him there nnder an escort, and when he arrived the
Emir imprisoned him in the citadel, in the house of Syud Nir
Sheriff, where Allah Dad Khan was already incarcerated -this
occurred ten days after the imprisonment of Stoddart and Conolly.
I n the various and distressing circumstances which succeeded one
another in connexion with the fate of these officers at Bokhara, as
much blame was due to the Anglo-Indian government for want of
foresight as to Colonel Stoddart, who, though an honest and loyal
soldier, was of an unbending disposition, and his national pride led
him beyond all reasonable limits ; he was perfectly unsuited to the
task committed to him, and wanting in the tact and versatility of
mind to carry out such a difficult undertaking. The line of conduct
he adopted could not fail to end in his ruin, and his blind confidence
in the success of the British arms in Central Asia, grieved him to
the utmost in his last moments, inasmuch as it caused the death
of one of the noblest of his countrymen. Instead of' sending
word to Captain Conolly to join him, why did not Stoddart follow the
instructions of his superiors ? I n vain the authorities of Calcutta
wrote to him that he was free to leave Bokhara, and advised him to
seize the first opportunity of flight that presented itself; retained by
an exaggerated sense of duty, and disregarding these instructions,
he prolonged the critical circumstances in which he was involved
till the dangerous period arrived at which the army of his countrymen perished in Afghanistan, and the massacre at Kabul encouraged the Emir to destroy his prisoners : they had not brought
him anything that he hoped for, and being demanded from
him on a11 sides, were the cause of extreme embarrassment.
Their fate had indeed excited the greatest interest everywhereneither England nor even Russia had forsaken them : intercessions
in their behalf arrived from Persia, Khiva, Constantinople, Kabul,
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and Herat. T h e Grand Mollah of t.he latter town, requested ,by
Major Todd to ask for the release of Colonel Stoddart, drew
upon himself a violent attack from Nasser Ullah Khan, who dismissed him rudely, and said, " I t is a disgrace to Islam that there
should exist amongst the Ulemas one so degraded as to come here
to intercede for this infidel." The perseverance with which the
liberation of the British agent had been demanded led the Emir to
suppose that his life was of great value, and that he might obtain a
considerable ransom for him ; he even hoped to turn his captivity
to good account, and asked the Queen of England to add to his
dominions a certain tei~itoryon his frontiers, but received only a
dilatory reply. Nasser Ullah speculated, in fact, upon his captives,
and when he saw that he was deceived in all his calculations, his
irascible nature was exasperated in proportion, and he revenged
himself in a terrible manner upon the unhappy officers who had
placed themselves in his power.
T h e forty-four servants of Stoddart and Conolly, who were
arrested a t their lodgings on the day their masters were imprisoned
in the citadel, remained forty-four days in the Siah-tchah bound
hand and foot to each other, and having for their subsistence only
a small ration of bad bread. On the forty-fifth they were taken
from this dreadful hole chained by the neck, eleven to a chain,
' forming four parties, and marched a t daybreak to the public square,
where they remained all the next night exposed to the deep snow
and piercing cold. Two of them had died in the Siah-tchah, a
third sunk about noon on the following day from the effects of the
temperature of that nigh$, and his corpse was left attached to the
chain till sun-down ; the feet and hands of the greater number of
his surviving comrades were frost-bitten, and they were waiting
with great anxiety the execution of the sentence of death which
had been passed upon them, when, to their infinite amazement,
they were all set at liberty. This was owing to the intercession of
the Grand Mollahs of Bokhara who, moved with pity, when they
heard of the atrocious order issued by the Emir, went in a body
to his palace to protest against it. " They are Musulmans like.
us, and our brethren," said they to Nasser Ullah Khan, " and may
the wrath of Allah descend upon thy head if thou sheddest their
blood. They hwe suffered sufficiently for serving the Infidels.
Give them their freedom if thou wouldest avoid the vengea.nce of
heaven and perhaps of men!" The Emir somewhat intimi-
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dated by the opposition of the Mollahs whose support was necessary
to the maintenance of his power, restored these unhappy beings to
liberty, but it was a ten holm struggle to get them out of his
hands.
Some Hindoo and Jewish Shroffs,* who had found the means of
keeping up a communication with Colonel Stoddart and Captain
Conolly, intrusted the servants of these officers with letters which
they were anxious to send to their superiors in India; they also gave
them some clothes and money, after which many of them departed
for Kabul. They arrived there in the midst of the strife of the 22nd
of March, 1842, when Mohamed Akbar Khan, master of the 'capital,
was besieging Fethi Djing Mirza in the citadel, and remained
here several months in the greatest anxiety, for they dreaded being
recognized as individuals who had served the English ; but this
danger they happily escaped, and when the Anglo-Indian army
arrived a t Kabul in the August following, they received their
arrears of pay, were generously recompensed for their sufferings,
and some again took service with British officers. Three of them
were for several years my servants; Mohamed, a Heratee, had
been with Captain Conolly ; another, Ali Bakhtiari, with Captain
Vilrovitch; the third, Hadji Semnanee, had been cook' to Dr.
Wolf, and from them I gathered many details respecting their old
masters.
Fear alone had induced the Emir to pardon these unoffending
men, and he indemnified himself for the blood he could not shed
then by treating with still more severity the captives remaining in
his power. Four days after the servants were set at liberty h e
ordered that Allah Dad Khan and Akhood Zadeh s h o ~ ~ lbe
d
removed from the prison of the Kaleh-Beghi, and lowered into the
Siah-tchah. I n this there still remained a Greek from Constantinople, the head servant of Captain Conolly, named Joseph (whom
.the other servants used to call Yoossoof Khan), and the seven
pich-khetmets who had been imprisoned in the citadel, whither
they had been taken in company with the English officers the day
they were prevented from returning to their own house. Twentyseven days later the Blollahs obtained the release of these seven
pi&-khetmets. From that period ninety-two days eIapsed, when,
and again a t the earnest intercession of the Mollahs, Nasser Ullah
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exercised once more his reluctant clemency by releasing the Afghan
Envoy, Allah Dad Khan, and also Akhood Zadeh; the former
hastened to return to Kabul, and the son of the Kazi of Herat,
after having for a few days found shelter with a merchant in
Bokhara, reachcd Persia on foot and joined his father at Meshed,
where both sought an asylum from the rapacity and cruelty of Yar
Mohamed Khan who had banished them from their country.
Joseph mas taken from the Siah-tchah at the same time as Allah
Dad Khan and Akhood Zadeh, but the close of his captivity was
to be that of his life also. The first time he was brought before
Nasser Ullah he said that he was a subject of the Sultan's, which
was true ; but as he had not been circurncised' the Emir thought
that he told a falsehood, being persuaded, or pretending to be so,
that all the subjects of the Sultan must be Mussulmans, and under
the impression that he was an Englishman, he ordered him into
the Siah-tchah. Suffering horribly from the misery he endu,ed in
this dreadful place, he thought that it might be mitigated if he turned
Mussulman ; he sent therefore a message to that effectto the Emir,
who instantly assented to his proposition, but never took him out
of the Siah-tchah, where the operation and cure were performed. It
was not until the 17th of June, that he saw the light again, when he
and the three malefactors, with whom Colonel Stoddart had passed
the two first months of his captivity, were brought up to be slaughtered -the execution took place on a Friday, at the hour of
evening prayer. The news of the massacre of the English in the
Khyber Pass had been sent' to Nasser Ullah by the Afghan serdars, who recommended him to get rid of his other prisoners or hand
them over to them ;and it mas their letter which prepared the way
for the death of the ill-fated British officers, which was hastened,
however, by another cause.
Three days after the execution of Joseph, the Emir commanded
that they should be taken from the citadel to a building near the
Siah-tchah, but they were not lowered into the well. The guard
then forced them t,o strip off all their clothes, and on inspecting
them very closely, found in a small pocket sewn under the top of
the sleeve of Colonel Stoddart's tchoha," a pencil, s o m ~steel pens,
a small phial filled with ink, and some sheets of paper, which were
taken to the Emir. Some days previously the police at the fron-
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tier had seized aletter which the Colonel had sent to Mr. Thompson, under-secretary to the British legation a t Teheran, who was
going to Khiva to continue the negotiations commenced by Captain
Conolly ; and when this letter was taken to Nasser Ullah he
wanted Stoddart to translate it, and also to tell him the use of the
articles that had been found upon him. Nothing excites more distrust in Oriental nations than the habit that Europeans have of
writing down or sketching, what they see or hear, and in the questionable position in which these officers stood, the double discovery
that had been made, could not but exasperate the Emir more and
more against them ;moreover, Colonel Stoddart a t once refused to
give the required translation, and he Gas cruelly beaten with rods on
the soles of his feet for three days in succession without overcoming his
resolution-he simply declared that the intercepted letter contained
nothing hostile to the Emir. But Nasser Ullah would not believe
him, and it being his conviction that the purport of the letter was
to induce the Khan of Khiva to make war upon him, he condemned
the two prisoners to death. N o word of weakness escaped Colonel
Stoddart when he was informed of the fate that awaited him, but
he completely gave way to the violence of his disposition, exhausting
the whole vocabulary of personal abuse in Persian against the
Emir and his executioner, and ceased not thus to apostrophise them
but in yielding his latest breath. H e mas put to death like a
sheep, in some ruins at the back of his prison, and in the presence
of a few passers-by who had been attracted to the spot by his cries
and his invectives. The officer who was charged with the execution of the sentence then declared to Conolly, who had witnessed
his countryman's death, that Nasser Ullah would grant him his
life if he would become a Mussulman, but the Englishman replied
without fear, as without boasting, " Stoddart and Yoossoof turned
Mahomedans and you put them both to death ; your proposal
is a snare, for you will not spare me any more than you did them.
I have no confidence in your promises ; I will be no renegade. I
die firm in my faith. Finish your work! " They did so, and
the bodies of these two heroic men were placed in a common grave
that had been dug before their eyes. I t was on a-Friday evening,
the 24th of June.
These sad details were communicated to me by Akhood
Zadeh, the Syud Mir Sheriff, whom I saw at Meshed in 1845,
.my Heratee servant, who had also been Conolly's, and was im-
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prisoned forty-four days in the Siah-tchah, and by many other
Bokharians, to whom the particulars of the captivity and death of
the British officers were perfectly well known. Dr. Wolf thinks that
they mere executed on the 17th of June ; but, after much investigation, I consider that the event took place seven days later, which
is proved by the following dates furnished by the persons aboye
mentioned :Stoddart and Conolly were imprisoned in the
. Jan. 2, 1842.
citadel
Forty-four days after, their servants were released,
Feb. 15, ,,
namely, on
Four days later Akhood Zadeh and Allah Dad
Feb. 19, ,,
Khan were imprisoned in the Siah-tchah
Twenty-seven days after, the seven pich-khet. Mar. 17, ,,
mets were released
Ninety-two days elapsed up to the death of YOOSsoof and the deliverance of Akhood Zadeh . June 17, ,,
Seven days later, Colonel Stoddart ancl*Captain
June 24, ,,,,
Conolly were executed

.
.

.

.

.

This statement is strictly correct; and was copied from the
police register at Bokhara by the Syud Mir Sheriff.
Akhood Zadeh, without being so precise himself, acknowledges
the accuracy of these dates ; he believed the deat,h of the British
officers to have taken place on the 2ntl of Djemadee el Ewal, or
Djemadee el Sanee, some days afte~ t l ~ eappearance of the $rst
apricots-such is the Asiatic mode of marking events
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CHAPTER XSXI.
Mohamed Shah of Persia threatens Khiva-Mr.
Thompson, the British minister, al~ivesat t h ~ city
t -He fails in his negotiations -Nasseli Flores, a
Neapolitan, comes to Teheran -Travels to Bokhara, and is thrown into prison
there-The Naib, Abdul Samut Khan-Nasseli is condemned to death-Abdul
S m u t esperiences the same fate - Reasons that led to his esecution -The
matchmaker, Orlando Giovanni -The Emir orders him to be put to death
Character of Nasser Ullah Khan -Measures taken in England to ascertain the
fate of Stoddart and Conolly Dr. Wolf - Policy of Par Mohmed after the
English left Herat- The Shnh Kamran in a m s against the Vizier-Yar Mohamed besieges him in the citadel -The Serdw Dine Mohamed Khnn-Kamrm
is made prisoner, and plundered by Yar Mohamcd- The Shah Zadeh
Mohamed Yoossoof The diamond vest -Negotiations regarding it--Mohamed
Yoossoof Mirza the dupe of Par Mohamed He flies to Meshed-Revolt t o
set Kamran at liberty -Par Mohamed assassinates his sovereign.
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SOME months before the terrible tragedy related in the last
chapter occurred, namely in the winter of 1841, the British
Minister at Teheran made a last effort to induce the Khan of
Khiva to give up the Persian slaves; the case was urgent, for
Mohamed Shah mas marshalling his battalions on the borders of
the Atrak and the Gourghan, and threatened to penetrate the heart
of IChiva if Allah Kooli Khan persisted in detaining his subjects.,
any longer. The Shah had been driven to this demonstration by
the fresh inroads made upon his territory by the Turcomans, who
at the instigation of the Khivans, plundered several Persian
villages and carried off their inhabitants ; in one of these raids,
they surprised Mohamed Walee Khan, a cousin of the Shah's,
and brought him to Khiva, where he was kept a close prisoner. '
At the time,that Mr. Thompson went to that city, accompanied by
the Persian envoy Mohamed Ali Khan KiaEoor, a Russian agent
left Orenburg for the same destination, to combine his efforts.witli
theirs in the hope of bringing about a pacific solution of the affair ;
and notwithstanding the threatened invasion Allah Kooli Khan
received them all haughtily. T o Mr. Thompson he said, " London
is too far off for me to have any intercourse with it, or expect any
help from there. Twenty times I have asked the English for
instructors of artillery, and they have tantalized me with promises
why theywhiah I have never seen realized ; I cannot .understand
-
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interfere in my affairs." IIe was not so arrogant with the Russian,
in whose favour Yacooba Mehter had been endeavouring to prepossess him ; but he addressed that ambassador thus : Petersburg
is nearer to Khiva than London, but the bones of the soldiers
that the Tzar sent from Orenburg last year to subjugate this
country still cover the steppes upon your frontiers, and remain,
whitening in the sun, a proof that that undertaking is not easy to
carry out." Then, turning to the Persian, he said, "As to
Mohamed Shah he may be the cat's-paw of England or Russia,
whichever he pleases; Allah Kooli Khan will never imitate his
example. You have all taken the trouble to come here to ask me
to release the Persian slaves, which I am resolved never to do."
And the three ambassadors left Khiva without having in the
least advanced their cause.
At Merv Mr. Thompson happily escaped the malevolence of-the
Emir of Bokhara and Yacooba Mehter, who had sent assassins to
the neighbourhood of that town to murder him, but chance and bad
information prevented them.* While he was here, Mr. Thompson
delivered from captivity a Neapolitan named Nasseli Flores, who
had been incarcerated by the Governor Niaz Mohamed Beg. When
this young man passed through Teheran he was told by a p a t
many persons, that, in taking the road to Bokhara, he mas rushing upon certain death ; but he would not listen to their advice,
and fate drove him on to his destruction. For many months
Flores had enjoyed the hospitality of M. Anitchkoff, the Russian
Consul-General at Tauris, and when he put into execution his
project of going to Lahore through the Usbek states, Sir John
M'Neil, who had a few months previously qeturned to Teheran,
conceived some suspicions against him; he even opened a correspondence with Count de Medem, the Russian Minister, and
complained of the direction Nasseli intended taking, protected
by a passport which had received the visa of the Russian authorities. H e said that he considered the journey of Flores across
Tartary concealed intentions hostile to England, and offered to send
him safely to Lahore free of expense if he would consent to go
there by the Persian Gulf and India, but nothing could overcome
the obstinacy of the traveller; and the Count de Medem to

* After this was written, Mr. Thompson. informed me that that this story
nraa not true. An Usbek woman, in

order to get a good reward for saving
his life, invented the tale.-Fw-ier.
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set at rest the suspicions of the British envoy, was obliged to erase
the Russian visas on his passport, and state thereon in Persian
that the Neapolitan travelled unprotected by Russia. Floreshad not
been long enough in Asia to understand the character of Asiatics ;
he expected to find on his arrival at Bokhara a people resembling
the Turks or Persians, and notwithstanding the impediments
thrown in the way of his journey, he persisted in his determination
and left Teheran with only one servant. H e remained some time
. a t Meshed, and I received a letter from him, from this city,
probably the last that he ever wrote. The ~ e r u s a lof this may
be interesting to the reader. It is dated Meshed, May 22,
1842 :-

$

?

" When I left Teheran I promised to let you hear from me
when I reached this city. I have been here now a fortnight, and
arrived after a fortunate journey of twenty-nine days. Nature has
been very niggardly to Persia ; but in the Khorassan there is more
vegetation than in the provinces of Azerbaidjan and Irak. Should
circumstances ever bring you to Meshed I advise fou, when you
get to Nishapoor, to take the mountain road. You will find
villages in the rich valleys ; through these water flows in abundance, and a double row of trees following the course of the
stream form a pleasing shade for the traveller. Between Nishapoor and this are two small lakes, which I assure you are very
picturesque.
" General Semineau, to whom I previously wrote, will have p r e
sented my sincere regards to you and have given you a description
of this country. I am forced to remain here until the caravan for
Bokhara is ready. The days seem an everlasting length ;the time
passes so slowly when one is obliged to wait and has an object in
view.
"Meantime I am in very good company ; your countryman
M. Jacquet, surgeon of the. regiment of Hamadan in garrison here,
a person of great merit, is very hospitable to me, and we pass
whole days in conversation. H e was not aware that there were any
French officers in the Persian army; and he will be enchanted,
after the report I have given him of your amiable disposition, to
make your acquaintance. Yon can, and with reciprocal advantage,
exchange the news of Europe with that of Central Asia, which.
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never fails to reach this frontier city. I am desired by him to say
a thousand obliging things on his part, so it now remains for you
to write to him, and I. assure you that you will be very pleased to
know him.
a T h e Turcomans often visit the villages near the city-they
are
a perfect nightmare to the Persians ; last year they surprised the
Vizier of the Governor in a garden out of the town and sold him
to the Khan of Khiva. Five months after Assaf Doowlat, the.
Governor, desirous of malting reprisals on a Turcoman tribe in the
mountains to the right of Nishapoor, went there with 3000 men of
all .arms and seven guns to surprise them, but though he made a
rapid march the greater part of the cnemy were gone, leaving
behind them only a few old clothes, swords, and still older camels,
and several hundred men within the entrenchment. The powder
was not spared ;several Turcomans were killed and wounded; also
some Persians, but the Governor on the second day fearing an
attack from a body of the enemy's cavalry, ordered an assault
without making a breach ; judge from that how war is conducted
in this country.
"The other day the Governor blew a Turcoman from the mouth
of a gun and cut-off the hands of seven others in the service of
Persia who had plundered travellers in the mountains.
" M y departure will, Inshallah! be after to-morrow with a numerous caravan. Pmy tell General Semineau that as soon as I
got here I sent him a letter by a messenger whom Ferez Ullah
Khan sent to Teheran. I would write to him again did time
permit, but I should only weary him; I beg you to offer him my
sincere gratitude and respect. Remember me to your comrades.
I do not forget our prince Malek Kassem Mirza; present to him
my compliments and tell him that I have given his letters to the
Governor, who received me very politely. Adieu, my dear
M. Ferrier. May God grant that we meet again in another
country rich and happy.
" Ever yours,

<' To the General Ferrier."

" NASSELI
FLORES.

Flores left, as he intended, with the caravan for Merv, where he
had the good fortune to be found by Mr. Thompson, who, as we have
said, procured his release, and he t.hen continued his journey towards
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Bokhara. His servant-the only one he had-declined to follow
him beyond Merv; but this incident, instead of opening his eyes,
appeared only to confirm him in his resolution to meet the difficulties and dangers of his undertaking, and he marched on to
certain death, with the self confidence of a conqueror. I t was
twelve days after the death of Colonel Stoddart and Captain
Conolly that Akhood Zadeh had the happiness of leaving the city
of Bokhara : on his journey from that scene of horrors he met at
Tchardjooee, on the left bank of the Oxus, Nasseli Flores, and
used every argument he could think of to turn him from his purpose of going on to that capital, relating to him succinctly all that he
had so lately witnessed and suffered ; but Nasseli understood not
a word of any eastern language, and his efforts therefore were
utterly vain-he sought to supply the place of words by signs, but
he addressed one both deaf and blind. The though! crossed the
mind of the energetic Afghan that he would bind him and c a y
him back to Meshed by force ; but he was alone and on foot, devoid
of resources of every description, how then could he hope to
succeed ? moreover such an act on his part might expose him to
the danger of being taken himself and sent back to Bokhara. He
could therefore do nothing but pray to Allah for the safety of.the
young traveller, who so confident and light-hearted, was surely going
to take his place in the Black Well, and with a heavy heart Akhood
Zadeh wended his weary way towards Khorassan. His fears were
just; the infatuated Italian continued his journey, and he had
scarcely been an hour in .the city of Bokhara when he was seized,
stripped, and lowered into the Siah-tchah ; here he was kept eight
days, and fed upon a meagre pittance purchased with the money
that had been found on him. H i was afterwards brought before the
Emir to be present at the investigation bf his papers, and as Flores
did not understand either Turkish or Persian, an Italian renegade
named Giovanni Orlando was ordered to interpret the conversation ; the chief of the Artillery, Abdul Samut Khan, * the mortal
enemy of all Europeans who had the temerity to go to Bokhara,
was also in attendance.

* " I think it well," remarks Dr.
Wolf, " to give you a sketch of the life
of this Abdul Samut Khan. He was
born at Tabreez in the year 1784, nnd,
having acquired some smattering of
military acience a t Rermanshah from

M. le Qe'ndrd Court, he was employed there for a while by Mohamed
Ali Mirza, the celebrated son of Feth
Ali Shah. On account of some misconduct of Abdul Samut Khan, Mo-.
hamed Ali Mirza ordered his ears to
2 H
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W e have seen how grievously the intrigues of this villain
influenced the fate of Colonel Stoddwt and Captain Conolly and
aggravated the sufferings of their imprisonment and death ; but' in
his conduct to them he acted quite as much from a sordid love of
gain by setting a daily price upon their lives, as from his hatred
to all Feringhees : besides, these two unhappy travellers constantly
revived in his mind the memory of the most unfortunate events of
his existence-the loss of his ears a t Tauris and the infliction
of the bastinado a t Peshawur-both
of wbich occurred in connexion with Eurdpeans, and he had sworn to revenge his injuries
on every one of them that might fall into his power. I t was
enough that Nasseli mas an European for him to incur the deadly
hate of the Naib ; he had also the fault, in his eyes, of being a.
soldier, for as Abdul Samut was exceedingly ignorant of the military art, he dreaded lest the Emir should keep Flores i n h i s
service, and that in comparing the knowledge of Both, the result
would be very much to his own disadvantage. H e had determined to compass the death of Nasseli from the moment that
h e entered the palace of the Registan : and the fatality which
seemed to follow the unfortunate Neapolitan pursued him even
here, for the letter of introduction to his countryman Avitabile
s t Lahore was found amongst his papers; that reudered Abdul
Samut perfectly furious, and sentence of death was pronounced
be cut off. The khan then deserted,
.and went over to Ali Mohamed Mima's
antagonist, Abbas Mirza, at Talmeez,
b u t was soon obliged to escape from
there. When I arrived at Cabul, in
1832, I met Sir Alexander Burnes, and
i n conversation he told me: ' When you
come t o Peshawur be on your guard
against a person there who calls himself
the vizier of Sultan Mohamed Khan ;
his name is Abdul Samut Khan, a great
rascal, who, if he can do auy harm to
an Englishman, he will do ao ; for he
knows that we lookupon him with contempt.' Therefore, on my arrival at
Peshawur I never came near him, but
saw him only for one moment, mhen
h e called upon me in the company of
Sultan Mohamed IClian. A short time
after this he intrigued against this
prince, fled from Peshawur, and took
service with Dost Mohamed Khan ;
he endeavoured to excite a revolt
hgninst that personage, but he w w clis-

covered, and fled to Bokhara, where
the wise and good Haken Beyk, the
Goosh-Beghee of Bokhara (when I was
there in 1352) procured him service
with the Ameer, to teach the soldiers
the military discipline. He lives in
great pomp outside the t o m , and hag
acquired during the nine years he has
been there a fortune of 60,000 tellahs,
that is, ducats. He is commander-inchief of the artillery, and has the title
of Nayeb. The Ameer retains by force
at Bokhara a certain Giovami Orlando,
of Pasma. I had obtained the Ameer's
permission to take him with me when I,
left that city; but having heard that
Abclul Samut intended to assassinate
me on my road, he requested me to
'inform the Austrian minister at Constantinople of his position at Bokhara.
Abdul Samut had paid ten nssassins to
kill me on my way to Meshed; and the
fact is so certain thnt ,I am acquainted
with the names of the ten individuals!'

'
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against the unhappy traveller. The Emir was only too well
inclined to order his execution, and on leaving this audience
Flores met with the same Gte as the lamented Stoddart and his
friend.
Prot-idence often takes upon itself to supply the deficiencies of
human justice ; of that fact the death of Abdul Samut Khan in
1847 is a proof, and this in spite of the services that he had
rendered the Emir of Bolrhara. He too well knew the character
of Nasser Ullah to believe in hie gratitude, and like every high
personage in an Asiatic Court, he had no lack of enemies who
daily excited his master's suspicions against him. Aware of this,
and. being a cunning fellow, he sent to his brother, a merchant a t
Meshed, all the money that he had amassed, whether honestly or
dishonestly, at Bolthara, and in 1847 this amounted to nearly
40,0001. For many years he had wished to return to Persia, and
enjoy at his ease the fruits of his rapacity ; but though he had
been on the look out for an opportunity of leaving, it never presented itself, and hampered as he was vith heavy baggage and
several women and children, flight was difficult. To send them
away before him would be to reveal his project to the Emir, who
indeed had long suspected it, and had given an order that he
should be closely watched. Nasser Ullah felt that he was more in
the power of the Naib than he liked to be, and had often thought
of putting him to death ; but then he was so useful-it was only
by his assistance that he had been able to impose his suzerainty
on the Khans of Cher Sebz, of Rokan, and Balkh, and to deprive
himself of his services when he had no other general capable of
commanding his army, might prove exceedingly injurious to his
interests ; he waited therefore, but he was full of suppressed fury
against the Persian heretic who had the audacity to be necessary
to him. Abdul Samut, however, finding that temporizing did not
advance his project of flight, determined to take other means of
securing it. I n 1847 the Emir marched against the Khan of Cher
Scbz, who was in arms to throw off the suzerainty that Nasser Ullah
had imposed upon him, and Abdul Samut, thinking that a good
opportunity had presented itself for attempting his escape, placed
himself in communication with the refractory Khan, and told him
that when the armies met he might charge the Bokharians without
any anxiety about the artillery, for he would have the guns loaded
with powder only, u and then," he added, " as soon as you have
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forced your way through our lines, I will turn the guns upon the
Emir and his troops and we shall crush them at once.'' This
letter was enbusted for delivery to a Persian artilleryman, but he
carried i t to Xasser Ullah Khan, when the Naib was instantly
sent for, and put to death in his presence ; his wives and children
were given up by the Emir to the merciless soldiery, under whose
cruelties many of them lost their lives.
One European still remained at Bokhara-Giovanni Orlando,
the Italian renegade already mentioned. This poor fellow, who
was by trade a watchmaker, was living at Teheran in 1839, when an
ambassador arrived there from the I . a n of Kokan, by whom he
was persuaded to follow him to the court of his master. Giovanni
was well treated by Mohamed Ali ; but scarcely had he felt the
advantages of his new position when the Emir of Bokhara attaclr_ed.
Kokan, and carried him off to his capital, where he obliged him
to mend all the broken watches of his court for nothing. This
treatment was widely different from the kindness he had received
from the Khan of Rokan; but, as it was impossible for him to
escape, he submitted to his sad fate. When Dr. Wolff was at
Bokhara in 1844, the Emir consented to allow the watchmaker
to return to Persia with him ; but on the day appointed for his
departure ~ i o v a n h was
i seized with a sudden panic : an idea that
assassins had been placed on the road to murder him had taken
such firm possession of his mind that he would not leave, and
he thus lost his only chance of returning to Europe. Three
years rolled on after this misfortune, and he continued to repair
the Emir's old watches: however, in the course of time his
tools wore out, and it was utterly impossible to replace them ;
his work, therefore, of course, became inferior, but Nasser Ullah
would accept no excuses, insisting upon its being as well done
as when he first arrived at Bolrhara, and for various failures inflicted the bastinado. One day the Emir's watch stopped in the
middle of his prayers, on remarking which he dashed it against the
wall, and, furious, ordered the unfortunate Italian to be brought
before him. H e was obeyed. " Kill him," he thundered to the
guard; and tbe third stroke of a club ended Giovanni's troubles
and his life.
The Emir of Bokhara, Nasser Ullah Khan Bahadoor, Melik el
Moumenine, is a monster of ferocity. The titles he bears are thus
translated :-Nasser Ullah, Khan, The Victory of God ; Bahadoor,
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T h e Victorious ; Melik el Moumenine, Prince of Believers. H e
raised himself to the throne by a series of frightfill murders
amongst his kindred, and other crimes from which even Bokharians
recoiled with horror; his bad faith became proverbial amongst
them, and his name was pronounced with terror by the people.
The Bokharians, however, are now apparently indifferent to the
atrocities committed by the Emir, orthc disgusting character of his
vices, the extent of which is beyond all that can be imagined, and
they consider that he is justified by his position in gratifying every
passion in any way that he pleases. A n increase in the taxation
is the only thing upon which they are in the least sensitive ; but as
on that point Nasser Ullah keeps strictly within the commands of
the Koran, and generally speaking the duties are rarely above
2+ per cent., which is fixed by the Zelriat, the Bokharians are
satisfied, and do not think the virtue of their wives or daughters
of any importance so far as the sovereign is concerned. Besides,
the ~nollahswere the first to set the example of base submission,
and the Kazi of Bolrhara issued a fetvo proclaiming that Nasser
Ullah was by the will of God the absolute master of all the women
in his territory, that he had a right to do what he liked with them,
and that it would be a crime to oppose his wishes; singularly
enough, the Kazi was the first person to feel the effects of the doctrine he preached, for his daughter fell a victim to the Emir's
brutal passions. One must, therefore, conclude from all this that
the inhabitants, though so perfidious and cruel, are in regard to
their prince the most easy-going people in existence; of this he
seems so perfectly convinced, that when he leaves his yalace he
never has any escort to attend him, and two or three times a-week
the Emir may be seen walking through the bazaars in the dress of
a dervish, accompanied only by one servant. The shopkeepers are
aware of the order he has given that no one shall pay him the least
respect, or treat him otherwise than as one of the public, and for
this reason nobody moves away at his approach : he walks from
one shop to another inquiring the price of grain or other rnerchandise for sale ; makes here and there a purchase ; and, if he finds
a tradesman playing tricks, he never offers a remark at the time,
but on the following day sends for the delinquent at his public
audience, and inflicts the punishment that he thinks he merits.
I n the year 1845 he appeared to be about thirty-four years of
age. This is the man whom the English hoped to make the
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docile instrument of their vishes; but their agent, as we have
already said, was ill-chosen to effect this object, and the sacrifice
of his life was the result. The presence of Europeans, Russian or
English, alarmed, and not without reason, h s e r Ullah Khan, but
though a monster, his jealous terror was the result of reflection,
and learning that an English envoy was coming to Bokhara, he
resolved to give him the most terrible idea of his power: by this
means he hoped to neutralise for the future any desire the English
might have to meddle in his affairs, and he determined to keep
their agent a, prisoner, to be made use of as an hostage in case His
countrymen should feel disposed to annoy him-this was not bad
reasoning for a barbarian.
The communications with Bokhara being cut off, the Indian
Government was for a long time ignorant of what had befaJJen
Stoddart and Conolly, and it had also been absorbed in preparing
the second expedition to revenge the disasters of 1841 in Afghanistan ; when, therefore, some months after, the Governor-General,
in announcing his successes and the punishment of the Afghans,
demanded the diplomatic agents of England from the Emir of
Bokhara, he found they were no longer in this world !
After the murdcr of these two officers was ascertained, the
Indian Government was utterly a t a loss how to avenge it. A
large army would be required to attack and successfully punish
Nasser Ullah Khan; it must leave in its rear the Sikhs, the
Afghans, and all the banditti on the left banks of the Indus
and the Oxus. Once at Bokhara, this army would find in its
front the advanced posts of Russia, the Cossacks of the Steppes ;
and Persia and Kokan, obliged to make common cause with
the sovereign of Bokhara, a country half as large as Europe with
its norna.de and warlike mountaineers, would have risen as one
man. Certainly -there was room for reflection, and the English
press and the opposition were not asleep ; they pointed o ~ l with
t
force the dangers of such an expedition, and this time the Directors dared not oppose the opinion entertained against it on all
sides. Nevertheless, the uncertainty which existed as to the fate
of Stoddart and Conolly awakened the sympathies of their friends,
and steps were taken to ascertain the truth ; a Protestant missionary, Dr. Wolff, volunteered to go to Bokhara, and with
admirable courage risked his own life upon the bare hope of
saving the lives of others. After having exposed himself to great
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dangers, he has returned to Europe firmly convinced of the death
of these two officers, though many persons are still doubtful of the
fact; as to myself, who followed closeIy the steps of Dr. Wolff in
Tartary and Afghanistan, I can only confirm his statement as one
that cannot be controverted.
The narrative of the British negotiations in Bokhara is so intimately connected with the history of Afghanistan as to have made
it requisite for me to give some details of i t ; but I must now
resume that of Herat, which will put the reader in possession of
the remaining information that I have been enabled to collect
respecting Afghanistan.
T h e British mission had scarcely left Herat when Yar Mohamed,
who had been warmly solicited to expel Major Todd by Assaf
Dooulet, Governor of Khorassan, claimed the fulfilment of his promise to pay him a subsidy in money, and gave him sii guns and
some thousands of firelocks to enable him to march on Kandahar.
Assaf Dooulet knew him too well to comply with his wishes;
the gifts would, he was aware, be received with the liveliest
demonstrations of gratitude, but all mould end there, and, under a
host of pretences, more or less admissible, he would not take a
single step beyond the walls of Herat. The Governor of Khoraasan, therefore, evaded his request, but in terms by no means
hostile ; Yar Mohamed, however, would not consider himself
beaten, and renewed his demands more than once without success.
The vizier never forgave this refusal, or the just estimate that
Assaf Dooulet had formed of his character ; he swore eternal
hatred to him and his family, and the consequence of this fracas to
the Governor of Khorassan will be related hereafter.
Unsuccessful with the Persian, Yar Mohamed was obliged to content himself with the money that he had extorted from the English,
and thought no more of invading Kandahar, but he determined to
pursue to its completion a scheme that the presence of Major Todd
had hitherto absolutely obliged him to delay-there was nothing
now to prevent him from compassing the death of the Shah Kamran, and establishing himself on the throne of Herat. This prince
a t once saw that t ~ could
e
not withstand the sinister projects of his
minister without the help of the English ;he therefore energetically
declared that they ,should remain a t his court and carry out their
own views ; but as such an arrangement did not suit the uizier, he
paid not the slightest regard to his sovereign's wishes.
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Shah Kamran had a presentiment that his end was approaching,
though after Major Todd's departure he roused himself to avert his
sad destiny, and at length determined openly to confront his tyrant
minister. 1 5 s supporters and advisers in this bold attempt were
his four sons-Iskander Mirza, Nadir Mirza, Zeman Mirza, and
Saadat Mulook Mirza, also his cousin Yoossoof Mirza, a grandson
of Hadji Firooz Eddin. These princes secretly assembled at night
all those in whom they could place confidence, and, having with
their aid overcome the vizier's guard, took possession of the citadel
for the king, retiring with him within its walls. I t was defended
by five hundred devoted soldiers, and as the garrison had provisions
for a year, and munitions of war more than necessary to hold it
for a longer period, the princes hoped that this stroke of policy
would have brought about a reaction against the minister, and that
the population of the country would have besieged him in the
town, thus rendering them masters of his person. But events
entirely falsified their calculations, for the vizier hearing just
before midnight that the Suddozyes had talcen up arms, without loss of time despatched all the cavalry that he was able to
collect a t the moment to hold thc surrounding country in check,
and invested the citadel with six Battalions, upon whose fidelity he
could depend. From that moment the cause of the Suddozye
dynasty became desperate a t Herat: its fatal hour had come.
Nevertheless, Shah Kamran, or rather his sons, wonld not succumb ;
they repulsed the attacks of Yar Mohamed with a perseverance
and bravery worthy of a better result, and the vizier finding his
attempts were fi-uitless against the energy of their defence, was
obliged to commence a regular siege.
Before he retired to the citadel Shah Kamran despatched a
messenger to the English at Ihndahar to apprise them of this
crisis in his affairs, and to beg them to send him troops, promising
to hold the forkess till their arrival, and to place it in their
hands. Unfortunately at this period, the spring of 1841, symptoms of agitation had already shown themselves at Kandahar, and
the Resident could not without imprudence detach any of the force
then stationed in that principality ; however, the Anglo-Indian
Government were not indifferent to the appeal of their ally, and
spared neither money nor promises in their endeavours to induce
the Afghans of I-Ierat to exert themselves in his favour.
I t has been related that Dine Mohamed Khan, the cousin of the
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vizier, had been arrested by his order towards the close of 1840,
but a t the expiration of five months this serdar succeeded in
escaping to the mountains of Gour, where h e married the daughter
of Moustapha Khan, an independent chief of the tribe of
Eimak Taymoonis, . which gave him great influence in the surrounding country ; this made the enmity of Dine Mohamed of
soine importance to Yar Mohamed, and, as that serdar had always
been a partisan of Shah Kamran, Najor Rawlinson, the British
Resident a t Kandahar, thought he could not do better than
request him to assemble such of the Afghans as were disposed
to help their sovereign, and march on E-Ierat. H e also sent
Dine Mohamed 1000 Russian ducats ; but whether, as the serdar
pretended, the money arrived too late, or, as others have said
with more probability he remained irresolute too long, when he
declared himself ready to march the opportunity of saving Shah
Kamran was lost. The Suddozyes, however, though abandoned
to their owA resources, behaved with the greatest intrepidity; they
held the citadel for fifty days, and gave in only when the artillery
and mines had partly destroyed the walls, and the d4bt.i~having
filled the ditch, the besiegers had obtained an easy access into the
body of the place.
I n the first moments of success Yar Mohamed acted with some
moderation, and sent the four sons of the Shah out of the territory of Herat without doing them any personal injury. As to his
sovereign, who entircly lost the little liberty that he had enjoyed,
the vizier thenceforth treated him as a state prisoner, and, as soon
.as he felt that the king was completely in his power, he proceeded
to despoil him of his treasures, and seized some splendid diamonds,
of the value. of more than 240,0001., which, were known to have
been taken by Shah Ma.hinood from the crown of Kabul when he
,reigned in that country. But the deposed prince resisted his
dem%ds with more determination than he expected, and refused
to tell him where he had concealed his riches.
Yar Mohamed knew his old master so well as to be perfectly
.sure that 'neither torture nor death would make him. reveal the
place ; he therefore employed stratagem, trusting that it would
succeed better than theats. T h e vizier acted with less generosity
to Mohamed Yoossoof, the Shah's cousin, than to the other princes,
for he retained him a prisoner a t Herat., but he now determined
to make use of him in his endeavours to conquer the obstinacy of
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Shah Kamran. H e therefore sent for Mohamed Yoossoof, and, after
having given him his liberty, informed him that it had never been
his wish to usurp the royal power; that he always intended to
substitute a prince of the blood-royal in place of the Shah, that
his thoughts had always turned upon him, Mohamed Yoossoof;
and finally, that his determination was to give him his eldest
daughter in marriage, and declare him sovereign of the principality.
The only conditiou, he said, that he should attach to these dazzling
promises was that the Prince should endeavour to prevail upon Shah
Kamran to divulge where he had hidden his gold and jewels.
The old Shah always had a great affection for his cousin, who
possessed his entire confidence, and he, therefore, not unwillingly
entrusted him with part of the desired information. Mohamed
Yoossoof, like a wary man, took one-half of the money wh2ch had
thus been placed in his way by his confiding sovereign, and carried
the other to the vizier, who did not conceal his gratification at this
first success. What he most coveted, however, was not yet forthcoming: this was a woman's vest, decorated with precious stones,
the value of which was 160,0002. Before Iiamran retired to the
citadel he thought this lady's waistcoat would be no longer safe with
him, and gave it into the care of one of his wives, who, uneasy at
the responsibility thus thrown upon her, handed it over to her
steward, named Nasser Ullah Beg. This trustworthy man had, in
the first instance, removed to the country ; but, three days after the
princes retired to the citadel he went to Meshed, carrying the
precious waistcoat with him. Mohamed Yoossoof Mirza was
ignorant of the latter circumstance, though he knew that the garment had been given to the Shah's wife, and he told the vizier
of this, who put the poor creature to the torture, to force her to
give it up ; but she bore the agonising trial rather than reveal
the secret. H e then tried the effect of domestic influences,
and signified to her that her only daughter by Shah Kamrau
should the next day be married to his son, the Serdar Syud
Mohamed +Khan; but when the unhappy girl heard who was to
be her husband, she poisoned herself to escape the detested nuptials. A t last Yar Mohnmed discovered that the object of his
search was at Meshed, and made every effort to get it back, but
without success ; he then revenged himself on the miserable wife
of his sovereign, whom he imprisoned in the citadel, and subjected
to daily torture, and it was not till 1846 that she m s released, on
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the reiterated demands of the Shah of Persia. She then fled to
Teheran, and joined her brother, the Serdar Chems Eddin Khan,
who had long since been driven to take service in the Persian army
by the tyranny of the vizier. As for the valuable vest, it never fell
into the possession of those who had a right to it. I n December,
1845, when I was a t Meshed, the faithful depositary of the treasure, Nasser Ullah Beg, died of cholera ; he had been ill same
time previously, and Assaf Dooulet, seeing his end approaching,
appointed him his steward, giving him a t the same time one thousand tomauns with which to purchase camels. Nasser Ullah, laid
up by sickness, was unable to execute the commission ; and when
he died, the governor of I<liorassan, under the pretence that the
deceased had' funds .of his in his hands, seized everythiug in his
house, and the royal vest thus became his property. It is true
that the claims of the Serdar Chems Eddin were supported by the
Shah of Persia, and that he ordered his uncle to restore it to him ;
but Assaf Dooulet settled the question of its restoration by the
payment of several thousand tomauns. Since that period he has
been deprived of his command in Khorassan, and with the wealth
that he accumulated during the thirteen years that he governed
that province, his son the Sipahi Salar, created a powerful party,
with whose support he raised the standard of revolt against the
Shah of Persia, and kept his army in check from 1547 to 1850.
A t the same time that Yar Mohamed tortured the faithful wife
of Kamran, he disposed of the other wives of that sovereign-and
in the Shah's lifetime-to his own friends and partisans ; and a s
they were, for the most part, young and rich, their new husbands
were well satisfied with this arrangement, though it is reprobated
by the laws of Islam. I was informed of one action of the vizier's
of which I should scarcely have believed him guilty, had it not
been mentioned to me by his most intimate friends, namely, that
he sold three or four of the daughters of Shah Kamran, as well
as the eldest of his wives, to the Turcomans, who disposed of them
again in the markets of Rhiva and Bokhara.
But to return to the Prince Mohamed Yoossoof : after having executed, so far as he had,the power, the behests of the vizier, he claimed
the performance of the promises which he had made him. Yar Mohamed declared himself ready to fulfil them, but objected that Mohamed Yoossoof had only p d y carried out his engagement, and
that much of the treasure had yet to be recovered ; he did not, he
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said, intend to alter his determination on account of that disappointment, if the prince would give him a decisive proof of his devotion
by having hi cousin, the Shah Kamran, put to death. Mohamed
Yoossoof now saw clearly the snare into which the vizier wished to
dram him, and subsequently throw upon him all the odium of the
murder of his relative, for it was in this manner that Yar Mohamed
intended to clear for himself, and at the prince's expense, the road
to the sovereign power, and thus avoid the disgrace of the crime of
regicide. Mohamed Yoossoof at once perceived the danger of rejecti n g the proposals of a man like Yar Mohamed, hardened in every
crime, and, to lull his vigilance, consented to all that he demanded ; .
in the evening, however, under the pretence of enjoying the fresh
air, he went out for a ride, escorted by a few servants, and escaped
to Meshed, where the Persians received him in the kindpt and
most generous manner. Before leaving Herat he took the precaution to write letters to several of his Fiends, in which he warned
them of the vile deed meditated by the vizier ; but the Heratees
had long been accustomed to submit to his tyranny, and were
indifferent to, or, a t any rate, took no interest in any schemes
that he might have against the Shah Kamrin, whose conduct
had made them callous to his fate. Some few chiefs, who were
in favour of a legitimate monarch, endeavoured to revive in the
people the prestige which attached to their ancient line of kings ;
but they could only excite a partid movement, which Yar
Mohamed speedily suppressed. This manifestation, however,
baffled him in his treasonable plans, and he waited till he should
so perfect his combinations that a failure in them would be impossible. His first preparatory measure was to remove Shah
I<amran.to the citadel of .Kussan, thirty-six miles west of Herat,
confiding his safe keeping to his cousin, the Serclar Dad Khan,
and for some months after this the miserable existence of the dethroned monarch was passed in this fortress in the midst of
continual orgies; the vizier commanded that- he should be freely
supplied with mine and spirits and exciting drugs, in the hope that
they would conduct him more quickly to the grave, and also that,
- i n his fits of intoxication he would say or write something that
would lead to the discovery of the famous jewelled vest. But his
hopes were disappointcd, for, however intoxicated the Shah might
be, he always recovered the most perfect self-possession whenever his hidden wealth was alluded to. A t last Yar Mohamed
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commanded that torture should be resorted to to vanquish his
obstinacy; but this also was fruitless. " Let me go on a pilgrimage to Mecca," said the old man, " and I will send you a
rich ransom when I reach Meshed." The vizier was too well
versed in the value of Afghan promises to trust to this one, and
finding that his prisoner was utterly useless for his principal purpose, and might even create trouble for him, he at length resolved
to put the Shah out of his way. The moment was favourable to
his project; the defiles of Kabul had witnessed the destruction
of one British force, the division in Kandahar could think only
of its own safety, Shah Shooja had lost his Life, and his death
was the forerunner of that of his nephew, the Shah Kamran.
After an unsuccessful attempt made by the inhabitants of Kussan
to deliver him in the spring of 1842, this unhappy prince was
again tortured and cruelly beaten, and at the close of March, Yar
Mohamed commanded that he should be suffocated. The Serdar
Dad Khan was the executioner, and when he placed the cushion
on the poor old man's face, he made no resistance ;on the contrary,
he testified a certain degree of satisfaction that the moment which
mas to terminate his sufferings had arrived.

SONS OF SHAH HAi\mAN.
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CHAPTER XX
Sons of Shah Kamran- Hadji Firooz Edilin-.Hh sad end, and that of bis son
E l e k I k s e m &za-Afghan
princes in Persia- Conduct of Russia and England with re,prd to Hertt-Par
Mohamed, now sovereign Prince of Herat,
attends to the welfare of the Hentees -Strengthens his power, and prepares t o
attack Gour -Dine Mohamed Khau plunders some caravans -Par Mohamed
takes possession of the province of Gour Differences with Xandahitr -Subjogates the Hazarah Zeidnats -Marches against the Usbek Rhannts -He is
recalled to the south - Privations suffered by hi army - Equilibrium between
the states of Central Asia- Mohamed Shah of Penia supports ICohendil Khan
in his quarrel with P a r Nohamed
The latter assists the Shah of Persia in his
mar mith Khorassm -Death of the Persian monarch - Alliance of Par Mohamed mith the Shah of Persia.
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TH.Eassassination of the Shah Kamran is the vilest of the many

-

atrocious crimes that stain the character of Yar Mohamed Khan.
H a d he waited but a short time longer, the death of his aged
sovereign, whose constitution was broken up by excesses and tortures, must have taken place naturally. T o Europeans the cowardly
deed appeays in the most odious colours : not so to the Afghans.
I n their eyes it mas simply the exercise of a right-the right of the
strongest ; it was perfectly reasonable that the vizier should kill his
enemy, if he could ; and the tone in which they would say to each
other, " the vizier has killed the Shah Ramran," seemed to express
a n opinion that h e deserved commendation for his conduct, and
had by this act added to the glory of his career rather than that
h e had done anything worthy of reproach.
A t his death the Shah left ten sons : their names were as follows :Djehanguir Mirza.
Se'if ool Moolk Kizcl.
Saadet Mulook Mirza.
Alemguir Mirza.
Ahmed Ali Mirza.

.

Djellal Eddin Mirza.
Iskander Wrza.
Chahab E z a .
Zeman Mirza.
Nadir Mirza.

Iskander and Zeman died of cholera a t Teheran in 1846. T h e eldest son, Djehanguir Nirza, who ought to have succeeded
Shah Kamran, will be remembered by his revolt against his father
at the time that the latter went to quell disturbances in t,he province of Furrah, and by the cruel sentence that he pronounced
against his envoy, Meuvalee Khan. H e showed, however, that
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the bIood of the Suddozyes flowed in his veins, for, like all that
family, he was brave, though restless and debauched. Some time
after the siege of Herat by the Persians, he declared himself independent in the district of Furrah, of which he was governor, and Yar
Mohamed mas obliged to send troops to subdue him ; which having
been accomplished, he was brought to Herat, where he had only half
his liberty. When, however, Shah Ramran was removed to Kussan,
the Mirza succeeded in escaping, and took refuge in Persia. A t
Teheran he lived utterly lost to all sense of his own dignity ; and
at the time he was residing in the low quarter of the Niguaristan,
inhabited by the Berbers, he thought only of drinking arraclr and
smoking opium, where, completely brutalised, he still lives on a
small pension granted him by the Shah of Persia.
The other sons of Ramran are effeminate men, 'more or less
polluted by the same vices as their elder brother. Sei'f ool
Moolk and Saadet Mulook, after the ruin of their house, retired
first into the district of Gour, and then into that of Zemin-.
davar, in the principdity of Kandahar. Nadir Mirza established
himself at Bagdad. Alemguir and Ahmed Ali took refuge
in India, and are .the most intelligent princes of this family.
The remaining brothers, Djehanguir, Djellal Eddin, Iskander,
Chahab, and Zeman went to Teheran, where the three who
survive owe their daily bread to the generosity of their cousin, the
Shah of Persia. Mohamed Yoossoof Mirza, also 'their cousin,
though much inclined to drunkenness, is superior to them in
capacity, and is distinguished by the same qualities that won for
his grandfather, Hadji Firooz Eddin, the esteem and affection of
the Heratees. That prince, it will be remembered, reigned sixteen
years in Herat, to the general satisfaction of the population, whom
he treated in the most paternal manner. After having been
vanquished by Moustapha Khan, he went to Meshed, and resided
there in great retirement upon the bounty of the Persian Government. One morning a party of serbaz broke into his garden, and
were proceeding to pillage it, when he went to remonstrate with
them ; but the simplicity of his attire so completely deceived the
villains as to his identity, that they supposed him to be a servant ;
and to prevent him from returning to the house to give the alarm,
one of them killed him on the spot with a stroke of his kandjar.
The fate of his son, Malek Kassem Mirza, was not less sad.
This prince was attached to the expeditionary corps which, under
'
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the command of Abbas Mirza, marched 'against I-Ierat in 1833.
Being detained by business at Meshed, he followed the arniy a
few days after it had left, accompanied by only ten servants, and
was attacked half-way between Meshed and Herat, by a party of
Turcomans ; in this murderous conflict he had the misery of
seeing one of hi sons fall beside him mortally wounded, and the
next moment he was seized, bound, and dragged off to Khiva,
where .he was sold in the public market-place for a slave.
Information of this fact having reached the Khan of Khiva, he.
purchased him immediately, and gave him the revenues of a village for his support, though he would never allow him to leave
his dominions ; and he died there in 1840. Mohamed Yoossoof,
the son of Nalek Kassem Mirza, obtained a grant of land from
Assaf Dooulet, -and, accompanied by some Heratees, who had
attached themselves to his fortunes, he raised the little village of
Singbest from the ruins in which it had lain for more than two
hundred years.
Mohamed Ali, Shah of Persia, sheltered and protected all the
members of the Suddozye-family in the hope of one day mal& use
of them against Herat, the possession of which he had not ceased to
covet, but his successor, Nasser Eddin Shah, harassed by the intestine divisions of his kingdom, was far less taken up with the idea of
extending it towards the east: but the Suddozye princes and a few
Afghan chiefs still remain on the list of state pensioners; though
i t m a y now be affirmed that not one amongst them has the capacity
necessary to induce the Afghans to place him on the throne of
his ancestors. T h e influence that Russia or England may one
day exercise in this part of Asia, renders anticipations of this kind
very unimportant, for those powers will respectively attach to
their own interests such of the Afghan chiefs as will bend with
the greatest docility to their views of dominion, without considering the qualifications of the individuals whom they place at
the head of the principalities The cruelty of Yar Mohamed
Khan was great ; great, also, were his ambition and his avarice,
which had been the source of a thousand evils to the Heratees ;
nevertheless they joyfully beheld him attain the sovereign power,
hoping that when they were relieved of Shah Kamran, for whom
contempt was the only feeling they entertained, the vizier.would
give them banquillity and security ; and they were not disappointed. As soon as he had proclaimed himself master of the
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principality, under the simple title of Vizier Saheb Hebir,* he
exercised his authority with a firm hand, and introduced a great
many reforms, which in his intercourse, with the English he had
found would be profitable to his treasury, as well as to the people ;
the taxes, police, customs, and all that related to them, were
placed upon a fresh basis, and every one gained by these reforms.
When he was firmly established he ceased to be cruel, even to
those who were opposed to him, but he showed thieves and
assassins no mercy. He had the tact to procure the recognition of
his usurped power by his neighbours, with the greater number of
whom he lived on good terms. The serdars of Herat, who up to
that time had sold him their support, were reduced to complete
obedience: some of the most turbulent he put down, replacing
them by others from the tribe of Ali Rioozye, to which he
belongs, and he eventually became absolute over the g ~ e a vassals,
t
and the nomade population under his jurisdiction. It was more
by address than by severity that he obtained this result, and
as no one dared to dispute with him the sovereignty he had
usurped, his power was soon limited .only by his will. The town
of Herat, destroyed by the siege of 1838, rose by degrees from
its ruins, thanks to the gold that the English had so profusely
scattered around them; Yar Mohamed continued the improvements they had so happily commenced, and applied prompt remedies to the evils under which the population still suffered. He
especially encouraged agriculture and commerce, placed a very
light duty upon the sale of corn and the necessaries of life, and
further relieved the poorer classes by setting them to work at the
fortifications of the town, which were rebuilt in accordance with the
plans of the English engineers. Finally, he completely checked the
pillage that had beeli carried on, not only in the principality, but even
up to the gates of I-Ierat. The means that he employed to attain
this end were so terrible that to this day, when any article is by
accident dropped on the roads, or even in the fields, no one dares
to take it up; the first person who finds it informs, with the
utmost speed., the nearest officer of police of the fact, whose duty
it is to seek out the owner, and return it to him, without putting
the ,careless proprietor to any expense. Yar Mohamed Khan had
become wealthy at this period-excessively wealthy ; his rapacity,
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without being extinguished, was a little abated, and lie wished
\
that the people, who now felt the advantages of his beneficial
administration, should g;ve him all the honour and gratitude due
for i t ; while by throwing the blame of the previous anarchy on
the weakness of Shah Kamran, in whose r e i p he ~retendcdhe
could never realise the improvements he proposed, he contrived to
render odious the memory of that unworthy though unfortunate monarch. Yar Mohamed mas thus o h p i e d in consolidating his
power in Herat, when the chiefs of some distant districts, who had
only nominally recognised the sovereignty of Shah Kamran, raiscd
the standard of revolt, and he therefore resolved to strike vigorously,
in order to annihilate any disposition of the kind for the future. After
having confided the city to his son, the Serdar Seif Mohamed Kh-an, .
and a picked garrison, he proceeded to the district of Kaleh- . '
noon, inhabited by the Hazarah Zeidnats; but the Serdar Kerim
D a d Khan, their chief, feeling that he was not strong enough to
confront the approaching danger, went to offer his submission to
the Vizier, engaged to recognise his suzerainty, also to pay him a
tribute in barek and horses, and gave him one of his brothers and
several Hazarah chiefs as hostages for his fidelity. This happy
settlement of the disturbances in Kaleh-noon enabled Yar Mohamed
to turn his arms against Gour, the state of which province caused
him considerable uneasiness.
This district was governed by two independent chiefs, the
Serdars Moustapha and Ibrahim Khan, who, being open to more
than one influence adverse to the interests of the new sovereign
of Herat., now and then made a raid upon his dominions a t the
instigation of Kohendil Khan, Prince of Kandahar. They might
have been acting in support of some discontented serdars, but on
the present occasion the danger to the vizier was more imminent,
for he had to unravel the plots of Seif 001 Moolk and Saadet
.
Mulook, sons of Shah Kamran, who, when driven from the citadel
of Herat, had taken refuge with Ibrahim Khan. This chief warmly
embraced their cause, an alliance the more vexatious for the vizier
as the country of Gour presents a t every step admirable positions
for an army on the defensive and is intersected by high and
rugged mountains, very precipitous, and covered with forests ; lying
between them are beautiful valleys, inhabited by the nomade ,
population, and in the villages which are also scattered on the steep
sides of these mountains, a few men in ambuscade might easily hold
,
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T o these advantages, which
enabled the fugitive princes to h a r s s the usurper of their rights,
and, in case of discomfiture, retire to a formidable position, there
was added another, scarcely less important; the intrepid cousin
of the vizier, Dine Mohamed Khan (who, as we have already said,
married the daughter of Moustapha Khan, the other Taymoorii
Serdar), also consented to join their party. And we must here
digress for a moment to give a brief account of his subsequent
career.
After his flight from Herat, Dine Mohamed Khan soon wearied
of the life that he led in the mountains of Gour, where he had been
found by the messenger of Major Rawlinson when he brought him
the proposal that he should march to the relief of Shah ICamran,
then besieged in the citadel of Herat. He afterwards took advantage of the return of the Mohamedzyes to Kandahar to resume
his active life ; and when the English left that city, and Koheudil .Khan proceeded there t o take it from Self der Djing, Dine
Mohamed appeared at Kandahar to offer his services to the son of
Shah Shooja, who was under the protection of the British. T h e
prince accepted them with gratitude; and in the battle which
took place a t Haooz Singsar, in which SeIf der Djing was defeated, Dine Mohamed distinguished himself by hi accustomefi
bravery. With two hundred chosen men he for two hours
sustained the attack of the entire army of Kohendil Khan, amounting to six thousand men ; but in the end, finding himself obliged
to yield, he retired to the mountains, where no one thought of
disturbing him. His little band being soon destitute of everything, he proceeded to the plain of Bakoos, near the Kachrood, and placed himself in ambush on the side of the I<oohi
Duzd (Robber's Mountain), where he waited for a caravan of several
thousand camels and mules, which was expected to pass that way ;
When it arrived he captured the whole, and upon this plunder
maintained his troop during the winter. I n the course of the two
following months he completely restored his finances by pillaging
- other caravans, after which he returned to the mountains of Gour,
where he found the sons of Kamran, with whom he made common
cause.
W h e n Yar Mohamed marched against Gour he with his usual tact
began his operations by sowing dissension among his enemies, and
.Bloustapha Khan, who supported Dine Mohamed, and Ibrahim,
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who took the part of the princes, quarrelled-nay, fought. I n this
conflict Ibrahim Khan was worsted, which led to thesubjugation of '
the country ; and the princes having lost the support of Moustapha
Khan, and Ibrahim having fled to the mountains, they were
obliged to retire to the district of the Serdar Akter Khan a t
Zemidavar, in the territory of Kandahar, where they were soon
surrounded.
A s to Dine Mohamed Khan, he grew tired of the harassing
life h e had passed for two years, and willingly gave his sanction to
a reconciliation which several chiefs wished to bring about between
him and the Vizier ; but remarking, as he thought, a coldness in
his reception by Yar Mohamed, he feared that he might be betrayed, and fled from his camp the same night. On arriving a t
Meshed he was kindly welcomed by Assaf Dooulet, who irnmediately availed himself of his acknowledged bravery by sending
him with his Afghans to pacify the southern part of Khorassan,
then in revolt, and the chief has since remained in the service
of Persia.
Y a r Mohamed had afterwards little trouble in reducing the
disunited serdars of Gour. Ibrahim Khan, driven from one position to another, retired to a fortified rock in the mountain of
Tchalap Dalan, which had the reputation of being impregnable ;
there, reduced by famine, he surrendered at discretion and swore
obedience to the Vizier; but a few days after, however, he
contrived to escape, and returned to the hills, where he lived for
some time by pillage. This chief had about 7000 families of
Taymoonis under his rule, and Yar Bhhamed, after having
completely devastated the country they occupied, removed them
to Herat, where he established some in the city and the remainder in the suburbs ; they were afterwards organized into several battalions of serbaz, and, being very brave, are now the best troops
in his army. Moustapha Khan having assisted Yar Mohamed
against Ibrahim Khan, the vizier spared his life, but this was
not the only reason that dictated his generosity; the district
inhabited by the former chieftain is the most impracticable in the
country, and the difficulties that Yar Mohamed would have had to
surmount in any attempt to reduce it, spoke far more in Moustapha's favour than the gratitude of the Vizier of Herat.
Having obtained these satisfactory results from his expedition,
the Vizier returned to his capital- and occupied himself in ex-
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tending his frontier towards the north. In the commencement of
1846 he marched with his army in the direction of the Moorgab,
on the banks of which river were encamped some Hararah
Zeidnats, commanded by one of the brothers of Icerim Dad Khan,
of Kaleh-noon, the chief of the whole of that tribe, but these
nomades decamped at the approach of the vizier, and retiring into
the Persian territory, put themselves under the protection of Assaf
Dooulet, who gave them the village of Kariz on the frontier of
Herat. This act was not of a nature to allay the hatred felt
by Yar Mohamed for the Governor of Khorassan: he did not
forget it, and at a later period made him pay dearly for the
vexatious opposition.
The Vizier allowed his cavalry to graze their horses in the fine
pastures watered by the Moorgab, and afterwards returned to
Herat to be present at the departure of his daughter Bobojane
for Kabul, whose marriage with Mohamed Akbar Khan 'was,' it
will be remembered, very nearly causing a serious conflict between
the Vizier and the Prince of Kandahar. The latter desired nothing
better than to seize this pretext for extending his territory at the
expense of Yar Mohamed, but each time that he sent his troops
towards the frontier of Herat, Mohamed Akbar as a devoted sonin-law, immediately made a corresponding movement towards that of
Kandahar, with the army placed in observation a t Ghuznee, which
at once checked the ambitious aspirations of his uncle, Kohendil
Khan. Nevertheless Yar Mohamed was anxious to take revenge for
the depredations that had been committed by Lhe Randaharians,
in the south of his principality, and ravaged the border villages
of' Kandahar. After this, and towards the middle of 1846, he
marched into the Gour country, where disaffection had again
manifested itself, and did not leave it till order was perfectly restored in the province. I t was about this time that the Serdar
Akter Khan, Alizye, attacked and beaten by Kohendil Khan, who
feared his influence and his power, took refuge with Yar Mohamed,
who g.ave him the government of the district of Gour, where
he was rejoined by his tribe which had been dispersed, and it
is still established there. Since that period Rohendil Khan has not
dared to renew his~incursionsupon the Heratian territory.
Towards the close of the year 1846, the intrigues of the prime
minister of theShah of Persia, having induced his royal master to
aeprive Assaf Dooulet of the government of Khorassan, and the
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consequence of that measure having been the entire ruin of his
family, one of his sons, as I have said before, raised the stanclard .
of revolt, and all Khorcasan responded to his appeal. The fa11 of
Assaf Dooulet greatly assisted the cause of Yar Mohamed, whose
power increased considerably. For thirteen years the Vizier had
been held in check by him ; he had never permitted him to extend
his rule over the small Usbek Khanats situated to the north
of his dominions, and he went even so far as to counteract openly
that which he more legitimately exercised over the Hazarah Zeidnats. As soon as Yar Mohamed heard that Assaf Dooulet had left
for Teheran, and that he had therefore nothing to fear from him
he marched once more against Kerim Dad Khan, whose submission .
had hitherto been only nominal. This time the Hazarah chief determined upon making open war with his suzerain; he assembled a
chosen band of 12,000 of his best cavalry, and Yar Mohamed led
to the attack in the open country of Kaleh-noon 8000 horse, GOO0
foot, and a battery of six guns. T h e combat, a most sanguinary
one, lasted nine hours ; but the Hazarahs were at length crushed,
and many chiefs lost their lives on both sides : the gallant Kerim
Dad Khan, weakened by the loss of blood that streamed from
many wounds, escaped with great difficulty, and was accompanied only by one single horseman of the brave men he had
commanded, when he reached the Persian territory a t Toorbut
Sheikh Djam.
Yar Mohamed encamped upon the field of battle, and in the
space of eight days collected ten thousand families of the Hazarah
Zeidnats whom he removed from their native soil to that part
of the district of Herat, reaching from Obeh to Gorian, where
he settled them on the banks of the Herirood. By these forced
immigrations of the Taymoonis and Hazarahs, the principality
became more populous than it had been previously to the siege of
Herat in 1838, and Yar Mohamed obtained the further advantage
of keeping under his eye the most turbulent inhabitants of his
dominions. H e made excellent soldiers of these Eimaks and by
their amalgamation with the Afghans it became almost impossible
for the former to betray him.
After having installed them in their new abode, and fixed the
tax they should pay a t three tomaums for each tent, Yar Mohamed
again took the field, and marched upon Meimana, a small independent Khanat lying north of Icaleh-noon, of which there were two
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chiefs, brothers, Eukmet Khan and Shere Khan, who admitted
his suzerainty without hesitation. T h e Vizier then pushed on to
the rich Rhanats of Serpeul, Chibberghane, Andekhooye, and
Akhtche, and their respective khans, who up to that period had
nominally been vassals of the Emir of Bokhara, also submitted.
From Akhtche Yar Mohamed sent an ambassador to that sovereign,
and also to the Caliph of Merv, to inform them that they must
with the least possible delay give up all the Heratee slaves then in
their territories ;he also warned them that-if there was the slightest
armed demonstration on their part, or on that ofthe Khanats which
he had subjugated, he would march straight upon their capitals.
Although Yar Mohamed had nothing to fear from the Shah of
Persia in thus extending his dominions, he considered it politic to
inform him of his march into the UsLek country, and assure him
that these conquests could not but contribute to augment his power
and renown, inasmuch a they were made in hi; name by the
most humble of his vassals. Mohamed Shah having the revolt in
I<horassan on his hands, and being unable to repress it, was obliged
to put up with these lying protestations, and he endured what he
could not prevent.
Yar Mohamed subsequently marched upon Balkh, when a
courier brought h i p information that the gallant Kerim Dad Khan,
having placed himself a t the head of some fugitives of his tribe
who had joined him in Rhorassan, was ravaging the district of
Gorian from one end to the other-his letters also brought him
other news not less vexatious. Shah Pecend Khan, an independent
Afghan chieftain and lord of Laush-jowaine (a fortress on the
north of Lake Roustem), who was allied to the serdars of Kandahar, had a t their instigation, and with the aid of some nomade
Beloochees, pillaged the camps and villages in the district of
Furrah and Bakooa This untoward intelHgence obliged the Vizier
rapidly to retrace his steps, and move with the mass of his forces
towards the quarter threatened. But, after the first five daysy
march, the Usbeks that he had incorporated into his army deserted,
and the IChanats, which had so recently submitted, proclaimed their
independence, a t the same time massacring the garrisons that had
been left in them. T o complete his misfortunes, the cold set in
with such intensity, that before he could reach Roochk a large proportion of his soldiers and four-fifths of his horses had perished ;
provisions suddenly failed, and hunger was added to the other
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miseries his army had to suffer. These difficulties, which occurred
simultaneously, were certainly great, but Yar Mohamed was only
three days' march from his capital ; he had obtained a large sum
of money in the countries through which he had passed, so that it
was easy for him to repair these disasters, and from the moment
of his return to Berat his activity and vigilance triumphed over
them.
This success against the Usbeks naturally excited tehe jealousy
of Persia and all the independent chiefs, his neighbouw, who,
dreading lest his influence and power should trench upon their
own,. formed a league against him ; and Kandahar, obeying
the impulse given by Persia, allied itself to the chiefs of Bokhara,
Khulrn, and Balkh, to oppose his projects and those of his ally, the
Emir of Kabul. The mutual hostility of these states is the imperative result of their respective positions, and that circumstance is
the cause which has for so many years prevented the union of the
Afghan principalities in one kingdom. If Kabul or Herat attacks
Kandahar, a diversion is made on the north by Balkh and
Khulln in support of that principality ; if it is on Ichulm or
Balkh that the central states direct an attack, then Kandahar aod
Persia will make a diversion in favour of the established equilibrium -the balance of power in Central Asia. Herat and
Kabul have for some time reciprocally assisted each other; but
it must be added that these alliances are modified and vary according to the interests that are engaged on either side. A short
time before Yar Mohamed's expedition to the north, he was
alarmed lest his friendly connexion with Kabul should be broken
off by the death of his son-in-law Mohamed Akbar Khan ; but as
his widow Bobojane then became the wife of Goulam Haidar
Khan, another son of Dost Mohamed's, and who also succeeded
Mohamed Akbar in the post of vizier of Kabul, these fears were
gradually dissipated, and, when he marched towards the south to
put down the revolt of the chief of Laush-jow+ne, his new sonin-law so completely overawed Kandahar that it gave him confidence in his intentions. T h e Vizier, however, knew by long
experience that family ties are of little value in the eyes of
Afghans, and that the smallest conflicting interest neutralises them
completely ; he therefore endeavoured, while preserving the friendship of the chiefs of Kabul, to secure the support of Persia, her
sovereign having till that period been hostile to him. To attain
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his object he in the first instance assisted the Shah's troops that
were engaged in repressing the revolt in Khorasgan at the head of
which were the sons of Asaf Dooulet ; and in thus acting he also
indulged the hatred that he felt for all the members of his family.
This alliance with Persia was a fresh proof of the far-sighted character of the vizier's policy, but the friendly manifestation had
very little effect upon Mohamed Shah, who detested him from
his heart's core, and an opportunity of showing this feeling
having presented itself, the Persian monarch did not allow it to
escape him.
On the 6th of August, 1848, a messenger from the Prince
Hamzeh Mirza, commander'-in-chief of the Persian forces in Khorasaan, brought two letters to the Shah. One of these missives
came from Kohendil Khan, who declared himself the very
humble vassal of the Shah of Fersia, and as such requested the
permission of the King of Kings to march against Herat with
15,000 men, and take it. " For a long time," said the Serdar,
" the great men of that city have been constantly asking m e to
assist them in putting an end to the tyranny of the Vizier Yar
Mohamed Khan ; but I will not undertake the expedition without
the authority of your majesty." The other letter was from Yar
Mohamed, who expressed himself in equally devoted terms, and
requested the assistance of the Shah against the hostile demonstrations of his neighbour of Ihndahar. He represented, judiciously
enough, that the position taken by the English near the right bank
of the Indus at Dadur, near the Bolan Pass, was at so short a
distance from the former city that they necessarily possessed, and
could exercise whenever they pleased, a most powerful influence
over the political conduct of Kohendil Khan, who had no means
of releasing himself from it ; also, that in furthering the designs
of the Prince of Kandahar upon Herat, the Shah of Persia
would be acting in direct opposition to his own interests, for the
English would then be able by his means to enter Persia a t
any moment they imperatively intimated a wish to that effect.
Mohamed Shah knew that thevizier told the truth, for experience
had long since proved that in maintaining the three principalities in Afghanistan, and upholding the independen&? of some
of the smaller chiefs, his government could exercise a much greater
ascendency over them than by uniting them under one sovereign ;
he could thus enter into their quarrels, and control them alter-
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nately through each other. But his antipathy to Yar Mohamed '
overpowered every other consideration, and he had decided on
supporting Kohendil Khan when death put an end to his earthly
career on the 4th of the following September, and arrested the.
execution of the orders he had sent to his army in favour. of.
the Prince. of Kandahar. A t the time the Shah of Persia came
to this unwise decision the Vizier was a t Meshed, assisting Prince
Hamzeh Mirza, who was besieging it. The Afghan army performed prodigies of d o u r in many successive assaults, but what
could 8000 men do against a city the inhabitants of which had, a.
century before, and for two years consecutively, resisted the efforts
of 60,000 Afghans, under Ahrned Shah, Suddozye, and finally
obliged him to raise the siege. When the news of the death of
Mohamed Shah reached Meshed, the Persian troops became demoralised, and two bahlions which occupied the citadel'evacuated
it, and rejoined the besieging army, which, subject to daily attacks.
from the enemy, and starving, had very soon no other resource left
than to retire into the territory of Herat, where Yar Mohamea
received Prince I-Iamzeh Mirza most hospitably, maintaining his
soldiers for many months ; and when, in consequence of the recall
of their commander to Teheran a t the commencement of 1849, they
quitted the principality, the prince presented four pieces of cannon
to the Vizier in testimony of his gratitude for the treatmentthat
he and his troops had received.
Nasser Edclin, the successor of Mohamed Shah, adopted a policy
entirely different from that of his father. Towards the middle of
1549 he sent to Yar Mohamed a sword richly set with jewels, and
his highest decoration, accompanied by a letter in whica he.
stated that h e considered the Vizier as his most faithful ally. 'fie..
latter was not tardy in returning these professions of friendship,
and in the spring of 1850 a colossal elephant, that had been presented by Yar Mohamed to his suzerain, was frequently seen promenading the streets of Teheran :in fact, the best understanding existed
between Nasser Eddin and Yar Mohamed. Those who know the.
Vizier see i n these demonstrative sympathies for Persia nothing
more than a n additional instance of his ability, but they remain..
still conviiced that he will never give her his support so completely.
as to enable the Persians effectually to subdue the revolution in
Khorassan under the Salar. That revolt is a great piece of
good fortune for Yar Mohamed ; he now gives the l a y to all the
'
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smaller chiefs around his dominions, and he is too clever not to see
that the pacification of Khorassan would be a disadvantageous
event for him-he therefore secretly feeds the fire, though he pretends lie is endeavouring to quench it-but it is with a cupful of
water.
As to Kandahar, there is less chance than ever of its receiving
support from Persia ; and a t this time, 1850, the attention of
Kohendil Khan, as well as that of the Emir of Kabul, is chiefly
directed to the results 'that have followed the extension of territory acquired by the English at the expense of the Sikhs, and
conseq~~ently
their nearer approach to Afghanistan. Their present
north-west frontier is the Indus, along the whole of its navigable
course ; and they have crossed i t a t two points-Peshawur on the
north, and Shikapoor on the south. These are tdtes-de-pont which
command the passage of that river, and give to the Anglo-Indian
government the power of exercising the greatest influence over
the policy of the chiefs of Kandahar p d Kabul-may Europe
never have cause to repent that she has permitted those conquests
which will render Great Britain and Russia all-powerful over this
planet.
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